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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to examine a major segment of Islamic international
relations theory as expounded by Sunni jurists of the classical period of the Islamic
Fiqh (661-1258 AD). It consists of that portion which is concerned with peaceful
relations as distinct from that other major segment which is about Jihad or Islamic
warfare. The thought of Muslim scholars on this topic provides a major part of an ideal
model for political life under Islam, and its appeal has continued to exert a strong
influence on the lives and thoughts of all Muslims throughout the centuries. Within this
segment of Islamic international relations theory attention is focused on the key
concepts of treaties, including alliance, and neutral status. One part of this is, however,
omitted. It is what in Western political philosophy would be called private (not public)
relations, and which in an Islamic classical Fiqh context - where the private/public
distinction, it will be argued, is absent - can be termed social relations.
The argument put forward will be that Islamic international relations are the totality
of relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, and never relations between Muslims.
Islamic law, it will be argued, governs this relationship, ensuring Islamic international
relations theory is essentially normative. The thesis will further suggest that Muslim
relations with non-Muslims are fundamentally pacific, not hostile, if the legitimate
purposes of Jihad are properly assessed. The thesis will also be concerned to assess the
extent to which peaceable Muslim relations with non-Muslims can be organised
through the different forms of treaty which are recognised in classical Sunni Fiqh. It
will be argued that the anti-Iraq coalition alliance of 1990-91 fulfilled the conditions of
a genuine Islamic alliance treaty, contrary to the view of numerous contemporary
Muslim scholars and publicists. Finally, it will be argued that neutrality, as well as
neutralisation, were possible during the period of classical Sunni Fiqh.
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Chapter 1
1.0) This chapter presents a statement of the aims and purposes of this thesis. It also
indicates the significance of the research and reviews the literature relevant to the
subject.
1.1) Aims and Purpose
The aim of this thesis is to examine a major segment of Islamic international
relations theory as expounded by Sunni jurists. It consists of that portion which is
concerned with peaceful relations as distinct from that other major segment which is
about Jihad or Islamic warfare. The thought of Muslim scholars on this topic provides
a major part of an ideal model for political life under Islam, and its appeal has
continued to exert a strong influence on the lives and thoughts of all Muslims
throughout the centuries. Within this segment of Islamic international relations theory
attention is focused on the key concepts of treaties, including alliance, and neutral
status. One part of this segment is, however, omitted. This concerns what in Western
political philosophy would be called private relations and which in an Islamic context
can be termed social relations. (See, for example, Badran A. Badran Al-Alagat al-
ljtima'ayah bayn al-Muslimean wa Ghayr al-Muslimean fi al-Shari'ah (The social
relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Shari'ah Law). 1 They cover such
matters as marriage between Muslims and non-Muslims, the children of such marriages
and inheritance.
The purposes of this examination is first, to clarify the fundamental differences
between Islamic international relations theory and the several varieties of Western
international relations theory. Second, its purpose is to show the relevance of Islamic
international relations theory in the present day and to explore the kind of difficulties
which can occur in applying it to contemporary circumstances.
1.2) Period of study
Islamic international relations theory was developed in the juristic writings (Figh) of Muslim
scholars during the Ummayyad and `Abbaside Caliphates between 661-1258 AD, from the
1 Badran, Bad ran Abu aliAynayn, Al-'Alaqat al-ljtitna'ayah byn al-Muslemean wa Ghayr al-Muslemean fi al-Shari 'ah, Dar
al-Nandha, Beirut, 1984.
1
Chapter I
sources of the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet and the four Orthodox Caliphs from
611 AD (the date of the first revelation to the Prophet Muhammad) to 660 AD. This period may
be labelled classical or classic, not because it has any reference to the standard Greek and Latin
literature, but because it applies to individuals, their deeds and sayings, and to scholarly works
which are of the first rank or standard and of the highest authority. It is these old, established,
standard juristic principles in major scholars such as the founders of the four Sunni School of
Fig/7 and other distinguished jurists, including al-Shaybani, al-Mawardi and later important
jurists like Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim. During the `Abbaside period, the Holy
Our 'an and Sunnah were transposed into the formal rules of the Shari 'ah, the four Schools
of Figh were established and developed, and the gates of interpretation (Ittihad) were
closed approximately at the end of this dynasty. In principle no new interpretation of
Islamic Law can be made after 1258 AD, and all that is possible is, in theory, imitation
(Taglead). This thesis therefore takes a broader view of the period of the classical Islamic
theory than AbuSulayman who restricts it to
• . . the juridical speculations made at the height of Muslim
civilization during the High Caliphate, primarily the 'Abbasi
period (750-1100 AC). . .2
The second period of this study is the early 1990's AD and the second Gulf war. This period
is chosen in order to examine the application of the key part of classical Islamic international
relations theory, namely, the doctrine of alliances in this contemporary crisis and the vigorous
debate among Muslim jurists and others over the legitimacy of the coalition against Iraq.
1.3) The Problem
Islamic political concepts are characterised by the fact that their foundation rests
upon the juridical bases of Islamic Law (Shari 'ah). These concepts are based on
Islamic ideas and principles. Since Islam is considered to be a polity as well as a
religion, there is no separation between these two aspects. Islam is a total religion; it is
a complete way of life with a comprehensive and detailed system of law. It has two
elements: to organise the relations between Muslims and God, and to organise the
2 AbuSulayman, AbdulHamid A., Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations, rd Edit, International Institute of
Islamic Thought, Herndon, 1994, p. 55.
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relations between humans, both inside the Islamic community and between it and non-
Muslims.
The Islamic Law covers all aspects of the Muslim concern and activity such as
social welfare, equality and justice, individual and collective rights and obligations,
taxation, properties regulation, punishments, inheritance, equity, laws of war and
peace, judicial administration, and political leadership. Other aspects govern spiritual,
physical and other social and political dimensions of human life. Given its
comprehensive character, the Shari 'ah also enshrines Islam's international law and
from the Prophet's emigration to Madinah (Hijrah) it has regulated the conduct of the
Muslim community in war and peace. Islamic international relations theory is
essentially the juristic interpretation of this part of Islamic law by expert religious
scholars.
The Divine law of Islam (Shari 'ah) has been provided in the ordinance of the Holy
Book the Qur'an and supplemented by the sayings and deeds of the Prophet
Muhammad the Sunnah. Taken together, the Qur 'an and the Sunnah, are considered
the basic source of all-human interpretation and the legislators for the welfare of the
Muslim community. This is because the Shari 'ah is derived from the Qur 'anic
injunctions, designed to deal with all aspects of Muslim's life, and from the Sunnah,
which is the authoritative explanation and exemplary practise of these Divine
injunctions by the Prophet Muhammad.
The Shari 'ah can become effective and binding only through a conscious and
deliberate co-ordination of the members of the Ummah (the Islamic community)
through an Islamic State. A state which is inhabited predominantly, or even entirely, by
Muslims is not necessarily an Islamic State. It can become a true Islamic State only by
virtue of a conscious application of the socio-political tenets of Islam to the life of the
nation and by an incorporation of these tenets into the basic constitution of the
country. It is on this "enjoining of lawful and forbidding of prohibited" that the ethical
value of the Muslim community and of Muslim brotherhood depends. Muhammad
Asad said,
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It is with this ideal of justice -justice toward Muslims and non -
Muslims alike - that the concept of an Islamic state (which is but
the political instrument of that ideal) stands and falls.3
However, some Western historians incorrectly understood the main aim, mission
and duty of Islam and its state which is to spread the call for God (Da'wa). They
alleged that in order to propagate its mission Islam is based on subduing and achieving
supremacy over non-Muslims. To achieve this supremacy, it is claimed, Muslims
declare war against all communities and nationalities and continue it until Islam rules
over the whole world. On this misinterpretation, war is the origin of relations between
the Muslims and other communities and determines their continuing, fundamentally
hostile nature. Joseph Schacht, for instance, argues that,
The basis of the Islamic attitude towards unbelievers is the law of
war; they must be either converted or subjugated or killed
(excepting women, children, and slaves); the third alternative, in
general, occurs only if the first two are refused.4
1.4) The Islamic State and its relations
The period will include the initial creation of the new social and political order
based on the revealed message of Islam and the formation of the spiritual bond of
Muslim brotherhood under the leadership of Prophet Muhammad (610-632 AD); the
establishment of the authority of the infant state, and the restoration of Islamic unity in
the state under the first Caliph Abu Bakr (632-634 AD); and the institutionalisation of
the Islamic State and its administration under the second Orthodox Caliph Umar (634-
644 AD).
The historical development of the Islamic State was continued under the four
Orthodox Caliphs who succeeded the Prophet Muhammad, following his example
closely in their religious and political leadership. However, their practice underwent
certain alterations and changes in the concept of authority, the administrative
3 Asad, Muhammad, The Principles of State and Government in Islam, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1961, pp. 3-4
& 33.
4 Schacht, Joseph, An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford University Press, London, 1975, p. 130.
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procedure of the State, and the general policy of the government under the succeeding
Ummayyads, `Abbaside dynasties.
The statesmanship of the Prophet Muhammad and the reign of the second Orthodox
Caliph Umar are of vital importance to this thesis. Their political style left an enduring
mark on the character of Islamic political institutions then and now. The examples set
by the Prophet Muhammad and Caliph Umar I, remain an ideal political guide and have
commanded great respect and admiration from succeeding Muslim societies.
Throughout history, most Muslim societies have kept alive the memory of this Ideal
State, hoping to emulate their beloved leader, the Prophet Muhammad, as an example
for their lives.
Modern international law has in common with the Shari ' ah that it determines what
is legal and what is not in international relations. However, they differ fundamentally in
that that the former was originally restricted in its jurisdictional application to
Christendom and only later widened to include all states in the world. In the works of
European scholars of the Early Modern Age, like Grotius and Puffendorf, one also
notices that they intentionally excluded Muslims from all community of interest with
the Christian Nations of Europe. Their re-formulation of international law originated in
the necessity of regulating the relations of the new sovereign states in Europe arising
from the disunity of Christendom.' Later European scholars thought that international
law was limited to Christendom but enunciated broad principles to include others as
well. From a Muslim scholar's point of view these European principles were just
echoes their time. Moreover, the modifications they made for civilisation came only
after they intensively borrowed Islamic principles from Muslim Spain, from Syria and
Palestine during the Crusades and from the early Ottoman Empire.6
Later still international law recognised new legal personalities, groups such as non-
governmental organisations and individual persons. By contrast, the Shari 'ah regulates
the relations between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects within the Islamic State as well
as between the Islamic states and non-Muslim states, groups (organisations with
5 Qadri, Anwar Alunad, Islamic Jurisprudence in the Modern World, Lahore, 1973, pp. 277-278.
6 Ibid.
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government such as tribes or religious communities) and individual/s. Among the
objects of the Shari'ah, there is the aim of enlarging the concepts of Islamic
international law to encompass all functions conducted by the State or its Muslim
citizens (what would be called public and private functions in modern international
law) in any intercourse with non-Muslims. Originally, as Hamidullah notes, this body of
law was termed Siyar,
When Islam came and founded a State of its own, the earliest
name given by Muslim writers to the special branch of law
dealing with war, peace and neutrality seems to have been Siyar,
the plural form of Sirat, meaning conduct and behaviour.7
The term Siyar was used originally by historians and in linguistic to designate the
life of the Prophet Muhammad. Later it was used in a more restricted way according to
al-Sarkhasi. The word Sirat he observed, when it is used without adjectives, it means
the conduct of the Prophet, more specially in his wars. Later still, it came to be used
for the conduct of Muslim rulers in international affairs and specifically in their dealings
with non-Muslims.' This thesis will be concerned with the analysis by jurists of that
part of Siyar concerned with peaceful relations between the Islamic State and non-
Muslims.
1.5) The literature review
The essential sources of this thesis, which it will rely on, will be the Holy Qur 'an
and the Prophetic Sunnah because they considered as the main body of the Islamic
Law. Nothing further will be said on the subject of the sources of Shari'ah in this
section except to note that a special problem arises in the translation of the Holy
Qur 'an from Arabic into another language. In the thesis only one translation is used,
that of Abdullah Yusuf Ali. However, this translation does not always provide a fully
accurate rendering into English of the Arabic meaning of the word/s used in the text.
Where this happens, Abdullah's translation is amended by the insertion of the correct
meaning in square brackets.
7 Hamidullah, Muhammad, The Muslim Conduct of State, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1977, p. 9.
8 AI-Sarkhasi, AbuBalcr Muhammad, Al-Muheat, Vol. I, Dar Biqa' Al-Kotoub Al Arablah, Cairo, 1957, p. 567.
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The rest of it is divided into three parts: (i) some of the more important jurists
whose treatises formed classical Muslim Figh of which Islamic international relations
theory is a part; (ii) contemporary scholars who have analysed and elucidated this
theory; (iii) some of the contemporary scholars whose works are relevant to the
understanding of some of the parts of Islamic international relations theory. Of the
available material, which specialises in the Islamic legislation, political thought and
institutions many of the works of contemporary scholars are often descriptive at best
and therefore not considered here. Not all classical jurists or contemporary scholars
have been included in this section because they are too many to be discussed and they
are all considered in various later part of the thesis.* Those which are included here are
the more important and representative of them.
1.5.1) Of all the Muslim jurists whose Figh is relevant to this thesis, Muhammad Ibn
al-Hassan al-Shibani treatise entitled al-Siyar is the work which is probably the most
central. It was the first book written in the Islamic history to deal directly with the
theme of the foreign relations of the Islamic State as a single aspect and so it provides
a systematic Islamic account of a major part of Islamic international relations theory.
Al-Shibani wrote from a Hanafi perspective.
The other important Muslim jurists did not attempt a comprehensive and systematic
exposition of Islamic international relations like al-Shibani. Instead, they contributed to
the analysis and exposition of major parts of this theory.
- Abd Almalik Ibn Hisham the author of the great essay Al-Syrah al-Nabczwyah
narrates in detail the biography of the Prophet Muhammad. This thesis relies heavily on
this book when quoting from the Sunnah of the Prophet to support any debate.9
- AbdulRahman Ibn Khaldoun, a Maliki scholar, was considered as one of the
greatest political and social philosophers in analysing, not only merely, the political, but
all aspects of human societies. Ibn Khaldoun regarded history neither as a mere
catalogue of facts, nor as a mere narrative of what happened in days gone by, but
* For full list see the bibliography of this thesis.
9 in Hisham, Abd	 AI-Syrah al-Nabawyah, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1955.
7
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science to be studied for the purpose of understanding the cause of the rise and fall of
states. His argument in his book Al-Moqademah is central to the concern of this thesis
because it provides a systematic account and analysis of a major part the nature and
formation of states from an Islamic perspective.m
- Abu Hamid al-Ghazali the Shafei'i theologian and religious philosopher presents
the classical theory of the Caliphate based on the ideal legislator from the political
reality of the 'Abbasid Caliphate dominated by the Suljuq Sultanate. In his great work,
Al-Iqtisad fi al-Patiqad, he provided an exposition of the nature of the Imama. His
investigation of the Imama was a matter for jurisprudence, not of political nor for
metaphysical affairs. The significance of this book to this thesis is to support the debate
about the nature and the authority of the Islamic State, and the methods of selecting
the Caliph.
- Abu Hassan, Ali al-Mawardi (of the Sunni Shafei'i school of jurisprudence) is
regarded as one of the greatest and most learned jurists of his time. He was not only a
distinguished judge but also an author of great repute. Al-Mawardi has left a number of
great books of which those dealing with the science of politics and administration and
the most famous. His book Ordinances of Government (al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah) was
the first in the Muslim history to analyse systematically the responsibility of the Caliph,
his Amirs (local rulers), his Wazirs (ministers) and deputies. The rights and duties of
these persons are expounded in details ties as a guide to those who are new to such
office. 1'
- Abu Yusuf, Y'aqub Ibn Ibrahim (of the Hanafites) wrote his pioneer book, Al-
Kharaj to the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Rashead. It is considered as the first and most famous
book on its theme. This book does not deal with the financial sources of the Islamic
State. It does deal with various aspects of itS affairs regarded as parts of international
relations, such as the relations with the Harbis. The importance of this book to this
thesis is the legislative side of the commercial and financial relations between the
Islamic State and people of domain of war (Dar al-Harb).
10 Ibn kl" uddoun, AbdulRaliman Muhanuned,A1-Mogadetnah, Al-Maktabah al 2Asryyah, Beirut, 1995.
11 Al-Mawardi, All Multanunad,Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah wa al-Welayat al-Denyah, Dar al-Ketab al-Arabi, Beirut, 1990.
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- Mohamad Ibn Jarear al-Tabari book (Shafei'i School) wrote different works in
various sciences. However, his book Tareikh al-Urnarn wa al-Muluk considered as the
first full detailed book which narrated the history of the globe prior to Adam. The
other great book, entitled Jami' Al-Bayan `An Ta'weal Al-Qur'an, is the greatest
work in the science of interpretation the Holy Qur'an. 12
- TaqulDean Ibn Taymiyyah (of the Sunni Hanbali School) lived during the last days
of the `Abbaside Empire. His essays concentrated on the state with a study of the ideal
one set up by the Qur'an, the Prophet and his Companions, coming directly to the
problem of the Ummah and finally grappling with the great problem of the
contemporary `Abbaside State. He dealt with the great with this great issue in his own
characteristic way and brought about a consideration of the state as such in
contradiction to the particular form of the Imamat. The problem of the nature, forms
and attributes of the state are dealt with in his book Al-Sysasah al-Shar'iyah.13
1.5.2) Two important modern scholars have addressed the problem of classical Islamic
international theory in two quite different ways.
- Majid Khadduri's pioneering study War and Peace in the Law of Islam (1941),
remains to this day as the only important scholarly work in the English or the Arabic
languages on Islamic international relations, the classical legal theory of which he
reconstructs. His book analyses the principles and rules governing the relations of the
Islamic State with non-Muslims countries and also discusses the fundamental changes
that the Muslim law of nations underwent and how it adapted itself to peaceful
coexistence with a rival legal system. However, his study was not a completely
comprehensive analysis of Islamic international relations theory as it omitted any
discussion of social relations and downplayed the diplomatic/political (especially
economic) aspects of Islamic international relations theory. Although much can be
learned from Khadduri's work, and while it must be the point of departure for an
academic analysis of Islamic international relations theory, it must be admitted that it
12 AI-Tabari, Moliamad Ibn Jarear, Tarelkh	 wa al-Muluk, Dar al-Ma'arif, Cairo, 1962 & Jami ' Al-Bayan 'An
Ta 'weal Al-Qur'an, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1968.
13 Ibn Taynilyyah, TaquIDean Aluned, AI-Sysasah al-SharVah, Dar al-M'arifah, Beirut, 1969.
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has many flaws in interpretation (which will be criticised in this thesis) and its central
thesis that Jihad (war) is the normal condition of relations between the Islamic State
and non-Muslim countries is, it will be argued, fundamentally mistaken."
- AbdulHamid AbuSulayman's book Towards an Islamic Theory of International
Relations (1987) is the only other significant scholarly work, apart from Khadduri, on
the subject of Islamic international relations. Much of it is a learned study of the origins
of jurisprudence (Usul al-Figh)and its reform which is undertaken in order to allow
him to reinterpret Islamic international relations theory in the contemporary context.
Although there are some references to the classical Islamic theory of international
relations in his book, particularly, his conceptualising of Siyar in terms of Jihad, Dar
al-Islam, Dar al- Ahd, Dar al-Harb, the main thrust of his work is a modernist
concern to revise and adapt Islamic theory to modern conditions. Because of this
feature, AbuSulayman's treatise has limited value for this thesis on the classical Islamic
theory of international relations. Its importance for this thesis is that it draws attention
to the misleading interpretation of Jihad and its place in Islamic international relations
theory. He writes that the reader of Khadduri,
• . . could be left with the impression that Muslim jurists reached
consensus on jihad, and all-out, virtually permanent state of war,
through which Islam could be forced on most of humanity . . .15
1.5.3) Other modern scholars have not aimed at producing comprehensive accounts of
Islamic international theory, like Khadduri and AbuSulayman, but have instead
contributed to our understanding of various parts of that theory.
- AbdulQadir Audah's book Al-Tashri' al-Jinai' al-Islami is considered as a
reference for all researchers of the Islamic international relations. It is a comparative
study between the criminal Islamic Law in Shari 'ah and its counterpart in secular law,
covers all principles, ideas and legal theories related to this subject. It concentrates on
the work of the four Sunni Schools of Figh: the Hanafite, the Malikite, the Shafei'ite,
and the Hanbalite. Al-Tashri' al-Jinai' al-Islami provides a systematic Islamic account
14 kh
- adduri, Majid, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1979.
15 AbuSulayman, Abdulllamid A., Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations, 2nd Edit., International Institute of
Islamic Thought, Herndon, 1994, pp. 21-22.
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of a major part of criminal law in Islam. Much can be learned from Audah's book and
it gives clear illustration of the status of Dhimmi and Musta 'min under the Islamic
criminal law. 16
- AbdulRahman Kurdi's book, The Islamic State, is a standard exegesis of the
Islamic State which is one of the key elements of Islamic international relations
theory."
- Abu Al 'Ala al-Maududi, with his pioneer works which covers the nature and
duties of the Islamic State, such as: Political Theory of Islam; First Principles of the
Islamic State; The Islamic Law and Constitution. The book which deals with the
relations between the Islamic State and its non-Muslims subjects is Rights of Non-
Muslims in Islamic State. The works of Maududi are very important because they offer
vital data for researchers of the Islamic international relations theory. These books
used in this thesis to compare the Islamic theory of state with the ones in international
theories. 18
- Ann K. Lambton in State and Government In Medieval Islam attempts to set out
the ideas on which the state rested and the ideas underlying the practice of government
as put forward by the Muslim jurists such as Abu Yusuf, al-Baqillani, al-Mawardi, al-
Ghazali etc. and some non-jurist writers such as Ibn al-Muqaffa' and al-Jahiz. These
book, moreover, covers the period from the 2"d to the 11th century AH, the 8 th to the
17 th century AD and is continued to the central lands of the caliphate, including Persia
and North Africa. The main concern of this book is with political ideas not with the
political institutions. It presents examinations to these ideas and ideals of the jurists in a
chronological framework. 19
16 Audah, AbdWQadir, Al-Tashri ' al-Jinai' al-Islarni, Mu'asasat al-Risalah, Cairo, 1994.
17 Kurdi, Abdulralunan, The Islamic State, Mensell Publication Limited, London, 1984.
18 Maududi, Abul Ala, Political Theory of Islam, Islamic Publications, Lahore, 1980. First Principles of the Islamic State,
Islamic Publications, Lahore, 1978. The Islamic Law and Constitution, Islamic Publications, Lahore, 1977. Rights ofNon-
Muslims in Islamic State, Islamic Publications, Lahore, 1976. Towards Understanding Islam, Nirobi, 1973.
19 Lambton, Ann K. S., State and Government in Medieval Islam, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985.
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- Erwin Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam. A large part of this book is
devoted to an exposition of the political thought of the Muslim Philosophers al-Farabi,
Ibn Sina, Ibn Bajja, Ibn Rushd, al-Dawwani and lb Khaldoun regarding the Islamic
Law Shari 'ah as the ideal constitution of the ideal state. It observes the character of
Islam in relation to politics, or in other words the relation between the religion and the
state.2°
- Muhammad Hamidullah who considered as one of the most famous recent Muslim
jurist. Among his great books is The Muslim Conduct of State which is the main
concern of this thesis. It is a comparative study of the Muslim jurisprudence on the
Islamic international law. The important parts of this book to the thesis are the
discussion of such relations between the Muslims and non-Muslims as the safeguard
(Amon) and neutrality.21
- W. Montgomery Watt's book, Islamic Political Thought is considered among the
pioneering works which deals with the Islamic political ideas as they have been
operative in the historical process. It attempts to preserve the neutrality proper to the
social scientist which neither affirms nor denies the metaphysical truth of the ideas
which influencing the life of the Islamic society during the classical period of the
Islamic Caliphate.22
- Wahba al-Zohaily in his book, Athar al-Harb fi al-Fiqh al-Islami, wrote a
pioneering and authoritative study of the impact of war on the origins of Islamic Fiqh
and its wider impact upon Aman, treaties and peace relations.23
- Yusuf al-Qaradawi is perhaps the most authoritative and widely respected living
jurist. Of his many important works his interpretation of Dhimmi status in Ghayr Al-
Muslimoun fi Mujtama' Al-Islam, and his famous treatise entitled The Lawful and the
Prohibited in Islam are of greatest relevant to this thesis. Through his T.V. programme
20 Rosenthal, Erwin I. J., Political Thought in Medieval Islam, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1962.
21 Hamidullah, Muhammad, The Muslim Conduct of State, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1977.
22 W. Montgomery, Islamic Political Thought, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1968.
23 Al-Zohatly, Wahbah, Athar al-Harb fi al-Figh al-Islaini, Dar al-Filo, Beirut, 1981 & Al- 'Ale:gat al-Dowalyah fi al-Islam,
Mu'asasat al-Risalah, Beirut, 1981.
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on the al-Jazeera Satellite Channel (www. Aljazzera.net ) , Dr. al-Qaradawi has
provided regular advice to Muslims, who permanently reside in non-Muslim states, on
various problems related to the daily life of a Muslim outside Dar al-Islam. This
advice, and his scholarly treatise on Muslims permanently resident in the West, deals
with an important element of Islamic international relations theory. However, this
element is not discussed in the thesis because it was unknown in classical Fiqh due to
the fact that any Muslims resident in Dar al-Harb were so on a temporary basis. The
mass migration of Muslims out of different countries in Dar al-Islam to the West is an
entirely new situation in the twentieth century and Islamic Fiqh which is related to it is
correspondingly modern, not classical. 24
1.6) The significance of the thesis
Although, Islamic political thought forms a link in the chain of human political
thought, it has received little scholarly attention. Islam's contributions to world
civilisation during the Middle Ages and its preservation of classical Greek
achievements deserve more attention and appreciation than have been given. It is in the
point of view of various scholars that Islam was the intermediate civilisation. 25
 Galal
Mazhar, for instance, states that,
The zenith of the Arabs activity may be placed in ninth and tenth
centuries AD, but that it continued down to the fifteenth century.
During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and especially
through the College of Translators founded by Archbishop
Raymond of Toledo (1130-1150 AD), almost all the
philosophical writings of Aristotle and commentaries on them by
Arabian philosophers as well as the writings of Avicenna,
Averos, al-Kind!, Costa ben Luca, al-Farabi, and al-Ghazali
were translated from Arabic into Latin and thus being made
available to the Western world26
One of the major reasons for Western neglect of Islamic political thought and
institutions was the lack of knowledge of the Arabic language. Another was the
24 Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf, Ghayr Al-Muslitnoun fi kfujtama 'Al-Islam, Cairo, 1977 & The Lawfill and the Prohibited in Islam,
International Islamic Federation of Student Organization, Kuwait, 1989.
25 Gotten, S. D. "Between Hellenism and Renaissance: Islam, the Intermediate Civilization," Islamic Culture, Vol. II, No. 2.
1963, p. 217.
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primary preoccupation of most Western writers with their own systems of government.
This preoccupation with everything Western overshadowed their interest and academic
studies of non-Western societies were sadly lacking.
Fortunately, however, Western and non-Western writers appeared on the scene
after World War II with a new outlook and new attitudes toward the Third World
societies. The impact of the post-war de-colonisation process and the emergence into
statehood of a multitude of independent non-Western States accelerated this shift in
Western interest and attitude toward the study of contemporary non-Western societies.
The fact remained, however, that the newly independent nations, of which the
Muslims are members, were faced with the task of reconstructing their societies and
restoring their identities. Upon achieving their independence from colonial rule, the
leaders of the emerging nations utilised Western as well as traditional institutions and
ideologies to achieve their national objectives of nation building and modernisation.
In the Muslim world, there are hundreds of millions adherents of Islam. Far from
being a dying faith, Islam is expanding. Its tenets and traditions enjoy a strong hold on
the structures of government, law, and social behaviour of these Muslim societies.
Islam and nationalism are the two foremost ideological forces in the area today.
The intellectual dialogue between religious and secular forces centres on the extent
of religion in the life of the state. Muslim traditionalists maintain that Islam is the
guiding principle in the social, economic, and political life of the nation and that Islam-
based institutions and public policy are best suited for the welfare and progress of the
Muslim society. Consequently they contend that an Islamic state, guided by Islamic
principles, provides the best answer for nation building and modernisation.
This thesis of The Classical Conception of Treaty, Alliance, and Neutrality in
Sunni Islam is an attempt to examine a political phenomenon within the framework of
Islamic political thought. The author of this thesis is of the opinion that the scholars
from the Muslim world in particular need to create and nurture intellectual centres of
26 Mazhar, Galal, Arab Contribution to European Civilization, The Arab Research Centre, (N.D.S.)pp. 60-61.
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their own where research on contemporary problems and issues can be carried out
meaningfully. The greatest difficulty that a modern social scientist encounters in
comprehending certain political and social concepts of classical and medieval Islam is
the fact that these concepts are grounded in a particular religious doctrine. These are
different from Western political concepts, which are permeated by Judaic, Christian,
Roman, and Greek political ideas. Islamic concepts have their origin in the context of
an entirely different social, economic, political, and historical setting. This in effect
creates problems of definition and semantics. Hence, it may be said that one of the
main reasons for the confusion regarding the idea of Islam, is the indiscriminate
application of Western political terms and definitions to an entirely different concept of
the Islamic polity.
Muslim scholars have to consider this basic distinction and search their societies in
their own native settings. In connected with this, Professor A. W. Singham urges the
scholars of the Third World nations to be objective and discriminate. He cautions them
against evaluating their own societies through Western concepts and through the eyes
of their Western mentors.27
It is clear that in contemporary world of conflicting ideas and ideologies it is
misleading to apply non-Islamic concepts to Islamic institutions. The ideology of Islam
has a social orientation peculiar to itself, different from non-Islamic settings and
concepts. The Islamic concept of treaty can be studied and interpreted fully only within
its own context and by its own terminology. Taking this into consideration, the thesis
of The Classical Conception of Treaty, Alliance, and Neutrality in Sunni Islam may
shed new light and provide valuable knowledge on this aspect of Islamic political
thought and institutions.
The treaty which lead to the Declaration of the State-City of Madinah and other
treaties which the Prophet Muhammad concluded over fourteen hundred years ago,
could be the principle and the ideal of which Muslim traditionalists admire and Muslim
reformers advocate in their movements and intellectual dialogues. These same treaties
27 Sin• glum, A. W., The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Society, Yale University Press, New Haven 1968, pp. 8-9.
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will be covered among the subject of this thesis. The intent of this thesis, furthermore,
is to discover and examine that treaty's concepts, values, and relevancy for our time.
1.7) Orientation and methodology of the thesis
The procedures and methods employed to accomplish the objectives of this thesis
will utilise three approaches: the narrative, the analytical, and the comparative. The
thesis will identify the socio-political setting within which the Prophet Muhammad
operated. Historical data collected from early Muslim writings and Islamic religious
records of the primary sources the Holy Qur'an and the Prophetic Sunnah are
considered. In reviewing this data in the historical setting of 7th Century AD, the
author hopes to scopes the light on the processes and policies used by the Prophet
Muhammad to establish and maintain the new political order within the Islamic State in
Madinah. The classic example of political leader for the Muslims to emulate is the
religious authority of the Prophet reflected in his charismatic personality that was the
primary factor for his success in establishing the first Islamic State.
Most of this thesis employs a systematic analysis in relation to key components of
Islamic international relations theory like the Islamic State, treaties and alliances and
the status of Dhimmis. This analysis is not intended to be, nor is it Islamic Fiqh. Fiqh
uses the sources of the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah in conjunction with the treatises of
earlier jurists to arrive at authoritative judgements on the Shari'ah. Furthermore, as
will be shown in chapter II, Fiqh is always expounded within one of the four Sunni
Schools of law. The tradition of each law School shapes in a profound way all jurists
who exercise judgement within it. Although this thesis makes use of the Islamic
sources and juristic writings in order to analyse the classical Islamic theory of
international relations its methodology differs from Fiqh in two ways: it is written not
from a religious Sunni Law School perspective, but from the standpoint of
international academic scholarship. Second, unlike Fiqh which is an explanatory
argument from premises of authority (i.e. authoritative sources and authoritative
judgements by religious scholars/jurists) to an authoritative conclusion or judgement,
this thesis will support its conclusions- which are not authoritative judgements- from
textual evidence in the normal scholarly way.
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In some parts of this thesis, the comparative approach will be used to compare and
examine the Islamic theory of international relations with various Western theories of
international relations and to focus on a comparison of the Islamic system of treaties
with its counterpart in international law. Most of the classical Muslim works on this
theme will be used to compare and contrast with their counterparts in modern Western
scholarship of international law and relations, such as by Oppenheim, Holsti and
Morgenthau. The aim of that is to distinguish the differences and similarities between
the two systems.
1.8) Hypotheses
Having stated the purpose and the significance of this thesis and having explained
the orientation and the methodology to be followed, the principal hypotheses to be
investigated in this thesis will now be delineated. These hypotheses fall naturally into
one of two groups: they are either concerned with the nature of Islamic international
relations theory or they are concerned with the subject of treaties in the classical Fiqh
of Sunni Islam.
1.8.1) Hypotheses related to Islamic international relations theory
1) That there is a separate Islamic theory of international relations which
differs fundamentally from Western theory of international relations in three
main respects:
(a)it consist of relations between Muslims and no-Muslims. All
relations between Muslims (within the Ummah) are internal or
non-international, even though they could be relations between
independent Islamic heads of government.
(b)it is normative, but unlike normative Western international
relations theories. They are moral theories: it is a theory framed
on Divine Law (Shari 'ah).
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(c)The Islamic theory unlike most Western theories, recognises no
distinction between public and private affairs at the international
level.
2) That all peaceful international relations (i.e. except Jihad) are contractual
in form.
3) Relations between the Islamic State (not states) and non-Muslim states are
fundamentally pacific, not hostile. Peace not war is the normal state of
affairs. War, hostility and Jihad exist or are employed for certain specific
purposes, such as self-defence. This hostility ends when that purpose has
been achieved.
4) That the Muslim juridical division of the world into two domains, Dar al-
Islam and Dar al-Harb, or three domains with the addition of Dar al-Ahd
(Sulh), was not based on legal-religious grounds. At least one other domain
existed during the lifetime of the Prophet Dar al-Da'wa. This Dar may
have some relevance to contemporary conditions.
5) That the basis of the Islamic theory of international relations is Islamic Law.
This law, it will be argued, is treated in Islamic international relations
theory as binding upon both Muslims and non-Muslims alike; international
relations should be conducted in practice in accordance with the Shari 'ah .
It is further hypothesised that this law is dynamic, progressive, and flexible
enough to meet the changing circumstances of time and place.
1.8.2) Hypothesis relating to treaties
1) It is hypothesised that legal persons involved in contracts or treaties can be
either individuals, various groups like tribes or religious communities, non-
Muslim states and the Islamic State (not-states).
2) Military alliance between the Islamic State and non-Muslim countries is
legitimate in Islamic international relations theory under certain conditions.
3) In addition to treaties of truce, friendship, commercial, alliance, and safe-
guard Aman there is a further kind of treaty hitherto unrecognised in juristic
or other scholarly commentaries; conciliation treaties.
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4) That neutrality as well as neutralisation is permissible in Islam to meet the
necessity of the Islamic State.
1.9) Contents of the thesis
This thesis consists of eight chapters after the present one, each dealing with a
specific issue related to the Islamic theory of international relations.
Chapter Two: Islamic Law and Fiqh
It examines the foundation of the Islamic theory of international relations as a
normative theory in Islamic Law (Shari'ah). It focuses on the origins of Islam, the
sources of Islamic law and the place of Fig/7 in Islam, including giving consideration to
the four Sunni Schools of Law and differences among them. Attention will also be
given to facility with which Islamic Law can evaluate and develop to meet modern
circumstances.
Chapter Three: Islamic International Relations In Classical Fiqh
Aims, first, to determine the main features of classical Sunni Islamic international
relations, including the elucidation of key concepts of the Islamic theory such as Ummah,
the Islamic State and the role of its head, Dar al-Islam, Dar al-Harb and Dar al-'Ahd.
Reference will be made to two parts of Islamic international relations which are not part of
the subject matter of this thesis, namely, Jihad and social relations between Muslims and
non-Muslims, such as marriage. The second theme of this chapter is a comparison between
Western theory of international relations and that of classical Islamic Fiqh.
Chapter Four: Dhimmis And Musta'min In The Islamic State
It is an analysis of the juristic principles relating to non-Muslims resident in the Islamic
State either on a permanent basis (Dhimmis) or temporarily (Musramins), focusing on
their rights and obligations. This includes an examination of scholarly views that such
theories were grounded neither on the Holy Qur'an nor on the Sunnah.
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Chapter Five: Classical Conception Of Treaty In Sunni Islam
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the Shari 'ah's rules regarding treaties,
including when they are lawful and when they are forbidden, who has the authority to
make treaties, and how treaties are formed, revoked or abrogated. Where it is relevant
and illuminating, comparisons will be made with the counterpart provision or rule in
international law. In this chapter four kinds of treaties will be analysed: treaties of
friendship, trade, reconciliation, extradition. Two important kinds of treaty are omitted
from this chapter because of the extensive literature involved and their fundamental
importance in the context of this thesis. These are treaties of neutrality and alliance,
and they will be analysed in the two following chapters.
Chapter Six Legitimacy Of Neutrality In Sunni Islam
This chapter interrupts the analysis of the different kinds of Islamic treaty in order to
examine whether the status of neutrality is possible under Shari 'ah or if only neutralisation
is permitted. The distinction between neutrality and neutralisation is drawn, and is used
to refute Khadduri's thesis on neutrality. The chapter is located in this position since it
pre-supposes not only chapter III, but also the discussion of truce treaties and Jihad in
the previous chapter.
Chapter Seven: Classical Conception Of Alliances In Sunni Islam
The basic interest of this chapter is in focusing on military alliances and those in
which military components were involved during the early time of the Islamic State and
particularly during the time of Prophet Muhammad and the four Orthodox Caliphs.
This chapter will review and analyse the Muslim Scholars views regarding the military
alliances in terms of a number of important elements, such as aims, methods, structures
and system. However, due to the lack of any systematic or scientific Islamic theory of
alliance in classical Figh, this chapter tries to discover and systematise the most
important elements required in an alliance between the Islamic State and a non-Islamic
entity. It will be concerned in particular to support the claim that treaties with non-
Muslims are legitimate in Islam, provided certain conditions are fulfilled, but that there
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can be no alliances in Islam, that is, within the Muslim Ummah where brotherhood
prevails.
Chapter Eight: Case Study, The Military Alliance Of 1990-91
This chapter will implement the findings of the previous chapter to the military
alliance of 1990-91 which was formalised as a result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It
examines the legitimacy (or lack of it) of that invasion from the Islamic perspective, its
affect on the regional balance of power, and the Islamic legitimacy of the alliance
between Muslim and non-Muslim state/s.
Chapter Nine: The Conclusion
This chapter draws together conclusions from the previous chapters, it summaries
the most important findings of this thesis in relations to the hypotheses formulated in
sections 1.81 and 1.82.
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Chapter II
2.1) Introduction
The Islamic Law (Shari'ah) has always occupied an important part in the Muslim
life. In Shari'ah, Muslims have a law that deals with all constitutional and legal issues,
and as such is treated, in Sunni Islamic theory, as the only legally acceptable code.
Consequently, to the devout Muslim, there can be only one legitimate rule, that is
through Islam, and there can be no disjunction between political and religious
discourse.'
Shari'ah, moreover, is a sacred law created by God throughout a rational method
of interpretation, and the religious standards and moral rules which were introduced
into the legal subject-matter provided the framework for its structural order. Islamic
Law represents an extreme case of a Jurists Law; it was created and developed by
private specialists; legal science, and not the state, which plays the part of a legislator,
and scholarly handbooks have the force of law. This became possible because Islamic
Law successfully claimed to be based on divine authority, and because Islamic legal
science guaranteed its stability and continuity.
The sacred law of Islam is an all-embracing body of religious duties, the totality of
Allah's commands that regulate the life of every Muslim in all its aspects. It comprises
on an equal footing ordinance regarding worship and ritual, as well as political and
legal rules. Shari'ah is the epitome of Islamic thought, the most typical manifestation
of the Islamic way of life, the core and kernel of Islam itself.
Islamic Law is particularly instructive example of a sacred law, it is a phenomenon
so different from all other forms of law - notwithstanding, of course, a considerable
and inevitable number of coincidences with one or the other of them as far as subject-
matter and positive enactments are concerned - that its study is indispensable to
appreciate adequately the full range of possible legal phenomena. 2
 According to
Muhammad Hamidullah,
1 Dawisha, Adeed, Islam and Foreign Policy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, p. 3.
2 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
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Islamic law is the provision or power given to man in order to
interpret and expand Divine commandment, by means of
analogical deductions and through other processes.3
Fiqh is a part of the methods and attitudes of the Islamic legislation, and it is as
such that they should be considered major sources of Islamic Law, but not the law
itself Nevertheless, by the end of the second century AR, Muslims had reduced the
number of recognised Schools of jurisprudence (Fiqh) to four: the Hanafite, the
Malikite, the Shafei'ite and the Hanbalite. These are called the four Sunni Schools of
jurisprudence (Fiqh).
This chapter aims to examine the structure of the Shari 'ah, focusing on its origins,
giving consideration about the four Sunni Schools of jurisprudence as well as
differences between them. Attention will also be given in assessing the ability of the
Islamic Law for evaluation and development in meeting recent issues.
2.2) The origin of Islamic law al-Shari'ah and Islamic jurisprudence Figh
It is difficult to attempt a study in any field of Islamic Law and its development
without considering the history of its practical precepts which have been gleaned from
detailed source-evidence. In order to understand the origins of the Islamic Law and its
legislation, there is the need to have a brief summary of its background.
Initially, some writers when analysing and discussing works in the field of Islamic
Law, wrongly emphasise the idea that Islamic jurisprudence Fiqh is law in itself and
not a secondary source of Islamic Law. Therefore, it is very important, in the modern
context, to identify both Shari'ah and Fiqh, Thus, there is a difference in meaning
between Shari 'ah and Fiqh which must be clarified. Shari 'ah, on the one hand, has
been defined as: the Divine Will revealed to the Prophet pertaining to the conduct of
3	 •Hanudullah, Muhammad, The Muslim Conduct of State, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1977, p. 6.
23
Chapter II
human life in this world. Fiqh, on the other hand, is the science of deducing and
extrapolating rules and injunctions from their sources in the data of revelation.4
In the earliest period after the death of the Prophet, two sources or methods, the
Qur'an and the Sunnah were recognised as the sources of the Shari'ah. However,
these were the traditional sources, the authoritative 'given'. Since the 'given' could
obviously not suffice for the developing needs of succeeding generations, the second
principle of human intelligence and understanding was recognised almost from the
outset. The first principle was called "learning" ('Jlm, not "knowledge" as it has been
sometimes interpreted). The second was called understanding or comprehension Fiqh.
With the establishment of Islamic studies, a radical change took place in the nature of
Fiqh, which passed from being a personal activity to mean a structured discipline and
its resultant body of knowledge. This body of knowledge was thus standardised and
established as an objective system; therefore, Fiqh became an 'Jim. Whereas in the first
stage, one used to say one should exercise Fiqh "understanding", the proper thing to
say now was 'one should "learn" or "study" Fiqh.5
Moreover, Fiqh developed a methodology of its own to interpret and make
deductions in line with the Shari 'ah. The source material coupled with the
methodology is the so-called al-Usul the methods ofjurisprudence. The basic sources
of Usu I are Qur'an, Sunnah, Ijma' and Qiyas. Fiqh was an integral part of classical
Muslim thought at the height of Islamic civilisation; it was the most unifying and
articulate element of the traditional way of life, serving to develop and regulate a
highly successful society and civilisation in terms of Economic, Political, Social, and
Legal needs.6
Fiqh is considered as the body of rules and injunctions, deduced from the Qur'an
and the Sunnah. Consequently, some defined Fiqh as the aggregate, considered per se,
of legal proofs and evidence that, when studied properly, will lead either to certain
4 AbuSulayman, Abdulliamid A., Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations, International Institute of Islamic
Thought, Herndon, 1994, p. 5.
5 Fazlur Ralunan, Islam, University Chicago Press, Chicago, 1979, pp. 101-103.
6 AbuSulayman, AbdulHamid A., Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations, International Institute of Islamic
Thought, Herndon, 1994, pp. 4-13.
24
Chapter II
knowledge of a Shari 'ah ruling or to, at least, a reasonable assumption concerning the
same; the manner by which such proofs are adduced, and the status of the adducer.7
Establishing Shari 'ah, prescribing law, laying down rules and regulations, and
defining system is a function which is specific to God alone. He has provided articulate
proofs and clean source-evidence in order to find His legislation, and ever since the
time of Adam, God has promulgated His law on Earth from time to time through His
Messengers and Prophets. This succession of revelations was partly necessitated by
changes in the needs and affairs of human beings, a concomitant of all created things,
calling for the repeal or modification of previous laws.8
The history of the legal science of the Islamic Law is divisible into four periods. The
first called: the legislative period of Islam, it commenced with the migrant Hijrah of
Prophet Muhammad to Madinah 622 AD, and ended with his death in 632 AD. All
legal rules Ahkam inclusive of all its classifications, such as principal and derived
rulings, teaching on the fundaments of the Faith, and regulations in connection with
personal practice and legalities were derived from the Holy Qur'an or from the
precepts Hadiths of the Prophet. The second period covers the time of the
Companions of the Prophet Sahabah and their successors Tabi 'un, and extended to
the foundation of different Islamic Schools of jurisprudence 632-717 AD, it has been
observed mainly in the collection, interpretation and extension of laws by collective
deliberations.'
The third period started in the early second century and ended in the third century
of the Hijrah 722-822 AD. It was marked by a theoretical and scientific study of the
law and religion, and it was then that the four Sunni Schools of jurisprudence were
established. Since then, there has been no independent exposition of the Islamic Law,
and jurists have been engaged within the limits of each School to develop the work of
7A1-Ra2i Fakhr al Din, Al Mahsul Fl 'Jim Usul al Figh, Matba'at AbdulRahman Muhammad, Cairo, p.94.
8 AI-Alwani, Taha Jabir, Source Methodology in Islamic Jurisprudence, The International Institute of Islamic Thought,
Virginia, 1990, pp. 4-5.
9 M. A. Abdur Rallim, The Principles ofMuhammadan Jurisprudence, Hyperion Press Inc. Westport, 1981, pp. 16-17.
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its founders. This is the fourth period of the Islamic Law and has yet to come to an
end. 10
The Shari 'ah, moreover, came into being and developed against a varied political
and administrative background. The rule of the Ummayyads, the first Islamic dynasty
661-750 AD represented, in many respects, the consummation of tendencies which
were inherent in the nature of the Muslims community under the Prophet. During their
rule, the framework of a new Arab Muslim society was created, and in this society a
new administration of justice, an Islamic jurisprudence, and, through it, Islamic law
came into being." Most notably, it is during this time when the Islamic empire grew to
its largest size, where new societies, with their methods of thought, melted in the new
Islam community and effected from one side or another on the Islamic legislation. In
the words of Abdullah al-Turki,
With the growth of the Islamic empire fresh facts and new
circumstances often arose for which no provision had been made,
especially as the affairs of the community became more
complex. 12
With the fall of the Ummayyads and the accession of the `Abbasids to power, a new
impetus was given to the study of jurisprudence. The Caliphs of this era appointed as
Qadis (judges) who were persons noted for their learning and legal acumen. During the
`Abbasids era, the Islamic Law came into contact with the practical concerns of life,
and the study of Greek and Roman literatures and sciences also came into considerable
vogue about this time."
The principles of the Islamic Law contained in the Qur'an were explained and
amplified in the Prophetic Hadith and Sunnah, which together constitute the second
basic source of the law. These in turn were understood with the aid of the consensus of
the Islamic community Ijma'. Lastly, analogical human reasoning or Analogy (Qiyas)
complemented these sources of Law on occasions of necessity. According to the
10 Ibid.
11 Bosworth, C. E. & Schacht, Joseph, The Legacy of Islam, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971, p. 394.
12 Al-Turki, Abdullah tbn AbdulMuhsin, Asbab Ikhtilaf al-Fogaha 'a, Matba'at al-Sa'adah, Riyadh, 1974, p. 23.
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traditional Islamic view, the sources of the Shari 'ah are: the Holy Qur'an, the
Prophetic Hadith, the jurist consensus Ijma' and analogy Qiyas. Out of that, the first
two are accepted by all Schools of Figh while the latter two are either considered of
lesser importance or rejected by some of the Schools. 14
 In connection with this, there is
discussion over whether there are more than two sources and if so, whether these are
three, four, five or even more. With this view has gone the further idea that Ijtihad is,
or has been, or may (again), become a fifth source of law, a method of determining
what Islamic Law shall be. A major question in modern Muslim life, a question of
social, political, economical and even psychological significance, is whether and how
far and by whom ljtihad may be exercised in changing the Islamic Law or modifying it
or adapting it to new conditions.15
2.2.1) The primary sources
It has been mentioned earlier that the Holy Qur'an and the Prophetic Sunnah are
the two main primary sources, which the Islamic Law derived from. Therefore, it may
be said that all Muslim Scholars had and have to refer to them in their writings.
a. The Holy Qur'an
Koran or Qur'an; basically the name is derived from the Arabic root qara 'a,
meaning "he read" or "he recited", and it is applied in the text of the book itself either
to a single "reading" or "passage", or to a collection of several. It was revealed to the
Prophet Muhammad at irregular intervals as necessity demanded and as dictated from
an original code, "the Mother of the Book", which is preserved in Heaven. The
intermediary which brought the revelation to earth was "a faithful spirit", later
identified with the angel Gabrie1. 16 It is well known that Qur'an is the Holy book of
Islam, but how does this book related to Islamic legislation. More specifically, what
was the message of the Qur'an itself? Jacques Jomier remarks,
13 M. A. Abdur Rahhn, The Principles ofMuhammadan Jurisprudence, Hyperion Press Inc. Westport, 1981, pp. 22-23.
14 Nasr, Sayyed Hossein, Ideals And Realities Of Islam, Mandala, London, 1991, P. 99.
15 Smith, Wilfred Cantwell, On Understanding Islam, Mouton Publisher, The Netherlands, 1981, p. 79.
16 Levy, Reuben, The Social Structure ofIslam, 5th Edit., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979, p. 150.
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The message of the Qur'an was very simple: the announcement
of the Last Judgement and threats against those 'who deserved
eternal fire on that day, along with happiness for the elect. The
earliest declarations stress social justice; it is the wicked rich
who are condemned most vigorously. Little by little the sphere of
these condemnations extends to those who reject the oneness of
God or say that Muhammad was a liar and that the Qur'an was
an utter forgery. When the corpus of the messages of the Qur'an
began to be formed, it contained the essentials of any
monotheistic faith, with a moral code . . . and deep concern for
mutual aid. 17
To achieve its goal of reformation, Islamic legislation has enacted a series of legal
commandments and prohibitions, which makes up rules of conduct governing the
social system of Islam. Therefore, in the formation of laws, the Qur'anic revelations
have to be taken into consideration in conjunction with the saying and deeds of the
Prophet.18
a) The removal of difficulty, throughout the Holy Qur'an there are various
examples which support the removal of difficulty from man's benefit by Islamic Law.
( A :	 . 1.4.osaa j
	 Li;	 L.LISI.
Allah does not burden a soul with more than it can bear. (2: 286)
( 1 A o :	 .	 1	 41 ..1.1).4
Allah wishes for you ease and He does not wish you difficulty for
you. (2: 185)
(1' A :F.1.4.111) .
	 .4:2 Cil..4.441 43.6. j taiia	 Cji 41 ALAI
Allah wishes to lighten the burden for you, for man was created
weak. (4: 28)
b) The reductions of religious obligation, the prohibited acts and substances in
Islamic legislation are quite few by comparison to those which are allowed by direct
command or by the absence of any command or prohibition. On one hand, foods
forbidden categories are listed in detail:
17 Jomier, Jacques, How to Understand Islam, 2" Edit., SCM Press Ltd., London, 1993, p.10.
18 Philips, Abu Ameenah Bilal, The Evaluation ofFigh, International Islamic Publication House, Riyadh, 1995, pp. 12-37.
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(V	 .	 .4..%.412.111 4,0„).14.11,9
Forbidden to you (for food) are: animals which die of themselves,
blood, pork, animals slaughtered in the name of others besides
Allah, animals killed by strangulation, or a blow, or fall, or by
being gored. (4: 24)
On the other hand, regarding the permissible foods:
• ,a43_3 3.% i4WJ taSJ	 410	 ji c)..4 1.11	 c.).4	 (j.%i ta j..+1. I
(o :611411)
On this day all good things are made lawful for you. The food of
the people of the Book is lawful to you and your food is lawful to
them. (5: 5)
As for the treatment of business transactions, the laws have not at all been detailed.
Instead, general precepts suitable for all circumstances have been legislated. In this
regard:
( :it siLJI ) . km:14 I jiji J.141 tS
Oh you who believe, fulfil your contracts. (5: 1)
(V Y 0 :SA.11) • .4 j.11	 141	 LW,.9
Allah has made trade lawful and prohibited interest. (2: 275)
.	 j1.4.1	 )t)	 1.91S1-1
(V '1 :c.Lall)
Oh you who believe, do not eat up your properties amongst
yourselves unfairly. But there should be trade by mutual good-
will. (4:29)
c) The realisation of public welfare. According to Mohammed Khidari Bek, 19 the
body of information contained in the Qur 'an, as a whole, may be grounded under
three headings with regards to the field of study to which they are related:
a. Information related to belief in God, His Angels, His
scriptures, His prophets, and the affairs of the next life.
These topics are known in the Islamic studies as
Theology.
b. Information related to deeds of the heart and soul, and
moral principles and rules of conduct aimed at the
19 Bek, Mohammed, A1-Khidari, Tareikh Al Tashre 'a Al Islami, Al-Maktabah Al-Tijariyyah, Cairo, 1960, pp. 17-18.
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development of nobility of character, which represent the
field of moral science.
c. Lastly, the information which represents the field of
law, this group related to deeds of the limbs and
contained within a body of commandments, prohibition
and choices.
Along with that assumption, Bek sees that Islamic legislation in the Qur'an is
comprised of a variety of acts which may be grouped in two basic categories as
follows :20
1) Dealings between human beings and God. These are the religious rites, which
are not valid without correct intention, and considered as the foundation of Islam after
Faith Eman. Some of these dealings are purely religious forms of worship, such as
praying and fasting: while others are socio-economic forms of worship, such as
compulsory charity Zakat; and yet others are socio-physical forms of worship, such as
pilgrimage Haj j .
2) Dealings among people. The laws governing these dealings may themselves be
divided into four sub-sections:
a. Laws ensuring and defending the propagation of Islam. These are embodied
in the codes of armed or unarmed struggle Jihad.
b. Family laws for the development and protection of the family structure.
These include laws concerning marriage, divorce, and inheritance.
c. Criminal laws specifying punishments and/or compensations for different
crimes.
d. Trade laws governing business transactions, rental contracts, and other
aspects of the commercial affairs.
Here, it must be observed that Islam did not erase all pre-Islamic customs and
practices. Instead, it removed every facet of corruption and cancelled all customs,
20 Ibid., pp. 34-35.
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which were harmful to the society. That is one of the basic elements of legislation in
the Qur 'an. The Prophet tradition, the Sunnahs, put forward these customs to deal
with and organise them in a new Islamic way to be agreeable to the new Islamic
society.
b. The Prophetic Tradition Sunnah
Literally, the term Sunnah means "way of behave either good or bad". 21 It is,
moreover "custom", "wont", "usage" as well as a general term that can be applied to
the usages and customs of nations. 22 In the Holy Qur'an the term Sunnah mentioned in
various verses under two meanings, either: the practice of Allah.
( y	 .	 4.1 c5ii	 40.-41
The practice of Allah already in the past: no change wilt thou find
in the practice of Allah. (48: 23)
Or: the way of old nations
(
	
:L). . .	 (:).4 	 &LA 44.14.:.L1	 C.).1.4	 ..5.1.}A.
Allah both wish to make clear to you and to guide you into the
ways of those before you ... (4: 26)
Prophet Muhammad has mentioned, in various occasions, the term Sunnah as a
precedent. It has been narrated that the Prophet is reported to have said,
He who sets a good precedent (Sunnah) in Islam, there is a
reward for him for this (Sunnah) and reward of that also to who
acted according to its subsequence, without any deduction from
their rewards; and he who sets is Islam an evil precedent
(Sunnah), there is upon him the burden of that, and the burden of
him also who acted upon it subsequence, without deduction from
their burden.23
In another occasion, the Prophet said,
Verily ye shall imitate the way (Sunnah) of those who were before
you (i.e. of the Jahiliyyahl inch for inch, ell for ell, span for span;
21 Ilm Mandhore, Muhammad Ibn Makram,Lisan al-Arab, Vol. XIII, Dar Beirut, Beirut, 1956, p. 225.
22 Glasse, Cyril, The Concise Encyclopedia Of Islam, Stacy International, London, 1989, p. 381.
23 Matraji, Mahmoud, Translation of Saheh Muslim, Vol. II B, Dar Al-Fikr, Beirut, 1993, p. 199.
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if they were to crawl into a lizard's hole, you should follow after
them.24
Muslim jurists used the term Sunnah as synonymous with the religious commands
of Prophet Muhammad. 25 This was later defined as "the way or practice of the
Prophet, inclusive of sayings and actions, as recorded in the Hadith. 26 It includes what
the Prophet approved, allowed, or condoned when, under prevailing circumstances, he
might well have taken issue with others' actions, decisions or practices; and what he
himself refrained from and disapproved of 27 In this connection, Abul A'la Maududi
clarified the basic duty of Sunnah when he says,
• . • to translate the ideology of Islam in the light of Qur'anic
guidance into practical shape, developed it into a positive social
order. 28
However, the Prophet had set a precedent for the religious-secular relationship
when he said,
You know better (than I do] in your civil (non-religious] matters.29
For Muslims, it is quite evident that the Qur 'an is, and must be, the essential basis
of the Islamic Law: where the Qur'an expresses a precept clearly, the obligation is
absolute. However, the Qur'an, composed in a very concise style, does not go into
details, or does so only rarely. Therefore, the words, the practices, and the examples of
the Prophet Muhammad in the first place, and sometimes those of his Companions,
have served to illuminate the legislation. These examples and these words have been
systematically collected in a stereotyped form, that of the traditions, Sunnah or the
sayings Hadith, which have played a very major role in the Islamic Law, as in the
spirituality of Islam itself In the Holy Qur'an there are verses which are referenced to
the importance of the Prophet's Sunnah,
24 Ibn Hanbal, Ahmed Ibn Muhanunad, Musnad al-hnain Ahmed Ibn Hanbal, Vol. II, Dar al-Ma'aref, Cairo, 1980, p. 327.
25 Ibn Mandhore, Muhammad Ibn Makram, Lisan al-Arab, Vol. XIII, Dar Beirut, Beirut, 1956, p. 225.
26 Bannerman, Patrick, Islam in Perspective, Routledge, London, 1988, p. 258.
27 Glasse, Cyril, The Concise Encyclopedia Of Islam, Stacy International, London, 1989, p. 381.
28 Maududi, Abul A'la, First Principles of the Islamic State, Islamic Publications, Lahore, 1978, p. 3.
29 Matraji, Malunoud, Translation of Saheh Muslim, Vol. IV, Dar El Fikr, Beirut, 1993, p. 108.
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So believe in Allah and His Messenger the unlettered Prophet,
who believeth in Allah and His Words: follow him that (so) ye may
be guided. (7: 158)
Al-Tabari in his work Jami' al-Bayan says,
In this verse God commands people to follow the Prophet's
commands ISunnahl to worship Allah in order to drive them to
the path of guidance.3°
Imam al-Shafei'i in his book Al-Risalah explains the relationship between the
Qur'an and the Sunnah. Al-Shafei'i mentioned,
The Sunnah's relation to the Qur'an may be of three kinds: (1) in
entire agreement with the Qur'an; (2) an explanation of the
sacred text; (3) not directly connected with the sacred text.31
Out of that, Sunnah is divided according to its category, into three types: the
sayings; the behaviour; and the ratification. The first depends on every single word
(Hadith) narrated on the Prophet in different circumstances* such as:
Start observing Saum (fasts) on seeing the crescent-moon of
Ramadan, and stop (fasts) on seeing the crescent-moon of
Shawwal.32
The second category is the behaviours of the Prophet, such as his performance of
prayer, in the Prophet's Hadith: Pray as you have seen me praying.33
Lastly, the category of Sunnah is where the Prophet approves or rejects the acts of
his Companions, either in his saying or by his attitudes, in connection with religious
issues, which he ratified by his silent, approval, or showing an acceptance.34
Al-Tabari, Mohamad Ibn Jarear, Jami ' Al-Bayan 'An Ta 'weal Al-Qur'an, Vol. VI, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1968, pp.
115-116.
31 AI-Shafer', Muhammad A., Al-Risalah, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1958, p. 16.
* The since of Hadith is the documentation of this Sunnahs.
32 Khan, Muhammad Muhsin, Sufmnarised Sahih Al-Bukhari, Maktabat Dar Al-Salam, Riyadh, 1994, p. 440.
33 Martaji, Malunoud, Sahih Al-Bukhari, Vol. I, Dar Alftkr, Beirut, 1993, p. 425.
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Most notably, the Sunnah of the Prophet became the characteristic term for the
theory and practice of the Sunni Muslim community Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'a .
Therefore, this found the Sunnis, those who refrain from deviating from dogma and
practice. The expression is particularly used in this sense in opposition to Shi Wes .35
The Prophet, in his efforts to correct the way of Muslim's lives, insisted Muslims must
follow his Sunnah and threatened,
He, who turns away from my Sunnah, does not belong to me.36
In the second century AR, the incidence of an increased circulation of Hadith and
the appearance of Hadiths that had never been circulated at all, led, in some cases, to
legal rulings and positions quite different from those held by Sahabah. Consequently,
in order to document the Prophetical Tradition, therefore they both: the science of
Hadith and the science of Figh were improved. The collections of traditions were
presented as a series of texts juxtaposed and classified according to their subject
matter. These texts differ in content; they range from the brief two- or three - line
sentences to the account, which takes up several pages.
In the science of Hadith, there is the so-called the individual Hadith, which consists
firstly of the chain of authorities Isnad who have transmitted the report; secondly, the
text or substance of the report, the Main. The usual form taken by the Hadith is that
the Relator says: "It was told by A, who had it from B, who had it from C, who had it
from D, that the Prophet - upon whom be peace- said [or did] . . . [here follows the
Main]. In relation to this, Afeaf Tabarah has given clear explanation to the
classification of Hadith, which according to its Isnad, Hadith is divided into four
different types:
1) The Continuous, which divided into two groups:
(a) The verbal and meaning continuous;
34 Abu Atalah, Khadeijah A., Al Islam wa Al 'Alagat Al dwaliyah, Dar Al Ma'arif, Cairo, 1983., p. 21.
35 Iloutsma, Martijn Theodor, The Encyclopedia ofIslam, Vol. IV, E. J. Brill Ltd., Leyden 1913, p. 555.
36 Martaji, Mahmoud, Sahih A1-13zikhari, Vol. VII, Dar Alfikr, Beirut, 1993, p. 1.
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(b) Continuous in meaning, for example, numbers of prayer unit Rak'a
in each prayers;
2) The Well-known, which was narrated by three Transmitters or more;
3) Two Narrators should narrate the strong, this type of Had//h;
4) The Isolated, which was narrated by one Transmitter.37
Hadiths according to its Main can be divided into four types:
1) The Genuine Sound, which contains no mistakes and is narrated by accurate
narrators.
2) The Fair Had//h. Its transmitted chain does not contain a narrator accused
of mendacity, but a weakness occurred in the narrator's memory;
3) The Infirm, which has doubts either in its transmitted chain or in its text.
For this reason, Muslim scholars do not build on this type of Had//h when
they pass legal judgements;
4) The Forged, the invented or fabricated, which is not a genuine Had//h.38
Since the Hadiths were not written down until more than a century had gone by, the
Isnads were needed to weed out those falsely attributed to Muhammad. What if the
Isnad, too, were fabrications? To weed out Hadiths with false Isnads, the early 'Mama
became quite expert on the lives of the Prophet, his family, and his Companions. If it
could be proved that one link in the chain of transmitters was weak because the person
in question was a liar or could not have known the previous transmitter, then the
Had//h was suspect. After a century of dedicated labour by many scholars, there
emerged several authoritative collections of Hadiths, the collections of Hadiths,
became the greatest authority. The standard canonical collections called the nine
books, they were still being used by Muslims until recent time. Those are:
1) Saheah Al Bukhari of Muhammad Ibn Ismael Al-Bukhari, which contains only
the genuine Hadiths. Ibn Khaldoun in his work Al-Mugademmah noted,
37 Tabarah, Afeaf AbdulFatah,Roah al-Dean al-Islamy, Dar Al `11m, Beirut, 1988, pp. 465-470.
38 Dol, `Abdur Ralunan 1., Shari 'ah The Islamic Law, Ta Ha Publisher, London, 1984, pp. 56-57.
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The collection of Bukhari is the most excellent book of Islam
after the Qur'an.39
2) Saheah Muslim of Muslim Ibn Al-Hajaj Al-Naysaburi;
3) Sunan Abu Dawud of Abu Dawud Sulayman Ibn Al-Ash'ath Al-Azadi;
4) Sunan Al Nasa'i of Ahmad Ibn Shu'ayb Ibn Ali Al-Nasa'i;
5) Al Muwatta' of Imam Malik Ibn Anas;
6) Sunan Al Termidhi of Muhammad Ibn Easa Al-Termidhi;
7) Sunan Ibn Majah of Muhammad Ibn Yazyead Ibn Majah;
8) Sunan Al Imam Ahmad of Ahmad Ibn Muhammad Ibn Hanbal Ibn Asad;
9) Sunan Al Darmi of Abdullah Ibn AbdulRahman Ibn Fadhl.
Furthermore, it must be observed that the deeds of the Prophet, as well as the
legislative side of the Hadith divided into three categories based on the Hadiths
narrated by the companions of the Prophet under his following duties.
a) What the Prophet said and practised under his prophetic character. These
Hadiths illustrate the structure and the themes of dogma and worship, such as
what is forbidden and what is lawful, praying, fasting, they way of life, treatment
of Muslims and others. Such Hadiths are obligatory for all Muslims who have to
practice and follow all the commands mentioned in these Hadiths. In this way,
the Hadith are a legislative source of the Shari'ah in addition to the Holy
Qur 'an.
b) The Hadiths narrated about or stated by the Prophet when he was practising
his duties as the political and military leader of the Islamic Ummah contain his
commands as well as his financial practice, the ratification of treaties, the
appointment of judges and so on. These Prophetic Hadiths contain commands
which are legally binding. They cannot be practised by an individual without
permission from the high authority of the Islamic State such as the Caliph, the
Imam, or the head of the State.
c) The third category of Hadiths are the sayings of the Prophet when acting as
the supreme judge of the Ummah. In his prophetic capacity the Prophet
39 Ibn Khaldoun, AbdulRahman, Al Mugademmah, Ahnaktabah Alasryah, Beirut, 1995, p. 413.
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Muhammad informed and instructed them about the judgements of Islam. In his
capacity as supreme judge he implemented those judgements when adjudicating
between them in legal proceedings. As in the two previous cases, these Hadiths
are legislative sources of the Shari 'ah. No individual Muslim is entitled to
implement these judgements: they can only be implemented by the Islamic
authority.40
2.2.2) The secondary sources
a. The exercise of judgement ljtihad
Adjacent to the two primary sources, ljtihad (exercise of judgement) is the first of
the secondary sources. It was practised by the Prophet and by those of his Companion
with legal proclivities (Ahl al-Nazar). The Prophet's ljtihad, if it was in religious
affairs, confirmed by a Qur 'anic text, and is connected with the civil purposes some
times, not confirmed by Qui. 'anic text; in which case, it was explained that the better
solution was other than that which he had adopted. The following Hadith gives clear
vision to this concern,
You know better [than I do] in your civil [non-religious] matters.41
In the Sunnah there are examples which confirm this assumption, among the famous
events come the battle of Badr as a clear illustration to the Prophetic ljtihad which was
not supported by a Qur 'anic text. It was related that the Prophet, in his preparation for
the battle of Badr marched with the Muslims and encamped on the farthest bank of the
valley the so-called al- 'Audwa al-Quswa at the nearest spring of Badr. AI-Habab Ibn
al-Mundhir, a Muslim companion, asked the Prophet: "0 the Messenger of Allah, has
Allah inspired you to choose this very spot, so we cannot go onward or backward? Or
is it the stratagem of war and the product of consultation?" The Prophet replied "it is
the stratagem of war and the product of consultation." Al-Habab said: "This place is
no good; let us go and encamp on the nearest water to seize the water-supply, and
build a basin full of water, then destroy all the other wells, then we fight the people, so
40 Tabarah, Afeaf AbdulFatah, Roah al-Dean al-Islainy, Dar APIlin, Beirut, 1988, pp. 465-470.
41 Matraji, Malurnoud, Translation of Saheh Muslim, Vol. IV, Dar Al-Fikr, Beirut, 1993, p. 108.
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that they will be deprived of the water." The Prophet said: "You have given the exact
advice." The Prophet approved of his plan and agreed to carry it out.42
During the time of the Prophet some of his Companions performed Ijtihad in
response to situations, which occurred to them, and when they met the Prophet they
explain what happened and tell him their judgements. Under such circumstances the
Prophet's approval or disapproval - after he explains the correct procedure - of their
ljtihad became a part of the Prophetic Sunnah. The Prophet Ijtihad, moreover, set a
precedent for his Companions and later Muslims, that clearly proved the legitimacy of
ljtihad, so that when they could not find an express legal ruling in the two main
sources, they were to perform Ijtihad in order to find a judgement of their own.
Moreover, probably to reinforce and establish this concept, the Prophet used to order
certain of his companions to make ljtihad concerning certain matters in his presence,
then he would tell them if they were correct or mistaken.43
The indications that ljtihad is valid and relevant in recent context are many. In the
story of Mu'ath Ibn Jabal when the Prophet sent him to Yemen as a Judge Qadi and
asked him:
What will you do if a matter is referred to you for judgement?
Mu'ath's replied "I will judge according to the Book of Allah ... or
by the Sunnah of the Prophet ... then I will make Ittihad to
formulate my own judgement.44
In the present day, according to some jurists, the practice of Mu'ath Ibn Jabal is to
be followed.
The extent of the Prophet's concern with encouraging his Companions to make
ljtihad and training them in its use can be seen in his Hadith:
When a Judge gives a decision, having tried his best (Ittihad) to
and reaches a correct conclusion, he receives a double reward;
42 Ibn Ilisham, Abd Almalik,A1-Syrah al-Nabaviryah, Vol. II, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1955, p. 223.
43 AI-Alwanl, Taha Jabir, Source Methodology in Islamic Jurisprudence, The International Institute of Islamic Thought,
Virginia, 1990, pp. 4-6.
44Abu Dawud, Sulayrnan Ibn Al-Asleath Al-Azadi„ Sunan Abu Dawild, Al Matba'a Al Taziyah, Cairo, p.303.
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and if he gives a judgement after having tried his best (ljtihad) but
erred, there is one reward for him. 45
It is also possible for this encouragement to apply to present day Qadis.
The roles of Ifiihad were organised during the time of the `Abbaside Empire, at that
time the scholars wrote the basics for the fulfilment of ljtihad. It may be said that: by
the time of the death of the last of the four founders of the four Sunni Schools of Fiqh,
ljtihad was gradually abandoned in favour of the imitation Taqlid, or submission to the
canons of the four Schools, and the gate of ljtihad was closed. 46 Taj al-Dean al-Subki,
defines Taqlid as,
Taqlid is the following the opinion of another person without
knowledge of authority for such opinion, and in jurisprudence, it
means following the opinion of a jurist in matters which have not
been dealt with by an express Qur 'anic or Hadith text or by
Jima ', for in matters which have been so dealt with there is no
room for juristic opinion and all persons whether jurists or not
would be equally bound to accept su ch laws.47
Since then Muslim thought, with few exceptions, has become rigid and imitation
(Taqlid) has been the dominant approach. In the 19 th century AD, modernists
introduced the concept of "piecing together" (Talfiq), Muslim jurisprudence and
legislation as the dominant force of the so-called modern Ijtihad. As N. Coulson put it,
The so-called modern Ijtihad amounts to little more than forcing
from the divine texts that particular interpretation which agrees
with preconceived standards. . . In sum, it appears that modern
(Muslim) Jurisprudence has not yet evolved any systematic
approach . . . Lacking any consistency of principle of
methodology, it has tackled the process of reform as a whole in a
spirit of juristic opportunism. Furthermore, many of the
substantive reforms must appear, on long term view, as
temporary expedients and piecemeal accommodations."
45 Al-Naysaburi, Muslim Ibn al-Hajaj, Saheh Muslim, Vol. 3, Dar Al Fikr, Beirut, 1995, p. 153.
46 Ithadduri, Majid, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1979, pp. 36-37.
47 Ibn Al Subki, Taj al-Dean Ibn Taqi Al-Dean, Jam' Al-Jawatni Matba'at BOulaq, Cairo, 1282 AH, p.276.
48 Coulson N.J., A History of Islamic Law, in AbdulHantid AbuSulayman Towards an Islamic Theory of International
Relations, International Institute of Islamic Thought, Herndon, 1994, p. 3.
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Nevertheless, despite the Prophet's concern or the subsequent followers, Ittihad has
met with many permanent difficulties, which has affected the role of Islam not only in
the non-Muslim culture inside the Muslim State but world-wide. In connection with
this Sheikh Zaki Yamani mentioned,
The Islamic role in human society had lost its influence and
started shrinking because of the closing of the gate of
investigation (Ittihad) many centuries ago. Hence, the legislative
and cultural demonstrations, despite their greatness, have been
restrictive and do not improve or acclimatise with time and its
changes. The Islamic influence in the fields of Economics,
Legislation, and Social, became very weak Consequently,
indications of weakness started to infiltrate even into the faith
itself therefore, stagnancy, going astray, and paganism
predominated with in many Muslim countries.°
However, some recent scholars argue that the Sunni view is incorrect as the
concept has been misinterpreted. Throughout the centuries Mujtahids -that is, those
who can practice Ijtihad or exercise their opinion in questions of Law- have
contributed to the further development of positive law and legal theory, they claim
since most leaders of reformist or renewalist movements necessarily claim the right to
practise ljtihad The stream of Fatwas* issued over the centuries presents a more
incorporated (into the state system, that is), and tacitly approved continuation of the
use of ljtihad." It has been argued that,
Legal activity, whether in theory or in practice, continued
unceasingly. The vast bulk of Fatwas (legal opinions) that
appeared and continued to grow rapidly from the fourteenth
century onwards is a telling example of the importance of Fatwas
as legal decisions and precedents. It is in this large body of
material that one may look for positive legal developments.51
Great diversity of opinion exists about the persons who may be considered as
Mujtahids and over the time in which they are to be found. Some are of opinion that
49 Vamani, Ahmed Zald, Islamic Law and Contemporary Issues, Arabic Edit, The Saudi Publishing House, Jeddah, 1388
4AH, p. 52.
Fatwa, is a decision or an opinion of a jurist on a point of law or legal problem. A Fatwa may deal with a weighty point of law, but
may also deal with social issues, for example, the legality or otherwise of abortion and birth control; with ritual matters, an example
of that is the permissibility of using stunning devices before the ritual slaughter of cattle; and political issues, such as the legitimacy
of a ruler.
50 Haling, Wad, B., Was the Gate of ljtihad Closed? International Journal ofMiddle East Studies. 16, 1984, p. 3-41.
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only the Companions of the Prophet can be considered as men of such high authority,
others add to these the Ansar, that is, the Supporters of the Prophet; others again
include the Muhagiroun, the people of Makkah who fled with the Prophet to Madinah.
Some consider the authority of the people of Madinah to be the higher, as they had had
the best opportunities of hearing the sayings and observing the practices of the
Prophet. The majority of Muslim theologians, however, are of the opinion that there
may be true Mujtahids in any age and in any place, and that their unanimous agreement
is to be accepted. 52 In the method ofljtihad, Muslim scholars discussed and classified
three classes ofMujtahids:
1. The absolute Mujtahid, which is of general and absolute authority, whose
specialist expertise embraces the whole of the Islamic Law.
2. The Mujtahid of a special School of theology, who is an authority within the
sphere of one of the special theological systems, as, for example, of the system of
Abu Hanifah, of Shafei'i and of others.
3. The Mujtahid of special questions, and cases, which have not been decided by
the founders of the four great Sunni Schools of Fiqh.53
Lastly, Muslim jurists have stipulated various characteristics and qualifications that
Mujtahid has to possess. Among the important conditions: wisdom, adulthood, full
knowledge of the texts and meaning of the Holy Qur'an, the Prophetic Sunnah, the
Consensus of juristic Ijma', the Abrogation and Abrogated (al-Nasikh wa al-
Mansoukh), the science of Arabic Language and finally the rules of the Islamic
jurisprudence (Fiqh).54
b. Consensus of juristic opinion tint&
The word Ijma' is derived from Jama'a, which means: collecting or gathering
together. Ijma' carries the double significance of composing and settling a thing which
51 Ibid., p. 18.
52 Klein, F. A., The Religion Of Islam, Kitab Bhavan, New Delhi, 1977, pp. 30-31.
53 Ibid., p. 31.
54 M-Shawkani, Muhamad Ali, Irshad al-Fohoill, Al-Maktaba M-Islamy, Beirut, 1982, p. 250.
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has been unsettled and, hence, determining and resolving an affair and agreeing or
uniting in opinion. 55 The famous jurist Ibn Hazm defined Ijma' as,
• . . an agreement of the jurists among the Companions in a
particular age on a question of law. 56
Its authority as a source of laws is founded on certain Qur'anic text,
Lo—ta." 1 ,90:4	 jAi 0.1c.	 I_OLS	 44.4, jj 411A4 1 ,9141 (:),all j.i.4".9.4.11
( 11. : JP) • 4-1,.,9 Z11-.1 i.:J91•4:94 CA1.1.11 d1•11.91 ai-9:1:511"9. CA4:111
Only those are Believers, who believe in Allah and His
Messenger: when they are with him on a matter requiring
collective action, they do not depart until they have asked for his
leave; those who ask for the leave are those who believe in Allah
and His Messenger. (24: 62)
And in the Prophetical Hadith
My followers will never agree upon what is wrong.57
In his efforts to elucidate this Hadith, F. A. Klein remarks,
This agreement is to be arrived at by Ijtihad or exertion, or
conscientious examination and meditation on the subject under
consideration. The chief men among the company of the
Mujtahidin are the Companions of the Prophet, and the four
Kalifs [Caliphs].58
Klein further contends what can lead to division within the Ummah and that its
acceptance is by no means universal,
It has been very properly remarked that the setting up of this
agreement of the learned doctors of Islam as a foundation of the
Faith and practice must be a source of religious dissension and
sectarian strife. Though it is now accepted by the Sunni Muslims,
there have not been wanting learned doctors who have altogether
rejected it, as they said it was a matter of impossibility to collect
55 Hassan, Farooq, The Concept of State and Law in Islam, University Press of America, London, 1981, P. 38.
56 Ibn Hazm, All Ibn Ahmad, Al-lima', Dar Al Itehad Al Arabi Ii Al Teba'a, Cairo,1969, p. 6.
57 Ibn Majah, Muhammad Ibn Yazead, &man Ibn Majah, Dar Ehya'a Al-Kotoub Al-Arabiyyah, Cairo, 1987, Kitab al-
Fitan.
58 Klein, F. A., The Religion Of Islam, Kitab Bhstvan, New Delhi, 1977, p. 30.
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the opinions of all the persons, even in the same generation who
would have the right to vote on the subject.59
However, Klein's interpretation is not accepted within the Sunni Islam. Ijma',
moreover, has been held to be a valid source of law not only upon the authority of the
above texts, but also on the unanimity of opinion to that effect among the Companions.
It is, moreover, an essential and characteristic principle of Sunni jurisprudence, upon
which the Islamic community acted as soon as they were left to their own resources
and were called upon to solve the first and most important constitutional problem that
arose on the Prophet's death by selecting their first Caliphate according to the principle
of Ijma'
The consensus of Ijma', moreover, is of several grades in point of authority; the
absolute one ensures certainty of belief, so that anyone not believing in the validity of a
rule based on such Ijma' becomes chargeable with unbelief An Ijma' is said to belong
to this category if it is in strict conformity with the requirements of law and proved by
infallible testimony. The second sort of imparts binding authority to the rulings
founded upon them, but do not ensure certainty of belief These are Ijma's are either
not constituted in strict accordance with the law or not proved by universal testimony.
c. Analogical deduction Qiyas
Muslim jurists have thoroughly discussed the secondary sources of Shari'ah and
there is almost a unanimous agreement that Analogy (Qiyas) is one of the most
important methods for deriving new principles. Qiyas is an intelligent deduction from
analogous situations based on study, thoughtful interpretation and individual insight.
They reasoned that God, the Prime Legislator, in revealing judgements, had specified
aims and purpose. Thus, if there is two similar situations and the efficient cause of the
matter under consideration that gives rise to a judgement was the same. If one situation
was governed by a provision and the other was not, the same provision can be used to
govern both situations. A mechanical application of Oiyas in this sense, however,
might result in judgements, which are unjust, or against public interest. Faced with this
59 Ibid.
43
Chapter II
possibility, Muslims jurists decided to employ Qiyas only as guiding principle, in their
derivation of new judgements, customs, welfare or benefits, and the elimination of
hardship. In the Hanafite School of Figh, this is referred to Preference Istihsan.6°
Most notably, Istihsan (literally, preferring or considering a thing to be good)
identified as the doctrine by which the jurists derive new judgements and principles
from the Qur'an and the Sunnah (though not by Qiyas) to meet the needs of the
Ummah. Istihsan is used when the exercise of Ra'y reflected the personal choice of the
scholar guided by his idea of what was appropriate. It came to signify a breach of strict
analogy for reasons of public interests, convenience or similar considerations. 61
 Thus,
to take an illustration, it may happen that a rule of law deduced by the application of
analogy to a text is in conflict with what has been expressly laid down by some other
text, or by the unanimous opinion of the learned, or similarly, it may happen that the
law analogically deduced fails to commend itself to the jurist, owing to its narrowness
and in-adaptability to the habits and usages of the people and could possibly cause
hardships and inconveniences. In that event, according to the Hanafite School, a jurist
is at liberty to refuse to adopt the law to which analogy points and instead to accept a
rule which in his opinion would better advance the welfare of human beings and the
interests of justice.62
Connected to the analogical deduction, it could be said that it is based on very
strict, logical and systematic principles and is not to be misconstrued as the mere
fancies and imaginations of humanity. Qiyas is either: (i) Evident, clear and apparent.
For example, wine is forbidden in the Qur'an. By analogy, this now means anything
intoxicating It is clear, therefore, that opium and any intoxicating drugs are also
forbidden; (ii) Or Qiyas may be hidden or concealed. An example of that is the alms,
the poor rate Zakat. By Tradition, it is established that one goat in forty must be given
60 Al-Kashani, Abu Bakr Hui Mas'aud, Bada'ea Al Sanay'a fi Tarteab Al Sharay'a, Vol. IV, Sharekat Al Matbou'at Al
'Alamiyyah, 1327 All, p.211.
61 Dot, `Abdur Rahman I., Shan 'ah The Islamic Law, Ta Ha Publisher, London, 1984, pp. 81-82.
62 A1-Sarkhasi, Muhanunad Ibn Ahmad, Al-Mabsut, Vol. X, Hyderabad, 1335 AH, p. 145.
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to God as alms, so it may be concluded by concealed Qiyas that the value of the goat
may be given instead of the goat itself. 63
In the Qiyas, four points are to be considered: (i) What is to be compared with; (ii)
What is compared; (iii) The point of similarity between the two, these are the common
elements between both subjects; (iv) The decision resulting from the comparison of
both. On the other hand, Qiyas comes under four conditions: (i) The precept or
practice upon which it is founded must be of general and not of special application; (ii)
The cause of the injunction must be known and understood.; (iii) The decision must be
based upon either the Qur 'an or the Hadith or the Ijma% (iv) The decision arrived at
must not be contrary to anything declared elsewhere, in the Qur'an or the Hadith."
However, it is important to concentrate on two important informal Schools: the
Rationalists Ahl al-Ra 'i and the Traditionists Ahl al-Hadith. The influence of these
Schools affected all Muslim scholars who had to belong to one of them. Alongside
these sources, only the Schools of the Hanbalite, the Hanafite, the Shafei'ite, and the
Malikite were recognised as the main Sunni Schools. Here it must be observed that
questions can be asked: what were the differences and disagreement among them? And
what are their affections at the current time? Consequently, the next work will answer
these questions by focusing on the Ahl al-Ra'i and Ahl al-Hadith Schools and later the
four Sunni Schools, presenting an explanation of the differences among them.
2.3) The Schools of Rationalists Ahl al-Ra'i and the Traditionalists Ahl al-Hadith
It was in the tenth century AD when sects such as Shi 'is, Kharijis, Mu 'tazila, Sufis
and other groups appeared in Iraq, that conflicts arose and the fabrication of Hadith
became widespread. Each sect strove to outdo the other and gain converts from
mainstream Islam. They took to distorting the meanings of the Prophet's words as
recorded in the Iktdith, and to manufacturing and then ascribing to the Prophet, words
and meanings designed to suit their own purposes. Consequently, the scholars of Iraq
63 Klein, F. A., The Religion Of Islam, Kitab Bhavan, New Delhi, 1977, pp. 32-33.
64 Ibid.
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were forced to lay down conditions for the acceptance of Hadith, according to which
only a few of the reports given by the Companions living in Iraq were acceptable.65
Sunni scholars and jurists who had not become involved with any groups, such as
Kharijis and Shi 'is, were either Ahl al-Ra'i or Ahl al-Hadith, since that time and up to
recent times this division remained. The appearance of differences between those two
Schools concerned the sources, methodology, and issues of case law. While it is true
that both had their roots in the approaches of the preceding generation of the Prophet's
companions and in those of the following generation, it was in the second century AH
when their differences in matters of Fiqh became clear. It was at this time when people
began grouping themselves on the basis of their differences in deriving legal points
from the sources. 66
The Ahl al-Hadith School is a continuation of the School of the Prophet's
Companions. They are recognised as the greatest group of Muslims who were present
when the Prophet stated his Hadiths. Their narrations of his Hadiths have been
therefore treated as accurate, reliable and completely trustworthy. They are persons
such as Abdullah Ibn al-`Abbas, the Prophet's cousin and one of his Companions,
Abdullah Ibn Umar Ibn al-Khatab 'A'isha, the Prophet's widow and daughter of Ahu
Bakr (his first successor), and Abu Hurayrah, a friend of the Prophet. This School
became widespread in the Hijaz for various reasons, of which the most important was
the fact that the region was more stable after the Caliphate had been moved, and most
of the political activities had been transferred, first to Damascus and later to Baghdad.
The Imam of Madinah Saeed Ibn Al-Muusayyab, noted that the people of Makkah and
Madinah had not lost much of the Hadith and Fiqh, because they were familiar with
the Fatwa and reports of the four Orthodox Caliphs and others such as Abu Hurayrah,
'A'ishah, and Abdullah Ibn Umar. Thus they did not need to use Ra'i in order to derive
law.
65 Al-Turld , Abdullah A., Asbab Ikhtilaf al-Fogaha, 1974, pp. 23-24.
66 Al-Rayis, Muhammad Dhiy' al-Dean, Al-Kharaj fi al-Dawlah al-Islainiyyah, 1e Edit., Matba'at Nandhat Masr, Cairo,
1957, pp. 81-82.
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The Ahl al-Ra'i school (it originated in Iraq) thought that the legal interpretation of
the Shari 'ah should have a basis in reason and also should take into account the best
interests of the people, and be backed by discernible wisdom. The members of this
group adopt the view that it was their duty to uncover these meanings and the wisdom
behind the laws and to make the connection between them. If the reasons for any law
were to lose relevance with the passing of time and the changing of circumstances, the
law would no longer be valid. If they found the reasons behind the law, they would
often prefer to cite arguments based on an analytical treatment of those reasons. Thus
in many cases, reason would be accorded legalistic preference when such reasoning
conflicted with the evidence of certain categories of Hadith.67
The scholars of Ahl al-Ra'i, moreover, agreed with all Muslims that once a person
has clearly understood the Sunnah, he may not reject it in favour of what is no more
than someone's opinion. Their excuse in all those cases in which they were criticised
for contradicting the Sunnah is simply that they did not know any Hadith concerning
the matter in dispute, or that they did know a Hadith, but did not consider it sound
enough owing, to some weakness in the narrators or some other fault they found in it
(a fault which perhaps others did not consider to be damaging). Alternatively, they
claimed that they knew of another Hadith, which they considered sound and which
contradicted the legal purport of the Hadith accepted by others. 68
Ahl al-Ra'i, moreover, criticises Ahl al-Hadith for having little intelligence and less
Figh understanding. Ahl al-Hadith claimed that the opinions of Ahl al-Ra'i were based
on no more than conjecture, and that they had distanced themselves from necessary
circumspection in those matters of religious significance which could only be
ascertained through recourse to the source-text. However, both Schools agreed of the
necessity of having recourse to reason whenever a matter occurs for which there is no
specific ruling in the source text. Moreover, before the differences in the methods of
interpreting and expanding the law had crystallised into codes, each, with its School of
adherents, no hard and fast distinction was made between those who relied mainly on
67AI-Alwani, Taha Jabir, Source Methodology in Islamic Jurisprudence, The International Institute of Islamic Thought,
Virginia, 1990, p. 29 o.w.
68 Ibid.
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Ra'i and those who put Hadith immediately after the Qur'an as a main root of the
Figh.69
2.4) The four Sunni Schools of jurisprudence Figh
It has been noted earlier that the Holy Qur 'an and Sunnah provide ample material
for legislation. However, not everything has been provided for decisions to be taken on
new issues in the interest of the Muslim community. Some scholars, putting forward
different principles, became the origins of different legal Schools. Among these
principles it should be noted: the universal accord of scholars living at a given period
on a given question Ijma', common interest Maslaha, personal interpretation Ra'i, and
reasoning by analogy Qiyas. The different positions taken over these principles were
the origin of various Schools and everything was discussed, explained and argued over
vigorously. 70 There was unbounded work both in the sphere of the legal principles
(Usul al-Figh) and in that of casuistry which recalls that of the spiritual leaders: it was
exercised on numerous questions, some of which were vital for both themes.
In this connection, Madinah and Koufah were the most important cities in the
development of the Islamic Law. The former was an Arab city where some of the old
tribal and family bonds still survived, whereas the latter had come into being during the
Islamic period comprising of Arabs, Persians, and local Aramaic people who had come
together to form a new society held together by the common ideals of Islam. Yet, both
cities had been sites of early Muslim rule and provided the required background for
anyone who wanted to study the practices of the early Muslim community. From these
two cities, in fact, arose the first two founders of Sunni law, Malik Ibn Anas from
Madinah and Abu Hanifah from Koufah. These individuals established Schools of Figh
by making a careful study of the Qur'an and Hadith and the practices of the earlier
generations. Based on meticulous study, they composed Compendia of Law in which
69 Levy, Reuben, The Social Structure of Islam, 5" Edit., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979, p. 175.
70 Ibraheam, Mohammed Ismael, A 'emat Al-Madaheb Al-Arba 'ah, Dar Al-Fiker Al-Arabi, 1978, p. 29.
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the teachings of the Shari 'ah as they pertain to all aspects of life were delineated and
systematised:71
At this point there was still a need to have the principles and methods of
jurisprudence systematised and a final form given to the process of, promulgating the
Law. Such a need was fulfilled by Imam al-Shafei'i whose particular genius in this
domain gave to Sunni Islam the most satisfying, and one might say beautiful method of
jurisprudence. In the tradition of al-Shafei'i, who founded the third School of Sunni
Figh, there were students, each of whom emphasised a certain aspect of the sources of
the Shari 'ah. One was Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, whose School became the fourth accepted
School of Sunni Figh with its characteristic disdain of rationalist methods and
complete reliance upon Hadith literature.72
Of the four Schools of Sunni Figh, the one with the least number of followers is the
Hanbalite School. For a long time it had its centre in Egypt and Syria. It has been given
its supreme expression by the celebrated doctor and theologian Ibn Taymiyyah. From
this background the Wahabism* movement began. The Shafei'ite School has always
been strong in Egypt and to a certain extent in Syria. The Malikite School is
completely dominant in North Africa and its followers constitute the most
homogeneous body in the realm of Sunni Law. As for the Hanafite School, it was the
official School of the Ottomans and is widespread in Turkey, the eastern part of the
Arab world and the Indo-Pakistani sub-continent.73
There has been occasion to notice that the law-books of the four Schools became
the standard textbooks and any attempt to depart from them was denounced as
71 Nasr, Seyyed Hossein, Ideals And Realities Of Islam, Mandala, London, 1991, pp. 103-105.
72 Ibid.
* The founder of this sect was Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahhab who was born at `Ayyaynah in Najd. After having received careful
instruction in the doctrines of Islam according to the Himbalite School. He was convinced by what he had observed on his journeys to
Makkah, Basrah, and Baghdad of the laxities and superstitions of the Muslims that they had widely departed from the strict principles
of Islam, and that a return to the primitive teaching of their religion was required. AbdulWahhab then determined to become the
reformer of this corrupt Islam and to restore it to its early purity in conformity with the teachings of the original sources of Islam. His
teaching met with the acceptance of many, but it also raised the enmity of others, especially the ruler of the district, and compelled
him to flee to Der'aiyyh, where he obtained the protection of Muhammad Ibn Saud- the founder of the first Saudi State- a chief of = =
considerable influence, who himself embraced Wahhabism, and who, by marrying the daughter of Muhammad Ibn AbdulWahhab,
still further united the interests of his own family with that of the reformer and became the founder of the Wahhabite dynasty, which to
this day rules in Saudi Arabia. For more details see Stoddard, Lothrop, The New World Of Islam, Chapman and Hall Ltd.,
London, 1921, pp. 20-25.
73 Gibb, H. A. R., Mohammedanism, A History Survey, 2" Edit., Oxford University Press, New York, 1970, p. 70-71.
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innovation (Bid'a). By Ijma', the principles of the four Sunni Schools are substantially
the same. They differ from each other merely in matter of details. They are classed
together in contradistinction to the only other important existing School of Fiqh,
namely, the Shi .
2.4.1) The Hanafite School
This School drives its name from its founder Imam Abu Hanifah. His name is al-
No'aman Ibn Thabit Ibn Zoti al-Tamimi (702-772 AD) and born at Koufah in Iraq.
During his lifetime Abu Hanifah gathered about him a band of disciples who were to
become the nucleus of the earliest School of Muslim jurisprudence, which was known
after him as the Hanafite School of Fiqh. His writing was influenced by the Rationalists
group Ahl al-Ra . The followers of the Hanafite School are famous in the way they
derive the accurate meanings of the Qur 'anic texts, and recheck the unclear and un-
logical findings of other scholars and re-examine it logically before accepting it. This
School recognises only the continuous Hadith with well-known sources. They use
Analogy (Qiyas) and juristic Preference (Istihsan) therefore they elaborate judgement
(Ittihad) and using hypotheses to find solutions for difficulties.74
In applying the principle of Qiyas, they are not content to seek verbal resemblances
between the written provisions of the Qur 'an and those they desired to evolve, but
they endeavoured to penetrate behind the wording of the text to the 'I/la or motive, of
the provisions made. In the new application of the text, or in the law derived from it,
there must be the same 'Ilia as in the Q111" 'anic revelation or traditional usage.75
Imam Abu Hanifah was the first to use the lawful artifice, which was a result of the
wish to merge the needs of life with the religion. This procedure was familiar to the
Iraqi scholars who attached importance to the social and working life. 76
 He was,
moreover, the first to give prominence to the doctrine of analogy (Oi)'as), though, as a
principle of law, it was undoubtedly in practical operation before his time. Imam Abu
74 Ibraheam, Mohammed Ismael, A 'emat Al-Madaheb Al-Arba 'ah, Dar Al-Fiker Al-Arabi, 1978, pp. 57-63.
75 Ibn	 Tiki al-Dean Ibn Taqi Al-Dean, Jam ' Al-Jawami', Vol.!!, Matba'at Bulaq, Cairo, 1282 AH, p. 180.
76 Ibid.
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Hanifah extended the doctrine ofljrna ' beyond what many of the contemporaries were
willing to concede; and recognised the authority of local customs and usage (`Urf) as
guiding the application of law.77
It is worth mentioning that the most well known students of Abu Hanifah are Abu
Yusuf, Muhammad Ibn Hasan, Zafar Ibn Hadheal, and al-Hasan Ibn Ziyadah.
Additionally, of the four, Muhammad Ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani is the author of The
S'iyar of the Prophet which is considered as the first book written in Islamic history
regarding Islamic International relations. Abu Yusuf is well known as the first jurist
who wrote in Islamic literature on the connection of the Islamic State's internal and
financial policies.
2.4.2) The Malikite School
Malik Ibn Anas Ibn `Aamer (717-801 AD) is the founder of this School. He was
born at Madinah where he studied, taught, and did all his work. Imam Malik's aims
were similar to those of Abu Hanifah, and the results differ in details only. Throughout
this time, the study of the Hadith was the special feature of the Madinite scholars,
though it is not to be supposed that other jurists in any way overlooked or minimised
the importance of this subject which is one of the fundamental sources of the Islamic
Law. He is known as one of the leaders in the School of Rationalists, as teacher
Rabe'ah Ibn AbdulRahman. In his time, Imam Malik was looked upon as the highest
authority in Hadith and his fame in this respect has not suffered by the lapse of time.78
The methods are shown in Imam Malik's Al-Muwatta', a collection of Hadiths,
which is known as the first book written regarding both the science of Hadith and the
science of Figh Al-Muwatta' contains about three thousand Hadiths, local traditions
and customs organised under headings as a guide to legal decision. In his book Imam
Malik as usual states the case at issue, quotes the passage of the Qur 'an that applies,
and then cites the pertinent Hadiths. The latter may be omitted where the Qur'an
provides a clear, comprehensive and authoritative rule which covers the case. In this
77 M. A. Abdur Rahlm, The Principles ofMuhammadan Jurisprudence, Hyperion Press Inc. Westport, 1981, pp. 24-26.
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situation the Qur 'an does not require Prophetic Hadith for its content to be completely
explicit and its practical application certain. In the Maliki Fiqh, local traditions and
customs have played an important part when a Hadith was lacking. However, they
have persisted even when a Hadith on the point did exist and was apparently
decisive.79
The Malikite School is recognised for giving a great importance to Ijtihad based on
public welfare, as a basis of deduction. In the process they have elaborated their well-
known theory the so-called "The Unrestricted Interests and Welfare" (al-Maslaha al-
Mursalah)* and denote of a utility or benefit which was not revealed or provided for in
any explicit text and has been arrived at by derivation." Moreover, al-Maslaha al-
Mursalah is a very strong link with the so-called "legal policy" al-Siyasa al-
Shar 'aiyyah, which has been identified by the Muslim jurists such as Ibn `Aqeal and
Ibn Nojim as,
An attitude done by the Imam for the benefit of the Ummah which
does not have a legal decision neither in the Holy Qur'an nor in
the Sunnah. The decision is connected with the civil life of the
Muslims and is not applicable for all times, but changes from era
to era according to time and place."
Similar to Imam Abu Hanifah, Imam Malik had students who were very famous in
this School of Figh. Among them were AbdulRahman Ibn Qasim, Abdullah Ibn Wahb
Ibn Maslam, Ashhab Ibn Abdulaziz al-Qaysi, Abdullah Ibn al-Hakam al-Masri, Asbagh
Ibn al-Faraj al-Amawi, Muhammad Ibn Abdullah Ibn al-Hakam, and Muhammad Ibn
Ibrahim Ibn Ziyad.
78 Ibraheam, Mohammed Ismael, A 'emat Al-Madaheb Al-Arba'ah, Dar Al-Fiker Al-Arabi, 1978, pp. 67-94.
79 Ibid., pp. 86-87.
It is the same meaning of which used as al-Masaleh al-Mursalah
Ibraheam, Mohammed Ismael, A 'emat Al-Madaheb Al-Arba 'ah, Dar Al-Fiker Al-Arabi, 1978, pp. 67-94.
81 Al-Jawziyah, Muhammad Ibn Abu Bakr Ibn Al-Qayyim, A'alam al-Mawaqqean an Rabb al-Alamean, Vol. IV, Sharikat al-
Teba'ah al-Fanyali, Cairo, 1968, p. 372 & Ibn Najeam, Zain AI-Dean Ibn Ibrahim, Al-Bahr al-Ra 'iq, Vol. V, Dar al-
Ma'rifah, Beirut, p. 76.
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2.4.3) The Shafei'ite School
Muhammad Ibn Idris al-Shafei'i (772-826 AD) was born in Gaza in Palestine and
the Shafei'ite School of jurisprudence is associated with his name. Imam al-Shafei'i
began his studies with Imam Malik at Madinah and followed his studies by learning the
methods of Abu Hanifah from his disciple and younger colleague al-Shaybani.
Consideration of their systems led him to be dissatisfied with both; with Malik's for its
rigid adherence to tradition and with Abu Hanifah's for what he considered the
excessive scope for personal prejudices which If tihad allowed to the arbitrary decisions
of individual jurists. In his work Al-Risalah, the roots of jurisprudence were the
Qur 'an, the Sunnah, and Ijrna'. Because they were insufficient for all the requirements
of the law, al-Shafei'i found a fourth root in Qi yas, unlike the other Schools."
Imam al-Shafei'i attained greater eminence as a jurist than the master himself. He
was noted for his balance of judgement and moderation of view. Though reckoned
among the upholders of tradition, he examined the tradition more critically, putting a
more liberal and workable interpretation on the well-known dictum of the Prophet
saying "My People will never agree on an error".
Comparing Imam al-Shafei'i with his master Malik Ibn Anas, Imam al-Shafei'i
admits the needs to examine the different views of the Companions and to prefer the
one which suited the Qur 'an, the Sunnah, which made more use of Qiyas and allowed
greater scope to Ijma' . However, he agrees with Malik in adopting Istedlal as a fifth
source of the Islamic Law." Istedlal, moreover, means the inferring from a thing
another thing, but with Shafei'ite School it used as a distinct method of juristic
ratiocination, not falling within the scope of interpretation or analogy. Istedlal is of
three kinds: (1) The expression of the connection existing between one proposition and
another without any specific effective cause. This kind of Istedlal is of four varieties:
(a) when the connection is between two affirmative propositions; (b) when the
connection is between two negative oppositions; (c) when connection is between an
82 Al-Shafeig, Muhammad Ibn Idris, Al Risalah, Matba'at Al Halabi, Cairo, 1958 AH, p. 66.
83 Al-Ghazall, Muhammad, Al lvf ankhoul, Matba'at Al Halabi, Cairo, 1386 All, pp. 213-215, 229.
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affirmative and a negative proposition; (iv) when connection is between a negative
proposition and affirmative proposition. (2) A presumption that a state of things, which
is not proved to have eased, still continues, (3) The authority of revealed laws prior to
Islam.
The basics elements and the roots of the Imam al-Shafei'ite Fiqh were set out in his
famous work Al-Risalh, and applied clearly in his book Al-Umm. Among the students
of Imam al-Shafei'i were, Yusuf Ibn Yahya, Ismael Ibn Yahya al-Mizni, and Al-Rabe'a
Ibn Sulayman Al-Maradi. Imam al-Ghazali is considered as one of the famous disciples
of the Shafei'ite School of Figh.
2.4.4) The Hanbalite School
This School was founded by Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (782-859 AD). He was born
in Baghdad and studied under different masters, including Imam al-Shafei'i. He is more
learned in the tradition than in the science of law. As a theologian, his reputation stands
very high, and in the number of traditions that he recollected no one, even in that age,
could approach him. 84 In law, he adhered rigidly to the traditions, a much larger
number of which he felt himself at liberty to act upon than any other subject. His
interpretation of them was literal and unbending and according to some he allowed a
very narrow margin to the doctrines of agreement and analogy. 85 Ibn Hanbal's teaching
was systematised after him by his disciples. Therefore, a widespread following was
commanded by this school up to the 8th century AD. The numbers suffered a
continuous decline although a series of brilliant and sensational representatives of the
School of Figh appeared across the centuries.
The School of the Hanbalite relies for its thoughts, and legal opinions (Fatwas) on
five sequential principles. 86 These are:
1) A text from the Holy Qur'an or the Sunnah;
84 Ibid. p. 189.
85 Bad ran, AbdulQader Ahmed Mustafa, Madkhal ha Madhab al-Imam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal, Damascus, Chapter III, pp. 1-3.
86 Musa, Mohamed Yusuf Dr., Al-Amwal wa Nadhariyah al-Aqd fi al-Fiqh al-Islami, Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi, Cairo, 1996, pp.
86-87.
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2) A legal opinion of a Companion;
3) If the Companions legal opinions were various, it takes the nearest to
the Qur'an and the Sunnah;
4) It relies on the 'weak' unreliable Hadiths in preference to the Analogy
(Qiyas), where there is no other evidence to contradict it;
5) Analogy (Qiyas) is the final principle, which could be followed if the
previous form could not serve to produce a judgement.
Lastly, the work of Imam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal can be found in his book Al-Musnad,
which contains more than 40,000 Hadiths and is considered as one of the greatest
treatises in the science of Hadith. Among the most famous students of Imam Ibn
Hanbal were Abu Bakr Al-Kharasani, Ibrahim Abu Ishaq, and Umar Ibn Abe Ali Al-
Kharki. Among the famous disciples of this School of thought are Imam Ibn
Taymiyyah and his student Ibn al-Qayyim the author of the pioneer work A 'a/am al-
Mawaggean an Rabb al-Alamean.
2.5) Disagreement among the four Sunni Schools of Figh
Islamic legal historians have assumed that the extension of the Islamic Empire led to
the various circumstances, such as issues of personal and social concern, which had not
been known to happen during the time of the Prophet and thus there were no
indications for them neither in the Qur'an nor in the Sunnah. That encouraged Muslim
jurists to search, investigate, and issue their judgement. 87 Consequently, differences
arose among them, i.e. the Muslim jurists, in their efforts to explain and deal with the
new situations.* This disagreement was only in minor details and not related to the
major doctrines and dogma upon which the remained unanimously agreed upon.
Thus, there was no variance for the main issues Unification Towhead, Praying Sala
and numbers or times of it, Fasting Sawm and its mode and duration, Religious Purity
Taharah, Poor Tax Zaka and its rate, Pilgrimage Hajj and its ordinances, the Lawful
Halal and Forbidden Haram as mentioned in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Differences
arose, only, in the highly detailed descriptions of Worship Ibadat, Transactions
87 Al-Turld , Abdulah,Asbab Ikhtilaf al-Fogaha, Matba'at al-Sa'adah, Riyadh, 1974, p. 11.
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Mu 'amalat, Fixed penalties Hudud and Punishments Uqubat . 88 In this connection, A.
AbuSulayman noticed,
• . . although these Schools may be unified on the basic principles
of Islam (for instance, that the pillars of Islam are five, not four
or six) and may also be unified on basic philosophical and
theological issues, they do not take a unified position on all legal
opinions. 89
F. A. Klein drew an analogy with differences within Protestant Christianity,
There is between them about the same difference between the
Lutheran, Calvinistic and Zwinglian Schools in the Protestant
Church. Such differences are not, however, considered as defects
to be regretted or injurious to the system; but, on the contrary, as
advantages and mercies, as they leave more liberty to people to
follow their personal opinions and inclinations in matters of duty
and discipline."
Difference in matters related to legal decisions was based on sincerity and were not
due to any bias, hatred, or prejudice. Disagreement only paved the way for exchanging
views, mutual consultation in order to attain truth, unravel real meaning, and derive
laws and decisions from the Qur 'anic verses and the Sunnah."
However, a question can be raised here about the basic of difference between the
four Scholars? Jurists see that the following Our 'anic verse and the two Prophetical
Hadiths are the fundamental grounds of any differences among scholars:
(1 A * : ji411)
	 41 14j. j	 is-C4 .110. I ID,'
Allah desireth for you ease; He desireth not hardship for you.
(2:185)
And the Prophetic Hadiths
* For more discussion see the early works on this subject which hold the same title "Ikhtilaf al-Fuqaha" such as Ibn Jarear Al
Tabari, Abu J'afar Ahrnad Al-Tahawi, Ahmad Ibn Nasr Al-Marwazi; others such as "Kitab Al-lima 'a wa Al-Ilchtilaf "by Abu
AbdulRahman Al-Shafi'i, and "Kitab Al-lkhtilaf' by Ibn Jabir Al-Dawudi.
88	 ,	 •Ma S/111111, Muhammad Saghir, Disagreement of the Jurists, Islamic Research Institute, Islamabad, 1971, p. 3.
89 AbuSulayman, AbdulHamid A., Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations, International Institute of Islamic
Thought, Herndon, 1994, p. 8.
90 Klein, F. A., The Religion Of Islam, Kitab Bhavan, New Delhi, 1977, p. 35.
91 Abu Zahrah, Mohammed, Al Milklyyat wa Nadhariyat Al Aqd, Dar Al Ketab Al Hadeath, Kuwait, (D.N.S.) pp. 19-20.
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Smooth the way to your affairs and do not render them difficult.
The difference of opinion among my Ummah is a (Divine) mercy.
In view of these differences, Umar II put an outstanding explanation to both the
Qur 'anic verse and Hadiths, when he opined,
I do not like it that the companions of the Prophet should not
disagree, because were there is one view only, the people would
suffer hardship. Surely the companions are the leaders to be
followed up. If one follows the view of any of them, one follows a
desirable view. In other words, they opened the gate of making
endeavour for a reasonable view and allowed disagreement in
reasoning. God has enriched the Ummah with their different
views in the details of laws. Thus the door of reasoning has been
flung open to allow them enter into the Divine Mercy.92
Moreover, Umar II, due to his consideration of great differences of opinion between
the legal scholars on the various legal issues, and fear of the passing away of
knowledge as well as of scholars, underscored two measurements: (i) the practices
attributed to the Prophet Muhammad should be collected and written down.
Accordingly, people of every locality wrote down in books whatever they knew to be
part of the Siinnah; (ii) the authorised to issue verdict Fatwa in most district was
restricted to a few named people particular Ulama.93
Recent scholars agree that there are various causes, which related to the basic
differences among the four Sunni scholars. Mohammed Ibraheam summarises these
cases as follow:
1. The understanding of some Qur'anic or Hadiths enunciation was
different from one scholar to another, therefore, derivations of judgement
differ from one another.
92 Al-Shatibi, Ibraltetun Ibn Musa, .611-Ttisam, Vol. III, Maktabat Al Halabi, Cairo, p. 11.
93 Ibn Abdalbar, Yusuf Ibn Umar, Jami 'a Bayan Al 'Ahn, Vol. I, Matba'at Al-Muniriyyah, Cairo, p. 33.
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2. That the full text or part of it, of the Prophetic Hadith did not reach to
all Mujtahids or (the meaning) of the Hadith was not clear to some of
them.*
3. Some scholars, if they have no pre-judgement, they merge both Analogy
Qiyas and personal opinion Fatwa, others halt on the text of the Qur'an or
Hadith, and do not exercise Ijtihad 94
It is worth noting that differences in environment give rise to different rules of law,
and changing circumstances often necessitate a modification in a rule of law. The well-
known Shari 'ah principle states "change of laws because of change of circumstances
cannot be denied". 95 The classical example of that is shown in the writing of Imam al-
Shafei'i. Moving from Iraq to Egypt, Imam al-Shafei'i changed many of his legal
opinions, and a new School of Fiqh came about different from his old one in Iraq
through the jurist himself.96
Difference among the four Schools can be illustrated in the following instance. All
four Schools agree that within Islamic territory neither Jews nor Christians may erect
new places of worship in towns or large villages. Whether their erection is also
forbidden outside such centres of population is a question on which the Schools differ.
Malik, Shafei'i and Ibn Hanbal refuse to permit it anywhere; However, Abu Hanifah on
this question permits the erection of churches and synagogues, though at a distance of
at least a mile from the outer wall of towns and villages. On the question of the
restoration of dilapidated churches and synagogues, Abu Hanifah is joined by Malik
and Shafei'i in declaring it to be lawful, provided that the ground on which the building
stands were in the first place granted freely by the Muslim conqueror. If the ground
had originally been seized from Islam it would be against the law to permit its
restoration. Of Ibn Hanbal's view of the matter there are different versions. The one
best supported teaches that neither the restoration of partly dilapidated buildings used
*
It can be argued that: due to the slowness of the transition of information, many jurists gave religious verdicts on different aspects
and they abrogated later because of the advent of new testimony. Hence, it happened that some of the later verdicts were not
documented, therefore, initial verdicts may be relied on by some jurists.
94 Ibraheam, Mohammed Ismael, A 'emat Al Madaheb Al Arba'ah, Dar Al Filo.
 Al Arabi, 1978, p.29.
95 Yamani, Aiunad Zald, Islamic Law and Contemporary Issues, Elite Publishers Ltd., Karachi, 1966, p. 8.
96 Ibmheam, Mohammed Ismael, A 'mat Al-Madaheb Al-Arba 'ah, Dar Al-Fiker Al-Arabi, 1978, p. 113.
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for non-Muslim worship nor the rebuilding of totally ruined ones is ever permitted.
Another version permits the one but not the other, while the least credible version
allows both.97
The diversity of Figh judgements in the four law Schools raises the problem of how
an individual Muslim is able to live in accordance with the Shari 'ah when it is
interpreted/judged differently. In Sunni Islam, each Muslim belongs to one of the four
Sunni Schools and conduct himself in accordance with the Fiqh of that School.
However, he is not tied to it for life, he must never regard its judgements as infallible
and slavishly follow them." On the contrary, he is permitted to pass from one to
another and select between the Fatwas and views of the four Schools according to his
needs. In other words, the differences between the four Schools of law are not
reconciled at the level of Fiqh: rather, they are reconciled in practice by the lives lived
by individual Muslims.
2.6) The impact of the main origins Usu/ on the Muslim thoughts
It is one of the boasts of Islam that it does not countenance the existence of a
clergy, who might claim to intervene between God and man. True as this is, however,
Islam, as it became organised into a system, did produce a clerical class, which
acquired precisely the same kind of social and religious authority and prestige as the
clergy in the Christian communities. This was the class of the Ulama the religious
leaders. 99 Thus, they are the basis of the Islamic political structure; they are an
assemblage of individuals bound to one another by ties of religion. Within the entire
Muslim community Ummah, all are on an equal footing, there are no distinctions of
rank, colour and nationality only of function. Accordingly, God alone is the head of the
community, and his rules are direct and immediate; its internal organisation was
defined and secured by a common acceptance, and a common submission to, the
97 Al-Dimasliqi, Sadr al-Din, Kitab Ralunat al-Umam, quoted by Goldizher L, Z.D.M.G., xxxviii, pp. 673 o.w. in Reuben Levy,
The Social Structure of Islam, 2" Edit., University Press, Cambridge, 1957.pp. 184-185.
98 Al-Dahlavvi, WaleyAllah, Al-Insaffi Bayan Asbab al-lkhtilaf, 2" Edit., Dar I-Nafals, Beirut, 1978, pp. 98,100, 101.
99 Gibb, 11. A. R., Mohammedanism, An History Survey, 2" Edit., Oxford University Press, New York, 1970, p. 65.
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Divine Law and the temporal head of community. loo
 Obedience to rulers was laid
down in the Qur 'an,
(co	
. 41.4 j.4`11	 jij js9.41 1	 ai j4 .1141a, i 1jisl
	
.i Li
0 ye believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those
charged with authority among you. (4: 59)
The meaning of the word Islam is surrender and submission. The Holy Qur 'an
explains this,
• C.1.9-14.)0. 44)..9	 IP.;12	 ‘:Ii.9•4"11	 CJA 4"11 4-1,9	 41/ C.):0 J4111
(M' 	 }at. 31)
Do they seek for other than the religion of Allah? While all
creatures in the heavens and on the earth have, willing or
unwilling, bowed to his will (accepted Islam) and to Him shall
they all be brought back. (3: 83)
In the Sunnah the following Hadith insists that,
A Muslim has to listen to and obey (the orders of his ruler)
whether he likes it or not, as long as his orders do not involve
him in disobedience (to Allah); but if an act of disobedience (to
Allah) is imposed, he should not listen to it or obey it101
Religion in this context means practical life, behaviour and attitudes, and the way of
the Divine path. For Muslim the religion of God means the way of God with his
creation, with his essence of things. Here, it must be note that, the word "submits" has
many meanings, including acquiescence to compulsion by the will; submission in
worship is a means to the submission of servitude, because with it man removes the
illusion, thereby releasing himself from imprisonment to freedom, from ignorance to
knowledge, from unhappiness to happiness when he submits voluntarily to the
compulsion of the will, with the intelligence, understanding, and appreciation that
distinguishes him from inorganic matter.102
As was pointed out earlier, Islam is involved in all aspects of the Muslims lives; it
shapes government policies and activities, the state confers with the religious leaders
100 Bosworth, C. E. & Joseph Schacht, The Legacy of Islam, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1971, p. 405.
101 Matraji, Malunoud, Translation ofSaheh al-Bzikhari, Vol. IV, Dar Al-Fikr, Beirut, 1993, pp. 167-168.
102 'paha, Matunoud Mohammed, The Second Message ofIslam, Syracuse University Press, New York, 1987, p. 115.
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and institutions to perpetuate Islamic polices, foreign affairs are influenced by the
ideas, principles and values of the Islamic religion. What is more important is that
Islam gives the Islamic government the ideological rationalisation for both its internal
and external policies. In the word of Edwin Rosenthal,
Islamic law does not differentiate between authority and power.
There is no rival claim between the divine law of the church and
the law of the state because Islam knows only one law, the
divinely revealed Shari 'ah, which holds sway over political life
no less than over social, economic and cultural life. Life is one
and indivisible; religion pervades and determines all its aspects.
The whole of life is ordered by the religious, all-embracing
divine law. The authority and validity of this law were never
questioned by any effective Muslim ruler, no matter what his own
practice was. He could not abrogate the religious law, though he
might at times set it aside. The unchallenged exercise of political
power could not clear him from offences against the Shari'ah. 103
Islam, by itself, is a diffuse and equivocal term. It is used both by outside observers
and members of the Muslim community to refer to personal Faith, theological
doctrine, cultural attitudes, and patterns of everyday behaviour (both normative and
actual). These various aspects of Islam can be comprehended in a simple and
analytically more adequate way by saying that Islam may influence political values (and
hence political behaviour) on three levels: (i) as a religion, strictly speaking - for
instance, as a system of theological belief and transcendentally — which fixes ethical
duties; (ii) as an ideology; (iii) as a symbol of cultural identity. It is the interaction of
these three models of religion, which produces a distinctive religious- political
orientation. 104
2.7) Islamic Law Shari'ah and contemporary issues
From time to time, it happens that some scholars, who are concerned about the
subject of Shari 'ah fail to distinguish between what it is purely religious and the
principles of secular transactions in Shari 'ah . Though, both are derived from the same
source, the latter principles have to be viewed as a system of civil law, based on public
103 Rosenthal, Erwin I. J., Political Thought In Medieval Islam, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1985, pp. 22-24.
104 Michael, Curtis, Religion and Politics in the Middle East, Westview Press, Boulder, 1981, p. 288.
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interest and utility, and therefore are always evolving and ideally improving. The
religious element serves as a model code of ethics, the purpose of which is to
strengthen secular principles, by giving them a sense of dependence on divine
guidance, and creating a subconscious respect for compliance. Despite its apparent
rigidity, Muslim law itself continues to develop as society changes, through the
provision of Fatwas (legal opinions) on request by the Ulama and through the
voluminous jurisprudential writings of many scholars.
It is well-known that in every science and sphere of life, there are issues that
naturally accept development which some times require it in order to realise their full
potential, although, there are other themes which are fixed and immutable. According
to the logic of Shari 'ah, the two must be integrated. Shari 'ah, on one hand, has fixed
rules which are unchangeable, such as the punishments that are laid down in the
Qur 'an and the Sunnah for specified major crimes such as theft, adultery, and murder.
On the other hand, there are rules relying on continual development and renewal; this
was clear from the discussion of ljtihad, and will come into view clearly when we
examine the public interest and welfare theory.
It has already been argued that the main source of the Fiqh is the Holy Qur 'an,
Allah has not always revealed legal issues in detail, but the basis for them have been
revealed. Moreover, the actual details will vary a little from one nation to another
according to time and place. Fiqh does not deal with these details; it is not the science
of applying the Shari 'ah to situations or in circumstances where the law lacks detail.
That specification is performed by various authorities, according to the matter at issue.
For example, the Holy Qur 'an did not mention in detail the right form of government
or way of organising ruling in all states (not just in the Islamic State) or how to
select/elect the rulers. It only mentioned the basis of what any state has to rely upon -
that the government must be just and therefore will be the same worldwide. The Holy
Qur 'an decided justice in
(0 A
	 .	 1 JAIAL jS 0.g1./11 c:hp.	 j
And when ye judge between people that ye judge with justice. (4:
58)
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And consultation in
(1 o° : (:)1 . j..2 A . ,).4(11
And consult them in affairs ... (2: 159)
And Equality in
(1 . :c.'11.)+.a.II) . S j.i.) c:j j1.4.).41114
The believers are but a single Brotherhood... (49: 10)
No further details are given and the decision-makers must decide the most suitable
systems for their needs, though during the Abasside Empire a scholar like Al-Mawardi
offered advice on the best way to organise the Islamic State. Similarly, the Holy
Qur 'an detailed specific punishments for only five kinds of crime. These are: the
crimes of waging war against Allah and his Messenger; striving with might and main
for mischief through the land; killing innocent people; slandering chaste, women
believers; adultery; and theft. For all other crimes the Holy Qur 'an did not determine
any punishment but left it to those who are in authority, such as judges and heads of
state, according to what they see is suitable to provide security and deter criminals.
Naturally, this will differ at different times and in different places, except that Allah
leads people to a general rule that punishment has to be equal to the crime committed
( 1 VI :3.111) . 4.4 :A.,' i jc LI SA.4.1 li.A.Li '.i.iil.c (19
And if ye punish, let your punishment be proportionate to the
wrong that has been done to you ... (16: 126)
And
( 1 ct t :S JL. I1) . 4. a a sla1 1..4 j.1.44 44,1c I JX1cli 44 aXIDI cj.,Li
. . . there is the law of equality, if then any one transgresses the
prohibition against you, transgress ye likewise against him ... (2:
194)
So, for example, the payment of blood money is part of the subject matter of Fig/7,
but jurists do not determine its amount for males and for females, nor whether it is the
same for believers and unbelievers, in what currency its is to be paid, and so on. All
these details are settled by judges, rulers and similar officials.
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In foreign relations, the Holy Qur'an formalised Muslim relations with others
(unbelievers) under the following verse
	
16 ..9.)45	 c.IJA	 el.9111:4	 (:.):1.111 CP'	 414-1:1.
(:),J, :511 Cp	 S1..4.1..A. L4.31 	
	  yai 41 (*.II *1.3) 1.313.41.1
	
S--1A	 --A-0,0:1 C.31 4+1 .)i) LsID 1.3.)411_,
0—ts	 . co.zulls ./4 as! jti
Allah forbids you not, with regard to those who fight you not for
your Faith nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing kindly
and justly with them: for Allah loveth those who are just. Allah
only forbids you, with regard to those who fight you for your
Faith, and drive you out of your homes, and support others in
driving you out from turning to them (for friendship and
protection), it is such as turn to them (in this circumstances), that
do wrong. (60: 8-9)
The Holy Qur 'an did not mentioned details in regarding to the public affairs,
because it gives the ability to each nation to distinguish its systems according to its
needs and interests, provided it never transgresses against the Qur 'anic teachings.
Although Fiqh is not concerned with the details of applying the Shariah, it is
concerned with formulating the legal rules of the Shari'ah as they apply to new
situations which Islam has never previously encountered. H. Lammens has explained
the dynamic quality of Fiqh to meet with new and modern issues which were not
mentioned in the Our 'an or the Sunnah when he says,
Sunni jurists had come to complete and explain the Qur'an, so
experience compelled Muslims to recognise that the Fiqh could
not dispense with the operations of logic. It was admitted that it
had become lawful to settle new cases by applying to them the
rules lied down to meet analogous circumstances. It is thus that
Qiyas or analogy became a new route of the Islamic law. A
fourth is called Ijma' or consent. In the absence of any `nass' or
text in the Ijma' the creators of the Fiqh were obliged to have
recourse to the light of Ra'y or liberty of opinion. But it was
tacitly understood that such recourse would be exceptional and
would not render Ra'y worthy to be considered as a fifth rout.105
105 Lanunens, H., Islam, Belief and Institutions, rd Edit., Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., London, 1968, p. 83.
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To meet the needs of the contemporary world and such new phenomena as organ
transplants and in-vitro fertilisation, and due to the realisation that it may be difficult, at
the present time, to find a scholar who is a legal authority on the interpretation of the
sources in his own right able to pass the judgements on issue, the Organisation of
Islamic Conference (OIA) established the Islamic Jurisprudence Council (IJC) in 1983
in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, consisting of Muslim jurists of the highest knowledge level in
both the sciences of the Shari 'ah and the detailed source evidence in order to provide
Islamic rulings on such matters as has already been noted)" Consequently, Figh has a
dynamic, progressive character through DC ruling on new phenomena, analogical
reasoning Qiyas and juristic consensus Ijma'. As a result, it can be argued that the gate
of ljahad (legal judgement opinion) has been reopened.
2.8) Public interest and welfare Maslaha
Public interest and welfare Maslaha was regarded by the Malikite School as a
source of the law. It is, moreover, predicated on the premise that one purpose of the
law is to serve man's best interests, and to promote his well-being and welfare in this
world and in the next. Although these serious purposes remain the basis of the manner
of interpretation they can accommodate some unusual rulings and the implications of
unfettered recourse to Maslaha which have led to theoretical -and practical-
limitations. 107 Excluding for the moment the rules governing devotional rituals, almost
all judgements and principles in the Qur'an and Sunnah are based on direct interests to
the community and intended as the Prime Legislator. In this sense Ibn al-Qayyim, in his
way defines Shari 'ah,
It is a system based on the welfare of the individual in the
community both in his everyday life and in his anticipation of the
life thereafter. It is all justice, all compassion, all benefits, and
all wisdom; thus any principles which become unjust,
1 06 Publication of the Muslim World League, The Muslim World League and its Organisation, MWL Press, Makkah, 1988,
PP. 25-30.
107 Bannerman, Patrick, Islam in Perspective, Routledge, London, 1988, p. 39.
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uncompassionate, corrupt and futile is not a part of Shari 'ah;
however, therein by false interpretation.108
The adoption of public interest and welfare, as a source of legislation, is almost
unanimously consented to Muslim jurists. Some minority of Muslim jurists assailed this
theory, such as the Shafei'ites. Nonetheless, they fully implemented it by different
methods and/or under different descriptions. Imam al-Ghazali of the Shafei'ite School,
for instance, defined it as,
The furthering of the manfa'a [interests] and the averting of
mafsada [evil], but in broad sense it is the ultimate purpose of
the Share 'a [the legislator], consisting of the maintenance of
religion, life, offspring, reason and property. Anything which
furthers these aims is Maslaha, and anything which runs contrary
of them is mafsada.1°9
In connection with this, the application of public interest to supersede a revealed
provision is one of the most exciting and important matters facing Shari 'ah. Jurists
were cautious in their espousal of the proposition and only in the Hanbalite doctrine
was it fully accepted. no
 The history of the Islamic jurisprudence Figh contains various
examples of cases which were governed at one time by an explicit provision either
from the Qur'an or the Sunnah, and then subsequently decided, as against the
provision in accordance with the public interest considerations. There is a real conflict
among Muslim jurists as to the permissibility of such a process.
Caliph Umar I, for instance, provided the first example for such conflict by deciding
certain cases differently from what has been revealed, due to certain changes that took
place in the Islamic community after the death of the Prophet; when he cancelled the
particular share in alms. This group mentioned in the Holy Qur 'an,
yL-1	 Li1).4.11	 L4:11
( .1	 411	 c.,41..9
108 Ibn AI-Qayyim Al-Jawziyah, Muhammad Ibn Abu Bahr, iralam al-Mawaggean an Rab al-Alcnnean, Vol HI, Sharekat
Al l'eba'ah Al-Fanyah, Cairo, 1968, p.1- o.w.
109 Al-Ghazall, Muhammad Ibn Muhanmtad, Al-Mustasfi, Vol. I, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1995, pp. 139-140.
110 Houtsma, Martijn Theodor, The Encyclopedia ofIslain, Vol. VI, E. J. Brill Ltd., Leyden 1913, p. 739.
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Alms are for the poor and the needy, and those employed to
administer the (funds): for those who hearts have been recently
reconciled to truth. (9: 60)
The Prophet, in the early period of Islam, wanted those whose hearts has been
reconciled to truth to adhere to Islam either by weaning them from their hostility, or by
buttressing their Faith, therefore he gave them a share in alms, and later the Qur'an
confirmed his attitude. After his cancellation of the share of this group in alms, Caliph
Umar I replied to those who appealed for these alms,
This was something that the Messenger of God used to give you
in order to bring you nearer to Islam; and now since God had
brought power and dignity to Islam we need not wean you from
your hostility. Either you stay in Islam or the sword is between
us. We do not give for Islam anything, those who want to believe
can do so and those who want to remain without faith can do
so.111
Jurists of the Malikite School adopted a moderate position in assigning priority to
public interest if the significance or the authority of the provision under consideration
is not certain and can be questioned. The Malikites, for instance, assume that if there
was a Qur 'anic provision which was in conflict with the particular public
consideration, and the significance of that provision was not certain or could not be
definitely interpreted, one can then either dispense with the text or interpret it in such a
way that it coincides with the interest consideration and blends with 4.112
However, Imam al-Tufl adopted the most extreme position in maintaining that
public interest supersedes and takes precedence over explicit provision even if revealed
by Qur'an and Sunnah. Imam al-Tufi argued,
In case of conflict between a public interest consideration and a
revealed provision, the former has priority, no matter how
authoritative the provision is.113
111 Ibn Sallam, Alm `Ubayd al-Qaslm, Al-Amwal, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1975, p. 722.
112 AI-Shatibi, Ibraheam Ibn Musa, Al-Posam, Vol II, Malctabat Al Halabi, Cairo, p. 311.
113 Al-Tufl, Najm AL-Dean, Tafsear, Al-Manar, Vol. IX, Dar Al Fikr, Beirut, 1995, p. 18.
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Al-Tufi, moreover, reasoned that the public interest is the intent and the end sought
by the Prime Legislator, revealed provisions and other sources are only means to
achieve those ends, and ends should always supersede the means.114
In addition to those jurists who maintained that: explicit revealed provisions can be
modified and sometime superseded if in conflict with public interest, there were some
jurists who maintained that: if the text was based on a custom and that custom has
changed then the text has to follow suit and be modified accordingly. Imam Abu
Yusuf, of Hanafite School and the author of Kitab al-Kharaj, adopted this theory. For
example, barley was once measured by volume because such was the custom at the
time of the Prophet. It changed subsequently at Abu Yusur s time when barley was
measured by weight. Along with that assumption, Imam Al-Qurafi, of Hanafite School
and the author of Al-Furuq, agreed with Abu Yusuf, and maintained that every
principle in Shari 'ah based on custom can be changed or modified when such custom
is changed.H5
Muslim jurists assumed that a judgement is dependent on its attribute in the matter
that gives rise to the judgement, 'Illa, that it only came into being with it and
disappeared without it. Muslim jurists differentiated between 'Illa and Hikmah, the act
of wisdom, of principle. Al-Shawkani mentioned,
Vila is what can be objectively ascertained and measured, while
Hikmah is the value judgement and the understanding reason for
the principle.n6
According to the general principles of Shari 'ah, and by virtue of what various
jurists said as to the importance of public interest, it seems that the differentiation
between the ' Illa and the Hikmah is only relevant in matters of devotional rituals. In
matters of secular and commercial transaction, it could be said that: a judgement is
dependent on its Hikmah, underlying subjective reason, coming into being with it, and
disappearing without it.
114 Ibid.
115 Mahmasant, Subhl, Philosophy ofJurisprudence in Islam, Beirut Publication House, Beirut, 1965, p. 212.
116 Al-Shawkani, Muhammad Ali, Nayl al-Awtar, Vol. VI, AI-Maktaba Al-Islamy, Beirut, 1982, p. 73.
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2.9) Islamic Law Shari'ah and modern International Law
As it has been noted earlier, Islamic Law (Shari 'ah) is derived from the Qur 'anic
injunctions, therefore, it deals with all aspects of Muslims life, for example: marriage
and all of its various modes of dissolution, contracts, loans, punishments for crime
wills, inheritance, equity, fundamental human rights, laws of war and peace, judicial
administration. A part of his duty, the Prophet, through his Sunnah, explained and
translated into practice all these injunctions. The Shari 'ah, moreover, has enshrined in
itself the principles of Islamic international law right from its inception after the
Prophet migration Hijrah, it regulated the conduct and behaviour of the Muslim
community in war, peace, and neutrality.
The general concept of international law restricts its jurisdictional application to
nations only (recently, international law has been extended to NGO's and since the
Bernadotte case in Palestine, 1948, to individuals). 117 But the concepts of Islamic
international law in the Shari 'ah regulated not only the conduct of the Muslim State
with other states, but also its relationship to non-Muslim states, groups like tribes and
religious communities, and to non-Muslim subjects living in the Muslim state. The
object was to enlarge the concepts of Islamic international law to encompass all public
functions conducted by the state or its citizens in any intercourse not necessarily
subject to private resolutions in the performance of the public needs or functions. In
the words of M. Hamidullah,
When Islam came and founded a State of its own, the earliest
name given by Muslim writers to the special branch of law
dealing with war, peace and neutrality seems to have been Siyar,
the plural form of Sirat, meaning conduct and behaviour.118
According to al-Sarkhasi, the word Sirat when it is used without adjective means
the conduct of the Prophet more especially in his wars, and later it came to be used for
the conduct of Muslim rulers in international affairs. 119 Comparing the Science of Al-
_
117 statan,Hanuned,Ahkatn al-Qanoun al-Dowali fi al-Share 'oh al-Islamiyyah, Dar al-Nandha, Cairo, 1970, p. 178.
118 Damidullah, Muhammad, The Muslim Conduct of State, Sh. Muhanunad Ashraf, Lahore, 1977, p. 9.
119 Al-Sarkhasi, AbuBaltr Muhammad, ill-Muheat, Vol. I, Dar Ellya' Al-Kotoub Al Arabiah, Cairo, 1957, p. 567.
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Siyar with the works of European jurists of the Early Modern Age like Grotius and
Puffendorf one can notices that they intentionally excluded the Muslims from all
community of interest in the Christian Nations of Europe. Their law originated in the
necessity of regulating the relations of the new sovereign states, which arose because
of the urgent need of temporal unity of Christendom. 120
The later European jurists, out of necessity, thought that international law was
limited to Christendom only, and then enunciated its broad principles to include others
as well. It is from the point of view of some Muslim scholars that these European
principles were just echoes of the time. Moreover, their human modifications for
civilisation came only after they intensively borrowed Islamic principles by the impact
of Muslim Spain, the Crusades and earlier Ottomans. 121
Consequently, it has to be pointed out that, on one hand, the term Siyar was used
by both historians and linguists to designate the life of the Prophet Muhammad. The
term itself acquired later the restricted sense of the conduct of the Prophet in his wars,
and later still the conduct of Muslim rulers in international affairs, and specifically in
their dealings with non-Muslims. When formulated as a body of legal rules, Siyar is a
branch of the Shari 'ah to organise the relationships between the Muslims and non-
Muslims. It is part of the Shari 'ah which rules relationships between human beings as
distinct from that part which governs relationships between believers and Allah, Its
foundation is the Qur 'anic distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims. Allah has
said
c:1.9-1.4.:911. ..9 .)--SIAn CP (a.94:15.9 4.9,-414 c:i..9JAL c..)41111 ,=+)ii Li
di) • (15.1-Lin •:4 j.si..9 a..4 .:9All *IA e.414 1.),11 .J111,-,cusl JAS c3•Z ,s1.3 41•••n
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Ye are the best of People, evolved for mankind. Enjoining what is
right and forbidden what is wrong, and believing in Allah. If only
the People of the Book had faith, it were best for them: among
them are some who have faith, but most of them are perverted
transgressors. (3: 110)
120 Qadri, Anwar Ahrnad, Islamic Jurisprudence in the Modern World, Lahore, 1973, pp. 277-278.
121 Ibid.
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In this single verse is contained the basis of Islamic international law and Islamic
international relations theory, namely, the religious distinction between the Islamic
Ummah, based on belief in Allah (AIL.,	 and implementation of His law (Ciii..11
..)--ciA.11 CP asizu on the one hand, and unbelievers who do not adhere to Islamic
law, on the other hand. 122 Since every part of the Qur'an is a source of Shari 'ah, it
follows that Siyar and the fundamental conception of Islamic international relations
theory is this element of the Shari 'ah.
2.10) Summary and conclusion
The single most important finding in this chapter is the comprehensive nature of
Islamic law (Shari 'ah). It is concluded that it covers all relations between human
beings in addition to all human relations with Allah. Part of this body of law governs
relations between Muslims and non-Muslims and this is the subject matter of Islamic
international law and of Islamic international relations. The foundation of both was this
religious distinction drawn in several places in the Holy Qur'an. The Islamic
international law is frequently term Siyar. It governs Muslim/non-Muslim relationships
between states, individuals and groups in contrast with Western international law
which is largely concerned with inter-state relations and, more recently and to a much
smaller extent, relations between the state and NGO's and between the state and
individuals.
A second major conclusion is the distinction made between the Shari 'ah and Fiqh.
Shari 'ah is the Divine Will revealed to the Prophet Muhammad pertaining to the
conduct of human life in this world (i.e. human relations with Allah and with each
other). Fiqh is the science of deducing and extrapolating rules and injunctions from
their sources in the data of revelation. The Holy Qur'an, the Prophetic Sunnah, are
recognised as the sources of the Shari 'oh. Together with consensus (Jjma) and
analogy (Qiyas) they constitute the main sources of Fiqh, the body of rules and
injunctions deduced from the Qur'an and the Sunnah. All remaining conclusions are
related to either the Shari 'oh or Fiqh and will be discussed accordingly.
122 Khallf, Ab4WWahab, A I-Siyasyah al-Shar 	 Al-Matba'ah al-Salafyah, Cairo, 1350 All, pp. 64-67.
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Taking the Shari 'ah conclusion first, the crucial finding was that the history of the
Shari 'ah law divided into four periods. Between 622-632 AD all legal rules Ahkain
inclusive of all its classifications were constituted. After this legislative period came the
collection period from 632-717 AD. In this period interpretation and extension of the
laws are made and the sciences of Hadith and Fiqh were improved by the Sunni jurists.
In the next, theoretical, period from 722-822 AD the four Sunni Schools of
jurisprudence were established. Finally, from 822 AD onwards Muslim jurists have
been engaged within the limits of each law School to develop the work of its founders.
The remaining conclusions all relate to Fiqh. During the second period of the
history of the Shari 'ah, the Islamic Empire extended to its largest level which resulted
in new, unprecedented problems arising which had never occurred at the time of the
Prophet and therefore for which no indications existed in the Qur 'an and Sunnah. In
the absence of these sources Muslim jurists nevertheless issued their judgements and
consequently differences arose among them. In the third period, these differences were
consolidated as the four Sunni Schools of Fiqh: the Hanafite, the Malikite the
Shafei' ite, and the Hanbalite which were recognised as the main Schools in the Sunni
Fiqh. Their differences were only on doubtful points and concerned (often minute)
details Worship lbadat, Transactions Mu 'arnalat, Fixed penalties Hudud and
Punishments Uqubat. Apart from differences over these four matters, there were
differences in style between these Schools of law. The Hanafite School is marked by
broad-mindedness without being lax, it likes to appeal to reason (personal judgement,
quest for the better, and so on). The Malikite School stresses a broad appeal to the
principle of general utility, evoking among some people the idea of the common good.
The Shafei'ite School attempts to combine tradition and the consensus of the Muslim
community (rather than the consensus of individual scholars) and results in a broad
recourse to reasoning by analogy. Lastly, the Hanbalite School is marked by a return to
a strict traditionalism.
On of the significant later differences between the Schools of law discussed in this
chapter was whether there are other secondary sources of the Shari 'ah, notably ljtihad
and the public interest. However, by the time of the death of the last of the four
founders of the four Sunni Schools of Fiqh, ljahad was gradually abandoned in favour
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of imitation Taglid, or submission to the canons of the four Schools: the gate of ljtihad
was closed. This led to permanent difficulties, which has affected the role of Islam not
only in the non-Muslim culture inside the Muslim State but worldwide.
The other major difference that was examined was whether public interest and
welfare are a secondary source of legislation. Muslim jurists almost unanimously
consented to public interest and welfare as such sources. A minority of them assailed
this theory, notably the Shafei'ites. Nonetheless, they fully implemented it by different
methods and/or under different descriptions. Jurists of the Malilcite School adopted a
moderate position in assigning priority to public interest if the significance or the
authority of the provision under consideration is not certain and can be questioned.
The Malikites assumed that if there was a Qur 'anic provision which was in conflict
with the particular public consideration, and the significance of that provision was not
certain or could not be definitely interpreted, then either the text could be dispensed
with or it could be interpreted in such a way as to coincide with the public interest and
blend with it. In accordance with the general principles of Shari 'ah, and by virtue of
what jurists have said concerning the importance of public interest, it has been
concluded that in matters of secular and commercial transaction, a judgement is
dependent on its Hikmah (underlying subjective reason). It comes into being with a
Hikmah and disappears without one.
While the four Schools of law were in fundamental agreement their differences in
Figh were never resolved by them. Instead, it was concluded, the individual Muslim
reconciles them in practice by choosing which rulings to follow in his life.
The final conclusion relates to the dynamic character of Fiqh. Through the use of
analogy Qiyas, in particular, a juristic consensus Ijma' was able to arise over how the
Shari 'ah applied to new situations or phenomena, such as organ transplants. A recent
development has been the Islamic Jurisprudence Council consisting of expert Muslim
jurists of the highest level of knowledge in both the sciences of Shari 'ah and detailed
source evidence in place of the judgements of a single jurist. These new juristic rulings
are evidence of the dynamic and progressive character of Fiqh, for Figh changes by
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way of expansion in applying the Shari ' ah to what is new. As a result, it can be argued
that the gate of 	 (legal judgement/opinion) has been reopened.
Following on from these conclusions, in the next chapter the nature of Islamic
international relations will be examined, both in its juristic formulation in terms of the
domains of Islam, war and truce treaty, and as a normative theory based upon the
Qur 'anic distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims.
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3.1) Introduction
In the previous chapter, it has been concluded that the religion of Islam is not simply
a system of beliefs, but also a way of life. It is an ideology, which governs the
behaviour of people and their institutions. The implementation of the Islamic teachings
is best illustrated by the manner in which the first Muslim community was established
and governed by the Prophet. Islam, moreover, contains diverse elements all bound
together in a certain unity of outlook by the common belief in God and his Prophet.
The Holy Qur 'an, combined with the exemplary life of the Prophet and his authentic
traditions, served as the main sources of the Shari'ah, from which is derived group
roles and regulations. The Shari 'ah, it was argued, provided a comprehensive guide to
human action on earth; nothing is omitted from the Divine law. For example, Islam,
unlike other religions, does not prescribe the separation of religion from politics. Ann
Lambton, for instance, writes:
In Islam, the antithesis between the individual and the state or
the government is not recognised, and no need is therefore felt to
reconcile and abolish this antithesis. Islam knows no distinction
between state and church.'
Within the Islamic Law, Muslims have rules that deal with all constitutional and
legal issues. As such, it is treated as the only legally acceptable code. Consequently to
the devout Muslim, there can be only one legitimate rule that is Islam, and there can be
no disjunction between political and religious discourse. Indeed, devout Muslims argue
that Islam is a complete social, political, legal and cultural system which means that the
Islamic international relations is a part of this body of law.
The major characteristic of Islamic international relations, it will be argued, is that
they cover all relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. 2
 The Shari'ah law
applicable to these relations bound and united all Muslims in their attitude and
behaviour towards non-Muslims. In other words, not only does it cover the relations
between the Islamic State (a single Islamic State being the postulate of classical Fiqh)
1 Lambton, Ann K. S., State and Government in Medieval Islam, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985, p. XV.
2 Kludlf, AbdulWahab, Al-Siyasyah al-Shar'iyah, Al-Matba'ah al-Salafyah, Cairo, 1350 AIL p. 64. Khalif suggests this idea
that the distinction of religion is the basis of Islamic international relations, but in his book the idea is neither developed fully nor
systemised. Both are attempted in this thesis.
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and non-Islamic states, but also it governs relations between the Islamic State and
infidel non-state groups and individuals. Even this does not exhaust the content of the
Islamic international relations, for it also includes the laws relating to transactions
between Muslims and non-Muslims at the individual and group levels.'
This interpretation of Islamic international relations theory differs from the version
that is found in classical Figh which is organised around the concepts of the domain of
Islam or peace (Dar al-Islam) and the domain of hostility or war (Dar al-Harb), with a
third domain being added later, the domain of pledge (Dar al-Sulh). An exposition of
this juristic theory will be given in this chapter, but it will be argued that it cannot
adequately account for treaty relations with both permanent and temporary residents of
Dar al-Islam and is not founded on the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah. Only on the view
that Islamic international relations are external to the Muslim Ummah and between
Muslims and non-Muslims are such treaties fully intelligible since in one of the two
cases the treaty is with non-Muslim citizens of the Islamic State.
This approach to international relations differs considerably from Western
international relations theory. As in the case of (Western origin) international law, the
various forms of Western international relations theory have been traditionally based
upon nation states as the unit of analysis with their inter-relations as the subject matter
of this theory. In its earlier formulation, it is true that Western international relations
theory and international law were applicable in full only to the Christian nation states.
As the scholar James Lorimer4 argued the human race divided into three spheres,
I) That of civilised humanity;
2) That of barbarous humanity;
3) That of savage humanity.
Lorimer argued each sphere was entitled respectively to plenary political
recognition, partial political recognition, and natural or more human recognition.
3 Badran, Badran Abu al-'Aynayn, Al- Alaqat al-Iftima'ayah byn al-Muslemean wa Ghayr al-Muslemean fi al-Share'ah, Dar
al-Nandha, Beirut, 1984. passim.
4 Lorimer, James, Institutes of the Law of Nations, in Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law ofIslam, John Hopkins
Press, Baltimore, 1979, pp. 282-283.
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Islamic countries were in the second sphere and consequently entitled to partial
recognition.
The sphere of partial political recognition extends to Turkey in
Europe and in Asia, and to the old historical states of Asia which
have not become European dependencies-viz., to Persia and the
other separate states of Central Asia, to China, Siam, and
Japan. 5
Only human beings in the first sphere of full political recognition were part of the
international order, or, as Lorimer stated, have attained the nobleness of affiliation of
the family of nations, and are subject to international law because they enjoy rights
which conserve its rules. However, over the past three centuries Islamic states have
been fully accepted into the system of international law and are equally subjects of
international relations theory. In recent years, Western international relations theory
has been widened to include not just relations between nation states but also between
them and certain groups, such as multi-national corporations, and in a few cases with
individual persons. Therefore, there is nothing which corresponds to Islam's
fundamental division between Muslims and non-Muslims in Western international law
and international relations theory.
Two further key arguments will be put forward in this chapter. Firstly, the argument
that Islam is based on a system of supremacy and subjection and that in order to
propagate its mission Muslims have declared war on all communities and nationalities
until Islam rules over the entire world, will be challenged. Joseph Schacht, for
instance, argues that,
The basis of the Islamic attitude towards unbelievers is the law of
war; they niust be either converted or subjugated or killed
(excepting women, children, and slaves); the third alternative, in
general, occurs only if the first two are refused. 6
It will be shown that the relationship between the Muslims and non-Muslims in not
always conceived as a hostile one as Schacht suggested.
5 Ibid., p. 282.
6 Schacht, Joseph, An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford University Press, London, 1975, p. 130.
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Secondly, this chapter questions the viewpoint advanced by Majeed Khadduri, who
argues that,
The Islamic theory of international relations is to be found
neither in the Holy Qur'an nor in the Prophet Muhammad's
utterances.'
Against Khaduri, it will be argued that the Islamic International relations is part of
the Shari 'ah which is derived primarily from the Qur 'an and Sunnah and is formulated
in terms of a fundamental dichotomy between Muslims and non-Muslims. However,
this dichotomy itself pre-supposes the fundamental Islamic belief in Towhead or the
unity of God, the unity of humanity, and the unity of Divine laws.
3.2) Monotheism al-Towhead
The three unities — of God, of humanity, and of Divine laws — are the very essence
of Islam. It is, therefore, of fundamental importance to examine these in order to gain
an understanding of Towhead and its relevance to the Islamic conception of
international relations.
a. The unity of God. Islam declares that there is no god but God. It is the
fundamental principle of the monotheistic religion and the font of the Message of the
Prophet Muhammad. 8
 According to the tradition of Islam, moreover, God is not only
the Creator but also the Sustainer of human beings.
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Your Guardian Lord is Allah, Who created the Heavens and the
Earth in six Days, then He settled Himself on the Throne: He
draweth the night as a veil O'er the day, each seeking the other in
rapid succession: and the Sun, the Moon, and the Stars, all are
subserviant by His Command, verily, His are the Creation and the
Command Blessed be Allah, the Cherisher and Sustainer of the
Worlds. (7: 54)
7 Khadduri, MaJid, The Islamic Theory of International Relations, J. Harris Proctor, Islam and International Relations, Pall
Mall Press, London, 1965.
8 Azzam, Abd-al-RaInnan, The Eternal Message Of Muhammad, The Devitt-Adair Company, New York, 1964, p. 35.
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Say: "Who is the Lord and Sustainer of the Heavens and the
Earth?" Say: "It is Allah." Say: "Do ye then take (for worship)
protectors other than Him, such as have no power either for good
or for harm to themselves?" Say: "Are the blind equal with those
who see?" Or the depths of Darkness equal with Light?" Or do
they assign to Allah partners who have created (anything) as He
has created, so that the creation seemed to them similar? Say:
"Allah is the Creator of all things: He is the One, the Supreme and
Irresistible." (13: 16)
Therefore, those who do not accept the unity of God are unbelievers as the Holy
Qur 'an confirms in the case of Christians,
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They disbelieve who say: Allah is one of three (In a Trinity) for
there is no god except One God, if they desist not from their word
(of blasphemy), verily a grievous chastisement will befall the
disbelievers, among them. (5: 73)
God is the absolute authority and the only sovereign in all aspects of human life.
Therefore, Islam makes a sharp distinction between sovereignty as an absolute divine
power over all human beings and their actions, and the general political authority. In
practical terms, this means the sovereignty of the Islamic law Shari 'ah, on the one
hand, and the ruler of the Ummah and the Islamic State, on the other hand. Muslims
are forbidden to render obedience to another mortal unless it is in the spirit of
obedience to the Shari 'oh. No human being is entitled to legislate in the matter of the
religion for others on his own authority. The Holy QUI" 'an insists,
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Then We put thee on the right Way of Religion; so follow thou
that Way, and follow not the desires of those who know not. (45:
18)
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In summary, the Islamic view of God's unity emphasises two important categories,
these are: (i) God's absolute sovereignty over human beings; and (ii) the primacy of
His law, the Shari 'ah, in the conduct of all human affairs.
b. The unity of Mankind. Islam teaches that all people regardless of their racial,
linguistic, cultural, or national origins are but one nation. They are members of the
family of human beings. Therefore, they are in effect brothers and sisters.
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0 mankind! Fear your Guardian Lord, Who created you from a
single Person, created out of it His mate and from them twain
scattered (like seeds) countless men and women ... (4: 1)
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0 mankind! We created you from a single pair of a male and a
female, and made you into nations and tribes that ye may know
each other. Verily, the most honoured of you in the sight of God
is who is the most righteous of you. (49: 13)
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Mankind was one single nation, and Allah sent Messengers with
glad tidings and warnings; and with them He sent the Book in
truth, to judge between people in matters wherein they differed.
(2: 213)
The unity of mankind therefore means that all people are of one community. It is
afterwards they come to differ in matters of religion and their social lives. The unity of
mankind concept includes the idea of fundamental equality between all human beings.
It is related in the Prophet Muhammad's Hadith that,
A coloured man has no preference over a white man, nor a white
man over a coloured one, nor an Arab over a non-Arab, nor a non
Arab over an Arab, except for righteousness.9
Thus, from the perspective of Islam the dignity of all people is the same, and the
defence of that dignity should be available whatever the colour or the nationality.
Divisions and conflicts between nations and communities arise despite this fundamental
unity and equality of mankind. Consequently, co-operation, in the Islamic conception,
9 Ibn Hanbal, Ahmed Ibn Muhammad, Musnad al-Imam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal, Dar al-Ma'aref, Cairo, 1980, Hadith no. 22391.
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promotes human unity and maintains mutual human interests. From this perspective, it
would seem natural to suppose that co-operation and not conflict was the normal
human condition. This implication of the unity of mankind leads to a questioning of the
view that the condition between the Islamic State and non-Islamic State is one of
warfare (Jihad) it will be later argued.
A further aspect of human equality is spiritual and is the practical consequence of
the belief in one supreme God. It results in the spiritual liberation of an individual from
subjection to any earthly authority. From the spiritual freedom of every human being to
follow the spiritual affirmation of the equality of all people under one sovereign God. It
further includes the idea that the human race, at birth, are all Muslims.
Every child is born with a true faith (i.e., to worship no one but
Allah Alone) but his parents convert him to Judaism, Christianity,
or to Magainism.1°
Originally all humans were of one nation and consequently the judgement was the
same for all people according to the tradition of Islam. The only way of categorisation
is by the response of people to God, that is, by their faithful acceptance of God's
guidance or their rejection of His revelation.
A third aspect of the concept of the unity of mankind, it could be argued, is the
common obedience of humanity to Divine law. Every human being is the recipient of
the Divine law; the Shari 'ah it is not just a law for Muslims. He is endowed with
intelligence, free will, and an innate capacity to distinguish between good and evil. An
individual is not perfect, yet he is perfectible. Therefore the law and the compact of
obedience are necessitated by the evil side in the nature of an individual. In the Holy
Qur 'an it can be recognised that a human being is viewed as a rational and responsible
individual. Reason has been given to human beings to enable them to act freely in
accepting the law and entering into a compact of obedience with God. The individual,
furthermore, is responsible for his acts and his intelligence he determines the course of
his action. Islam takes a rather optimistic view of the nature of man. The Prophet
10 Matraji, Maltmowl, Translation ofSaheh al-Bukhari, Vol. II, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1993, p. 315.
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Muhammad stated that a human being is created as pure by God, and upright by
nature; he is inclined toward the good if properly directed by Divine law.
c. The unity of the Law. The universality of the values embodied in the Islamic law,
Shari 'ah, implies that its applicability is not limited to the Islamic community or, more
narrowly, to the followers of Muhammad (the Companions). They apply to the human
community at large. The Islamic values can be recognised by man's reason if a human
being could free himself from passion and selfish interest." However, it is not just the
universal values that the Shari 'ah contains that are applicable to all humans: it is the
Divine law in its entirely that is applicable to the nation of humanity, Muslim and non-
Muslim alike. The Shari 'ah is derived from the Qur'an, understood as the final part of
a series of Divine revelation through Prophets for all mankind.
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The same religion has He established for you as that which he
enjoined on Noah, that which We have sent by inspiration to thee,
and that which We enjoined on Abraham, Moses and Jesus:
Namely, that ye should remain steadfast in Religion, and make no
division therein: To those who worship other things than Allah,
hard is the way to which thou callest them, Allah chooses to
Himself those whom He pleases, and guides to Himself those
who turn to Him. (42: 13)
Obviously, unbelievers do not accept this final Divine revelation and consequently
do not view themselves as bound by the Divine law which is derived from it. Only
Muslims lead their personal and communal life in accordance with these Divine laws.
However, the Shari 'ah is not just the instrument that regulates and conditions the
behaviour of individual Muslims within the Muslim society: it is applicable to and must
regulate all their dealings with non-Muslims, whether as states, groups like tribes, or
individual non-Muslims. To that extent unbelievers are, in practice, bound by the
Islamic Law.
11 Bassiotuti, N. Cheriff, "Islamic Concept, Law, and World Habeas Corpus, The Rutgers Camden Law Journal, I, 2, (Fall
1969), p. 166.
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3.3) Islamic Concept of International Relations al-Siyar
In the classical Muslim literature, the term "international relations" was not
formalised by its modern academic name. Instead, Muslim jurists referred to al-Siyar,
that is, to the law dealing with non-Muslims [most of which governs relations between
Muslims and non-Muslims, but a small part of which affects only non-Muslims].
Contemporary jurists and scholars - for example, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Muhammad
Hamidullah, and AbdulHamid AbuSulayman - differ over the precise nature of the
Islamic international relations (al-Siyar). According to Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the law of
the Islamic international relations consists of International Law, Politics, Figh, and the
Islamic History. 12 Hamidullah sees al-Siyar more narrowly as a special branch of law
dealing with war, peace, and neutrality. 13 He defined Islamic international law as,
• . . part of the law and customs of the land and treaty obligations
which a Muslim de facto or de jure State observers in its dealings
with other de facto or de jure State."
AbuSulayman almost agrees with Hamidullah when he argues that al-Siyar consist
of Jihad, Dar al Islam, Dar al Ahd and Dar al Harb.i5
The different views on al-Siyar are not easy to reconcile. A start can be made by
drawing a distinction between the principles of Islamic international relations and their
practice, the latter being found in historical situations in different geographical areas of
the world etc. The principles are a distinct section of the totality of the Shari 'ah. This
distinct section are the laws which covers non-Muslims inside and outside the Islamic
State and their relations to Muslims. These laws can be broken down into four sub-
groups: (1) Relations between the Islamic State and non-Islamic states. (2) Relations
between the Islamic State and non-Muslim religio-social groups e.g. tribes and
individuals living outside the Islamic State. (3) Relations between the Islamic State and
non-Muslim individuals and groups living inside the Islamic State, (4) Relations
between Muslim individuals and non-Muslim individuals within the Islamic State
12 Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf, Al-Share'ah wa al-Hyatt, al-Jazeera Satellite Channel, 8/3/1998, 23:00 GMT.
13 Hamidullah, Mohamad, The Muslim Conduct ofState, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1977, p. 9.
14 Ibid., p. 3.
15 AbuSulayman, Abdulflamid A., Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations, 110IT, Herndon, 1994, p. 19.
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covering such areas as marriage, family matters and commercial transactions. This
fourth category will not be included in this thesis since the Islamic State is not
involved.
Surprising as it may appear to anyone familiar with Western international relations
theory, in which all relations between states or other units of analysis are external, in
the Islamic theory any person who is not a member of the Ummah, whether a foreigner
or a citizen of the Islamic State, is deemed to have international relations with the
Islamic State and to be the subject of al-Siyar. This apparent paradox arises from the
general principle that relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims are invariably
treated as external or international, whereas no relationship between Muslims, however
"external" they may seem to be (for example the relations between Muslim territorial
rulers during the late period of the ' Abbaside dynasty), is ever treated as a matter of
external or international relations. All Ummatic relations are internal or domestic from
the standpoint of Shari 'ch.
A second element in an attempt to reconcile the diverse views of Siyar of the jurists
involves a close examination of the three Dars or domains. This will establish, it is
hoped, whether the narrower interpretation of al-Siyar by Hamidullah and
AbuSulayman is justified or whether it omits some of the content of Islamic
international relations. It will be suggested that the latter is the case, since the concept
of the three Dars does not cover all relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. The
mistake made, it will be argued, is to treat the part for the whole of al-Siyar.
The division of the world into Dar al-Islam, Dar al-Harb and, much later Dar al-
Ahd or Dar al-Sulh, is nowhere mentioned in the Holy Our 'an or in the Thdiths,
except in Saheah Muslim under the term the House of Emigrants or Dar al-
Muhajerine, which is not relevant to the present context. All three are juristic
constructions made after a period of protracted warfare between the Islamic State and
its enemies. In the years after the death of the Prophet Muhammad (632 AD), the
Arabs with their duty to propagate Islam, spread the Islamic religion throughout
Arabia, the Middle East, and North Africa. In the time of the second Caliph, Umar I,
the Arabs controlled Egypt, Syria, Palestine, and most of ancient Persia. During the
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period of the third Caliph, Uthman, the Islamic Empire spread west to Tripoli, north to
the Taurus and Caucasus mountains, and east to what is now Pakistan and
Afghanistan. In 711 AD, During the Umayyad dynasty, the Islamic Empire expanded
to its maximum; by 732 AD the Arab-ruled area extended from the Atlantic Ocean to
the boundaries of India and China.16
Muslim jurists considered war and hostility between the Muslims and other political
entities to be the basic element which had led to this division and where a state of
affairs was described according to the condition of the Muslims: victory and conquest,
or defeat. Jurists set a difference in Shari 'ah rules according to this division because of
the occurring war between Muslims and their enemies. 17 Some Muslim jurists such as
Ibn Hazm, for instance, held the view that,
After the emigration of the Prophet to Madinah, Muslims had
considered any part in the world except Madinah to belong to
Dar al-Harb within which Jihad could legitimately be waged at
any time or place."
The juristic division of the globe into Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb was for two
main reasons according to AbdulWahab Khallaf,
1. Muslims in the beginning needed to unify their affairs, to emerge
with their Islamic character, and direct their power and force toward
a joint enemy. Their aim was to preserve the Islam entity and
manifest a good impression of Muslims among nations.
2. Juristic characterisation of the reality of the previous relations
between Muslims and others when war was the only factor
controlling these relations, in the absence of an obligatory treaty. As
a result, jurists pictured the actual state of war between Muslims and
other nations as a permanent condition because warfare appeared to
be incessant. In the jurist's eyes, wars in the remote past against the
Persians and the Romans were followed by the defensive wars
16 Peretz, Don, The Middle East Today, Praeger Publisher, New York, 1988, P. 24.
17 Al-Zohally, Wahbah, Athar al-Harb fi al-Figh al-Islam', Dar al-Film, Beirut, 1981, p.167.
18 Ibn Hazm, All Ibn Aluned, Al-Muhali, Vol. VII, Dar Al-Itehad al-Arabi Ii al-Teba'a, Cairo, 1969, P. 353.
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against the Mongols which eventually destroyed the Islamic State of
the `Abbasides. In turn, these wars were followed by the fanatical
Christian Crusades during the Middle Ages. Because their campaigns
against the enemy appeared to be ceaseless, jurists came to take the
view that all states outside the Islamic State were hostile and some
would be currently in a state of active belligerency against it.19
Three modern jurists have expressed this idea in similar terms. Al-Zohaily writes,
War between two states results in dividing the international
family into two teams: on one hand, the hostile team that
includes belligerent states; and on the other hand the team which
contains the non- belligerents, the neutral states, and the other
members in the international family.20
AbuSulayman stated this same idea but in slightly different words when he said,
The early Muslims were confronted by unceasing aggression and
persecution, and the non-Muslim powers basic attitude of
hostility against Muslim ideals and society never changed. This
inevitably left its mark on the thinking of the jurists. Thus, war
and fighting became practically an integral and natural part of
the relationship with non-Muslims, though some of the Jurists did
not advocate initiation of fighting by the Muslims. They did
advocate retaliation when Muslims were attacked 21
Similarly, Mohammed Abu Zahrah emphasised,
All jurists unanimously called the non-Islamic countries hostile
state/s, because of the continuous war during the juristic
diligence era [i.e. during the period of ljtihad] arising from the
enemies aggression and the Muslims defence.22
If the juristic division of the globe into two opposing parts Dar al-Islam and Dar
al-Harb thus reflected contemporary reality, a third Dar was introduced by Muslim
jurists by the second century AH to bring Muslim principles into line with a new
reality, namely, the existence of peaceful relations between the Islamic State and non-
19 Khalif, AbdulWahab, Elm Usul	 Al-Dar al-Kuwaityah ti Al-Teba'ah, Kuwait, 1968, pp. 69-76.
20	 Wahbah, Athar al-Harb fi al-RUM al-Islami, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1981, p.167.
21 AbuSulayman, AbdulHamid A., Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations, IIOIT, Herndon, 1994, pp. 43-44.
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Islamic states resulting from a pledge or treaty ('Ahd). Dar al-Ahd therefore denoted
an intermediate status between Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb where non-Muslim
states were at peace with the Islamic State which will be explained below.
None of these three Dars (which are examined more fully below) was mentioned in
either the Holy Qur 'an or the Prophetic Sunnah, but in the Book of Saheah Muslim
another Dar is mentioned under the term The House of Emigrants or Dar al-
Muhajerine ". . . then call them to change from their homeland to the Dar al-
Muhajerine . . . [emigrants House1.23
Dar al-Muhajerine, in the Prophetic Hadith means the city of Madinah. It was the
target of all people who embraced Islam prior to the conquest of Makkah and who
were seeking the refuge and protection of Muslims. Meanwhile, new followers of Islam
in Makkah were encouraged by the Prophet to emigrate to Madinah in order to avoid
oppression by the Quraishi. 24 However, that command to emigrate was cancelled by
the Prophet after the Conquest of Makkah, when he said "No migration after the
conquest of Makkah ".25
Not only were Dar al-Islam, Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Ahd not mentioned in the
Qur 'an and Sunnah, but also it is difficult to see how these concepts could be applied
to the situation of the early Muslims who were living in the city of Makkah with the
Prophet Muhammad before their emigration to Madinah. Indeed, jurists of the classical
period refer to Makkah before the Hijrah where the Prophet called people to Islam.
Makkah was neither Dar Islam nor Dar Harb, however as the place where the Prophet
called people to Islam, and the location of the nascent Ummah, perhaps Makkah could
be called the House of Calling to Islam or Dar al-Da'wa ila Allah.*
22 Abu Zahrah, Mohamad, Al- 'Alatiat al-Dowalyah fi al-Islam, Dar al-Ketab Al-Hadeath, Kuwait, p. 59.
23 Ibn Majah, Muhammad Ibn Yazead, Sunan Ilm Majah, Vol. II, Dar Ehya'a al-Kutub al-Arabiyah, Cairo, 1987, p.953 &
Al-Shafei g, Muhammad Ilm Idris, Al-Umin, Vol. IV, Al Matba'ah al-'Amereyah, Cairo, 1322 AH, p. 182.
24 Lings, Martin, Muhammad, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1984, pp. 108-115.
25 Al-Shawkani, Muhamad Ali, Nail al-Awtar, Vol. VIII, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1952, p. 25.
This concept has been developed from the writings of scholars' al-Qaradawi, Hamidullah and AbuSulayman. Though, it is not
derived directly from any passage in their writings. For this reason, no sources can be quoted here. Dar al-Da 'wa, as presented in this
thesis, is as original interpretation of both the situation in Makkah before the Hijrah and, arguably, certain non-Muslim states in the
present day.
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3.3.1) The normality of war and peace
The idea of dividing the world into homelands or domains (Dars) appeared only
after wars and hostilities erupted between Muslims and non-Muslims. AbuSulayman
argues that the early Muslim experience of continual hostility at the hands of non-
Muslim powers made contemporary jurists come to think of warfare as the normal
relationship with non-Muslims. He suggests, however, that warfare should not be
regarded as an integral or normal/natural part of these relations. 26
 This is the issue
which must now be explored.
In favour of the view that warfare between the Islamic State and non-Muslim
powers was the norm is the fact of the prevalence of the war involving the Islamic
State from the period after the Hijrah to the end of the `Abbaside dynasty and the
Christian crusades in particular, warfare was specially prominent during the early
Muslim state to the end of the Umayyad Caliphate. Very many of these wars arose
from the hostility of non-Muslim powers to the Islamic State but some Muslim jurists
such as Imam al-Shafei'i take the view that even the People of the Book are not
genuine monotheists in addition to rejecting the Prophethood of Muhammad. Jurist Al-
Ramli argued that such unbelievers were blasphemers which meant Muslims had a duty
to kill them. 27
 The more normal view is that of Imam al-Shafei'i and his followers who
argued that every Muslim has a duty to call the unbelievers to Islam. The call to Islam
must be peaceful but if the unbelievers do not become Muslims or become protected
persons within the Islamic State (Dhinuni) then it is the duty of Muslims to wage Jihad
against them unless they are to feeble to wage war. 28
 This stance towards non-Muslims
is based upon verses in the Holy Qur'an and exhortation to Jihad by Prophet
Muhammad in Hadith.
First, there are Holy Qur 'anic verses which command Muslims to fight non-
Muslims, such as,
26 AbuSulayman, AbdulHamid A., Towards an Islamic Theory ofInternational Relations, HIT, Herndon, 1994, pp. 43-44.
27 Al-Ramli, ShamsAldean Muhammad 1611 ShihabAhlean, Nehayat al-Muhtaj ila Sharh al-Minhaj, Vol. IV. Matba'at al-
Halabi, Cairo, 1386 All, p. 223.
28 Ibid., 224.
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Fighting is prescribed upon you, and ye dislike it; but it is
possible that ye dislike a thing which is good for you, and that ye
love a thing which is bad for you; but Allah knoweth, and you
know not. (2: 216)
Other verses issue a similar command but for a narrower group of non-
Muslims,
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But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the
Pagans whenever ye find them, and lie in wait for them in every
stratagem (of war); but if they repent, and establish regular
prayers, and pay Zakah then open the way for them: for Allah is
Oft-forgiving, most Merciful. (9: 5)
Second, there are Holy Qur 'anic verses which enjoin Muslims to martyrdom, that is
to die in the way of Allah through Jihad such as:
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And if ye are slain, or die, in the way of Allah, forgiveness and
mercy from Allah are far better than all they could amass. And if
ye die, or are slain, lo! It is unto Allah that ye are brought
together. (3: 157,158)
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Let those fight in the cause of Allah who sell the lie of this world
for the Hereafter; to him who fight in the cause of Allah- whether
he is slain or gets victory- soon shall We give him a reward of
great (value). (4: 74)
Similarly, the Sunnah contains many Hadiths which encourage Muslim to join Jihad
and die in the Way of Allah such as:
A journey undertaken in the morning or evening (for Jihad) in the
way of Allah is better than (anything) on which the sun rises or
sets.29
The person who participates (in Holy battles) in Allah's cause and
nothing compels him to do so except his belief in Allah and His
Apostle, will be recompensed by Allah either with a reward, or
29 Matt.* Maltmoud, Translation of Saheh al-Bit/chat-4 Vol. IV, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1993, p. 29.
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booty (if he survives) or will be admitted to Paradise (if he is
killed in the battle as a martyr). Had I not found it difficult for my
followers, then I would not remain behind any squadron going for
Jihad and! would have loved to be martyred in Allah's cause and
then made alive, and then martyred and then made alive, and
then again martyred in His cause.30
The Prophet said that a Muslim who did not fight in the way of Allah but died was a
hypocrite,
One who died but did not fight in the way of Allah nor did he
express any desire (or determination) for Jihad died the death of
a hypocrite.31
Third, there are Qur 'anic verses which not only prohibit Muslims to ally with the
Pagans and Apostates, but even prohibit showing friendship to them. For example,
4,--i 41 c:.)-• (.›,4 al (.1.4 C.)A.9 (:):1 4,5,411 (.10 (...)A Pl4I.9i c:.8./i1-0 C.L914:9-41 :11":1. V
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Let not the Believers take for friends or helpers unbelievers rather
than Believers: if any do that, shall have no relation left with Allah
... (3: 28)
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o ye who believe! Take not the Jews and the Christians for your
friends and protectors: they are but friends and protectors to
each other; and he amongst you that turns to them (for
friendship) is of them; verily Allah guideth not a people unjust. (5:
51)
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0 ye who believe! take not My enemies and yours as friends (or
protectors), offering them (your) love, even though they have (on
the contrary) driven out the Messenger and yourselves (from your
homes), (simply) because ye believe in Allah your Lord! if ye have
come out to strive in My Way and to seek My Good Pleasure,
showing friendship unto them in secret: for I know full well all
that ye reveal; and any of you that does this has strayed from the
Straight Path. (60: 1)
30 Ibid., p.30
31 Ibid.
90
Chapter III
Finally, there is a Hadith which confirmed the necessity of fighting non-Muslims as
a method of calling for Islam and enjoining Believers to die in the way of Allah.
Prophet Muhammad said,
I have been ordered (by Allah) to fight against the people until
they testify that none has the right to be worshipped but Allah
and that Muhammad is Allah's apostle, and offer the prayers
perfectly and give the obligatory charity, so if they perform all
that, then they save their lives and property from me except for
Islamic laws, and then their reckoning (accounts) will be done by
Allah. "32
On the bases of this Hadith and previous Hadiths and Qur 'anic verses, some
scholars have concluded that Muslims are not permitted to ally, adhere, and even build
relationships with non-Muslims. In their view Islam was based on force after the
Hijrah, and that compulsion in matters of religion took the form, primarily, of Jihad
against all non-Muslims to force them to embrace Islam. The Prophet Muhammad, on
this view, was the apostle of war. Majid Khadduri, for example, writes,
The Muslim law of nations recognised no other nations than its
own, since the ultimate goal of Islam was the subordination of
the whole world to one system of law and religion, to be enforced
by the supreme authority of the imam.33
Similarly, Nageab Armanazi suggests,
The Islamic division of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb is similar
to the Bolshevik rule, where it is supposed that Russia is the
home of every communist, a house of peace for communists, and
the rest of the world is the house of war, though it should be
permeated by communism and where possible establish pro-
communist regimes [satellite states].34
The prevalence of Jihad during the period after the Hijrah until the end of the
`Abasside Empire was reflected in the juristic division of the world into two parts Dar
a-Islam and Dar al-Harb, Dar al-Ahd was a late juristic development reflecting the
reality of relations between the Islamic State and non-Muslim powers in that several
32 Al-'Sqalani, Shehab Al-Dean Abu Alfadhl, Fat'h al Bari bi Sharh Saheah al-Bzikhart, Vol. VI, Matba'at al-Halabi, 1378
AH, p. 85.
33 Khadduri, Mujid, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1979, pp. 44-45.
34Armanazi, Nageab, International law in Islam, PhD thesis, Damascus, 1930, p. 113.
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non-Muslim powers had established peaceful relations with the Islamic State. Despite
this fact and corresponding juristic conception it is probable that the majority of non-
Muslim political entities were in Dar al-Harb, not in Dar al-Ahd. This suggests that
conflict not peace was still the norm. This view is reinforced by the fact that Dar al-
Ahd is composed of non-Muslim powers which have concluded peace with the Islamic
State, having previously been Harbi powers at war with the Islamic State. Then finally
these treaties were treated by the jurist as temporary truces lasting ten years at the
most. However, facts overtook the juristic view for during the time of Salah al-Dean
and the Jihad against the crusades these treaties had become permanent, suggesting
that peace not war was the normal state of relations between the Islamic State and
non-Muslims.
On the other hand, peace as the normal state of relations has several considerations
in its favour as follows:
A. There is the unity of mankind to which division and conflict are, in principle,
alien. The unity of mankind is seen in reality in relations within the Muslim Ummah
where peace is the norm. Dar al-Islam is properly translated as the domain of peace."
B. Hanafi, Maliki and the Hanbali jurists criticised the view of al-Ramli* and others
that the blasphemy of non-Muslims is a cause for killing them. They argued that non-
Muslim's aggression against Islam is the reason for fighting and killing them.36
C. The basic Islamic attitude towards non-Muslims who are not hostile to Muslims
is, in general, peace. This can be inferred from the following considerations:
1) The Muslims in Makkah before the Hijrah constituted the infant Ummah and
they were subject to persecution by the non-Muslim Quraishi. During this period, God
never commanded the Muslims to wage Jihad against these hostile Makkans. In other
words, before the Hijrah, peace was the normal relationships between Muslims and
35	 Wahbah, Athar al-Harb fi al-Figh al-Islami, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1981, p. 136.
See footnote 27.
36	 Hamam, Kamal Al-Dean, Fath al-Qadear, Sharh al-Hedayah Ii al-Marghalani, Vol. IV, Matba'at Mustafa
Muhammad, Cairo, 1356 All, p. 291.
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non-Muslims. Islamic propagation (Da 'wa) in Makkah was peaceful. The Qur 'anic
teaching of the Prophet and all Muslims is that they must behave towards non-believers
with wisdom and beautiful preaching as quoted below.
(I Di : (.1) 1 jAc S1). Qp
	
U
. . . wert thou severe or harsh-hearted, they would have broken
away from about thee. (3: 159)
:1.11) .	 j	 ;LA-Call.) d1,1,) 6.4)4 0.1) EJ1
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Invite (all) to the Way of the Lord with wisdom and beautiful
preaching: and argue with them in ways that are best and most
gracious. (16: 125)
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If then they turn away, we have not sent thee as a guard over
them; thy duty is but to convey (the Message). (42: 48)
The call to Islam must be with wisdom and discretion, meeting people on their own
ground and convincing them with illustration from their own knowledge and
experience, which may be very narrow, or very wide. Moreover, preaching must be,
not dogmatic, not self-regarding, not offensive, but gentle, considerate, and such as
would attract the attention of non-Muslims. Manner and arguments should not be
acrimonious, but modelled on the most courteous and the most gracious example.
Therefore, the Muslims are not guards set over people to free them from the need of
exercising their limited free-will.
Holy Qur 'anic verses are cited which stipulate that the cause of Jihad is for self
defence, the protection and guarantee of freedom of the faith, and the prevention of
iniquity. Self-defence as a cause of Jihad is commanded in the following verse,
1) .	 Y	 a 1 j .L1.9.:i jj111.14 c).):111j.).L.,,A (01 1j11.1 j
(14.
Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you but do not
transgress limits: for Allah loveth not transgressors. (2; 190)
It is sometimes supposed that this verse has been abrogated by a later verse, though
this is rejected by the Jurist Ibn Taymiyyah. He wrote,
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Repeal Waskh" needs evidence, the Holy Qur'an does not
contain any verse which contradicts this verse, on the contrary it
is upheld elsewhere.37
Ibn Taymiyyah continues by interpreting this verse to mean injustice through
aggression against the Muslims and is a cause for Jihad,
The meanings of this verse, the prohibition of assault which is
injustice is not permitted in any laws [legal system] in any
circumstances does not accept the repeal.38
Jihad for self-defence and for the protection of the faith is commanded in another
verse,
c.*>. 1 .;.)11 cal :01
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To those against whom war is made, permission is given to fight,
because they are wronged; and verily, Allah is Most Powerful for
their aid. They are those who have been expelled from their
homes in defiance of right, for no cause except that they say
"Our Lord is Allah," did not Allah check one set of people by
means of another, there would surely have been pulled down
monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, in which the
name of Allah is commemorated in abundant measure. (22: 39-40)
In this verse, the cause of fighting for self defence can be found under "expelled
from their homes"; and fighting for the cause of protecting the Islamic faith is under
"Our Lord is Allah." It has been mentioned previously in this chapter that the causes of
fighting non-Muslims is their hostility to the Islamic religion and its teachings, and
consequently that it is fully justified that righteous people fight against a ferocious and
mischief-loving people. However, the justification was far greater when the small
Muslim community was not only fighting for its own existence against the Makkan
Quraishi, but for the very existence of the faith in the One True God. They were exiled
for their Faith while they had as much right to worship in Makkah as other Quraishi.
37 Ibn Taymiyyah, TaquiDean Ahmad Ibn Sheilah, Resalat Al-Krtal, Matba'at AI-Summit Al-Mtthammadiyyali, Cairo, 1368
AH, p. 118.
38 Ibid.
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Abu rear Al-Nahas in his work Al-Nasekh wa al-Mansukh, mentioned that the
Companion Ibn al-`Abbas noted,
This it is the first verse concerning the fighting in the holy
months which was prohibited according to and in consideration
of Arabian traditions; then it became justified because of the
detriment and assault on Muslims alienates them from Makkah.
These were the main causes to permit fighting in the holy
months.39
In the Qur 'anic verses the justification for Jihad are stipulated. Fighting for any
other cause is therefore unlawful because it transgresses the limits commanded in the
Holy Qur'an. The Shari 'ah organised the principal attitude of fighting for its
followers, which strongly recommends that: war is permissible for the purpose of self-
defence and the protection of the Faith, and that it is waged within well-defined limits.
That means fighting is forbidden for any other causes. However, when war is
undertaken, it must be pushed with vigour, but not relentlessly and only to restore
peace and freedom for the worship of God. It has been narrated that Prophet
Muhammad, during his wars, caught many unbelievers as prisoners of war, some were
executed, others were redeemed or discharged, the Prophet did not compel any of
them to convert to Islam.
2) Jurists disagree over the Hadiths which support Jihad, fighting against non-
believers and dying in the cause of God. The Shafei'ites, for instance, held the view
that a Hadith such as,
I have been ordered (by Allah) to fight against the people until
they testify that none has the right to be worshipped but Allah
and that Muhammad is Allah's Apostle, and offer the prayers
perfectly and give the obligatory charity, so if they perform all
that, then they save their lives and property from me except for
Islamic laws, and then their reckoning (accounts) will be done by
Allah.4°
39 Al-Nahas, Abu J'afar, Al-Nasekh wa al-Mansukh, Matba'at Zaki Mujahed, Cairo, p. 190.
40 Al-'Sqalani, Shelia!) Aldean Abu Alfadhl„ Fat'h al Bari bi Sharh Saheah Al Bukhari, Vol. VI, Matba'at al-Halabi, 1378
All, p. 85.
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conflicts with the Prophet's teaching and with that of the Shari'ah about dealing
with a peaceful approach to non-Muslims. Imam al-Shafei'i in his work al-Umm
mentioned,
The word people in that Hadith [the previous Hadith] means the
Arabian Pagans in general, and the cause to fight them was their
hostility to the Islam and to the Prophet Muhammad and their
fighting him. Where the word fight does not mean to kill, it could
be permissible to fight the person, but ills not permissible to kill
him, which means: to push out the evil, not to call to Islam.41
However, it can be argued that the prohibition against alliance and good relations
with non-believers is made only to prevent harm to other Muslims or because it does
not serve the other interests of them. According to the Holy Qur'an,
eS1-11-9	 (.1.9".)	 4.-/A 444. 1-4:1 	 54a.. e44.	 • • •
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. . . offering them your love, even though they have rejected the
Truth that has come to you, and have (on the contrary) driven out
the Messenger and yourselves (from your homes) simply because
ye believe in Allah your Lord. (60: 1)
It has been mentioned earlier that a rejection of Islam is not a cause for fighting and
killing non-Muslims. That cause is that non-Muslims fight against them and/or treat
Muslims and Islam with hostility. Therefore, if these causes are ended and hostility has
ceased as a consequence, relations with non-Muslims will return to normal, lawful
peace and be based on equality. The exchange of mutual interests will not be
forbidden. This judgement can be build on the base of the Holy Qur 'anic commands
which mentioned as follows,
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Allah forbids you not, with regard to those who fight you not for
your Faith nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing kindly
and justly with them: for Allah loveth those who are just. Allah
only forbids you, with regard to those who fight you for your
Faith, and drive you out of your homes, and support others in
driving you out from turning to them (for friendship and
41 Al-Shaferi, Muhammad Ibn Idris, ill-Unun, Vol. IV, Al-Matba'ah aPAmereyah, Cairo, 1322 MI, p. 181.
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protection), it is such as turn to them (in this circumstances), that
do wrong. (60: 8-9)
Those verses have divided non-Muslims into two groups, those who are to the
Muslims inoffensive, who did not fight them in the cause of Faith, or drive them out of
their homes; this group is in the position to enjoy philanthropy and justice. The other is
the opposite: they are in the camp of hostility, of fighting or co-operating with others
against Muslims. Islam forbids making allies of them. Nevertheless, the Shari'ah
insisted that protection or refuge to the individual enemy Must'amin should be offered,
even in the time of war. In the Holy Qur'an it is written,
m__:14 ail 4.1.1. 4.i.lii 1.:.i 41 pi.s t..... 9, Lfi.% D .).,Li di j1..1.1 ais. .A.4.11 c).4 .1.%i c)1,9
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If one amongst the Pagans asks thee for asylum, grant it to him,
so that he may hear the Word of Allah, and then escort him to
where he can be secure, that is because they are men without
knowledge. (9: 6)
While the rights of non-Muslims under the Islamic state have been examined, it is
important to elucidate the obligations of Muslims who live in a non-Muslim country. It
can be said that: it is the duty of the Muslim to respect and adhere to the rules of that
country which control relations between Muslims and both the people and the
governments of these countries. The Muslims' rights are what the laws of these
countries give to them. They must not exceed or break these laws either by imposture,
perfidy or any other illegal (in the Shari'ah) behaviour. In the Holy Qur'an,
(I b : .)11) . c)13.+4.%11 'II c.11.,..a.11 F.I .:)+ 34
Is there any Reward for Good-other than Good? (55: 60)
However, there is an argument which justifies Muslims using sharp practices to
relieve non-Muslims of their money, provided it is done without perfidy and imposture,
even if such practices are prohibited in Islam against other Muslims. Against this
argument is the Islamic traditions that Muslims have to deal in the same way with all
people, without any consideration for colour, religion, nationality or the place where
they live.
D. There are Qur 'anic verses revealed after the Hijrah which pre-suppose that
peace is the norm.
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. . . do not transgress limits: for Allah loveth not transgressors.
(2: 190)
This verse can be interpreted to mean that the Islamic State must not initiate war
because it is commanded to wage Jihad only as self-defence (as has been shown
above). To abide by this verse means the Islamic State cannot wage war for any other
reason/s; that would be to overstep the prescribed limits. Hence, peace must be
regarded as the norm by the Islamic State. Another verse commands Muslims never to
use compulsion in religion. In the Holy Qur 'an,
dz./L.,' ul--all H..t... j j.ii i
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Mankind was one single nation, and Allah sent Messengers with
glad tidings and warnings; and with them He sent the Book in
truth, to judge between people in matters wherein they differed.
(2: 213)
This means that Islam requires Muslims to be tolerant of non-Muslims, whether they
are individuals, groups or states. If this command is respected the Islamic State will not
attack a non-Islamic State to spread Islam. Again the verse pre-supposes peaceful
relations are normal between Muslims and non-Muslims.
The logic and compulsory characteristic for a global Islamic law (Shari 'ah) issued
by God, where Shari ' ah by itself; as mentioned in a previous chapter, organised all the
Muslims relations with others and among themselves. As Islam legislated Jihad to
defend the Faith, it also legislated Jihad to defend the Islamic State. Jihad is not only a
collective duty outside Islamic countries, it is also an individual duty inside them to
protect these countries and recover what has been extorted from them. Charis Waddy
in her work The Muslim Mind illustrated clearly Jihad when she said,
Jihad . .. is divided into two. The Greater Jihad is fighting ones
animal tendencies. The Lesser Jihad — fighting one behalf of the
community, in its defence — is a duty incumbent on a Muslim
provided he is attacked. A man has the right to defend his life,
his property, and he has to organise himself along these lines.42
42 Waddy, Charis, The Muslim Mind, Longman Group Ltd., London, 1976, pp. 94-95.
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Some Muslim rulers, like the Abbasides, established themselves in power by force
and force was never far away from their rule thereafter. The prominence of force
within their Empire may have coloured their attitude to force outside it, so that
relations with non-Muslim states, became perceived primarily in terms of force and
conflict. The prevalence of hostile relations for a time thus came to be viewed as a
permanent state of affairs. This belief seems to have been adopted by the jurists of this
period of the High Caliphate and influenced their juristic Fiqh.
In general, Muslim jurists have debated for decades to determine a common Islamic
conception of the relations with other states or nations (Ummahs) which may be called
international relations. Classical Muslim jurists therefore came to divide the globe into
two domains,* the domain of peace (Dar al-Islam) and the domain of war (Dar al-
Harb). Later, the domain of treaty (Dar al-Ahd) was the third domain added by Imam
al-Shafei'i. He based it on the conciliation treaty concluded between the Prophet and
the Christians of Najran and it denoted all countries and other political entities (like
tribes) which had similar treaties with the Islamic State.43
It may be concluded therefore, that hostility was not the normal or natural
relationship between Muslims and others. That relationship was peaceful with all
nations (Ummahs) except for those of them which indicated their hostility to Islam and
against the Muslims. War has been used as a means of spoiling the enemies' plots to
frustrate their attempt to prevent Da'wa being spread and to eliminate injustice and
tyranny. Muslim scholars recognised, therefore, Muslim and non-Muslim relations
according to their satisfaction of the doctrines of both the Holy Qur'an and Hadith.
Mohamad Abu Zahrah, for example, noticed,
There are a group of jurists who recognise the peaceful
relationships among Muslims and others, unless: an aggression
against a Muslim country; or an anticipation of an aggression
has to be occurred 44
* There are no particular scholar who can rely on him as the first who used this division, but it seams that there Muslim jurists of the
first Islamic century to call any territories which were not under the control of the Islamic State as Dar al-Harb. With the time this
idea was improved. For further details, see chapter V.
43 Al-Shaferi, Muhammad Ibn Idris, Al-Umtn, Vol. IV, Al Matba'ah aPAmereyah, Cairo, 1322 All, pp. 103-104 & 109.
44 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
99
Chapter 111
It is no exaggeration to say that the juristic division of the world to Dar al-Islam,
Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Ahd is based on the occurring relations among Muslims and
non-Muslims, and was made by the Muslim jurists in the second century AH, and had
not been created by the Shari 'ah . Moreover, this division is a logical issue, it can be
found that in the Roman law people were divided into three groups: the Citizens, the
Latins and Foreigners. The latter called the enemies, if they do not have any protection
treaty with Rome they were vulnerable to be being humiliated. 45
 They lived in the
country with no legal personality. P. Vatikiotis has confirmed this when he said,
The millet idea was not an original invention of the Muslims. . .
Romans and Byzantines practised such discrimination between
the homoioi and the others, especially by the Byzantines as
regards the Jews.46
Therefore, juristic division was based on reality; and war was the cornerstone of this
division. This does not mean to put the world under the control of two states, one of
them includes all Islamic countries, while the other includes the rest of the world.
AbdulWahab Khalaf, for example, assumed,
This division mainly depends on the achievement of Muslims
security and peace inside their countries. The basis of the
difference between the two-domain spheres is the lack of safety
and security. The Dar al-Harb is the one that does not maintain
peace for Muslims, but it is a temporary matter which will be
ended when the war is over.47
It might be questioned whether in the light of historical events that the theory of
classical Islamic international relations was determined by these facts and not by lofty
religious-legal principles? Theoretically, of course, relations between the Islamic State
and non-Muslim political entities were based on principles of Islamic law and justice,
not on the ground of conquest of non-Muslims by the Islamic State, on the relation
between winner and loser or between the stronger and the weaker. This is one of
several obligations imposed on Muslims by the Islamic law. This was confirmed by the
words of Bat Ye'or,
45 Al-Bad rawi, Badro,Madkhal :la al-Qanoun al-Romani, Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi, Cairo, p. 198.
46 Vitildotis, P. J., Islam and the state, 1 ' Edit., Routiedge, London, 1987, p. 87.
47 Khalaf, Abduiwahab, Nizam al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah, Dar al-Ansar, Cairo, 1397 AH, p. 69(o. w.).
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The Islamic power granted the subjected Jewish and Christian
peoples the right to collect taxes for their own communal
institutions, the rights administer justice in matters of personal
law, freedom of religious education and worship, and recognised
by the official status of the head of each community."
Consequently, the previous debate leads to the necessity of understanding the
categories of the juristic division of the world into different domains Dars, which will
be expounded below.
3.3.2) The Domain of Peace Dar al-Islam
Muslim scholars see that every territory and people that has been under a stable
Islamic government of a Caliph for a period of time is an Islamic State. Such
government will cause the Shari 'ah to be applied throughout the territory and among
the people for a period of time. From the Islamic point of view, any change in
government from Islamic rule to government by non-Muslims, where the Shari 'ah is
no longer implemented as previously and the Muslims may even be expelled from the
territory, as in Palestine and perhaps Spain, is considered to be an extortion and
occupation. The territory which was once an Islamic State or part of an Islamic State is
now considered to be part of Dar al-Islam, with Muslims under a duty of restoring the
territory to the Islamic State; Muslims must strive to liberate these occupied lands.49
Dar al-Islam, it can be concluded, consists of the people and territories which are
either currently within the Islamic State or which formed part of the Islamic State in
the past.
This summary and conclusion is not consistent with Fuad Khuri's narrower account
of Dar al-Islam as a political adaptation implying a territorial domain including
Muslims and non-Muslims living under the Islamic public policy. 50 The Muslim
community and Dhimmis can only do this within the Islamic State. It is the only state
which implements Islamic law. Muslim communities which live under non-Muslim
governments will no doubt abide by the Shari 'ah as far as possible, but they will not be
48 Ye' or, Bat, The Dhimmi, Jews and Christian under Islain, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, London, 1985, p. 49.
49 Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf, Al-Share'all wa al-Hyatt, al-Jamera Satellite Channel, 81311998, 2300.
50 !Churl, Fuad I., Imams and Emirs, Saqi Books, London, 1990, P. 29.
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able to live in the fullness of its rules since the non-Muslim government will not
enforce the Shari 'ah throughout the state. There may also be some conflicts and
confrontation with the non-Muslim population, as seen in Bosnia and Kosova during
the 1990s. Khuri's argument specifically contradicts the standard juristic position that
Dar al-Islam includes territories and sometimes people (assuming the Muslims have
not been expelled) that were once part of the Islamic State.
The argument that Dar al-Islam consists of the people and territory of the Islamic
State and those that were formerly part of it is complicated by the juristic argument
over inhabited territory adjacent to the Islamic State. This border territory was not
sharply demarcated like contemporary states boundaries, even after Caliph Umar I set
up boundary posts on principle trade routes into the Islamic State. Consequently, it
was often difficult to determine whether a mixed Muslim/non-Muslim population was
part of the Islamic State or outside it. This difficulty would be greater if the population
in question was Bedouin. Furthermore, outside the trade routes it was unclear where
the territory of the Islamic State ended and that of the non-Islamic State began, and
therefore where the rule of the Shari 'ah ended. As a result of these uncertainties jurists
had major problem of deciding how to treat these adjacent territories. The Hanbali
jurists' position is that any country without Islamic rules and ruler, is not an Islamic
State, even if it is adjacent to an Islamic one." Jurists of the Shafei'i School consider
the land where the Shari 'ah is not applied is not Islamic, but a hostile state, even if it is
occupied by Muslims. 52 Hanafite jurists, however, consider it an Islamic State as long
as the Muslims are secure and the territory is adjacent to the Islamic State. If there is
no safety for Muslims and Dhi minis, if Islamic law is not enforced, and if the land in
not adjacent to the Islamic State, then it is considered a hostile state. From another
juristical point of view that country is not a hostile state, even if Islamic law is not
enforced there or even is cancelled, so long as security is provided and it is adjacent to
the Islamic state.53
51 Al-Javrclyah, Muhammad Ibn Abu Bahr Ibn Al-Qayylm , Ahkam ahl al-Dhumnah, Vol. I, Matba'at 3amPat Dimishq,
Damascus, 1961, p. 366.
52 Ibn AbcdIn, Muhanunad, Hashiyat Ibn Abechn, Vol. IV, Al-Matba'ah al-Ameriyyah, 1326 AH, p. 175.
53 Al-Kasani, Abu Bakr Ibn Mas'aud, Bada'ea Al Sanay'a fi Tarteab al-Sharaya, Vol. VII, Sharekat al-Matbou'at al-
'Alamyalt, 1327 AH, p. 130.
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In the light of these juristic views the original account given of Dar al-Islam can be
reformulated as follows. Dar al-Islam is the country and people that receives an
Islamic ruler, the Caliph, and adopts the Shari ' ah in its entirety. Outside Dar al-Islam
are the non-Islamic countries without an Islamic ruler and where Islamic law is not
imposed; they are either hostile states or atheist countries. Between the two are the
border territories (or marchlands/no-man's lands), which have different juristic views
and are regarded as either part of Dar al-Islam or still outside its borders.
The classical jurists were concerned above all to determine who was with the
Islamic State and who was against it. It was partly this concern which was applied to
territory adjacent to the Islamic state that caused the different juristic views to arise. In
present day circumstances a novel problem has occurred within the Ummah to which
the categories of the classical jurists do not easily apply and which have generated
many problems. Among the most important is: what is the norm for Islamic dominance
and the performance of its law? Is it enough to implement the Islamic law on a
personal status without the rest of the Islamic Law for a country to be included within
Dar al-Islam? If that is the case, many veteran Islamic countries, such as Turkey (the
last Islamic Empire), might be ejected from Dar al-Islam! Is it sufficient for Muslims
to be able to perform their religious practices such as prayer and fasting in complete
freedom for them to be included in an Islamic state? Many Islamic countries recently
would not count as Dar al-Islam or part of it on such tests. What judgement can be
given on the non-Muslim countries in which freedom of religious belief is fully
protected and where Muslims can practice their religion sometimes even better than in
many Islamic states?* Of course, these non-Muslim countries cannot be counted as part
of Dar al-Islam. However, logically there is no difference between these kinds of non-
Muslim countries and other Islamic states in which the Islamic tradition is not
performed completely.
Take the case of Turkey (the last Islamic Empire and a full active member in recent
Islamic organisations) which gives a clear instance of such an Islamic State in which
neither safety nor security could be obtained for Muslims or their establishments.
* France, for example, the majority of the French Muslims, 72% of 3 Million, believe that they have full freedom in practising their
religious ceremonies, while the rest see that Islam has to be in the same level of the consideration of the Christianity in that country.
Asharq al-Awsat newspaper, Vol. 6655, 16/2/1997,
103
Chapter III
Initially, it can be emphasised that Mustafa Kamal- later Ataturk- who became
Turkey's strongman, tore Turkey from its Islamic roots when he introduced secularism
in several phases such as the abolition of the Caliphate and the Ministry of the Shari 'ah
and Pious Foundations on March 1924. After this, he introduced secular education, the
Arabic alphabet was banned and replaced by the Latin one when writing Turkish.
Western style judicial systems were introduced, the closure of dervish retreats and
religious sects were ordered, the adoption of the Western calendar, and finally the
adoption of the principle of secularism in the Constitution of February 1937. In
secularised Turkey, where 98% of the population are Muslims, all religious affairs are
carried out by a central government organisation affiliated to the Prime Minister's
office, namely the Department of Religious Affairs, established in 1924. The function
of this organisation is to carry out tasks related to the beliefs, divine services, moral
Islamic principles, and to enlighten citizens on religious matters. In the words of Feroz
Ahmed,
Until 1926, the Ottoman Empire and the republic had used the
Islamic code of law, the Share 'ah, though all the religious
communities had been permitted to use their own personal laws
relating essentially to the family and inheritance. Article 41 of
the Treaty of Lausanne had guaranteed; these rights to the
minorities. But the Jewish and Christian communities renounced
this privilege and agreed to live under 3 common Western civil
codes. In 1926, the government introduced the Swiss Civil Code,
the Italian Penal Code, and a Commercial Code based largely on
the German and Italian codes.54
Focusing on the recent Turkish political situation, it can be seen that the country is
ruled by the Kamalist pasha-generals even when it is under civilian government. The
Kamalist pasha-generals are traditional defenders of the secularist system, ardently
secularist, pro-American, and authoritarian. Islam is anathema to them. They have
mounted three coups since 1960 when displeased by the antics of the politicians.
Turkey's generals have made a series of close military and intelligence accords with
Israel. These are designed to forge a regional anti-Islamic alliance, and gain support of
the pro-Israel lobby in Washington. They bitterly oppose the Islamic civilian
54 Aluned, Feroz, The Making 0/Modern Turkey, Routledge, London, 1993, p. 80.
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government, which is dominated by Prime Ministers Necmettin Erbakan of the Islamic
Welfare Party. Erbakan calls for reintroduction of Islamic values into Turkish life;
reorientation towards the Islamic east; loosening the old alliance with the US, and
Kamalist pasha-generals and redirecting funds now spent on the military to social
projects. He urges normalised relations with closer links to the Arabs, both of whom
are deeply unloved by Turks. 55
 In connection with this, both the Turkish elitists and the
military characterised Erbakan as "unfit to govern" because of his Islamic dedication
and seemingly aversion towards "westernising" Turkey.56
In April 1997 the Turkish National Security Council listed 18 anti-Islamic demands.
At the top of the list was a call for educational reform that would require students to
attend eight years of secular schooling- rather than the five years at present - before
optional Qur 'anic training. 57 The government statement gave no specific details of the
cabinet's plans. in connection with this. Law and order authorities kept up a campaign
against Islam. Turkish security police arrested 21 people for putting on an Islamist play
deemed to have insulted the security forces. In April 1997 they announced that they
had closed down more than 20 buildings in two western districts where Islamists were
holding Qur'anic lessons.58
The simple juristic division (or dichotomising) of the world in classical Fiqh had to
be amended when it no longer corresponded to contemporary circumstances. The
outcome was the addition of a third domain, Dar al-Ahd. In the light of the recent
Turkish experience, it could be argued that the threefold juristic division of the world is
no longer strictly accurate and so it is important for Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb to
be revised and redefined to reflect modern realities. It has been concluded earlier that
protection of Faith, Dogma and freedom of religious practice are the character of Dar
al-Islam, therefore a new theoretical definition of Dar al-Islam could be: 'the place
(state, territory, city or even a house) where Muslims can practice their religion in
55 Eric, Margolis, Turkey's Split Personality, The Foreign Correspondent, Toronto Ontario Canada, 30/3/1997.
56 Moye, Carrie, New Developments in Turkey Demand Crucial, Star Weekly Magazine, Amman, Jordanian, 29/8/ 1996, p.
15.
57 The Jerusalem Post, Testing Time For Turkey, Vol. 57557, Jerusalem, 28/4/1997.
58 Salahuldein, Mohammed, AlSera'a bayn al-Vtilmaniyyah wa
	 fi Turkiyah, Al Madinah Newspaper, Jeddah, Vol.
12427.
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complete freedom, no matter where this place is located, or at when they practice it'.
Similarly, Dar al-Harb can be defined as where the Islamic religion cannot be practised
in complete freedom, where Muslims experience aggression, and are denied their most
basic religious rights. This domain is located out side the past or present Islamic State.
However, this does not mean that Muslims should relinquish those territories to non-
Muslims where the Shari'ah is not implemented by the government (such as in
Turkey). Instead, it implies the need to correct the governmental and ruling system and
convert it into an Islamic one.
Additionally, it can be said that unless a declaration of war takes place, Islam
instructs Muslims: (i) not to wage perpetual war with the nations of the world which
are excluded from the sovereign jurisdiction of the Islamic State; (ii) not to fight, or
even deal with hostiles among all non-Muslims throughout the world. Such an attitude
can be categorised as perfidiousness or treachery which is not acceptable to the
Shari'ah. The previous assumption can be based on the following Qur'anic verse,
.	 (,6‘,1 V 411 a p13.., alp N41. 1 	 .a (.1).4 	 L4.3
(o A
If thou fearest treachery from any group, throw back (their
Covenant) to them, (so as to be) on equal terms: for Allah loveth
not the treacherous. (8: 58)
Muslims in Western Europe and other non-Muslim countries - in which religious
beliefs are protected - are not in Dar al-Harb. This is because of the following causes:
a) None of these states or their leaders has declared war against Islam;
b) There are treaties which systematise the relations between these
countries and the Islamic states, and Muslims individuals should adhere
to these treaties;
c) Muslim individuals had entered those countries according to agreements
which arranged their residence and protected their rights.
It has previously has been noted that classical Islamic jurisprudence originally
divided the globe into first two, then three domains, though neither division, it was
suggested is applicable today. Some contemporary scholars, e.g. AbuSulayman, have
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reinterpreted the three juristic Dars to try and fit them to the facts of the modern
world. It is arguable, however, that a new concept and term is needed to describe
present day realities outside Dar al-Islam. Just as Dar al- 'A was originally regarded
as part of Dar al-Harb until it was conceptualised as separate Dar, so today another
part of Dar al-Harb could be separated as a separate Dar, Dar al-Da'wa ila Allah
which can be translated as "House of Calling to Islam" in which the call to Islam is the
basis of relations between Muslims and others. The situation today is similar to that of
the city of Makkah during the early time of the Prophet Muhammad, before his
emigration to Madinah. Makkah at that time was neither Dar Islam nor Dar Harb: it
was a place of call to Islam. The similarity between some Christian countries and
Makkah before the Hijrah is that Muslims may freely make the call for Islam under the
secular law of states. This law also guarantees Muslims freedom to practice Islam and
for that there was no counterpart in pre-Hijrah Makkah. It seems implausible to
describe such countries as hostile to Islam and part of Dar al-Harb. Furthermore, not
all have treaties with Islamic states, which would make them part of Dar al-Ahd. For
these reasons it might make better sense to describe their position as neither Dar al-
Islam nor Dar al-Harb nor Dar al-Ahd, but as Dar al-Da'wa.
3.3.3) The Domain of War Dar al-Harb
Dar al-Harb has two main aspects: first, it is any part of the world that does not
apply the religious and political rules of Islam because it is out of Islamic sovereignty;
second, there are various countries called Dar al-Harb because of their enduring
hostility or enmity to Islam, not because they are continuously fighting the Islamic
State. Al-Kasani differentiated between Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam when he
remarked that,
The meaning of describing a state as either Islamic or blasphemy
(and hostile) is not Islam or blasphemy, but security and fear.
That means: If absolute security is for Muslims and absolute fear
is for blasphemy, it is an Islamic state. But if absolute security is
for non-believers and absolute fear is for Muslims, it is a hostile
state. Since the rules are based on security and fear instead of
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Islam and blasphemy, security and fear are considered more
deserving.59
Muslim jurists divide into two groups when characterising the Dar al-Harb. The
first, which contains the majority,* held the view that: it is a country or group of
countries where Islam is not sovereign, Islamic rules are not applied, and no peace
treaty or pacific relations with Muslims exist. It is a Dar al-Harb as long as it is hostile
to Muslims and Islam. Aggression by it is to be expected, so Muslims must be ready
and prepared to fight off the people of this state."
The second, the minority, is the group of Hanafite jurists who assumed that Islamic
sovereign authority and security of the Muslims and non-Muslims [Dhimmis] cannot
turn the country or part of it into Dar al-Harb. Likewise, it cannot be a hostile state if
the Muslims are in a minority, but Islamic sovereignty remains. Also, if people of a
country apostatise Islam, win victory and apply the rules of polytheism, or when
Dhimmis enjoying Muslim protection revoke the pledges and gain the leadership of
their country, the country is not yet a Dar al-Harb, according to these jurists.
However, they agreed that Dar al-Harb will turn into Dar al-Islam by applying the
Islamic rules. 6I Dar al-Islam however does not turn into Dar al-Harb if this should
cease to be the case. Spain and similar countries, according to this juristic view, are
still part of Dar al-Islam.
Based on the Hanafites opinion, it can be concluded that the following two kinds of
states had not been taken into account as they could not be related to the division of
the two original Dars. These are: (i) states which had never known or achieved the
sovereign authority of Islam, for example, the unexplored states or territories of the
African or South American Jungles; (ii) other states that are not adjacent to Dar al-
Islam. Consequently, it can be hypothesised that states which are not adjacent to Dar
al-Islam and/or not expected to behave aggressively towards the Islamic State, are part
59 Al-Kastuti, Ala' Al-Din Ibn Mas'aud,Badae' al-Sanay'a fi Tarteab al-Sharay'a, Vol. IX, Matba' sit al-Imam, Cairo, p. 4395.
The majority of the Malikites, the Shafei'ites, and the Hanbalites.
60 A1-.1awziyah, Muhammad Ibn Abu Bala Ibn Al-Qayyirn , Ahkatn ahl al-Dhuntnah, VoL V, Matba'at	 Dirnishq,
Damascus, 1961, p. 366.
61 Ibid., p. 374.
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of Dar al-Islam. To them, apply the definition of Muslims in isolation since they are
distant countries.*
However, both groups, which had different perspectives in characterising the Dar
al-Harb, summarised their definition of Dar al-Harb as the state that has the security
and sovereign authority of all Harbis under its own rules. The same jurists disagreed,
however, in how Dar al-Islam might come to be Dar al-Harb. The Malikites, the
Shafei'ites, and the Hanbalites stipulated four conditions by which any Islamic territory
would convert to become Dar al-Harb. They differ from the Hanafites over these
conditions, which are,
1)Harbis rule a state hostile to Islam and/or defeat the Islamic
State;
2) People of an Islamic territory apostatise Islam;
3) Dhimmis who enjoying Muslim protection revoke their pledges
and gain control of the country;
4) Dissent/rebellion against the Imam where dissidents manage to
acquire their own sovereign state though the land of their state was
initially, part of Dar al-Islam.62
The Hanafites, on the other hand, stipulated three conditions for any country, or
territory, to consider as a Dar al-Harb; these are:
1) When dominion of the territory is by a non-Muslim ruler who
behaves malignantly to the Dar al-Islam, and therefore prevents
Islamic Law being implemented.
2) The country is adjacent to, or bordering, Dar al-Islam and from
which an aggression could be anticipated.
3) Security and safety for Muslims and Dhimmis still remaining in the
state is not provided.63
Based on the Hanafites opinion, it can be argued that the provision of being adjacent to Muslims has to be ignored in recent time.
Distances turned to be very near, the invention of the super sonic aircraft and the plastic missiles, make it very easy mission to reach
any place in the world in short time.
62 Al-Sarkhasi, Muhanunad Ibn Ahmed, Sharh al-Siyar al-Kabir, Vol. IV, Hyderabad, 1335 AH, p. 302. & AI-Bahrawi,
AbdulRalunan	 & Others, AI-Fatawa al-Hindiyah, Vol. II, Al-Matba'ah al-Ameriyyah, Bulaq, 1310 AH, p.232.
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Moreover, the Dar al-Islam will not become Dar al-Harb when non-Muslims
capture it, as long as some of Islam's rules are implemented in it. In connection with
this Ibn Hegir al-Haythamy's observation is relevant,
The Islamic State never becomes a hostile (blasphemy) state.
That can be confirmed by the saying of Prophet Muhammad in
his Hadith 7slam is always superior and never inferior." If we
consider an Islamic state seized by non-Muslims to become a
hostile (blasphemy) state; this will be a null estimate. If Muslims
can recover this state by military force they will regain it as their
property and as it used to be before being seized by non-
believers."
By now, it could be understood that the juristic idea of dividing the world into two
or more Dars follows the historical development of the relation of an Islamic State
with other non-Islamic states. It can be said that the Islamic Shari 'ah meets with the
international law when it considers the world as one nation.* Within it, war is a
temporary matter that results in a temporary enmity between two states. Dar al-Harb
is thus limited to this the circle of warring states, including every other state which
supports them morally, physically and ethically.
3.3.4) The Domain of Pledge Dar APAhd
As it has been mentioned earlier, Muslim jurists divide the world into two domains,
those of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb . The Shafei'ites added another part, which is
the so-called domain of pledge or Dar al- Ahd,* which is not under Muslim rule, yet is
a tributary relationship to the Islamic State by truce (Sulh) treaty. This truce is
generally used in Shari 'ah as the opposite of by force ('Unwa). 65 The first known Dar
al-Ahd in Islamic history was established by the Prophet Muhammad when he
concluded a treaty of truce with the Quraishis, the leaders of Makkah, in the year 6
AR Muslim jurists, in their efforts to organise the relations between the Dar al-Islam
63	 Khusru, Dorar al-Hokam fi Sahrh Ghurar al-Ahkam, Vol. I, Al-Matba'ah al-Sharafiyah, Cairo, 1303 AH, p. 295.
& Khan, Qadi, Al-Fatawa al-Khaniyyah, Vol. III, (NPS & NDS) , p. 574.
64 Ibn Hegir, Al-Hithami, Tohfat al-Mohtag Ii Sharh al-Minhaj, Vol. IV, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, p. 230.
** This could be seen in the mentioned Qur'anic verse: "Mankind was one single nation 	 "(2: 213).
Some jurists called it Dar al-Aman or Dar al-Mztad'ah.
65 G'ibb, A. R. & H. Kramers, Short Encyclopedia OfIslam, E. J. Bill, Leiden, 1974, p. 69.
110
Chapter III
and Dar al-Ahd insisted that treaty or pledge granted peaceful relations between the
two Dars should not be more than ten years, and could be renewed after that.66
Such a state of affairs came into reality during the time of the Caliphate but was not
under Muslim control, yet it was not considered a part of Dar al-Harb. That was
because it was linked to Dar al-Islam by a pledge (Ahd). Because of this agreement,
the two domains, Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Ahd, were reconciled and enjoyed peaceful
relations for the duration of the pledge or treaty. 67 However, Harris Proctor notes that
the Hanafite jurists had never recognised Dar al- 'Ahd as a separate domain (Dar). He
quoted the Hanafi point of view when arguing that,
If the inhabitants of the territory concluded a peace treaty and
paid a tribute, it becomes part of Dar al-Islam and its people are
entitled to the protection of Islam.68
However, some Hanafi jurists such as Ibn al-Hamam differed from this view. He
argued,
It is a hostile state since we conciliated its people for a limited
time. Even if they are reconciled with us and pay an annual
tribute and are judged according to their own rules, we don't
agree to this unless it is for the good of Muslims. These people
have no commitments towards Muslim rules and they are all but
Harbis. 69
In addition to the above view, al-Sarkhasi explained,
It is true that it is called Dar al-Ahd since it has rules of
conciliation. However, it is considered as a hostile state since the
rule of Islam is not conducted in that place."
Examining the previous three views, some Hanbalites jurists such as Abu Y'ala held
and supported the Shafei'ites view. 71 However, the rest of the jurists, the Malilcites and
66 Al-Far'a, Muhammad Ibn al-Hussein, AI-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1994, p. 58.
67 Al-Tureaqi, Abdulah, Dr., Al-Iste'anah bi Ghayr al-Muslimoun fi al-Fiqh al-Islami, Riyadh, 1409 AH, p176.
68 Proctor, J. Harris, Islam and International Relations, Pall Mall Press, London, 1965, p. 26.
69 Ibn Hamam, Kama] Al-Dean, Fath al-Qadear, Vol. VI, Matba'at Mustafa al-Halabi, Cairo, 1356 AH, p. 462.
70 Al-Sarichasi, Muhammad Ibn Ahmed, Sharh al-Siyar al-Kabir, Vol. VI, Hyderabad, 1335 AH. p. 1893.
71 Abu Y'ala, Muhammad Ibn al-Hussein al-Far'a,A1-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah, Dar al-Filcr, Beirut, 1994, P. 133.
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the Hanbalites, supported the view of Ibn Hamam, the Hanafi. 72 In connection with
this, the Shafei'ites view may be considered as the more accurate division because
truce countries were not always under the conditions which were stipulated by Muslim
jurists to be part of Dar al-Islam. In the words of Armanazi,
The Shafei 'ites view of the division of the world into three
domains should be the basis of international relation between the
Muslims and other nations to protect the interests of transactions
and all political and commercial relations.73
However, contrary to the Hanafites, both the Hanbalites and Shafei'ites considered
the pledge state to be part of Dar al-Islam, since its people become Dhimmis, enjoying
Muslim protection upon reconciliation and the payment of Jizyah becomes due. 74 Al-
Mawardi, for instance, when reckoning the lands of Dar al-Islam, included among
them the lands of Dar al-Ahd, if their people pay the Jizyah.75
The Dar al- Ahd, moreover, could change to be Dar al-Harb if its rulers revoked
the pledge and fought or behaved in a hostile way to Dar al-Islam. This was confirmed
in the Holy Qur 'an in the following verse,
H.11	 445 col Is.11.12.3 	 cj.4	 cji
( I :ZIP) C.)48:3;1. H-SLI
But if they violate their oaths after their covenant, and attack your
Faith, fight ye the chiefs of Unfaith: for their oaths are nothing to
them: that thus they may be restrained. (9: 12)
However, this does not allow Muslims to execute people of Dar al-Ahd, even if
they are prisoners of war. That could be based on the Qur 'anic verse,
(A :Cylo.0.141) . tj 4.,sa Lo.k.
And they feed, for the love if Allah, the indigent, the orphan, and
the captive. (76: 8)
And in the Sunnah the Prophet is reported to have said,
72 Al-Mawardi, All Muhammad, Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah wa al-Welayat al-Denyah, Dar al-Ketab al-Arabi, Beirut, 1990, p.
133.
73 Arminian, Nageab, International law in Islam, Ph.D. Thesis, Damascus, 1930.
74 Ibid., pp. 1699-1703.
75 M-Mawardi, All Muluntunad, Al-Ahkain al-Sultaniyah wa al-Welayat al-Denyah, Dar al-Ketab al-Arabi, Beirut, 1990, p.
150, 164.
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Render back your Trust to those to whom it is due, and do not act
treacherously even with those who are unfaithful to you.76
3.4) Ummah, the main body of the Islamic community
The creation of the Islamic community Ummah was the turning point in the social,
economical, and political life of Arabia. It was the nucleus of the Muslim Ummah,
which gave birth to the classical Islamic community-state in Madinah, organised under
the Islamic Law and conducting its affairs in the spirit of the teachings of Islam. The
meaning of the term differs according to various authorities.
When the classical jurists dealt with the Islamic Ummah, they spoke of the believers
vis-a-vis non-believers, which is a philosophical or ideological concept. On the other
hand, they spoke of Dar al-Islam vis-a-vis Dar al-Harb, which is a matter of the
extent of Muslim rule or jurisdiction and of Caliphate in relation to non-Muslim
nations. The usage relates to the organisational and constitutional structure of political
authority in Muslim lands. 77 However, the traditional concept of Ummah was not
always religious in connotation, and many of the traditional writers have indeed
distinguished between a religious and a social meaning of the term. The term Ummah
is mentioned in sixty-four different places in the Holy Qur 'an, but with different
meanings. 78At one point, for example, it was used to mean a "model" when Allah
speaks about the Prophet Abraham,
( n V . :3.,..111) . (:)..is,y1.4 ci.4 4 ei i Libl.% ;11 tilti Li cill ..1161j.11, cjI
Abraham was indeed a model, devoutly obedient to Allah, and
true in faith, and he joined not gods with Allah. (16: 120)
Or time or era
1—i jy.a.4 04 ta+1.1. 4 e ..9,, VS 4.....p.i Lic>1,511...I O.usie., Z41 (..,JI L..,11.1.31 iNtria Li j.i.' i cjIli
(A :4,9.4) . cj J.IA.L...s. aq l i.i1.5 l.4 14.4 ciL%,9 H.Ic
If We delay the chastisement for them for a definite term, they are
sure to say, "What keeps it back?" Ahl On the day it actually
76 Al-Termidhi, Muhammad Ibn Easa, Sunan al-Termidhi, Al-Maktabah al-Islamiyyah, Beirut, 1983, Kitab al-Beu'a.
77 AbuSulayman, AbthdHamid A., Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations, International Institute of Islamic
Thought, Herndon, 1994, p. 51.
78 Al-Hadeathi, Nizar AbdulLateaf, A1-Umma wa al-Dawla fi Siyasat al-Nabi wa al-Khulafa'a al-Rashidun, rt Edit., Dar al-
Huriya, Baghdad, 1987, pp. 131-132.
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reaches them, nothing will turn it away from them, and they will
be completely encircled by that which they used to mock at! (11:
8)
And in some part as method and pattern,
Vj 40 c.jj.1 c.)--. Iii-1.4 —....1„9 is5.1.4 1 .04 Chilli Zil .104. 1.43 L95 jt.1 (.:)i :s..?....n43. ei
(Y :ZIA • C.1.3144 L•4 ..A.14. 41 ..1 44-9 (...kli4.:9-41 V -9 4.1-5‘uU
Do you think that you would be left alone while Allah has not yet
known those among you who strive with might and main, and
take none for friends and protectors except Allah, His Messenger,
and the community of Believers? And Allah is well acquainted
with all that ye do. (9: 16)
Or as a community,
(AI :Ft4.011) . cija4r.ti ?..C, j us j Os.slj Li.s:,. 45 0:11e a
Verily, this Umma of yours is a single Umma and I am your Lord
and Cherisher: therefore serve Me and no other. (21: 92)
A common religion (or part of a religion) sometimes defines this community. It
applies, occasionally, to any community,
(r r :c..i .)41) . cL0.14...	jell L51 1.11 s ri-41 viz 11t.t.li 4.14j IA IA (1
Nay! They say: "We found our fathers following a certain religion,
and we do guide ourselves by their footsteps." (43: 22)
Jurists al-Baghdadi and al-Mawardi differ from the other Muslim jurists in their
understanding of the concept Ummah. They were inclined to ascribe to the notion of
Ummah a specifically religious connotation rather than a socio-historical one, and to
argue for the unity of the community of believers in spite of the multiplicity of political
leaderships. Theirs was, therefore, an ideological rather than a socio-historical
discourse.79
Having unwillingly acknowledged the possibility of having more than one Imam,
they found it necessary to insist on the unity of the Muslim religious community. The
reality of division within the Islamic State had to be compensated for by over-
emphasising the spiritual unity and oneness of the community. Al-Mawardi is therefore
79 AI-IIassab, Fatiil A., Al-Mawaridi fi Nazariyyat al-Iclarah al-Islamiyyah al-'Ammah, Dar al-Taii'a, Beirut, 1984, pp. 69-71.
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inclined to use Ummah and Milla interchangeably - the integration of the community
cannot now be achieved politically and has thus to be emphasised religiously."
Like al-Baghdadi, al-Mawardi was unable to comprehend that among the reasons
behind the disintegration of the Islamic Caliphate there might have been some reasons
related to the socio-historical division of the community of Muslims into various
Ummahs, in the ethno-cultural sense. He chose instead to seek a juristic formula,
however unrealistic, that would reinvest the formal unity of the Sunni community in
spite of the growing dispersion of the centres of government. 81 However, another
Jurist al-Shahristani distinguished in his book al-Milal wa al-Nihal, between Ummahs
on the one hand, which according to his view nations such as the Arabs, the Persians,
the Greeks and the Indians, and on the other hand Milla, which means the law or
legislator (Sharae '), and Nihla means religion or religious order.82
Muslim thinkers had their different understanding of the concept Ummah where
they attempted to reconcile the difference in the two meanings. Abu Nasr al-Farabi, for
example, dealt with the Ummah as part of three communities which formed the
Humankind. He divided the Humankind community into three types: the great, the
middle, and the minor. The first covers all nations on the Earth, the second is the
Ummahs which inhabit a particular part of the Earth, the third is the cities.83
N. Nassar in his book Mafhum al-Ummah Baiyn al-Dean wa al-Tareikh mentioned
that al-Farabi used two other synonyms for the cities: Community Jama 'a, or Gather
Jam' (the latter includes tribe and clan). According to Nassar,
Al-Farabi mentioned other Ummahs surrounding the Arabs such
as the Abyssinians, Indians, Persians, Syrians, and Egyptians.
Then referred to several characteristics of an Ummah: physical
character, natural traits, and a common tongue, and
80 Ibid.
81 Nassar, Nasif,Malhum al-Umma Baiyn al-Dean wa al-Tareikh, Dar Al-TalFa, Beirut, 1983, pp. 88-101.
82 Khuri, Fuad I., Imams and Emirs, Saqi Books, London, 1990, p. 27.
83 Salem, Mohamed Aziz,	 wa al-Hukm fi al-Islam, Muasast al-Shabab, Alexandria, p. 143.
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distinguished the Urnmah as a group from the Milla as a set of
views and deeds, ruling the life of a certain community."
Besides that assumption, Nassar added to al-Farabi's view,
Muslims were people of a creed (Ahl al-Milla). An Ummah may
possess a Mina or may not, and there are seven great Ummahs,
including the Persians, Syrians, Greeks, Egyptians, Indians,
Chinese and Turks. Each Ummah has some physical
characteristics as well as a common tongue and one monarch.
This may infer to a certain degree of confusion but it is certainly
indicative of how he distinguishes between the concept of Ummah
and that of Milla."
Nassar, finally, holds that there were Muslim scholars unlike al-Farabi, al-Mas'udi,
for instance, who did not use the term Ummah in the religious sense, nor did he speak
of an Islamic Ummah.86
Al-Farabi's view supported by some contemporary scholars. Rosenthal, for
example, said,
Ummah denotes originally a religious community, not
necessarily of Muslims, since ills applied to the Jews of Medina
who are an Ummah in themselves, and in the 'Status" form
together with the mu 'minim, the believers (in Allah). The Umrnat
al-Islam "apart from the men (min duna-l-nas)", that is, all
mankind outside the community of Muhammad in Medina.
'Community" is here used by Muhammad in a religious, social
and political sense. 87
Fred Donner, among the contemporary scholars, in his book The Early Islamic
Conquests, illustrates what could be a pioneering definition of the concept and the
aspect of the Ummah. Donner initially distinguished between tribe and Urnmah when
he said,
The concept of a community of men was thoroughly familiar in
Arabia. There was the tribe, for example, with which the umma is
84 Nassar, Nasif, Mafhum al-Umma Batyn al-Dean wa al-Taredch, Dar al-Talra, Beirut, 1983, pp. 39-79.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Rosenthal, Erwin I. 3., Political Thought In Medieval Islam, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1985, p. 25.
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commonly compared, and with which it shares some
characteristics. And, although ills usually stated that the umma
differed from the tribe in that it was based on ties of religion
rather than of kinship, if seems clear that even the notion of
religious ties extending across tribal groups was not known in
pre-Islamic Arabia. 88
Donner then explained the uniqueness of the Islamic Ummah which distinguish it
from others,
What was unique was the concept of the umma, then, not the idea
of community, or even the idea of a community defined by
religion, but rather the uncompromising monotheism of the
Islamic community that, by its rejection of paganism, in essence
laid claim for the umma to the souls and bodies of the whole
pagan population. The uniqueness of the umma and its character
as monotheistic religious community transformed the act of
breaking with the community from a social act into moral one.
Such a break was not merely unfortunate or undesirable, but
positively evil, because there was only one Islamic umma. To
break ties with the umma was to break with both God and man; it
was both a sin and crime . . The regulation of the umma
demanded that the tribal ties of believers be transcended. . . the
political consolidation of the Islamic community [umma] was the
concept of an absolute higher authority in the form of divine law
. . . [which] became not only a set of abstract moral guidelines,
but a true social and political legislation with a divine basis that
was to be applied and observed by the umma. 89
Donner then concludes that,
The umma was very different in its political and social
implications from other Arabian religious communities, whether
pagan, Jewish, or Christian. It not only facilitated, it demanded
the breaking of the tribal ties. The umma . thus became the
focus of a Muslim's social concern. Indeed, it was the insistence
on rupturing the traditional ties of kinship in favor of the umma .
. . [which] allowed 11 10 expand.9°
Therefore, the concepts of Ummah and Islamic Shari 'ah go together in an
ideological attempt to cope with the disintegration of the Islamic State. The
destruction of the old order by the Mongols sacking of Baghdad in 1258 AD had
88 Donner, Fred McGraw, The Early Islamic Conquests, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1981, pp. 55-56.
89 Ibid., pp. 55-58.
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disturbed the intellectual coherence of the jurists. Ibn Taymiyyah, for example, stood in
marked contrast to contemporary jurists of the period. In his book 'Al-Siyasa al-
Shar 'aiyyah' he places his main emphasis on the supremacy of the Shari 'ah over the
unity and the life of the community, and as the only means whereby a lasting, sound
unity could be established for the Ummah. 9 ' Ibn Taymiyyah's view supported by some
contemporary scholars such as Fuad Khuri who writes,
Once a community surrenders to God's laws [Shari 'all] it joins
Islam and becomes part of the Ummah . . . The Islamic Urnmah
is a form of universal religious brotherhood.92
Another supporter to Ibn Taymiyyah's view was of E. Rosenthal, who said,
The umma is a living reality created by the Prophet who,
transcending family, clan and tribe, invited all Arabs to form the
"Community of Muslims" (Ummat al-Islam). The brotherhoods
inaugurated by him (mu 'akhat) were associations of like-minded
"believers" (mu 'minun) which he valued more highly than mere
brotherhood.93
Unlike the above classical pioneer Muslim thinkers, AbdulRahman Ibn Khaldoun
deserves special attention because of his distinctive sociological approach. In his work
al- Mogademah, he gave his understanding of the term Ummah as a certain socio-
historical, for example, of the Greeks, Persians, Egyptians, and he regards Ummah as a
phenomenon that is of 'longer term' than that of Dynasty or state Dawla. He usually
speaks of the Islamic community as a Milla, not an Ummah, for the meaning of the
latter to him is more closely related to a concept of a group, people or race (although
he does not seem to attach too much importance to the factor of language). He further
relates the concept of Ummah to that of Watan- a term that expresses a certain
relationship between a specific group and a specific territory, which is different from
the term Jiha, which he uses in a purely geographical sense.94
90 Ibid.
91 Ihn Tanniyyah, TaquIDean Ahmed, Al-Sysasah al-Shar'iyah, Dar al-M'arifah, Beirut, 1969, pp. 5-8.
92 IChuri, Fund I., Imams and Emirs, Saqi Books, London, 1990, p. 28.
93 Rosenthal, E. K. J., Political Thought in Medieval Islam, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1985, pp. 24-25.
94 nn Ithaldoun, AbdudRahman Mohammed, Al-Mogademah, Al-Maktabah al-Vistnah, Beirut, 1995, p. 153 o.w..
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The mission of the members of the Ummah, individual and groups, is to be servants
of God and spread God's rule. Guided by the word of God and the Prophet, the
Ummah has a mission to create a moral social order. In the Holy Qur 'an verse (3: 110)
God describes Muslims as the best community evolved in mankind who, enjoining
what is right and forbidding what is evil, This command has influenced Muslims
practice throughout the centuries, providing a rationale for political and moral
activism. Government regulation, Islamic Law, and implementing Shari 'ah have all
been justified as expressions of this moral mission to command the good and prohibit
evil.95
The internal organisation of the Umtnah is based on the profession of a common
religion. Perpetual peace among its members, the general lifting of the blood feud and
the union of the Muslims in one great nation was assumed. Its organisation was
secured and defined by a common acceptance to the Shari 'ah, in the first place, and
then to those who exercise authority, which was simply the symbol of the supremacy of
the Shari 'ah which was implemented by, and upon the Islamic authority, even the
Prophet himself was subordinate to the Shari 'a/i. It was to the Shari 'ah, not to the
authority that the believer owed his obedience, which was dependent on justice,
theoretically a command entailing disobedience to God was not to be obeyed. The
Prophet is reported to have said,
There is no obedience for a man in disobedience the God.96
3.5) The Islamic State, its nature and duties
The nature of the Umma as a community bound together by a common Faith Islam
and a common Divine law Shari 'ah means that the Islamic State is understood by the
classical jurists, primarily in terms of the ruler or Imam whose primary function is to
ensure the implementation of that Islamic law. To understand further the nature of the
Islamic State, the difference between this state and the other non-Islamic states must be
grasped. The fundamental difference between the Islamic State and other states is that
95 Esposito, John L., Islam The Straight Path, Oxford University Press, New York, 1991, p. 30.
96 Al-Qastalani, ShihabAidean Ahmed 1bn Muhammad, Irshad al-Sari Ii Sharh Saheah al-Bukhari, Vol X, Matba'at Bulaq,
1327 AH, p. 220.
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in the former, sovereignty belongs to God while in a non-Islamic State it essentially
belongs to human beings. This means two things: first that Islam is the official religion
of the Islamic State and second the Shari 'ah is implemented by the state. The fact that
this is not the case in non-Islamic states leads Muslim jurists to describe them as
blasphemy states.
After this point there is a divergence of views today between those who contend
that the Shari 'ah covers all situations, either actually or potentially (its adaption to new
situations requiring the exercise of ljtihad) on the one hand, and those who contend
that within the Islamic State there is both Shari 'ah law and non-Shari 'ah law. There
are certain commandments, prohibitions and guiding principles which have been
explicitly laid down in the Holy Qur 'an and explained by the Prophetic Sunnah such as
the matrimonial relations and inheritance, which have to be incorporated in Muslim
legal codes without any alteration. Where there is no explicit, mandatory role, the
matter is understood to have been left to the discretion of the legislative organ of the
Islamic State (Modern examples of such laws are European laws imported into Egypt,
or aviation safety laws). This legislation, however, must never conflict with the
fundamentals of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur 'an and the Prophetic Sunnah, that
is, they must never conflict with the Shari 'ah .
Thus, in the Islamic State human beings have limited rights of sovereignty — where
sovereignty denotes primarily legislative capacity - while in all other states they
arrogate to themselves unlimited sovereign rights or an absolute legislative capacity.
This dispute over the character of law within the Islamic State is a contemporary
controversy. Our concern, however, is with the Islamic State to the end of the great
`Abbaside Caliphate in 1258 AD where the gates of ljtihad remained open and
consequently the Shari 'ah could be applied to any novel situation. Since the issue of
non-Shari 'ah law did not arise in this period it follows that it is unnecessary to decide
between rival conceptions of law within the Islamic State (a decision which the author
has neither the religious authority nor the competence to make).
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Exploring modern Western literature, it can be found that scholars in dealing with
the Islamic State announced shortage of materials which covered the early period of
Islamic history. Ann Lambton, for example, explains this when she said,
Unfortunately for the early and medieval period of Islamic
history sources which tell us what people really thought are
rare. 97
Consequently, Western scholars differ in describing the nature of the early Islamic
State. Julius Wellhausen, for example, has argued that it is a theocracy. 98 Others
described it as a state governed by a God or gods. 99 Arnold had a different view when
he assumed that the classical Muslim state was a universal nomocracy, a system of
government based on a legal code. 100 Still others, such as Fritz Kern, have suggested
that it is a monarchical or oligarchic state with authority entrusted by force or reason
to one or the few. 1 ° 1 Finally, some characterise it as a religious community which had
become a state. 102 In the Muslim classical literature, by contrast, the Islamic State is
never defined by the jurists. However, contemporary Muslims thinkers, such as Taha
Hussein, rejected Western definitions.
Nothing can be more misleading than the concept that the state
founded by the Prophet was theocratic state. Islam was and
remains a religion prior to and beyond everything else. It guided
people to their benefits in the current life and in the life
hereafter, but it did not rip off their freedom when it gave them
the liberty to choose between good and evil, private and public
interests. 103
Jurist Al-Maududi sees that the Islamic State is completely different from any
Western kind of state
The Islamic Khilafat is a democracy which. . . is the antithesis of
the Theocratic, the Monarchical and the Papal forms of
97 A. K. S. Lambton, Introduction, in Ferdinand, Klaus & Mozaffari, Mehdi, Islam: State And Society, Cruzon Press,
London, 1965.
98 Wellhausen, Julius, The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, Calcutta University Press, Calcutta, 1927, pp. 5-8.
99 Smith, C. Ryder, Encyclopcedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. XII, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1924, pp. 287-289.
100 Arnold, Thomas W., The Preaching of Islam,r Edit., Constable, London, 1935, pp. 4-5.
1111 Kern, Fritz, Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1939, pp. 27-34.
102 Gabrieli, Francesco, Muhammad and the Conquests °Alum, World University Library, 1968, p. 91.
103 Hussein, Taha,A1-Fitnah al-Kubra, Vol.!, Dar al-Ma'arif, Cairo, 1951, pp. 22-23.
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government, as also of the present-day Western Secular
Democracy . . . what we Muslims call democracy is a system
wherein the people enjoy only the right of Khilafat or
vicegerency of God Who alone is the Sovereign. In our
democracy the Khilafat is bound to keep within the limits
prescribed by the Divine Code. 1°4
Arnold's view (see above) encouraged some contemporary scholars, such as Asghar
Ali, to adopt the view that the first Islamic State was a nomocracy state, that is, merely
as a vehicle for achieving security and order in ways conducive to the Muslims
attending to their religious duties of enjoining good and preventing evil [al-Amr bi al-
M 'arouf wa al-Nahy 'an al-Monkar].'o5
The Islamic State came into existence after the Prophet's Hijrah from Makkah to
Madinah. It was based on a protection pact - later known as the Aqabah Pact - with
the leaders of the two leading tribes of Madinah, the Aws and the Khazraj (who were
known later as the Helpers Ansar). 106 According to the pact, the Prophet bound
himself never to forsake them when he undertook that,
I make with you this pact on condition that the allegiance ye
pledge me shall bind me to protect me as you protect your women
and your children [yourselves] . . . I am yours and ye are mine. I
will be the friend of your friends, the enemy of your enemies. 1°7
On the other side, the leaders of Madinah adhere to the Prophet: (i) to listen and
obey in all sets of circumstances (ii) to spend in plenty as well as in scarcity; (iii) to
enjoin good and forbid evil; (iv) to fear the censure of none in Allah's service; (iv) to
defend the Prophet if he seeks their help and protect him as they would protect them
selves.'" In the year 622 AD the Prophet Muhammad moved to Yathrib, henceforth
named the City of the Prophet, or shortly the City, al-Madinah, to build the first
Islamic State. 1 °9
 On arrival at Madinah, the Prophet had two priorities: (i) to organise
104 Maududi, Abul Ala, First Principles of the Islamic State, Islamic Publications, Lahore, 1978, pp. 25-26.
105 See the debate of Asgliar All Engineer in his work, The Islamic State, Advent Books, New York, 1980, pp. 32-51.
106 Al-Mubarakphori, SafiulRalunan, The Sealed Nectar, Biography of the Noble Prophet, Maktabat Dar us Salam, Riyadh,
1995, pp. 157-159.
107 Irving, Washington, Life ofMahomet, Henry G. Bohn, London, 1852, p. 78.
108 Lings, Martin, Muhammad, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1984, p. 111.
109 Sherwani, Haroon Khan, Muslim Political Thought and Administration, Munshiram Manoharial Publisher, 1981, p. 13.
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the Muslims into a social polity; (ii) to provide it with protection to meet any external
threat. In order to achieve the first goal, the Prophet constructed a Mosque where he
imparted to the new Muslim polity the practical structures of Islam, and thus welded
them into a disciplined community-state with a common ideology.
For the second aim, the Prophet made covenants* (the constitution of Madinah) of
peace, trust and alliance with the Jews. Christian and Pagan tribes of Madinah as allies
of the Jews also secured and protected the Islamic State from any external aggression
as a result of that alliance. They did not form a separate alliance with the Islamic
State, 110
 In that treaty the Prophet drew up a charter meticulously recording the terms
of agreement, that is, the rights, duties and obligations of the Muslims and non-
Muslims which provided the general structure of the constitution. The main
characteristics of the Islamic State in that treaty were:
I) A religious-political organisation functioning under a written constitution (i.e.
the Constitution of Madinah);
2) An ideological state based on the concepts and fundamental principles
embodied in the Holy Qur'an;
3) A "federal" structure comprising two communities, the Muslims and non-
Muslims, in one territory;
4) Safeguards to ensure the freedom of the new Islamic society from outside
invasions;
5) Institutions to guarantee the domestic tranquillity and the provision of justice;
6) Institutions to protect equal personal security for all its citizens.
After the death of the Prophet, the period of the glorious Caliphate lasted thirty
years (632-661AD). It was characterised by the expansion of the Islamic Empire and
the appearance of various complex religious, social and political situations which were
different from the polity of Madinah. Therefore, the Caliphs practised ljtihad when
they faced new situations or problems for which there is no legal judgement in the Holy
* This treaty known as "The Constitution of fachnah." See appendix 1.
110 Irving, Washington, Life ofMahotnet, Henry C. Bohn, London, 1852, p. 89.
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Qur'an or the Prophetic Sunnah. 111 Exploring the period of the Caliphate, the period
of the first Caliph Abu Bakr (632-634 AD) started with wars with the Arab tribes who
rebelled en masse when they knew of the death of the Prophet. Many renounced Islam
entirely; many attached themselves to new (false) prophets who arose in different
places, still others were willing to remain Muslims at prayer but would not pay the
Zakah. 112 The era of Abu Bakr is therefore characterised as the rise of the revolt of
Arabia (the Ridda) as it was the chief problem with which he had to deal." 3 The era of
Caliph Umar 1(634-643 AD) was also extremely important in Islamic history. Umar I
was considered as the real organiser of the Islamic State because almost all the
institutions of authority were established during his Caliphate, such as, armies, state
treasury, provinces, welfare schemes, taxation, and judicial services. These formed the
basis of the Islamic States during and after his Caliphate."4
There have been widely different interpretations of the various events and bloody
episodes that took place after the assassination of Umar Tin 643 AD, among them the
civil war which broke out and led to a situation of nearly complete chaos. These
episodes, although involving doctrinal differences and disputes, have an important
bearing on the development of the Islamic State. After the last of the Rashidoun
Caliphs the basic character of the Islamic State underwent a fundamental
transformation with the Umayyads (663-750 AD). The Caliphate became a dynastic
government with the Caliph as a monarch. This was one of the chief criticisms levelled
against the Umayyad during the later `Abbaside period." 5 It is worth mentioning that
the Umayyads use the title of Khalifat Allah (the Caliph of God) which almost
certainly means that they regarded themselves as deputies of God, rather than as mere
successors to the Prophet Khalifat Rasoul Allah, since it is unlikely that Caliph means
.......".
11 1 APAlimi, Ithalid AbdulAteaf, Kitab al-Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah Ii al-Mawardi, Dar al-Ketab al-Arabi, Beirut, 1990, p. 6.
112 Noldeke, Theodore, Sketches From Eastern History, Adam and Charles Black, London, 1892, p. 73.
113 Gabrieli, Francesco, Muhammad and the Conquests of Islam, World University Library, 1968, p. 92.
114 Al-Seuti, Jalal al-Din, Tareikh al-Khulafa', Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, p. 128.
115 Watt, W. Montgomery, Islamic Political Thought, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1968, p. 39.
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successor (one cannot be a successor of God). Furthermore, they saw no need to share
their power with, or delegate it to, the emergent class of religious scholars.n6
In the year 750 AD, the `Abbasids came to power after they had succeeded in
overthrowing the Umayyads and establishing their new dynasty which lasted for nearly
four centuries (750-1158). 1l7 During that time the Ulama were embarrassed by the
religious behaviour of some of the `Abbaside Caliphs and there was unrest among
some. A large number of them reconciled themselves to contemporary realities and
tried to modify the theory of the Islamic State to suit the necessities of the new
situation of a protracted struggle between the Caliphs and their Sunni and Shi'i
opponents. Under the pressure of the rival claimants to power they formed a theory of
government with a twofold aim: to vindicate and uphold the divine purpose of the
Muslims state and to support the `Abbaside Caliphs against all challenges to and
encroachments on their authority. 118
The first Islamic State, which was set up by Prophet Muhammad in Madinah, is
considered to be the ideal model of the Islamic State. Muslims believe that whatever
the Prophet did was perfect because he was not only the living embodiment of the Holy
Qur 'an but also acted under Divine guidance through revelations. On the other hand,
the Caliphate remained one of the principal themes in the course of Islamic history and
is often regarded as synonymous with the Islamic State. Muslim jurists and theorists of
the classical period looked back to the glorious Orthodox Caliphate (632-661 AD),
concentrated on the ideal state and its rulers, and propounded theories making the
Shari 'ah and its sources its basis. Al-Mawardi,* al-Ghazali, Abu Yusuf, Ibn Taymiyyah
are considered as the pioneering jurists who dealt with the political theory of the
Islamic State. Ibn Khaldoun and al-Farabi shared the Muslim jurists theoretical efforts
and are considered as the eminent theorists and philosophers of the classical period
from the tenth to the eleventh centuries AR.
116 Hawting, G. R., The First Dynasty of Islam, Croom Helm, London, 1986, p.13.
117 Kennedy, Hugh, The Early Abbasid Caliphate, Croom Helm Ltd., London, 1981, pp. 41-42.
118 Rosenthal, E. K. J., Political Thought in Medieval Islam, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1985, 1962, p. 27.
* The author decided to concentrates on al-Mawardi's book because it was the first scientific treatise on political science and state
administration in the Muslim history. This does not mean that the other juristical works were less important, but because al-
Mawardi's work left enduring influence on the Muslim political thought.
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Al-Mawardi' s** book Ordinances of Government (al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah) was the
first in Muslim history to analyse systematically the Islamic State, political science and
state administration because he mentioned that the Caliph had ordered him to write
such a book. If there was such a literature on the Islamic State available before that
time, the Caliph would surely not have issued his command. 119 In the words of Ann
Lambton,
His purpose was to give a legal exposition of the theory of
government speculatively derived from the basis of theology and
to set out the formal basis of government so that the ruler, knew
his rights and duties.120
Not all al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah of al-Mawardi was concentrated on the Caliphate.
In fact, only a small portion of the work is devoted to political theory, the rest was
devoted to details of administration and rules of government, though these are linked
directly to his concept of the Caliph. The significance of this is that an analysis of the
Islamic State turns out to be an analysis of the Caliphate, directly or indirectly. In other
words, al-Mawardi identified the Islamic State with the office of the Caliphate and the
method of his rule. Al-Mawardi's preoccupation was with the internal aspect of the
Islamic State. He had little to say on the subject of its external relations with non-
Muslim states and individuals, except to note that one of the duties of the Caliph was
to wage Jihad and in certain circumstances to make the arrangements for non-Muslims
to become Dhimmis. This theory left an enduring influence on Muslim political
thought, therefore, later writers followed him in identifying the Islamic State with its
head, the Caliph. In the introduction of his book he wrote,
Abu al-Hassan al-Mawardi (974-1058) regarded as one of the most Muslim systematic political pioneer jurist of his time. He was
not only a distinguished judge but also an author of great repute. He was a staunch Shafei'i jurist and had the good fortune of being
equally favoured by both the Buwaihids and the 'Abbasids. Al-Mawardi writings include a commentary on the Qur'an, a voluminous
work on Shafei'i jurisprudence, linguistic treatises, an anthology of aphorisms. His method is narrative and didactic and his major
themes are supported by an abundance of quotations from the Holy Qur'an, the Traditions, the saying of the Orthodox Caliph, and
venerable scholars, renowned for their sagacity or orthodoxy, like al-Hassan al-Basri, as well as numerous unnamed and unidentified
philosophers, rhetoricians, and poets. For further details about the Buwaihids see Glasse, Cyril, The Concise Encyclopaedia Of
Islam, Stacy International, London, 1989., p. 80. During the time of al-Mawardi, the Hanbali Jurist Muhammad Ibn al-Fara'a,
known as Abu Y'ala wrote a book with the same title and in the same subject. Examining the two books, it could find great similarity
between them, they both refereed to the same source and quoted from the works of Ibn Sallam, al-Waqidi, Yahya Ibn Adam, and Ibn
Ja'far. Examining booth books it could be found that Abu Y'ala used the descriptive method by mentioning only the view of the
Hanbali School in the Fighi issues. However, al-Mawardi's book distinguished from Abu Y'ala's by the used of comparative
approach in the Fighi subsidiary issues, al-Mawardi first mentions the Shafeil view then compare it with the different of the Hanafi
and the Maliki views. For further details see Da'wud M. S. & Muhammad F. A., Al-Imam Abu al-Hassan al-Mawardi,
Alexandria, 1978, pp. 17-18 & Faldtri, Majid, Ethical Theories In Islam, E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1991, p. 158 & Khalid
AbdulAteaf,Kitab al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah Ii al-Mawardi, Dar al-Ketab al-Arabi, Beirut, 1990, pp. 9-11.
119 Rosenthal, E. K. J., Political Thought in Medieval Islam, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1985, p. 27.
120 Lambton, Ann K. S., State and Government in Medieval Islam, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985, p. 84.
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As the laws of governance are more applicable to those in
authority but because these latter, being occupied with politics
and management, are prevented from examining those laws as
they are mixed with all the other laws. I have devoted a special
book to them. Thus in response to the person to whom my
obedience is due in this affair, I have made known to him the
madhhabs of the fuqaha' so that he sees both that his rights are
respected and that his duties are fulfilled and that he honours the
dictates of justice in their execution and aspires to equity in
establishing his claims and in the fulfilment of others clairns.121
The reason of the state is that God has laid down laws in order that issues might be
satisfactorily settled and the principles of right, truth, and goodness may be widely
known, as he said in the preface. Then he emphasised the necessity for the Imamate or
Caliphate, which literally means presidentship, as guaranteeing the existence of the
community and found out that the Imamate is derived from the Shari 'ah but not for
any other reason. Al-Mawardi says
The institution of Imamate is necessary as a requirement of the
Shari 'ah and not as a requirement of reason. The appointment of
an Imam by the consensus of the Muslim community is
obligatory. The Imamate is established to replace prophecy in the
defence of the faith and the administration of the world. 122
To put al-Mawardi's idea in modern form: what it means is firstly, that the real
motive of the State is the rule of justice and truth, and secondly, it is the machinery of
the State which sifts good from the bad, virtue from vice and the sanctioned from the
prohibited.123
With an entire disregard of the fact of history during the four preceding centuries,
al-Mawardi maintains that the office of Caliph is elective. This tells us that his treatise
was not an analysis of how government was in fact organised but how it ought, in
principle, to be organised. Thus the Caliphate should be organised on the same elective
principles as were found among the Rashidoun Caliphs, as opposed to the practice of
121 Al-Mawardi, All Muluunmad,Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah wa al-Welayat al-Denyah, Dar al-Ketab al-Arabi, Beirut, 1990, p.
16.
122 Ibid., p .p. 29_30.
123 Sherwani, Haroon Khan, Muslim Political Thought and Administration, Munshiram Manoharlal Publisher, 1977, p. 74.
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dynastic succession by the Umayyads and 'Abbasid. In the same fashion, he lays down
qualifications for the candidates and electors. According to al-Mawardi,
The instituted by means of election and the electors shall consist
of persons with special qualifications, which are justice together
with all its condition, knowledge of religion, and wisdom.
Candidates must possess certain qualifications including
assurance of his senses, assurance of his organs, judgement
necessary for the administration and management of the affairs
of the subjects, bravery, and descent from Quraish.124
Al-Mawardi then gave quite a mass of detail regarding the election and appointment
of the Imam and discussed the qualification of voters and candidates. He tried to make
the theory fit in with what could be actual fact, namely that almost every Imam has one
of two ways to be elected.
Every Imam has to be appointed in one of the two ways, by
election or by designation, that is, he may by elected by an
electoral college (ahl al-hal wa al- 'aqd), or he may be
nominated by the reigning lmam.125
Al-Mawardi states that authorised jurists disagree on the number of electors, where
some assume that the Imam has to be elected by consensus of the Ummah, others saw
that not less than five persons should elect the candidate, while still others were of the
opinion that three persons are sufficient, and the last group held the view that one
person is enough to elect the Caliph, namely the current Caliph. However, the Jurist
stipulated, in both ways, that the Ummah has to agree upon the Imam and to give a
pledge (' Aqd) for allegiance (Bay 'ah) to him.'26
In other words, each Imam may appoint his successor and yet the elective character
of the institution may be preserved. This opinion has been advocated by al-Mawardi to
advance another important opinion on the case of two candidates equally qualified for
the office of the Caliph,
124 Al-Mawardi, All Muhanunad, Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah wa al-Welayat al-Denyah, Dar al-Ketab al-Arabi, Beirut, 1990,
pp. 31-32.
125 Ibid., p. 33.
126 ibid ., 35.
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The electoral college may nominate anyone of the two as Caliph
without assigning any reason for the choice.127
Nevertheless, if two people fulfil equally the condition of Imamate, the most
advanced in years is the preferred choice. The election of a less qualified person in the
presence of a more qualified person is legal, provided the former fulfils all the
conditions of the Imamate. However, if two Imams are elected for the Ummah in two
different towns, the Imamate is for the one who was elected first. Therefore, the
existence of two Imams contemporaneously is illega1. 128 For example, Ann Lambton
says,
One of his [al-Mawardi] motives in this, too, was no doubt,
implicitly to refuse recognition to the claims of the Fatimids.
That he also incidentally excluded the claims of the Ummayyads
of Andalus was of little importance since they did not pose, as
did the Fatimids, a political threat to the Abbaside.129
However, al-Mawardi's view was not accepted by the classical or the contemporary
Muslim scholars. Jurists Ali Al-Ash'ari* opposed this view when he said,
The existence of two Caliphs at the same time is possible if their
territories are far flung and widely separated by a sea, which
hinders easy communication between the two.130
Similarly, AbdulWahab Khallaf, a contemporary Muslim scholar, assumes that,
It is possible to have numerous Imams when Islam is broad and
countries are distant in order to ease of control of the countries'
affairs and understand Muslim citizens' needs. 131
Muhammad Hamidullah has explained the main cause of the multiplicity of Muslim
states. Hamidullah assumes,
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid., pp. 35-38.
129 Lambton, Ann K. S., State and Government in Medieval Islam, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985, p. 90.
* Ali Ibn Ismael al-Ash'ari (d. 334/935) was the defender of the Sunni views during his time against the Shi'i and the Mu'tazilite
doctrines. See Cambridge History of Islam, Vol. II, 1970, pp. 812-813.
130 Engineer, Asghar Ali, The Islamic State, Advent Books, New York, 1980, p. 73.
131 Khalaf, Abdulwahab, Nizam al-Dawlah al-Islatniyyah, Dar Al-Ansar, Cairo, 1397 All, p.25.
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In the beginning there was no possibility of having more than one
Muslim state. When Islam spread far and wide, and the Muslims
did not form a compact whole with continuous and contiguous
frontiers, the division of Islamic territory into many states was
inevitable . . . With the downfall of the Ummayyads, Spain
became independent of the East. The Caliph Haroon al-Rashead
created a buffer-state in North Africa, in a country where three
realms met- the 'Abbaside Empire, the Idrisite Kingdom and the
Umayyads Dominions of Spain; and handed it over to the family
of Aghlabites who exercised full independence.132
In spite of all changes which happened within the `Abbaside dynasty during its
decline in the power and the rise of other Islamic states, such as the Umayyad in Spain
and the Fatimid in Egypt, it is remarkable that there was no one outside the `Abbaside
Caliph in Baghdad who had the courage to proclaim himself the successor of the
Prophet or hold the title of the Caliph, a fact which proves the sanctity of the office of
the Caliph even in the hour of its agony.133
Al-Mawardi then specified the public, religious, legal, and military functions and
duties of the Imam. Among the important elements of the Imam 's duties are: (1) to
defend the Ummah against its enemies; (2) restrain oppression and redress grievances;
(3) enforce and exact the Shari 'ah 's punishments; (4) maintenance of law and order to
make people lead a peaceful life, and proceed in their economic activities freely, and
travel safely; (5) organising and prosecuting Jihad against those who refuse to embrace
Islam after being invited to do so. To prosecute this until they accept Islam or enter
into a contract and became Dhimmis; (6) collecting of Kharaj and Zakat without
extortion or pressure, fixing of allowances and stipends from the state treasury Bait al-
Mal to those who deserve, appointment of honest and sincere men to the principal offi-
ces of states to secure affective administration; (7) look into and apprise himself of the
affairs of his dominions so that he may himself direct the national policy without
engrossing himself in luxury or religious devotion are also the important duties of an
Imam, according to Mawardi. Writing on the Caliph al-Mawardi said,
When a person is duly elected as Imam then this should be
announced in public, then people entrust all their affairs to him
132 Hamidullah, Muhammad, The Muslim Conduct of State, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1977, p. 88.
133 Sherwani, Haroon Khan, Muslim Political Thought and Administration, Munshiram Manoharlal Publisher, 1977, p. 71.
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and must give him their unquestioning obedience, and they must
obey him.134
It is permitted for the Imam to be addressed as the Caliph of the Prophet of God
Kalifat Rasoul Allah, because he succeeded the Prophet of the God in his Ummah,
said al-Mawardi. In general, the title Khalifa, which in the West became Caliph, means
somebody who stands in the place of another, that is the absence or death of another
person. However, Jurists were opposed to allowing the Caliph to be addressed as "the
Caliph of God", considering it a sort of libertinism; "succession is for someone who is
absent or dead, but God is neither absent nor dead". 135 When the first Caliph Abu Bakr
was addressed as "Caliph of God" he said, "I am not the Caliph of God but the Caliph
of the Prophet of God". 136 The duty of the Caliph is to defend the faith, dispense
justice, lead in prayer and in war, all in one. He is bound by the legislation (Share 'a)
to the loyal, effective discharge of these duties, either in person or by delegating his
authority to his appointed officials, chief among them the minister (Wazir) and the
judge Qadi, or, more often, to non-official persons who have usurped his effective
power by force.137
On the basis that the duty of all Muslims is obedience to legitimate authority, al-
Mawardi forbids the Caliph to be removed from office unless he is affected by some
definite change in his physical or mental ability. Al-Mawardi sees that the Imam could
forfeit his position on account of one of the following reasons:
1. The loss of probity on his part by reason of evil conduct or heresy. This is of two
kinds:
(a) If he becomes a slave to his inordinate desires and flouts the prohibitions of
the Shari 'a/i.
(b) The one connected with his faith, that is, if he holds opinions contrary to the
principles of religion or twisted opinions as amounts to an abrogation of the
accepted principles of Islam.
134 Ibid., p. 50.
135 Crone, Patricia & Hinds, Martin, God's Caliph, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 4.
136 Ibid.
1 37 Rosenthal, Erwin 1.1, Political Thought in Medieval Islatn, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1985, p. 26.
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2. If there occurs a change in his person:
(a) Loss of his Physical senses, that is, if he loses his mental faculties and his
sight.
(b) Loss of bodily organs, that is, if he loses two hands or feet.
(c) Loss of personal ability to supervise and direct, that is, if:
(i) He is over-powered by one of his officials and his rule was opposed to
the principles of religion and justice,
(ii) If he is captured by the enemy and there is no hope of his
deliverance.138
However, some Muslim jurists stipulated the full obedience of the Muslims to their
Imam, even if he was unjust (but he did not disobey God such as by committing sin).
The Hanbali jurist Ibn Batta, for example, observed,
You must abstain and refrain from sedition. You must not rise in
arms against the Imams, even if they be unjust. The Caliph Umar
said 'y he [the ruler], oppress you, be patient; if he dispossess
you, be patient." The Prophet, may God bless and save him, said
to Abu Dharr: "Be patient, even if he be an Ethiopian slave. "139
If the Imam is over-powered by one of his legal officials who appropriates all
authority to himself, but does not openly defy the Imam, the Imam continues in his
office, provided the usurper rules in accordance with the injunctions of the Shari 'ah,
and in deference to the accepted norms of justice. This is to ensure that the functions
of the Imamate should continue to be performed, and that the people do not fall prey
to the ways of evil on account of the non-enforcement of the Shari 'ah. If the governor
or the usurper declares his allegiance to the Caliph and promises to maintain the unity
of the Caliphate, and enforces the laws of Shari 'ah, and co-operates with the Imam
against the foes of Islam, the Caliph shall recognise his absolution by conferring on him
the deed of investiture formally and publicly.140
138 SluunsAldean, Muhammad Mandi, Nidham al-Hukm wa al-Idarah fi al-Islam, 2nd Edit., Al-Mu'sass al-Dowaliyya Ii al-
Dirasat wa al-Nashr, Beirut, 1991, pp. 168-182.
139 Lewis, Bernard, The Political Language of Islwn, University of Chicago Press, 1984, pp. 101-102.
140 Al-Mawardi, All Muhammad, Al-Ahkatn al-Sultaniyah wa al-Welayat al-Denyah, Dar al-Ketab al-Arabi, Beirut, 1990,
pp. 53-60.
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Ibn Khaldoun, the pioneer Islamic thinker, places the State most positively in the
centre of his intellectual concerns. Like al-Mawardi, the state (Dcrwla) in Ibn
Khaldoun's understanding means government (or regime in power) but not a territorial
'structure with a juristic personality' that sues and can be sued. 141 The Dawla is a mix,
it is composed of a natural dynamic factor which is tribal or group-mind solidarity
' Asabiyyah, to which are added elements that result from the very existence of the
State itself. Some of these are material, such as the accumulation of finance through
tax extraction and the mobilising of armies using this money, and the appearances of
royal grandeur and luxury. Others are psychological, derived from the people
becoming used to submitting to its will and believing it their duty to do so. 142 Ibn
Khaldoun conceives ' Asabiyyah as a social and ethnic identity based on kinship when
he states that,
Social solidarity is found only in groups related by blood ties or
by other ties which fulfil the same function.143
Asabiyyah, derived from Asab (meaning nerve), signifies internal cohesion, often
brought about by unity of blood or faith. In the state setting, unity is brought about
through the use of the force; but in an Asabiyyah setting; it arises voluntarily through
the sharing of moral bonds, descent, marriage, ethnic origin, tribal affinity, faith or
through some or all of these mixed together. According to Ibn Khaldoun, the
Asabiyyah structure reaches its zenith when it blends with religion leading to conquest,
as happened at the dawn of Islam. An Asabiyyah arrangement is always distinguished
by two criteria: first, the element of exclusiveness, the groups' image of itself as
unique; second, the non-hierarchical structure of its authority.144
However, it is this very Asabiyyah of the Arabs (as well as of other nomadic
peoples studied by Ibn Khaldoun such as the Persians, Kurds, Turks and Berbers) who
are the main factor in the downfall of their states and the ups and downs of their
government. For not only does this `Asabiyyah lose its vigour with the passage of
141 Khuri, Fuad I., Imams and Emirs, Saqi Books, London, 1990, p. 53.
142 Ibn Khaldoun, AbdulRalunan Ibn Muhanunad, Al-Mogademah, Al-Maktabah al-'Asryah, Beirut, 1995, p143.
143 Ibid. p. 124.
144 )(hurl, Fuad I., Imams and Emirs, Saqi Books, London, 1990, pp. 52-53.
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time, but as it assumes power its appetite for consumption and luxury expands, and the
victors 'expenses will exceed their income', pushing people into more extraction and
confiscation of wealth from the society, 'whereupon those who run factories and
production get weaker, and with their weakness the head of the state weakens and his
power wanes, and the state eventually falls.145
Ibn Khaldoun, moreover, assumes that religion is a binding force which helps in the
formation of states. There is also the secular or semi-secular form of the state, the
basis of which is not a Prophetic mission, kingship (Mulk) or Dominion pure and
simple, though even here religious precepts may play an important part. Here the unity
of purpose or group-mind solidarity `Asabiyyah must be the sense of unity and the
resolve to work together for a definite purpose which goes a long way towards making
strong and free nations. 146
Ibn Khaldoun then distinguishes three kinds of regime according to its government
and purpose: Siyasah Diniyah, politics (not government as it has been rendered by
Rosenthal) based on the divinely revealed law (Shar), the rational (not ideal as
Rosenthal claims) Islamic theocracy; Siyasah politics based on a law
established by human reason; and Siyasah Madaniyah, politics of the ideal State of the
philosophers, Madinah Fadilah, as in the writings of the Greek philosopher Plato.147
The state as such is the natural result of human life which requires association
ljtima' and organisation: "human association is necessary; the philosophers express this
in the saying: 'man is a citizen by nature'. This means that association is indispensable;
it is civilisation Madaniyah, in their terminology synonymous with 'Llmraun. Mutual
help is necessary to satisfy mans need for food, clothing and housing, and man must
unite with many of his kind to assure his protection and defence. Experience forces
men to associate with others and experience, together with reflection, enables man to
live. In addition to this rational explanation Ibn Khaldoun States that "this association
145A1-3abiri, Muhammad, Al 'Asabiyyah wa al Dawla, Dar Al Nashr Al Maghrabiyyah, Casablanca, 1982, p. 404-405
146 Sherwani, Haroon Khan, Muslim Political Thought and Administration, Munshiram Manoharlal Publisher, 1981, p. 141.
141 Rosenthal, Erwin I. J., Political Thought In Medieval Islam, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1985, p. 86.
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is necessary for mankind, otherwise their existence and God's will to make the world
habitable with them would not be perfect". 148
In the classical Islamic literature, there is a common agreement that the paramount
function of the Islamic State is to equalise the deployment of justice and freedom of
belief among mankind. The Islamic State is responsible for emancipating man and
allowing him freely to decide upon his own belief and practice. 149 In the modern
period, Abu al-`Ala a-Maududi delineates the functions of the Islamic State as,
The object of the [Islamic] state is not merely to prevent people
from exploiting each other, to safeguard their liberty and to
protect its subjects from foreign invasion. It also aims at evolving
and developing that well-balanced system of social justice which
has been set forth by God in His Holy Book Its object is to
eradicate all forms of evil and to encourage all types of virtue
and excellence expressly mentioned by God in the Holy Qur 'an.
. . A state of this sort cannot evidently restrict the scope of its
activity. Its approach is universal and all-embracing.150
The previous aims of the Prophet's state at Madinah were the major concern and
subject of the Islamic State thereafter. Islam had concentrated on them because the
attainment of all other purposes and functions depends on the success of the Islamic
state in securing the highest degree of order, consistent with the liberty of individuals
and groups in Islamic society. This responsibility is articulated in the following Holy
Qur 'anic verses:
JJ 4-1-9--"4.).9 S	 .O-4.)-4. I -9 ..)&11 3J it V.9 41-.1	 C.)44 1.91111
(V :ZIA) . Cp.11 cjia ‘1.9.14.4
Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold
that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His
Messenger, nor acknowledge the Religion of Truth... (9: 29)
148 Ibid.
149 Al-Meheari, Sneed Abdullah, Al-Alaqat al-Khareflyah Ii al-Dawla al-Islannyyah, Muasasat al-Resalah, Beirut, 1995, p.
29
150 Maududi, Abul Ala, Political Theory of Islam, Islamic Publications, Lahore, 1978, p. 30.
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Accordingly, Muslims bear firmly the responsibility to fight those who are
iniquitous, who enforce their own thought and creed upon other peopleyi
, 111--c. HI anj Ci4 .Aiu;zi.M csi 4..01÷-9 cral-Ill C.J..9-4=1:4 C.):'. :11 alz a-4,4 L.:11
(t/ :Lus,1411)
The blame (to fight and/or oppress) is only against those who
tyrannise mankind and unlawfully commit outrages on the earth,
those shall have a painful chastisement. (42: 42)
According to Muhammad al-Saboni
Under this structure the responsibility for Muslims, who have
been appointed to be in the middle of the road, between two
extremes, not purely religious, not purely secular.152
Likewise, the function of the Islamic State may be defined in terms of the particular
activities in which it engages. It has been mentioned earlier that among the traditions of
the Islamic Law, Shari 'ah, equalises the deployment and diffusion of justice and
guarantees freedom of belief and thought among those who live within the Islamic
territories. Both the Islamic authority and the Ummah have to be fully responsible
toward those who are tyrannised by their own rulers and who are exposed forcefully
and without their express consent to a certain thought or creed. This is confirmed by
al-Kasani in his book Bada 'ea al-Sanay 'a,
According to the Islamic Shari 'ah, the Muslim authority is fully
responsible for emancipating people and allowing them freely to
decide upon their own belief and practice.153
From these important sources on the nature of the Islamic State it is clear that it is
not the purpose of that State, as a powerful political body, to perform any political or
social roles in directing the attention of its subjects, or manipulating them, toward
specific policies in order to facilitate the politicians dominant function. The Islamic
State's main objective is to apply and enforce Islamic Law which is fully accepted by
151 Al-Khawareznil, Abu al-Qashn Mahmoud al-Zamalthshari, AI-Kashaf, Vol. II, Dar al-Filo-, p. 186.
152 Al-Saboni, Muhammad Ali,ltdukhtasar Tafsear Ibn Kathear, Vol. III, Dar al-Hadeath, Cairo, p. 281.
153 Al-Kasani, Abu Bala- Ibn Mas'aud, Bada'ea al-Sanay'a fi Tarteab al-Sharay'a, Vol. VII, Sharekat al-Matbou'at al-
'Atamyalt, 1327 All, p 113.
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its citizens, who give their ultimate consent to their rulers to implement the terms and
the provisions of the Islamic Law upon them. I54 It is also noteworthy that Ibn
Khaldoun, like al-Mawardi, has little to say about the relationship between the Islamic
State and non-Muslims.
The core of this chapter is focused on the fundamental principles of the Islamic
State in order to establish its nature and relations with non-Muslims states, groups, and
individuals. An important modern author, Abdulrahman Kurdi, in his pioneer work The
Islamic State summarised the principles of the Islamic State as follows,
I. Sovereignty. The essence of sovereignty is the power of command and such a
command must issue from a single will. Moreover, it has been noted earlier in this
chapter that one of the main differences between the Islamic State and other states is
sovereignty. The Islamic Law declared the essence of sovereignty to be the power to
command and this supreme power must always belong to God Himself and to His
revealed Messages. In the Holy Qur'an
(1Y	 .	 4%11
	
411 011
Then are they returned unto Allah, their True Protector, surely His
is Command, and He is the Swiftest in taking account. (6:62)
(f	 . . .	 1_944	 yi	 VI	 CJI . . .
. • . the Command is for non but Allah: He hath commanded that
ye worship non but Him. (12:40)
(AA :0.2.4.21611) .
	 44 j 4.1 4.4
	 P 40.41 3S
	 1,1 421 -Sr
Everything (that exists) will perish except His Face. To Him
belongs sovereignty and to Him you will be returned. (28:88)
These verses confirm that in the Islamic system the absolute sovereign, or command
as it has been translated in some verses, is only for God alone and by extension
sovereignty belongs to His final revealed message of Islam, as Muslims believe.
However, the Islamic Law has bestowed upon the Islamic Ummah and upon its
leadership a special sovereign power to be exercised when necessary.I55
154 Kurd', Abdulralunan, The Islamic State, Mensell Publication Limited, London, 1984, p. 65.
155 Ibid., p.37.
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The Islamic conception of the sovereignty of God is perfectly straightforward and
understandable. However, the sovereignty of the Caliph means the ultimate
responsibility within the Ummah rests with him.I56
2. Justice: Islam seeks to set up a just society and, therefore, attaches the greatest
importance to justice, equity, and fair dealing. Initially, God in the Holy Qur'an
mentions that,
.	 !J.:a
And the Firmament has he raised high, and He has set up the
balance of Justice. (55: 7)
4.1-411.9	 *L13.1.11
	 u4•49	 'Jilt	 SJ t../"11..9 3 11•11-)	 C.J1
( cl	 . C.11)S.S.i
Allah commands justice, the doing of good, and giving to kith
and kin, and He forbids all indecent, and evil and rebellion. He
instructs you, that ye may receive admonition. (16: 90)
Then Allah commands Muslims,
j (:),1411 ,3J1 ,9	j 	 pla4.41 12.,..itlicsAl_gi LA.'S 1,9141 as.1.111..4
-9119-15 C.J1.1 1 .931'6 	 c.08-111 .92-.C6 Nit-44-1 L14	 j
(11"0	 .	 (jS	 CAi 1442,1:1
Oh ye who believe, stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to
Allah, even as against yourselves, or your parents or your kin and
whether it be against rich or poor; for Allah can best protect both.
Follow not the lusts of your hearts lest ye swerve and if ye distort
justice or decline to do justice, verily Allah is well acquainted
with all that ye do". (4: 135)
. Jul-4 1 JASai	 u.4111 
	 J	 1.51.4"111..9.1:05 de,S J.414 4'.111 cj)
(*A :Ft.mal1)
Allah doth command you to render back your Trusts to those to
whom they are due, and when ye judge between people that ye
judge with justice. (4: 58)
Justice, moreover, is placed next to piety in different places in the Holy Qur 'an such
as,
(	 .)itL) • Pc,,r411 C..1.9A41	 41-1-la C.1.4 C.J.-*•44.../:1:11/J	 c.r":1. 4/J
156 Rosenthal, E. K. J., Political Thought in Medieval Islam, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1985, p. 47.
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And Allah will judge with Justice and Truth: but those whom
invoke besides Him, will not (be in position) to judge at all.
(40:20)
God is the Fountainhead of justice and the doing of justice is a religious duty. The
entire community is responsible because no one dares to harm or encroach upon the
rights of others. Since justice had to be done in God's name and according to His laws
no one was above the law of God and there was no immunity from it for anyone.
Indeed, the Prophet Muhammad himself never claimed any immunity. In short,
everyone was equal before the law and enjoyed equal opportunities. The most
important consequence of this was that appointments were made on the basis of merit
alone and not on the ground of kinship, wealth or status. 157 Ibn Taymiyyah, for
example, explain the nature of justice within the Islamic State when he said,
The integrity of the official is essential for the preservation of
public order and morale, and since the governor of the Muslim
state is obliged to "command the good and forbid the evil" the
political organisation of the Muslim community is superior to
that of any other state. Justice has its origin and justification in
the command of God.158
In Islam, the judiciary has been made entirely independent of the executive. The task
of the judge (Qadi) is to implement and enforce God's laws among His servants. He
does not sit on the seat of justice in the capacity of a representative of the Caliph, or
whoever is in authority, but as a representative of God. The Qadi is fully authorised to
apply the law of God to the Caliph just as to any ordinary individual. 159 In his efforts to
administrate and organise the judiciary, Caliph Umar I separated the judiciary from the
other organs of the Islamic State departments, and set up an institution of juriconsults
Ilia' consisting of capable and trustworthy scholars of law Muftis to give their legal
opinions on its application and so to assist the Oadi and the public. 160 In the case of the
administration of justice, moreover, the Qadis give due consideration to the local
customs and habits of the people and accept them when they were not in conflict with
the law laid down by Islam. It is narrated that Ibn Na'im, who was appointed a Qadi of
157 AI-Tabari, Mohamad Ibn Jarear, Jarni ' a/-Bayan 'an Ta'weal al-Qur'an, Vol. XII, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1995, p. 68.
158 Rosenthal, E. K. J., Political Thought in Medieval Islam, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1985, p. 55.
159 Maududi, Abul A'la, Political Theory of I slam, Islamic Publications, Lahore, 1980, p. 44.
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Egypt in 737 AD, that he used to listen to the Copts speaking in their own language.
Not only that, he talked to them in their language, and listened to the witnesses in their
language and delivered his judgements in that language.161
Social justice in Islam was institutionalised by Islam when Muslims were (and are)
required to pay Zakah, a voluntary charity for the poor, fix shares of inheritance for
women and children, and a host of regulations regarding the just treatment of debtors,
widows, the poor, orphans (90: 13-16) and slaves (24: 33). Those who practice usury
are sternly rebuked and warned that they face "war from God and his Prophet".162
If the rulers implement the justice of the Shari'ah among the citizens, who are
thereby equal in their rights and duties, then it is the just Islamic State. The opposite is
the unjust state in which groups of Muslims live together and dissent from the legal
Imam for some specific reason/s. They may become fortified in their lands, choose
another ruler and establish an army and have their own security. 163
 The injustice of this
state lies in the usurpation of a legal and legitimate ruler.
3. Brotherhood: in the Holy Qur'an God describes Muslims as brothers and
protectors of one another, with a warning that unless they protect each other there will
be tumult and oppression on earth. The Prophet Muhammad explained this concept
when he said,
The relationship of the believer for another believer is like the
building, one supporting the others.164
Among the principle priorities of Islam is the formation of the feeling of solidarity
between all Muslims. This solidarity started when the Prophet and his few followers
were bound together by the tie of faith against their pagan compatriots who sought
their destruction. To the Prophet Muhammad, the principle of fraternal solidarity and
brotherhood among Muslims was of transcendent importance and he succeeded in
160 1bn Ithaldoun, AbdulRalunan Ibn Muhanunad, Al-illogademah, AI-Maktabah al-'Asryah, Beirut, 1995, pp. 204-207.
161 lqbal, Afzal, The Culture of Islam, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 1967, p.207.
162 Esposito, John L., Islam The Straight Path, Oxford University Press, New York, 1991, p. 31.
163 AI-Zohaily, Wahbah, Athar al-Harb fi	 Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1981, p. 170.
164 Al-Nalvavvi, Yahya Ibn Sharaf, Riyadh al-Saliheen, Vol. I, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1993, p. 218.
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implanting this so deeply in Muslim hearts. 165 In the infant Muslim society of Madinah
he melted the distinction between the migrants Muhajirun and the supporters Ansar
and imparted to them the injunction about the general structure of brotherhood,
()	 .
The believers are but a single Brotherhood. (49: 10)
Washington Irving illustrated this brotherhood between the Muhajirun and the
Ansar when he said,
To give them a new home, and link them closely. . . Mohamet
[the Prophet Muhammad] established a brotherhood between
fifty-four of them and as many of the inhabitants of Medina. Two
persons thus linked together were pledged to stand by each other
in weal and woe; it was a tie which knit their interests more
closely even than of kindred.166
Muslim brotherhood is not based on economic interests, race, or colour. It is based
on Truth as revealed by the One True God. Not only is this brotherhood based on
faith, it is also a part of the faith. 167 Consequently, the structure of the Ummah is based
on the belief that Muslims contentedly follow, namely, that Islam made all Muslims
brothers under the patronage of its exalted faith and determined this brotherhood
among the faithful to be a nationality and classified all rights and duties accordingly.
The Prophet said,
The believers in their mutual kindness, compassion and
sympathy are like the body. If one of the organs in afflicted, the
whole body responds to it with wakefulness and fever.168
It is true that sometimes a Muslim will dispute with another Muslim, and at times
they fight, but this is not a permanent situation. L. Stoddard explained this when he
said,
The bond between Moslem and Moslem is . . . much stronger
than that between Christian and Christian. Of course Moslems
165 Stoddard, Lothrop, The New World Of Islam, Chapman and Hall Ltd., London, 1921, p. 37.
166 Irving, Washington, Life ofMahomet, Henry G. Bohn, London, 1852, p. 89.
167 Khalid Haig, Faith and Fraternity, impact international, Vol., 28, No. 3, March 1998, P. 5.
168 AI-Nawawi, Yahya Ihn Sharaf, Riyadh al-Sahheen, Vol. I, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1993, p. 219.
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fight bitterly among themselves, but these conflicts never quite
lose the aspect of family quarrels and tend to be adjourned in
presence of infidel aggression.169
Relations between Muslims are therefore quite different in character from their
relations with non-Muslims. Within the Ummah, where the ties of brotherhood unite all
Muslims, relationships are always internal to the group. Those outside the group, non-
Muslims, therefore have a different relationship with Muslims; it is intrinsically
external. In principle then, international relations are relations between Muslims and
non-Muslims, a relationship based upon revelation in the Holy Qur'an.
4. Shura, the mutual consultation: Shura is used in Arabic to denote a discussion
held by a group of people in order to reach a firm decision in any matter. It can also be
a discussion of alternatives for a person who seeks an opinion concerning a certain
problem. Of the alternatives provided he then chooses one as a solution. 170 Among the
Prophet's teaching to his Companions was the practice of Shura by consulting them on
matters about which there was no revelation in the Holy Qur'an. He did that according
to the Our 'anic teaching,
JI) • (.1 .1.s :91411	 41 a 41 Lola Js..0	 1:111 r"11
(10i
Consult them (the believers) in matters of administration and
when thou art resolved, then put thy trust in Allah. (3: 159)
The Prophet aimed to accustom his Companions to think about general problems
because he was concerned about teaching them to feel responsibility. He also wanted
to apply God's command to institute Shura and accustom the Ummah to practise it.
Consultation is useless if there is no freedom for expressing personal opinion. The
Prophet Muhammad never blamed any of his Companions for making mistakes. The
Prophet's teaching about the characteristics of successful leadership was emphasised to
implement Shura. However the ruler should not waver once he has taken a decision
and begun to act upon it. To waver might shake the peoples' confidence in him and
169 Stoddard, Lothrop, The New World Of Islam, Chapman and Hall Ltd., London, 1921, P. 38.
170 Kurdi, Abdulrahman, The Islamic State, Mensell Publication Limited, London, 1984, pp. 69-70.
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lead to confusion among his followers. 171 The Holy Qur'an laid down the principle of
Shura to guide the decision-making process of the community.
• C.0-1111:9	 .)J LAA-9 	 etQAS-9 Ifôt-'414	 MP)
(rA :j.&l)
Those who respond to their Lord, and establish regular prayer;
who conduct their affairs by mutual consultation. (42: 38)
A kind of Shura founded by the Holy Qur'an was the power for Muslims to choose
their leadership. The Holy Qur'an does not provide specific details concerning suffrage
or procedure for the election but requested from Muslims to settled all their affairs
through Shura. Since public authority is a trust given to the person or persons on
behalf of the Ummah to decide upon a course of conduct by Shura. 172 The first
regulation of selecting the Imam was made by Caliph Umar I. The Caliph arranged that
after his death five of the most distinguished of the old Companions of the Prophet
should decide as to whom among themselves ought to succeed.173
According to the Shari'ah, authority and power to rule are trust Amanah of the
people and not birth-right of anyone.
JL)	 J 1.4.1itii 	 kLI. 1144i1 1_0:51	 4,}atzi,	 CJI
(0 A
Allah doth command you to render back your Trusts to those to
whom they are due; and when ye judge between people that ye
judge with justice. (4: 58)
This trust is indicated in another place in the Holy Qur'an,
L,4—'J j"..4.11.4	 S)1.4.s.AtUiu;a_f•h 	 ilittLISA	 Ly.:41
(i	 . j441	 4,3
. . . 
establish regular prayer, pay Zakah and enjoin good upon the
people and to restrain them from committing wrong. (22: 41)
171 Umari, Akram Diyab, Aladan Society at the Time of the Prophet, Vol. II, The International Institute of Islamic
Thought, Herndon, 1995, p. 38, 55.
172 Ahmed, Mumtaz, State Politics and Islam, American Trust Publications, Indianapolis, 1986, P. 35.
173 Noldeke, Theodore, Sketches From Eastern History, Adam and Charles Black, London, 1892, pp. 77-78.
143
Chapter III
Muslims in their Islamic State, form a religious group tied by a unified religion and
belief. At the same time, they form a political group tied by faithfulness and belonging
to one nation. Islam is their religion, nationality, belief, worship, and rule. The
constitution of their state is the Shari 'ah which controls its rulers wills and desires, and
forms their sovereignty. Their State is free to conduct its foreign affairs through the
ruler, determine its peaceful relations with others based on equal sovereignty, again
through the ruler, and it is free to declare war within the limitations imposed by the
Shari 'ah, once again through the Imam.
Lastly, Islam had been criticised recently that it is a single party religion, in which
Muslims are not free to exercise any kind of political liberty. In reality, it must be said
that because all Muslims embrace one doctrine, acknowledge, and ideological system
which is Islam, this prevents any Muslim from nominating himself or asking to be
appointed in any official position. Ibn Taymiyyah argues that the Prophet Muhammad
insisted on avoiding running after public office or political position. 174 He supported
his view by the following Hadiths,
Abu Musa, said: I entered the Prophet's house with two men of
my clan: both of them asked the Prophet, saying: 0 Messenger of
God, would you please appoint us in one of these public offices
which God has put in your hands?' The Prophet said: We, by
God's name, do not appoint to the public offices [in our state]
those who ask for them, nor anyone who is covetous for such a
thing.175
AbdulRahman Ibn Samarah said: 'The Prophet told me: "0
AbdulRahman, do not ask for public office, because if it has been
given to you accordingly, you will be left to depend on yourself;
but if you have been assigned to such an office without
requesting it, you will be backed on this appointment by God.19176
Abu Dharr al-Ghafari, said to the Prophet: "0 Messenger of God,
do you intend to assign me to one of these public offices?" The
Prophet puts his hand on my shoulder saying: "0 Abu Dharr you
are such a delicate person, and authority is a trust as it will be a
cause of humiliating regretfulness on Resurrection Day, but not
-	 -
174 Ibn Taymiyyah, TaquIDean Ahmed, Al-Sysasah al-Shar Vah, Dar al-M'arifalt, Beirut, 1969, p. 6.
175 Matraji, Malunoml, Translation of Saheh Muslim, Vol. III A, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1993, p. 476.
176 ibid.
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for those who fulfil its obligation, and properly give the duties
required thereon."177
Abu Y'ala Ma'qil Ibn Yassar said: 'I heard the Prophet say: "Any
one who becomes responsible, by God ordained [holding such
public office] and he cheats therein until his death. God has
forbidden him to enter paradise."178
Therefore, it can be concluded from previous Hadiths that the main reason for not
accepting self nomination is that public offices in the Islamic state are great burdens
which will be accounted for by God in addition to personal deeds. They are, absolutely,
not honorary social ranks or a means to make fortunes. Hence, Islam forbids people to
ask for public office.
In summary, the Islamic State is conceived by Muslim authors primarily in terms of
the ruler and his government. This was because the Ummah was understood to be a
community united by its Divine law and religion. Unlike modern states in international
law, which are conceived as legal entities where their municipal laws have a territorial
jurisdiction, the Islamic State was not understood as a legal entity, but as a legitimate
power whose main function was to implement the Shari 'ah among the community of
Muslims who were united by it. In their discussions of the Islamic State, the Muslim
authors were pre-occupied with its internal aspects rather than its relations with non-
Muslims. Insofar as the external relations of the Islamic State were discussed, the
authors restricted their analysis to the duty of Jihad and the position of Dhimmis
within the State. The important point for this thesis was that the Islamic State acts
towards other non-Muslim states and non-Muslim groups and individuals through its
Head, the ruler of Imam.
3.6) Groups of non-Muslims
According to the Shari 'ah people divided into two groups no matter what their
races, nationalities, or colours:
171 Ibid., p. 480.
178 Al-Nawawl, Yahya Ibn Sharaf, Riyadh al-Sahheen, Vol. I, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1993, p. 516.
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1) Those who accepted and believed in Islam and its: teaching, book, and the
Prophet Muhammad. Theses are called the Muslims or the believers;
2) Those who rejected Islam and its contents, they called non-Muslim or
unbelievers. In the Holy Qur 'an,
.	 j142.1 1.9 1.111	 1014i 10.11Li in JAI
It is He Who has created you: and of you are some that are
Unbelievers, and some that are Believers: and Allah sees well all
that ye do. (64: 2)
This division has a very important role in the legal stance of individuals inside the
Islamic State, which created different rights, duties, and obligations for the believers
and other categories within the Islamic State, and in applying the Islamic judgements
upon each group. 179 The Shari 'ah also regulates the relations between Muslims and
those non-Muslims who live outside the Islamic State. There are some significant
differences between the Shari 'ah rules which apply to non-Muslims within the Islamic
State and those who live outside it. Islam further distinguished within the category of
unbelievers so that the rights and duties of both the Muslims and the non-Muslims will
vary according to which type of non-Muslim groups in being considered. The Holy
Qur 'anic moreover categorised mankind according to,
Cj1 1_0	 0-4111 um J..)..4.11,5 jtoct.111_9	 9Lij1.3.11-4	 c..$1
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Those who believed, those who follow the Jewish, and the
Sabians, Christians, Magians, and Polytheists, Allah will judge
between them on the Day of Judgement, for Allah is witness of all
things. (22: 17)
According to the Qur 'anic categorisation of mankind, the groups of non-Muslims
are the Jews, the Sabians, the Christians, the Magians, the Polytheists elsewhere in the
Holy Qur 'an two other non Muslim groups mentioned — Apostates (45: 24) and
Polytheists (4: 116). The Jews and the Christians called as the People of the Book.
A. The People of the Book. They are defined further as scripturaries, they are the
eldest and best known group in the Islamic Law, having been mentioned in the Holy
Qur 'an and Hadith in various places. They are the nearer to the idea of Towhead, that
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they worship God and believe in the Prophets, but they deny the Prophethood of
Muhammad. Therefore, the Islamic legislation toward them differs from the other non-
Muslim groups.'" However, jurists differ in defining this group. The Hanafites, for
instance, define them, as those who believe in any Divine religion and have scriptures
such as the Bible, the Torah, and the Psalms. 181 Jurists of Hanbalite and Shafei'ite,
however, restricted this character to the Jews and Christians only,' 82 based on the Holy
Qur 'anic verse,
( I Co	 : el.s..1411) . . .	 via 4:65.11	 t,g1311 Lji
Lest ye should say: The Book was sent down to two Peoples
before us ... (6: 156)
Both Jews and Christians were mentioned in the Holy Qur'an in different verses
such as,
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Those who believe and those who follow the Jewish and the
Christians and the Sabians, any who believe in Allah and the Last
Day, and work righteousness, shall have their reward with their
Lord; on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve. (2: 62)
Lambton has argued that this group Ahl al-Kitab has been enlarged over time.
There was some difference of opinion as to those who might be
admitted to this status. Originally . . . Jews, Christian and
Sabaeans; Zoroastrians were later added and given the status of
Ahl al-Kitab. 183
Some Muslim jurists of the Mughal Empire in India have even claimed that the
Polytheists Hindus were People of the Book, while it is true that such sects as Hindus
and Zoroastrians have structures there are important reasons why they should not be
included in Ahl al-Kitab. This is because the categorisation of the non-Muslims should
179 Badran, Badran Abu aPAynayn, Al- Alaqat al-litana'ayah byn al-Muslemean wa Ghayr al-Muslemean, Dar al-Nandha,
Beirut, 1984, p. 13.
180 Ibid., pp. 12-18.
181 Ibn Abdin, Muhammad ALTAR, Rod al-Mukhtar 'ala al-Dur al-Mukhtar, Vol. III, Al-Matba'ah al-Ameriyyah, 1326 All,
p. 370.
182 Ibn Qudalunah, Abdulah Ibn AJuned, AI Alughm, Vol., VI, Matba'at al-Manar, 1348 All, pp. 590-591.
183 Liunbton, Ann K. S., State and Government in Medieval Islam, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985, p. 204.
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be come from the main Islamic legislative sources in the Holy Qur'an and the
Prophetic Szinnah and neither offer any support for their inclusion in the group, the
People of the Book.
Islam preferred the People of the Book, in particular Christians, over other non-
Muslim groups by providing them with various advantages such that they differ from
Muslims only in minor judgements which the Shari 'ah denied to them only to protect
Islamic dogma, the Muslims and their interests. 184 Because of these small differences,
Muslims are enjoined to avoid arousing bitterness or hostility to members of the
People of the Book.
1.141	 vte 4,11) 11 yti.C11	 j
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And do not dispute with the People of the Book except by (the
way) which is best, unless it be with such of them as transgress,
and say, We believe in what has been sent down to us and sent
down to you, and our God and your God is one, and to Him do
we submit. (29: 46)
B. The Sabians. Literally Sabian means: the person who departed from one religion
to another religion, the Arabs used to call the Prophet Muhammad as-Sabi' because he
departed from the religion of Quraish to Islam. 185 Jurists have differed in defining this
group, the Hanafite and Hanbalite, for instance, defined them as: a sect of the
Christians, while the Malikites define them as a religious group between the Jews and
Christians which do not have either a Divine Book or a religion.186
They are also called Subbi (plural Subba) and Nasoraeans, or Mandacans, and are in
sometimes called the Christians of Saint John. They claim to be Gnostics, or Knowers
of the Great Life. They are divided into three sects: the first is those who believe in
frequent immersions in water. Their Book Ginza is written in a dialect of Aramaic.
They have theories of Darkness and Light as in Zoroastrianism. They use the name
Yurdun (Jordan) for any river.
184 Bad ran, Badran Abu aliAynayn, Al- Alagat al-Iftima'ayah byn al-Muslernean wa Ghayr al-Muslemean, Dar al-Nandha,
Beirut, 1984, p. 18.
185 Hughes, Thomas Patrick, A Dictionary of-Islam, W. H. Allen, London, 1885, p. 5511.
186 Al-Jusas, Abu Balm Ahmed Ibn All Al-Razi, Ahkam al-Qur an , Vol. III, Matba'at al-Awqaf 	 Alasatanah,
1335 AIL p. 91.
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The second is the pseudo-Sabians of Harran, who attracted the attention of Caliph
Mamuan-al Rashid in 830 AD by their long hair and peculiar dress. The probably
adopted the name as it was mentioned in the Holy Qur'an, in order to claim the
privileges of the People of the Book. They were Syrian Star-worshippers with
Hellenistic tendencies, like the Jews contemporary with Jesus.
The origin of Sabians is the third group who played an important part in the history
of early Arabia. They are known through their inscriptions in an alphabet allied to the
Phoenician and the Babylonian. They had a flourishing kingdom in the Yemen tract in
South Arabia about 800-700 BC, though their origin may have been in North Arabia.
They worshipped the planets and stars such as the Moon, the Sun, and Venus.
Probably the Queen of Sheba is connected with them. They succumbed to Abyssinia
about 350 AD and to Persia about 579 AD, their capital was near San' a.187
C. The Magians. This group of different non-Muslim sects is the worst, according
to Ibn al-Qayyim. The al-Khuramiyyah - the follower of Babik al-Khurmi - did not
believe in any kind of God, forbidden conduct was lawful, for example, it permitted
individual men to marry any of his prohibited females. 188 The cult of Magians,
moreover, is a very ancient one. They consider Fire as the purest and noblest element
and worship it as a fit emblem of God. Their location was in the Persian and Madina
uplands and the Mesopotamian valleys. The Magians scripture is the Zend-Avesta, the
bible of the Parsis. They were mentioned in the Gospels as the Wise men of the East.
The Magians Majus mentioned only in one place in the Holy Qur 'an,
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. . those who follow the Jewish, and the Sabians, Christians,
Magians ... (22: 17)
D. The Polytheists. They are also called idolaters or pagans Mushrikun, the word
used in the Holy Qur 'an for idolatry is Shirk. In theological works the word Wathani
is used for an idolater. The members of this group do not believe in the Towhead of
God. They believe in the partnership of another thing with God such as idols, the
187 Ali, Abdulah Yusuf, The Holy Qur'an Text, Translation and Commentary, King Faint Holy Qur'an Printing Complex, AI-
Madinah Al- Monawarah, 1991, pp. 26-27.
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angels and the sun. Paganism was the religion, which the Prophet Muhammad fought
calling mankind to a new religion based on the oneness of God. Cyril Glasse writes of
the Muslim position,
This is the fundamental error at the root of all sin or
transgression. It is the association of something with God other
than God Himself God is the Absolute. This means that He is
Complete, He is Totality, He is Reality. Nothing can be added to
Him, and nothing can be taken away. He is All-Possibility. He is
One and Indivisible. To set anything alongside God as Reality is
to commit the sin- the error that engages our consciousness and
our beings- of "association", which is the only sin that God
cannot forgive, because it denies Himself and prevents
forgiveness.189
Shirk is the fundamental state of being in revolt against God, irrespective on any
professed belief in other gods. It is also atheism, or the putting of nothingness in the
place of God. 190 Shirk is the opposite of surrender to and belief in the one God, which
the latter is acceptance and recognition of his Reality, knowledge, or Islam. Because
Islam is knowledge, it is initiated by the act of recognition, the Shahadah is perceiving
and declaring that "there is no god but God". The Holy Qur'an states that,
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God forgiveth not (the sin of) joining other gods with Him; but He
forgiveth whom He pleaseth other sins than this: one who joins
others gods with Allah, hath strayed far, far away from the Right.
(4:116)
E. The Atheists. They are non-Muslims who believe in the eternity of matter, and
assert that the duration of this World is from eternity. They deny the Day of
Resurrection and Judgement. In Arabic literatures, they are called Dahreyoun.
Recently Communists are the nearest group to the Atheists. The term originates in the
Holy Our 'an in the following verse,
(1. I	 . J.4.111 VI LIS.14-1 j	 c:L9.4:114.1:1111.114.%
	 L41,9111 j
188 Al jawziyah, Muluunmad Ibn Abu Bala- Ibn Al-Qayylin, Ighathat al-Lahfan min Masa 'ed al-Shiytan, Vol. II, Matba'at
al-Halabi, Cairo, 1357 AIL pp. 247-248.
189 Glasse, Cyril, The Concise Encyclopaedia Of Islam, Stacy International, London, 1989, p.370.
190 Hm Qudamah, Abdulah Ibn Aluned, Al-Mughni, Vol. VII, Matba'at al-Manar, 1348 All, p. 796 & Ibn Abdin,
Muhammad Amin, Rad al-Mukhtar ala al-Our al-Mukhtar, Vol. III, Al-Matba'ah al-Ameriyyah, 1326 All, p. 396.
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And they say: "What is there but our life in this world, we shall
die, and we live, and nothing but Time can destroys us ... (45:
24)
F. The Apostates. The act of apostasy is called Ridah and an apostate is called
Murtadd. In the Holy Qur'an the term apostate is mentioned as the "turning back from
Faith" (2: 217 & 5: 54). The word is also applied to the period of insurgency and the rise
of false prophets among the desert tribes, which followed the death of the Prophet
Muhammad. The act of apostasy is the renunciation of Islam in favour of another
religion or no religion at all.
It has been noted above that the Shari'ah discriminates among non-Muslim groups,
one of the most clear examples of this is the unique punitive treatment of the apostate
non-Muslims. An adult male apostate is liable to be executed if after a warning and the
lapse of three days, he continues in his error and does not recant. Only lunatics and
drunkards are exempt as they are not held responsible for their acts of apostasy. Abu
Yusuf and Imam Muhammad, of Hanafite School, considers an under age male who
apostatised must be held responsible for his act, but he is not responsible until he
comes of age. When the boy has become a man the death penalty will be imposed if he
continues in his apostasy. Most Schools hold a female apostate in the same legal
position as a male and so equally liable to suffer the penalty of death. However from
the Hanafites point of view, she is not subjected to capital punishment, but she may be
kept in confinement until she recants. The will of a male apostate is invalid but that of a
female apostate is valid.191
In connection between apostasy and marital relations, if either the husband or
spouse apostatises from the Faith of Islam, a divorce takes place ipso facto. The wife is
entitled to the whole of her dowry and no sentence of divorce is necessary. If the
husband and spouse both apostatise together, their marriage is generally allowed to
continue. However, if, after their joint apostasy, either husband or spouse was singly to
191 Ibn Qudalunah, Abdulah Ibn Ahmed, A 1-Mughni, Vol. VIII, Matba'at Al-Manar, Cairo, 1348 AH, pp. 213-215.
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return to Islam, then marriage would be dissolved. 192 If a person upon compulsion
becomes an apostate his spouse is not divorced nor are his lands forfeited.
According to Hanafite jurists, moreover, a male apostate is disabled from selling or
otherwise disposing of his property. However, Abu Yusuf and Imam Muhammad - two
famous followers of Imam Abu Hanifah - were differed from their master upon this
issue. They considered a male apostate to be as competent to exercise every right as if
he were still in the faith. If a boy under age apostatise, he is not to be put to death, but
to be imprisoned until he comes to full age, when, if he continue in the stance of
unbelief, he must be put to death. Lastly, the Holy Qur'an clarifies the punishment of
any Muslim who become apostates as,
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. . . if any of you turn back from their faith and die in unbelief,
their works will bear no fruit in this life and in the Hereafter; they
will be companions of the Fire and will abide therein. (2: 217)
These are the groups of non-Muslim who were found in the Shari 'ah. Others have
become known in more recent times but Islamic international relations in its classical
forms was not based upon them. So, for example, on the method of Analogy (Qiyas)
Muslim Jurist of the Mughal Empire extended the category of People of the Book to
include Hindus on account of Scriptures. Whether this inclusion is valid or not, and it
has been argued earlier that it is invalid, the plain fact is, Hindus were never a subject
of classical Islamic international relations anymore than the Moonies.
Islamic Shari 'ah requires Muslims to respects other religions and the interests, life,
honour and properties of non-Muslim individuals and groups as long as the non-
Muslims do not encroach upon the rights of Muslims or the Islamic State. 193 For
example, should someone be tempted to violate the rights of the Islamic State, or
disturb its peace, or endanger its security or exploit its peaceful policies, all Muslims
must hasten to defend their country and suppress all attempts of such a nature.
192 Ibid.
193 Tabarah, Afeaf AbdulFatah, Roah al-Dean al-biotin, Dar A1-`11m, Beirut, 1988, pp. 281-282.
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To those against whom war is made, permission is given (to
fight), because they are wronged; and verily Allah is Most
Powerful for their aid. They are those who have been expelled
from their homes in defiance of right, (for no cause) except that
they say, "Our Lord is Allah" Did not Allah check one set of
people by means of another, there would surely have been pulled
down monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, in
which the name of Allah is commemorated in abundant measure,
Allah will certainly aid those who aid His (cause); for verily Allah
is Full of Strength, exalted in Might, able to enforce His Will. (22:
39-41)
And,
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But if the enemy incline towards peace do thou (also) incline
towards peace, and trust in Allah: for he is the One that heareth
and knoweth (all things). (8: 61)
Provided no such violation occurs, Islam requires Muslims to respect non-Muslims
because it acknowledges all Divine Books and all the Prophets sent by God. In the
Holy Qur 'an,
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Say: We (Muslims) believe in Allah and in what He has revealed to
us, and in what He revealed to Abraham and Ismael and Isaac and
Jacob and the tribes (of Israel), and in what was given to Moses
and Jesus, and in what was given to (all) the prophets by their
Lord. We make no distinction between any of them, and to Him
do we submit. (2:136)
For this reason Islam aims to pluck out the religious grudges from Muslims.
Moreover, it caused Caliph Umar I in his covenant with the people of Jerusalem, for
instance, to ensure their safety, their property, their churches, their crosses, and all the
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rituals belonging to their religion. Umar I, moreover, prohibited Muslims from
occupying, destroying or damaging their places of worship or other property.194
Similarly, Islam orders the fulfilment of obligations undertaken by the Islamic State,
including honouring treaties, provided that non-Muslim states fulfil their obligations
and honour their treaties with the Islamic State. The Holy Qur'an commands,
(1 :O.1.1419 .
	 I ji ji	 Li (.5.411 W.?.
0 ye who believe! fulfil ( all) obligations. (5: 1)
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But the treaties are not dissolved with those Pagans with whom
ye have entered into alliance and who have not subsequently
failed you in aught, nor aided anyone against you; so fulfil your
engagements with them to the end of their term: for Allah loveth
the righteous. (9: 4)
3.7) Summary and conclusion
In the Islamic international law, Muslims have to share in the fulfilment of their
opulence and advancement, and by the same order, they should make valuable
contributions to humanity at large. This provides for friendly relations, in the broadest
sense of the world, with other people and states.
The term "international relations" was not formalised by its modern academic name.
Instead, Muslim jurists referred to al-Siyar, that is, to the law dealing with non-
Muslims [most of which governs relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, but a
small part of which affects only non-Muslims]. Because this law determines how the
Islamic State and more broadly the Muslim Urnmah should behave towards non-
Muslims and how non-Muslim individuals, groups and states should behave towards
Muslims and the Islamic State, Islamic international relations theory is a prescriptive or
normative one. The precise nature of the Islamic international relations (al-Siyar) after
this point is contentious and contemporary jurists and scholars such as Yusuf al-
194 Muir, William, Sir, The Caliphate, Its rise, Decline, and Fall, from Original Sources, The Religious Tract Society,
London, 1892, pp. 144-145.
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Qaradawi, Muhammad Hamidullah, and AbdulHamid AbuSulayman, were found to
differ over its character.
It has been argued that any person who is not a member of the Ummah, whether a
foreigner or a citizen of the Islamic State, is deemed to have international relations
with the Islamic State and to be the subject of al-Siyar. This apparent paradox arises
from the general principle that relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims are
invariably treated as external or international, whereas no relationship between
Muslims, however "external" they (for example the relations between Muslim
territorial rulers during the late period of the Abbaside dynasty), is ever treated as a
matter of external or international relations. All Ummatic relations are internal or
domestic from the standpoint of Shari'ah.
Another key argument is that the early juristic division of the world into two
opposing parts Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb reflected a contemporary reality after a
period of protracted warfare between the Islamic State and its enemies. However, a
third Dar was introduced by Muslim jurists by the second century AR to bring Muslim
principles into line with a new reality, namely, the existence of peaceful relations
between the Islamic State and non-Islamic states resulting from a pledge or treaty
('Ahd). Dar al-`Ahd therefore denoted an intermediate status between Dar al-Islam
and Dar al-Harb where non-Muslim states were at peace with the Islamic State.
Moreover, the juristic division of the world into Dar al-Islam, Dar al-Harb and, much
later Dar al-Ahd or Dar al-Sulh, is nowhere mentioned in the Holy Qur'an or in the
Hadiths, except in Saheah Muslim under the term the domain or house of Emigrants
Dar al-Muhajiroun, which is not relevant to the present context. Majeed Khadduri
claims that the Islamic theory of international relations is to be found neither in the
Holy Qur'an nor in the Prophet Muhammad's Hadiths, i95 but while this is true of
classical Figh, it has been argued that the Islamic international relations is part of the
Shari 'ah which is derived primarily from the Qur 'an and Sunnah and is formulated in
terms of a fundamental dichotomy between Muslims and non-Muslims. This dichotomy
itself pre-supposes the fundamental Islamic belief in Towhead or the unity of God, the
195 Kbadduri, Majid, The Islamic Theory of International Relations, J. Harris Proctor, Islam and International Relations, Pall
Mall Press, London, 1965.
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unity of humanity, and the unity of Divine laws. It may be true that the term
"international law" itself has not been mentioned in the Qur'an or the Sunnah, but the
Qur'an treats it in different verses and the deeds and the sayings of the Prophet
Muhammad are frequently concerned with the principles of treating the various nations
of non-Muslims.
It has been found that Dar al-Harb did not mean lasting enmity or war against the
Islamic State or that hostility was the normal relationship between Muslims and others.
That relationship was peaceful with all nations (Unimahs) except for those of them
which indicated their hostility to Islam and against the Muslims. Islamic Shari'ah
requires Muslims to respects other religions and the interests, life, honour and
properties of non-Muslim individuals and groups as long as the non-Muslims do not
encroach upon the rights of Muslims or the Islamic State, such as, should someone be
tempted to violate the rights of the Islamic State, or disturb its peace, or endanger its
security or exploit its peaceful policies, all Muslims must hasten to defend their country
and suppress all attempts of such a nature. (22: 39-41 & 8: 61). Provided no such
violation occurs, Islam requires Muslims to respect non-Muslims because it
acknowledges all Divine Books and all the Prophets sent by God (2:136).
This conclusion was reached primarily after a short examination of the purposes of
Jihad. It has been found that the Qur 'anic verses which provide justification for Jihad
stipulate that fighting is for self defence, the protection and guarantee of freedom of
the Faith, and the prevention of iniquity. Fighting for any other cause is therefore
unlawful and therefore forbidden because it transgresses the limits commanded in the
Holy Qur'an. However, when war is undertaken, it must be pushed with vigour, but
not relentlessly and only to restore peace and freedom for the worship of God.
Significantly, it was narrated that Prophet Muhammad, during his wars, caught many
unbelievers as prisoners of war, some were executed, others were redeemed or
discharged, but the Prophet did not compel any of them to convert to Islam.
It was also concluded that the argument that Islam is based on a system of
supremacy and subjection, and that in order to propagate its mission Muslims have
declared war on all communities and nationalities until Islam rules over the entire
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world, is mistaken. Against the view of Khadduri and some Western scholars who
argue that the Muslim attitude to non-Muslims is hostile who must be either converted,
subjugated or killed (except women, children, and slaves) it has been argued that
hostilities only occur as a result of the behaviour of non-Muslims. Even the Muslim
jurists themselves, the Hanafi, the Maliki and the Hanbali, criticised the view of the
other jurists like al-Ramli that the blasphemy of non-Muslims is a cause for killing
them. They argued that non-Muslims' aggression against Islam alone is the reason for
fighting and killing them.
Moreover, the domain of pledge Dar al-Ahd is composed of non-Muslim powers
which have concluded peace with the Islamic State, having previously been Harbi
powers at war with the Islamic State. At first, these treaties were treated by the jurist
as temporary truces lasting ten years at the most. However, facts overtook the juristic
view because during the time of Salah al-Dean (Saladin 6 th Century AH, XII AD) and
the Jihad against the Crusaders these treaties had become permanent, confirming the
view that peace not war was the normal state of relations between the Islamic State
and non-Muslims.
The conceptions of Dar al-Islam, Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Ahd cannot readily be
applied to the present day world, and this situation led to a suggestion for redefining
Dar al-Islam. The core of this revised conception is still the protection of Faith,
Dogma and the freedom of religious practice, however. Dar al-Islam is now defined as
the place where the Muslim can practice his religious acts of devotion in complete
freedom and Dar al-Harb is the place where the Islamic religious acts of devotion
cannot be practised in complete freedom. Dar al-Harb is linked to aggression toward
any Islamic object or behaviour, such as abuse of Muslims or destroying their place of
worship and in other ways depriving Muslims of their most basic religious rights. Not
all non-Muslim states are part of Dar al-Harb on this revised definition. Some of them
protect religious belief and practice, including that of Islam, and show no hostility
toward Muslims and Islam, yet they are not a part of Dar al-Islam. Such states
arguably belong to a different Dar called the domain of calling to Islam, Dar al-Da 'wa .
The precedent for this fourth Dar was Makkah before the emigration of the Prophet
and His Companions to Madinah, when Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb did not, as yet,
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exist. After the emigration the Prophet named Madinah as Dar al-Muhajiroun. (See p.
87)
The view taken of Islamic international relation in this thesis is that it consists of the
totality of Muslim relations with non-Muslims, but for practical purposes those
relationships have been narrowed down to those between the Islamic State and non-
Muslim individual groups and states. For this reason, this chapter undertook an
extensive examination of the nature of the Islamic State. It concluded that the Islamic
State is not theocratic, but is an ideological state set up by the will of the people in a
constitutional manner, following the democratic principle of decision-making. It exists
in order to implement the Shari'ah and secure the welfare of the entire community.
While citizens may participate in its affairs, the Islamic State is conceived by Muslim
authors primarily in terms of the ruler and his government. This was because the
Ummah was understood to be a community united by its Divine law and religion.
Unlike modern states in international law, which are conceived as legal entities where
their municipal laws have a territorial jurisdiction, the Islamic State was not understood
as a legal entity, but as a legitimate power whose main function was to implement the
Shari'ah among the community of Muslims who were united by it. In their discussions
of the Islamic State, the Muslim authors were pre-occupied with its internal aspects
rather than its relations with non-Muslims. Insofar as the external relations of the
Islamic State were discussed, the authors restricted their analysis to the duty of Jihad
and the position of Dhimmis within the State. The important point was that the Islamic
State acts towards other non-Muslim states and non-Muslim groups and individuals
through its Head, the ruler of Imam.
The analysis of the juristic principles relating to non-Muslim residents in the Islamic
State either on a permanent basis (Dhimmis) or temporarily (Musta'min) follows next.
It will focus on the rights and obligations of them, including examinations of scholarly
views that such theories were grounded neither on the Holy Qur'an nor on the
Sunnah, all these will be found in the next chapter Dhimmis and Musta'min in the
Islamic State.
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4.1) Introduction
The characteristic form of the Islamic State to the end of the `Abbaside Caliphate
was that of a multi-cultural or more accurately, a multi-religious, polity. That is to
say, that in addition to the Muslim citizens of this state there were non-Muslims who
were allowed to practise their religion and were not forced to convert to Islam in
conformity with God's command in the Holy Qur 'an
(r cot CO5411) . . . c:),1111 4,1 ol ,)S) V
Let there be no compulsion in religion ... (2: 256)
These non-Muslims were either permanent or temporary residents within the
Islamic State. The former — Dhimmis — could be described as full citizens of the
Islamic State, receiving its protection in return for the payment of a poll tax (Jizyah),
the latter —Music/ 'mins — were given a special kind of protection by the Islamic State
covering the period of their temporary residency (Am an) .
The relationships between the Islamic State and its temporary and permanent non-
Muslim residents are at the level of the individual and of groups. Thus, that part of
Islamic international relations which will be considered in this chapter are those
between the Islamic State and its internal or resident non-Muslims. Surprising as it
may appear to anyone familiar with Western international relations theory, in which
all relations between states or other units of analysis are external, in the Islamic theory
anyone who is not a member of the Ummah, whether a foreigner or a citizen of the
Islamic State, is deemed to have international relations with the Islamic State.
This chapter will be concerned to explore and clarify this apparent paradox which
rises from the general principle that relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims
are invariably international, whereas no relationship between Muslims, however
"external" they may be (for example the relations between Muslim territorial rulers
during the late period of the `Abbaside Empire), is ever treated as a matter of
international relations. All Ummatic relations are internal or domestic.
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4.2) Shari'ah and relations of Muslims and non-Muslims
Throughout centuries, Muslim authorities safeguarded the rights and sanctities of
non-Muslims within the Islamic State. Regardless of their disputes on different issues,
Muslim jurist were unanimous in emphasising these rights and sanctities which are,
1) Freedom of religions belief The Islamic view of freedom of religion and
religious worship is expressed in the Holy Qur'an. The following verses concern non-
Muslims who are not compelled to accept Islam.
(Y	 ji.41) . . . 40i11 cj.4 4)11 au.) a aisIl 4,1 olA Y
Let there be no compulsion in religion; truth stands out clear from
Error. .. (2: 256)
.	 0,101	 6.4.4+	 CJA cjA-St	 p L.t, 4.1,9
If it had been thy Lord's Will, they would all have believed,-all who
are on earth! wilt thou then compel mankind, against their will, to
believe! (10: 99)
(A
	 Os.%1	 41.94.1	 J.,t, 414 LI*4, jsl
To each among you, have We prescribed a law and an Open Way;
if Allah had so willed, He would have made you a single People ..
. (5:48)
The phrase (To each among you) of the last verse (5: 48) has been interpreted in
different ways by Muslim scholars. Al-Tabari's commentary reflected something of this
diversity when he presented a superior explanation of the previous verses. First, he
introduced two different views on (To each among you). According to Al-Tabari,
Some of them say: it means the adherent of various communities,
i.e., Allah has set up for each community a law and a way . . .
Others say: No, it means the community of Muhammad They say
that the meaning of the sentence was: We have already made the
book, which we sent down upon Our Prophet Muhammad, 0
mankind, for everyone of you, i.e. who enters Islam and confesses
about Muhammad; He is for me a Prophet!, as a law and way. 1
Al-Tabari adds,
The first of the two explanations is correct, the explanation
giving the meaning: for all people of the religious-communities
I AI-Tabari, Mohamad Ibn Jarear, Joon' Al-Bayan fi Ta 'weal Al-Qur'an , Vol. IV, Matba'ah al-Halabi, Cairo, 1373 A.H. p.
365.
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we have set up a law and a way. We say that the first is right
because of the words of Allah, (If Allah had so willed, He would
have made you a single People) If the words (To each among you)
had referred to Muhammad's community and they are one single
community the words (If Allah had so willed, He would have made
you a single People) would not have been given, but Allah has
given them and made them one single community. The meaning is
therefore clear. However, the meaning of what the message from
Allah to His Prophet Muhammad brings is as follows: Allah
mentions what has been prescribed to the people of Israel in the
Torah, and what deeds were laid upon them. Then He mentions
that He made Jesus the son of Mary followed the steps of the
Prophets before him and sent the Bible upon him and he ordered
him who followed him to do the works prescribed therein. Then
He mentioned our Prophet Muhammad and says of him that He
sent the Scripture in truth, confirming the scripture that came
before it, and he ordered the deeds mentioned therein. The
judgement of what has been sent down upon him is different from
the other books, and He explains that He has already set up for
Muhammad and his community a different law than that of the
previous Prophets and communities, and that his religion [Islam]
and the previous religion are one with regard to Allah, observing
what He ordered and prohibited. And they are different with
regard to that which has been prescribed for each of them and
his community, and what has been made legal and prohibited for
them. 2
Moreover, the Islamic Law and practice regarding the public performance of
religious rites and communal festival by the non-Muslims are equally generous. In
their own places of worship, non-Muslims are allowed to practice their religious
ceremonies, they are only restricted from openly blowing horns (conches) in public
places. In connected with this, al-Kasani mentioned that,
Within the boundaries of their own places of worship, the non-
Muslims can perform their rites and no Islamic Authority will
interfere therein. 3
Therefore, it must be understood that at the best time of Muslim civilisation
religious liberty was granted by the rulers to all the various sects and denominations
2 Ibid., 366.
3 Al-Kasani, Abu Bala Ibn Mas'aud, Bada'ea al-Sanay'a fi Tarteab al-Shar'aya, VoL VII, Sharekat al-Matbou'at al
`Alamyah, 1327 AH, p 113.
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of their subjects. Fanaticism was never carried to the extent of compelling any
community to embrace Islam.4
2) Granting protection of their lives and properties and philanthropy in dealings
with them. The most important protection to be guaranteed to any non-Muslims,
whatever his belief, is from internal persecution, tyranny and injustice. Muslims are
duty bound to spare their hands and tongues from hurting all non-Muslim and to
protect them against any enmity internal and external, for God does not like tyrants
but punishes them quickly in this world or gives them greater punishment in the next
world. 5
 This right of non-Muslims may be viewed clearly in the word of jurist al-
Qurafi,
The covenant of protection imposes upon us certain obligations
toward the Ahl al-Dhimmah. They are our neighbours, under our
shelter and protection upon the guarantee of Allah, His
Messenger and the religion of Islam. Whoever, violates these
obligations against any one of them by so much as an abusive
word, by slandering his reputation, or by doing him some injury
or assisting in it, has breached the guarantee of Allah, His
Messenger and the religion of Islam.'
Ibn Hazm agrees with al-Qurafi that the duty of all Muslims is to protect the
Dhimmis. In other words, the duty of protecting Dhimmis is not confined to the
Islamic authority, but is an obligation imposed upon all Muslims. Ibn Hazm said,
If enemies at war come to our country aiming at a certain
Dhimmi, it is essential for us that we come out to fight them with
all our might and weapons since he is under the protection of
Allah and His Messenger, If we did anything less than this, it
means we have failed in our agreement for protection.7
In the Sunnah, Prophet Muhammad strictly recommended and emphasised the
duties of Muslims toward non-Muslims, warning anyone against violating non-
Muslims who live in the Islamic State with the wrath and punishment of God. He
said,
4 Zaydan, Judi, History of Islamic Civilization, Vol. IV, E. J. W. Gibb Memorial, Leyden, 1907, p. 179.
5 Al-Tabari, Mohamad Ibn Jarear, Jam' Al-Bayan fi Ta 'weal Al-Qur'an , Vol. V, Matba'ah al-Halabi, Cairo, 1373 AH, p.
156.
6 Al-Qurafi, Ahmed Ibn Idris, Al-Furuq, Vol. I, Al-Matba'ah al-Tunisiyyah al-Rastnlyyah, 1302 All, pp. 14-15.
7 Ibid.
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He who oppresses a person from among the People of the
Covenant, or infringes on his right, or puts a responsibility on him
which is beyond his strength, or takes something from him
against his will, I shall dispute with him on the Day of
Resurrection.8
The full force of this duty laid upon Muslims was brought out by the jurist Ibn
Abedin who says,
Since Muslims are given a responsibility to protect the blood and
property of non-Muslims, and since the persecution of weak
persons at the hands of the strong is considered as one of the
greatest crimes, the persecution of non-Muslims in an Islamic
State will be considered to be a greater crime than the
persecution of Muslims by non-Muslims.9
3) Permissibility for Muslim men to marry women of the People of the Book. It
was the Prophet's practice to follow the scriptuaries in such matters that are not
prohibited for Muslims by God and not specifically regulated for them either. In
connection with this, two Hadiths, both related by Ibn 'Abbas, are commonly quoted.
The first Hadith is,
The Prophet used to copy the people of the scriptuares in matters
in which there was no order from Allah, The people of the
scriptuares used to let their hair hang down, while the pagans
used to part their hair. So the Prophet let his hair hang down first,
but later he parted it.1°
The second Hadith is as follows,
When God's messenger fasted on the day of Ashura and
commanded that it should be observed as a fast, he was told that
it was a day held in honour by Jews and Christians, and said: "If
am spared until next year, I shall fast on the ninth."
The Islamic legislation toward the People of the Book differs from that applicable
to the other non-Muslim groups. Consequently, Muslims have a positive approach
towards the People of the Book and in particular to the Christians. They differ from
other non-Muslims in the nature of their disbelief and scripture, but they have a
8 Abu Daoud, Sulayman Ibn Al Ash'ath, Sunan Abu Daoud, Vol. IV, Al-Matba'ah al-Taziyah, Cairo, p.205.
9 Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf, Ghayr al-Muslimoun fi Mujtatna' al-Islam, Cairo, 1977, p.12.
10 Khan, Muhanuned Muhsin, Sahih Al-Bukhari, Arabic-English, 4th Edit., Vol. VII, Dar al-Arabiah, Beirut, 1985, p. 525.
11 Matraji, Mahmoud, Translation of Saheh Muslim, Vol. II A, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1993, p. 341.
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common stock of legal prescriptions with Muslims, which other non-Muslims do not.
In the Holy Qur 'an,
J.4cz4,1	 cis-1:41,9 LO	 cj.,1,1J1 j
 J44411.11.1 (:),1111 jlazUJ .5.41
	
1./1.1.4	 (:)1.4 titli1	 JL..a.iL Loci
C.)-4 LAP LA 6.4.111 L)A 0;206 e41-1:PC csJ:i
 (.1.9.41 Jj 1-4
or -A
	 .	 1.4.1su uAi 1.4j
Strongest among men in enmity to the Believers wilt thou find the
Jews and Pagans; and nearest among them in love to the
Believers wilt thou find those who say, "We are Christians":
because among these are men devoted to learning, and men who
have renounced the world, and they are not arrogant. And when
they listen to the revelation received by the Messenger, thou wilt
see their eyes overflowing with tears, for they recognise the truth:
they pray: "our Lord we believe, write us down among the
witnesses. (5: 82-83)
Muslims and Christians are close enough to each other to allow Muslim males to
marry Christian females, and to share Christians' food in so far as it is good. Prophet
Muhammad himself, for instance, took Mary al-Qibtyah as his wife based on the Holy
Qur 'anic verse,
(.1.%S.it.t1j	 JLAO	 ji C}i.3.11 	 iiaj,A1. I
JA11.11 I.1)	 cj.4 4.-411 1 ,0 ji (:),11/1 4:j.a QUAaa.4.11_, 6:114 .).4.11 4:}4
(0 : is11-411). . . (:)1.111	 j
This day are (all) things good and pure made lawful unto you, the
food of the People of the Book is lawful unto you and yours is
lawful unto them, lawful to you in marriage are not only chaste
women who are believers but chaste women among the People of
the Book, revealed before your time when ye give them their due
dowers, and desire chastity, not lewdness, taking them as lovers.
(5: 5)
This verse also explains the actual existence of various religious groups, namely
that those with a scripture of Divine revelations are something willed by God. Such
bodies have a reason to vie one to another with good works.
4.3) Safeguard covenant Aman
Aman is similar to the protection convention for Dhimmis* in that it can be written
or unwritten treaty. It differs from the protection convention by providing the
* See 4.4.
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safeguards of safe conduct and security to non-Muslims on a temporary basis.* This
safeguard is pledged to non-Muslims by the Muslims, either by the Islamic authority
or by individuals. Nothing, however, is reciprocated by the non-Muslim/s.* Ibn Arafa,
of the Malikites, defined the Aman as,
Keeping away from shedding the blood of Harbis or their slaves,
and holding back from taking their property as long as they live
stable under the rule of Islam for a definite period of time.12
Such a pledge can be given to any individual of Dar al-Harb, the so-called Harbi,
when he/she enters an Islamic territory. He/she will be a Musta'min, that is, a person
to whom this protection has been pledged. Ann Lambton, for instance, has explained
the origin and procedure of Aman,
The custom of giving safe conduct (Aman) to strangers or
outsiders had prevailed among the Arab tribes before Islam. By
it, a stranger who was in principle outlawed outside his own
group received for his life and property the protection of a
member of a group to which he did not belong and the protection
of that group as a whole. Islam continued the institution of
Aman.13
The Qur 'anic teaching of Aman can be found in the following verse,
ac)	 c›.,s..›,11.411
	 sa.i	 j
If one amongst the Pagans asks thee for asylum, grant it to him,
so that he may hear the Word of Allah, and then escort him to
where he can be secure, that is because they are man without
knowledge. (9: 6)
And in the Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad,
The covenants of all Muslims are equal; they are one hand against
others; the lowliest of them can guarantee their protection.
Beware, a Muslim must not be killed for an infidel, nor must one
who has been given a covenant be killed while his covenant
holds. If anyone introduces an innovation, he will be responsible
* It is a tradition founded prior to Islam, and remained after when the person gives a fill protection to others. It has been
narrated, for instance, that after Caliph Ali, the fourth Orthodox Caliph, defeated `Aisha, the widow of the Prophet, in the battle
of the Camel, Marwan Ibn al-Hakam, one of 'Aisha's supporters, given an Aman by Malik Ibn Masm'a, the leader of 'Anizah
tribe. AI-Tabari, Mohamad Ibn Jarear, Tare ikh al-Umam wa al-Muluk, Vol. III, al Matba'ah al Hussayniyah al Masriyah,
Cairo, p. 56.
* See Chapter V, 5.2 for the implications of this omission.
12 Al-Hattab, Muhammad Al-Maghrabl,Mwahib al-Jail! ii Sharh Milkhtasar Khalil, Mat ba' at al-Sa' ad ah, Cairo, 1328 AIL
p.360.
13 Lambton, Ann K. S., State and Government in Medieval Islam, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985, p. 202.
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for it If anyone introduces an innovation or gives shelter to a man
who introduces an innovation (in religion), he is cursed by Allah,
by His angels, and by all the people.14
It may be inferred that: the term Aman is almost exclusively concerned with the
granting of temporary security. It was used as a synonym of Dhimmah during the
early period of the Islamic Empire, thereafter the elaboration of it was distinguished
from the concept of Dhimmah and extended to cover non-Muslims who lived outside
the Dar al-Islam and belonged to the Dar al-Harb . 15 The continued affinity between
Dhimmi status and the status of Musta 'nun in the later period of the Islamic Empire
was noted by Joseph Schacht,
The position of Musta 'min resembles in general that of the
Dhimmi, except that he is not obliged to pay Jizyah for a year;
should he remain in Islamic territory longer, he is made a
Dhimmi.16
Aman is not given to persons of Dar al-'Ahd because they are covered by the
protection afforded by the treaty. Aman at the level of individual persons is therefore
given only to Harbis. As a consequence, a Musta 'min, person who obtains Aman,
could be defined as follows: a non-Muslim who is an enemy alien, who is not
protected by any kind of security treaty and whose country is at war with the Islamic
State. Under this condition his life and property are completely unprotected by law
unless he has been given Aman. The protection given to such non-Muslims can vary.
Altogether, there are five kinds of Aman that could be given to the Musta 'mm:
1) The singular Aman. It is given to between one to ten Harbis, such as a small
caravan or a small castle. The four Sunni Schools of Figh agreed that only the Muslim
can confer this sort of Aman, not Dhimmis or Mu 'ahed (members of Dar al- `Ahd) or
other Musta 'min, even if they fight side by side with the Muslims. 17 That is because
the Prophet equalised the lives of all Muslims when he said, "The covenants of all
Muslims are equal", and distinguished them from those of Harbis or unbelievers. Such
14 Al-Shawkani, Muhamad Ali, Nail al-Awtar, Vol. VIII, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1952, pp. 27-28.
15 Lambton, Ann K. S., State and Government in Medieval Islam, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985, p. 202.
16 Schacht, Joseph, An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford University Press, London, 1975, p. 131.
17 Al-Shafeig, Muhammad Ihn Idris, Al-Umtn, Vol. IV, Al Matba'ah al-'Amereyah, Cairo, 1322 AR, pp. 196-197. & AI-
Sarkhasi, Muhammad Ihn Ahmed, Al-Mabszit, Vol. X, Matba'at al-Sa'adah, Cairo, 1931, p. 70. & Anas, Malik Ibn, AI-
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Aman was known before Islam, indeed the Prophet himself enjoyed it at the beginning
of the Islamic Da'wa. Ibn al-Qayyim in his work Zad al-M'aad reported,
The Prophet Muhammad, in his return from Taif to Makkah,
despatched a man from Khuza'ah tribe to Al-Mt'im Ibn 'A di, a
notable in Makkah, volunteered to respond to the Prophet
Muhammad's appeal for Aman, Al-Mrim accepted and offered
Aman to the Prophet and asked him to enter Makkah under his
protection. Therefore, non-of the Qurashies can attack the
Prophet. 18
Al-Kasani, of the Hanafites School, denied the validity of Dhimmi 's Aman, even if
the Dhimmi was empowered by a Muslim to pledge Aman. 19 Muslim jurists stipulated
that the Muslim individual who gives Aman has to be an adult, free, male or female.
The Malikites, Shafei'ites, and Hanbalites jurists approved of Muslim slaves giving
Aman, but the Hanafites jurists deny the slave this right, unless he joins Jihad or is
empowered by his master to do so. 20 It is true that neither the Prophet nor Caliph Abu-
Bakr had approved the slaves giving the Aman. However, Caliph Umar I approved it
when he said,
The slave of the Muslims is from the Muslims, his covenants is
[the same as] the Muslims covenants.21
If the slave's Aman was not permitted the Caliph Umar I could not give this
approval. As noted above, only Hanafi jurists refused to accept the legitimacy of this
kind of Aman, except under two specific conditions.
2) The general Aman. This kind of Aman can be given only by the Imam or his
representatives and it is pledged to all Harbis or a large number of them. This is
confirmed by the words of al-Sharkasi,
Moddawanh al-Kobra, Vol. III, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1991, p. 42. & Al-Ramli, Shams Al-Dean Muhammad Ibn Shihab Al-
Dean, Nehayat al-Muhtaj ila Sharh al-Mmhaj, Vol. VII, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1386 AH, p. 217.
18 Ibn Al-Qayyim, Shams Al-Dean Muhammad Ibn Bakr, Zad al-M'aad, Vol. H, Al-Matba'ah al-Masriyah, Cairo, 1914,
pp. 46-47.
19 Al-Kasani, Abu Bakr Ibn Mas'aud, Bada'ea Al Sanay'a fi Tarteab Al Sharay'a, Vol. VII, Sharekat Al-Matbou'at al-
`Alamyah, 1327 AH, p. 106.
20 AI-Qurtobi, Muhammad Ibn Ahmed, Al-Jame'a 11 Ahkam al-Qur'an, Vol. VIII, Dar al-Kotoub, Cairo, 1369 All, p. 76.
21 Ibn Qudamah, Abdulah Ibn Ahmed, Al-Mughm, Vol. IX, Matba'at al-Manar, 1348 All, p. 241 & , p. 241& Ibn Sallam,
Abu `Ubayd al-Qasim, Al-Amwal, Dar Beirut, 1975, p. 243 & Al-Bayhaqi, Ahmed Ibn AI-Hussein, Al-Sunan al-
Kobra. Vol. IV, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1994, p. 94.
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The Imam, by the authority and power he has, is the only one
entitled to guarantee safety for huge number of people.22
3) The Aman by conclusion of a truce. Under such Aman only the Imam or his
representatives can give it to the enemy on condition that they have ceased fighting.
The Arabic term for that is al-Muwada'ah or al-Muhadanah. The Harbis properties,
lives, and families are entitled to full protection by Muslim authorities as long as they
enjoyed the benefits of this Aman. Hence, according to the Islamic Law, under this
Aman it is not permitted to extradite the Musta 'nuns to their countries under any
circumstances.23
4) The Aman by custom (‘-'1..)c.). This sort contains two categories, these are:
a) The messenger, the modern term is "the negotiator" who is sent
on a mission carrying a message to the Imam. He will be permitted
to proceed without Amon, since he possesses diplomatic immunity
or is negotiating the disengagement of forces in wartime under a
flag of truce. However, if it is found that he lacked the letters of
credence or that he had no message to deliver or showed any sort of
perfidiousness, he was liable to be killed.24
b) The merchants who according to the Arabian customs were
permitted to enter Islamic territories while Muslim merchants,
reciprocally entered non-Islamic territories. However, this
customary sort of Aman was changed recently. Merchants are not
now permitted to enter a state at war with their country. If the Imam
found that the transactions with Musta'mins threaten the security or
the economy of the country, he is entitled to exclude them from
entering the Dar al-Islam.25
22 Al-Sarkhasi, Muhammad Ibn Ahmed, Al-Mabsut, Vol. X, Matba'at al-Sa'adah, Cairo, 1931, p. 72 & Aims, Malik Ibn,
AI-Moddawanh al-Kobra, Vol. III, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1991, p.42 & Al-Ramli, Muhammad Ahmed, Nehayat Al Muhtaj ila
Sharh Al-Minhaj, Vol. VIII, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, p. 80 & Al-Bahuti, Mansour Ibn Uonis, Kashaf al-Qina', Vol. III,
Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1982, p. 104.
23 Al-Shaferi, Muhammad Ibn Idris, Al-Umin, Vol. IV, Al Matha'ah aPAmereyah, Cairo, 1322 AH, pp. 196-197. & Al-
Sarkhasi, Muhammad Ibn Ahmed, Al-Mabsiit, Vol. X, Matba'at al-Sa'adah, Cairo, 1931, p. 70.
24 Al-Bahuti, Mansour Ibn Uonis, Kashaf al-Qina ', Vol. III, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1982, p. 87.
25 Ibid.
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5) The Aman for dependants (4-..341-.1). Under this sort of Aman, the family and the
wealth of the Musta'min would join him in his temporary stay in Dar al-Islam.
However, if he died in the Dar al-Islam, the Aman granted was still valid for his
property and his heirs could take it out of the Dar al-Islam if they wanted to do so.
However, there was a dispute between the jurists regarding the Musta 'min 's property
if he died after he returned to Dar al-Harb, leaving his property in the Dar al-Islam.
The Malikites and the Hanbalites, on one hand, argued that it could be taken out of the
Dar al-Islam by the heirs or sent by the Islamic government to them in Dar al-Harb .
If, however, the identity of the heirs was not known, then the property could be
handed over to the deceased's government. 26 The Shafei'ites, one the other hand,
argued that such property could be legitimately confiscated by the state. 27
 The
Hanbalites assume that if the Mu sta 'min ' s Aman terminated for any reason, the Aman
of his family could still be valid for his family, slaves, and wealth.28
Aman serves a very useful purpose. Without it, it would be impossible to establish
the temporary peaceful relationship between Muslims and other non-Muslims during
the period of hostile relations. It can also allow non-Muslims to travel in Islamic
territory during periods of hostilities as well as of peace. Aman does not have a special
form; it can be concluded by using any words which give the required meaning,
directly or indirectly. Even cue words or signs are considered to be binding terms in
these covenants." Accordingly, the head of the Islamic State could grant Aman by
any approved enunciation, sign, or written message. 3° It has been narrated that Caliph
Umar I wrote to the commander of the Muslim army, Sa' ad Ibn Wallas,
• . . If a non Arabic [Harbi] individual meets one of your soldiers
and gives him a sign by his body or even by his tongue and he
[the Muslim soldier] does not understand that sign, they [the
26 Ibid., p. 636.
27 Al-Shaferi, Muhammad A., Al-Umm, Vol. IV, Al Matba'ah Al 'Amereyah, Cairo, 1322 AH, p. 191.
28 Al-Bahuti, Mansour Ibn Uonis, Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat, Vol. II, Dar Al-Fikr, Beirut, 1982, P. 636.
29 Al-Azadi, Abuda'ud Sulayman Ibn Al-Asleath, Sunan Abuda'ud, Vol. II, AI-Maktabah al-Asryyah, Beirut, 1950, p. 76.
30 Al-Halal, AbdulKaream Ibn Muhamad, Fath al-Aztz tn Sharh al-Wageaz, Vol. XVI, A document in Al-Azhar Library,
Cairo, pp. 99-100.
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than four months. On the other hand, the Hanbalites permitted the Harbi to live in
Dar al-Islam for up to ten years.36
During their stay in Dar al-Islam, the Musta'mins have the same rights as the
Dhimmis, the only exception is that they do not have to pay the Jizyah. They are at
liberty to enjoy the security of the state and equal justice, to practise their religious
belief, and to use the services of the state such as education and transportation, and to
work in commerce. Abu Yusuf in his work Kitab al-Kharaj remarked,
Musta'min can enter into commercial transactions during his
stay in Dar al-Islam within the limitations of the law, but he is
not allowed to buy any weapons or slaves or any other kind of
instruments useful in war. If his purchases of contraband were
considered void, the Musta'min would be given back his money
and the weapons returned.37
Shari 'ah commands the Imam to support the Musta'mins if they lose their property
by offering them shelter and help to return to their own country. In connection with
their obligations to the Dar al-Islam, they have to respect the religious beliefs and
practices of the Muslims and abstain from saying or doing anything which harms
Muslims or the teaching of Islam, such as usury transactions which might be
construed as lack of respect for Islam.35
The status of Musta'min will be changed to Dhimmi under three conditions:
(1)if Musta 'min requests a period of Aman which exceeded one year, then he must
pay the poll tax Jizyah and become a Dhimmi;
(2)If he buys land or property which comes under the land-tax Kharaj, which is
evidence of his interest of living in Dar al-Islam for long time;
(3)If a female Musta'min marries a Muslim or a Dhimmi she takes on the status of
her spouse. However, if a Musta'min male marries a Dhimmi female he would
not become Dhimmi. He can take her back with him to Dar al-Harb • However,
36 Al-Bahuti, Mansour Ibn Uonis, Kashf al-Qina Vol. I, Dar Al-Fikr, Beirut, 1982, p. 695.
37 Abu Yusuf, Y'aqub Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Habib, Al-Kharaj, Al-Matba'ah al-Salafyah, Cairo, p.188-189.
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the reverse does not apply; the female Musta'min cannot take a Dhimmi with
her to Dar al-Harb .39
By the expiry time of the Aman, the Musta'min has four choices: (i) Embrace
Islam; (ii) Become a Dhimmi by paying the Jizyah; (iii) Quit Dar al-Islam; (iv) Gain
an extension to his/her stay in Dar al-Islam under the stance of necessity from the
Imam.
If a Musta 'min commits a crime in Dar al-Islam he will be under the Shari 'ah and
its system of criminal punishment in exactly the same way as a Dhimmi. In
connection with this, the Hanafites differ from another Schools of Fiqh in not
applying Islamic law to Musta'mins if they committed a crime which is against their
religion, but they would be punished by Islamic provisions if they have committed a
crime against individuals within Dar al-Islam . 4° Ibn Hamam explained the Hanafites
point of view as follows,
Musta'mins do not enter Dar al-Islam for residence, but for a
specific purpose such as trading or acting as a messenger or for
transit, and there is nothing in seeking protection by which he is
obliged by all the Shari 'ah provisions for crimes and
transactions. They are only obliged to what agrees with his
purpose in entering Dar al-Islam. So they must not be unjust and
should do no harm, as long as Muslims provide them with justice
and non-harm. Crimes of retribution and defamation relate to the
rights of worship. Hence, Musta'min should be punished for
these two crimes as for other crimes which harm rights of
individuals [like compulsion and dissipation]. As for other
crimes that do not touch the rights of individuals, he is not under
obligation. This means that implementing punishment requires
control over the venue of the crime and the time at which it was
committed.'"
To simplify the previous point of view, it can be said that crimes where the
Shari 'ah differentiates between Muslims and non- Muslims are those which are based
38 AI-Badawi, Ism'ael, Ikhtisasat al-Sultah al-Tanfithiyah fi al-Dawlah al-Islatniyyah, I .` Edit., Cairo, 1977, p. 183.
39 Al-Mawardi, All Muhammad, Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah wa al-Welayat al-Denyah, Dar al-Ketab al-Arabi, Beirut, 1990, p.
252 & Ibn Hamam, Kamal Al Dean, Fath al-Qadear, Sharh al-Hedayah Ii al-Marghalani, Vol. III, Matba'at Mustafa al-
Halabi, Cairo, 1356 AH, pp. 131-132.
40 M-Hasri, Ahmed, Nadhariyat al-Huktn wa Masader al-Tashre'a fi Ausul al-Figh al-Islami, Maktabat al-Kuliyat al-
Azhariyah, 1981, pp. 215-224.
41 Ibn Hamam, Kamal Al Dean, Sharh Fath al-Qadear, Vol. IV, Al-Matba'at al-Ameriyyah, Cairo, pp. 155-156.
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purely on religion and offences against it. Therefore, it is unjust to apply penalties on
the non-Muslims for acts that are not prohibited in their religion. For example, a non-
Muslim may be punished for drunkenness but not for drinking alcohol. Another
example is that Islam imposes fasting on Muslims and considers non-fasting and
eating openly during fasting day/s as two sins. Non-Muslims are therefore not
punished for not fasting but only if they eat openly. This is because their actions will
hurt Muslims' feelings.
The Islamic Law defines crimes as those actions prohibited by Shari'ah which
Allah punished with a Hadd or discretionary punishment; in the case of mere
suspicion of such an act, immunity is required by the dictates of the Shari'ah; when
the occurrence of a criminal act has been properly established, then the full
consequences, necessitated by rulings of the Shari'ah ensue. 42 Hence, it can be
understood that if the action is subject to no punishment mentioned in the Holy
Qur'an or in the Sunnah then it is not a crime, though it may be a sin or an evil act, as
well as possibly blameless. Therefore, crime can be defined as an action which the
Shari'ah explicitly forbids and for which it normally prescribes a punishment for the
offender.
Crimes, according to the Islamic criminal law are divided into three categories.
AbdulQadir Audah in his pioneering work Al-Tashri' al-Islami has stated
these categories as follows:
1) Those for the Divinely prescribed punishments (Hudoud) such as
adultery, highway robbery, alcohol-drinking, and theft;
2) Those for retaliation and compensation or blood-money including
murder. Retaliation means doing exactly to the offender what he has
done to the victim. Compensation means the money which the
offender or his relatives pay to the victim or to the relatives of the
victim in the case of murder. Therefore, the relatives have the right
to forgive the offender and thereby prevent the execution of capital
punishment for the crime of murder he committed. Instead, they
42 Al-Mawardi, Ali Muhammad, Al-Ahkam Al-Sultaniyah wa Al-Welayat Al-Denyah, Dar al-Ketab al-Arabi, Beirut, 1990,
p. 361.
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accept compensation. Alternatively, they may choose to demand
capital punishment and, in addition, compensation.
3) The discretionary punishments, where there is no specific
punishment mentioned in the Shari 'ah. The decision belongs to the
judge to make a suitable judgement and punishment for crimes such
as treason, violence and usury.43
According to the Islamic criminal law if the Musta'min commits a crime of the
first category, particularly highway robbery or adultery with a Muslim female, they
are subject to Divinely prescribed punishments. The Hanafites differ by arguing that
he is not liable for Hudoud punishment if he commits adultery with a non-Muslim
female or is involved in highway robbery." The Shafei'ites, the Malikites and the
Hanbalites, on the other hand, agreed that he has to be punished according to the
Qur 'anic verse:
C./-4 H-4.;1 -9 *4:.11 1111 ..91 1 .94u2 1 :9/ 1 .-941 C.J1 4-1.-P4Q-9 b1 1 -94J1-%71(11:111 PI:)+1-4.1)
(r V'	 yac S ,A."11 Jj ‘4.1 4:1 u:2,fil 4:).41)41. ji Litt&
The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His
Messenger, and strive with might and main for mischief through
the land is: execution, or crucifixion, the cutting off of hands and
feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land: that is their
disgrace in this world, and a heavy punishment is theirs in the
Hereafter. (5: 33)
Ibn Taymiyyah explained the agreement of the three Schools of Fiqh when he
remarked that,
The punishment of highway robbery is the execution and
crucifixion if the guilty kills and pillages the money. He is
executed without crucifixion if he kills without pillaging. If he
pillaged the money without killing, then his hand and foot will be
cut from opposite sides [that means crucifixion]. But if he just
scares the public without killing and pillaging then he has to be
exiled from the land by either imprisonment in another city or
expulsion from his residence to another country.46
43 Audah, AbdulQadir,.41-Tashri ' al-Jinai '	 Mu'asasat al-Risalah, Cairo, 1994, pp. 78-83.
44 Al-Sarldiasi, Muhammad Ibn Aluned,A1-Adabsut, Vol. IX, Matba'at al-Sa'adah, Cairo, 1931, p. 55.
* It means right hand and left foot.
46 Ibn Taymiyyah, TaquIDean Ahmad, Al-Sysasah al-Shar Vah, Dar al-M'arifah, Beirut, 1969, pp. 82-83.
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However, Muslim jurists differed over the crime of theft. The Hanafites, unlike the
other three Schools of Fiqh, assumed that the Musta 'min who committed theft is not
liable for punishment, while the Shafei'ites, the Malikites and the Hanbalites assumed
that he has to be punished according to the Shari 'ah. Also, if a Muslim is involved in
a crime of theft against a Musta 'min 's property, then he is subjected to the Hudoud
punishment mentioned in the Holy Qur 'an,
•	 4$1..9	 (j--4 VISj 1÷wS LL., FLA 41...1.4i 	JI.J.u.11.9 jj1.6,11j
(rA :O1.1.411)
As to the thief male or female cut off their hands, a retribution for
their deed and exemplary punishment from Allah, and Allah is
Exalted in Power, Full of Wisdom. (5: 38)
Regarding the second sort of crime, Muslim jurists agreed that if a Musta 'min
murders a Muslim, a Dhimmi or another Musta 'min in Dar al-Islam, he will be
subjected to the punishment of retaliation and compensation like a Muslim. Moreover,
if a Muslim kills a Musta 'min he is subjected to the same punishment because under
Aman the life and property of the latter are fully protected.47
Lastly, for the punishment of the third category of crimes, it has been mentioned
earlier that the judge has the right to punish the Musta 'min if he is involved in such
crimes with the punishment being suitable to the charge the same as any other
individual who lives in the Dar al-Islam."
Muslim jurists, moreover, differ regarding the causes that terminate Aman. The
Hanafites, the Shafei'ites and the Hanbalites rejected the view of the Malikites when
they argued that if the Musta 'min leaves Dar al-Islam, or the duration of Aman
expires, the Aman would be terminated and the Musta 'min has to leave the country.
Moreover, the head of the Islamic State can expel Musta 'min and repudiate the Aman
at any time if he discovers that the Musta 'min have either concealed a harmful
purpose or if his presence in Dar al-Islam is inconsistent with Muslim interests.49
47 Abu Yusuf, Y'aqub Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Habib, Al-Kharai, Al-Matba'ah al-Salafyah, Cairo, pp. 224-225.
48 Al-Shafeil, Muhammad I bn Idris, Al-Umtn, Vol. VII, Al-Matba'ah Al-'Amereyah, Cairo, 1322 All, p.326.
49 Anas, Malik Ibn, Al-Moddawanh al-Kobra, Vol. III, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1991, pp. 83-85.
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A general point that is pursued in this thesis is whether all relations between the
Islamic State and non-Muslims are contractual or treaty relations. It has been found
that Muslim jurists treated Aman as a treaty or contract because it was a pledge of
protection to a Harbi and pledges have the status of covenants, treaties or contracts in
the classical Figh. It should be noted however that Aman would not count as a treaty
or contract in international law because they can only be made by parties which are
formally equal and where there is a reciprocity in the terms of the agreement. In the
Shari 'ah, the legal status of Muslims is not equal to that of non-Muslims because of
the importance it attaches to the distinction between belief in Islam and unbelief.
Secondly, where only one side benefits, as is the case in Aman (the Musta'min receive
protection from the Islamic State) while the other party does not (the Islamic State
receives no tax or other benefit from the Musta 'min), then the arrangement lacks the
element of reciprocity essential to a contract or treaty in international law. 5° This
absence of reciprocity is due to the fact that the two parties — the Islamic State and the
Harbi s — are not formal or legal equals under the Shari'ah. The legally superior
Islamic State confers protection on the legally inferior Harbis. In addition the two are
unequal in their power or strength, but this does not effect the issue of the presence or
absence of a contract or treaty which is a purely legal fact. Aman is a pledge of
protection and so a treaty in the Shari 'ah, though it would not qualify as a treaty in
international law.
4.4) Convention 'Ahd al-Dhinunah
The protection convention is unlike a normal treaty in which all terms, conditions
and obligations must be written. It can be either a written or an unwritten treaty
between the Muslim Imam and a religious group of people. It has the essential feature
of a treaty or contract, namely, reciprocity; in exchange for permanent protection by
the Islamic State the Dhimmi group pays poll-tax (Jizyah). Consequently, this could
be added as a new category of the Islamic treaty to be two kinds, the written and the
non-written treaties.
50 Akehurst, Michael, A Modern Introduction to International Law, 3rd Edit., George Allen and Unwin, London, 1977, pp.
30-32, 121. Akehurst argues that the parties to a treaty enter into legal obligations to each other. It is also of relevance to note his
comment on page 121 that a unilateral promise by a state will be legally binding upon that state if it intends that result. (Nuclear
Tests case, ICJ reports, 1974, pp. 253, 267-8) This legally binding promise by a state is, arguably, the counterpart to Aman in
international law.
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The non-Muslims who live permanently within the Islamic State called Ahl al-
Dhimmah or the covenanted people Dhimmis, they pay the Jizyah and their relations
are organised by a written or an unwritten arrangement with the Islamic authority
which is equivalent to a treaty. Gibb and Bowen defined a Dhimmi as,
A non-Muslim subject of a Muslim ruler. Relations with the ruler
are regulated by contract once the non-Muslim community is
incorporated in the Domain of Islam. Under special conditions
the contract provides for the toleration of the infidel Dhimmi and
allows him to practise his religion, what is offered the non-
Muslim is in return for the payment of a special poll tax Jizyah.51
Al-Maududi in his work Rights of Non-Muslims in the Islamic State has classified
the non-Muslims who inhibit the Islamic territories into three different categories.
1) Those who accept the hegemony of a Muslim State whose affairs
are to be decided by the terms of the appropriate treaty are called
Dhimmis. The Muslim State is duty bound to abide by all the terms
of such a treaty.
2) Those who fought against Muslims until they were defeated and
they were overpowered they are Conquered People. They
automatically become the Dhimmah or the responsibility of the
Islamic State. They will pay a fixed amount of Jizyah and the
Islamic law will protect their lives, property honour and places of
worship.
3) Lastly, those who clearly happen to be residing permanently in
the Muslim State as its citizens.52
It is difficult to see the distinction between categories 1 and 3. Number 3 appears
to be an example of an un-written agreement and, perhaps, Maududi thinks that
number 1 refers to a written treaty. This same point applies to Hamidullah's
argument.
Muhammad Hamidullah added another category to that of al-Maududi.
51 Gibb & Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, in Vatikiotis, P. J., Islam and the state, 1' Edit., Routledge, London, 1987,
p. 87.
52 Maududi, Abtd Ala, Rights ofNon-Muslims in Islamic State, Islamic Publications, Lahore, 1976, pp. 2-5.
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4) Resident aliens who have opted voluntarily to live in a Muslim
State.53
The importance of the Dhimma to the Islamic State is that its members become
citizens of that state through the treaty and their permanent residence therein. Because
of its importance, Muslim jurists affirmed and insisted that the Imam, his deputy or
the Imam's representative must conclude this treaty. The jurists considered the treaty
to be void if someone other than those mentioned previously concludes it.54
Aqd al-Dhimmah also has very important effects. One of these is the termination
of an existing war and the hostile relations between the Muslims and the non-Muslims
who become Dhimmis. This implies that the Muslims will avoid launching or
becoming involved in another war against them unless they violate the convention.
For their part, the non-Muslims cease to be at war with the Islamic State when they
accept reconciliation with it, and agree to pay it the Jizyah. The treaty of Dhimmah
preserved their: lives; souls, personal and group properties (e.g. their churches) and
honour according to the terms and conditions detailed within the text of the treaty. As
for protecting them from foreign aggression, jurists insisted that the Imam has to
provide full protection to them in any part of Dar al-Islam or in the adjacent
territories. In this respect, the protection offered to Dhimmis is the same as that
offered to Muslim citizens of the Islamic State. However, if Dhimmis are in the Dar
al-Harb and still pay the Jizyah they will not be protected unless they have stipulated
that condition in the convention."
In Dar al-Islam where all citizens - Muslims and Dhimmis - are subject to the same
law, Dhimmis will not be forced to be governed by the whole of the Shari 'ah. They
are subject to the criminal law, but because of the strong link between personal law
and their religious belief and practices all personal affairs will be organised in
accordance with this personal law. Dhimmis can therefore follow the rules of their
53 Hamiduliah, Mohamad, The Muslim Conduct of State, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1977, p. 111.
54 Ibn Qudamah, Abdulah Ibn Ahmed, Al-Mughni, Vol. VIII, Matba'at al-Manar, 1348 All, p. 505 & Al-Dardear,
Ahmed, Al-Sharh al-Sagher, Vol. III, Matba'at Madani, Cairo, 1963, p. 308 & Al-Bahuti, Mansour Ibn Uonis, Kashaf al-
Qina ', Vol. III, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1982, p. 117.
55 Al-Mawardi, All Muhammad, Al-Hawi al-Kabir, Vol. XIX, Maktabat al-Azhar, Cairo, p. 165 & Al-Nawawi, Yahya Ibn
Sharaf, Rawdat al-Talibean, Vol. X, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1993, p. 322.
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religions with regard to what is lawful and what is forbidden. 56 Accordingly, some
Muslim jurists permitted them even to sell and drink wine, eat pork and trade in those
commodities inside their community." Bat Ye'or, for instance, confirms
... they were granted the right of self-administration according to
the laws of their religions as well as . . . freedom of worship,
movement, and residence, which proved precious guarantees.58
It is a matter of principle that the Dhimmis were entitled to have their own civil
suits adjudicated by their own judges without governmental interference. 59 However,
whenever Dhimmis opt for the Shari 'ah as the rule in their personal law, the Shari 'ah
will apply to them even if the members of their community insist on their being tried
according to their preceding personal law. The cases of Dhimmis are to be decided by
no one else but their co-religionists in accordance with their personal, traditional or
religious law. 6° The Holy Qur'an mentions,
CJI..9 11.1-4 14.9.)--4?1. C...)--5 Hi-1P C..);2.,:i C:i)..9 HiC' C.):2.Pi -91 Nr.1:61.. 4.-%11 dlis- 14 ()La
(ir : E.111.411)	 ej,․)--s -11ya..4 4.11 cjl .13....ilL ta4.1..44 4.,ti cJA..c.%
If they do come to thee, either judge between them or decline to
interfere; if thou decline, they cannot hurt thee in the last; if thou
judge, judge in equity between them; for Allah loveth those who
judge in equity. (5: 42)
Islam, moreover, developed rights and obligations of the Dhimmis and constituted
a law which regulated and governed their relations with Muslims, both individuals
and authority. Muslim jurist formalised these rights and obligations, they derived
some of these rules from the Holy Qur 'anic legislation, and others from decrees
issued by the succeeding Caliphs, particularly from the charter of Caliph Umar I with
the Christians of Jerusalem. Simon Ockley 61 stated the terms of the charter as follows:
1)	 The Christians shall build no new churches, either in the city
or the adjacent territory;
56 Anas, Malik Ibn, AI Moddawanh al-Kobra, Vol. IV, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1991, p. 162.
57 Al-Shafer', Muhammad Um Idris, Al-Umin, Vol. V, Al Matba'ah al-'Amereyah, Cairo, 1322 AH, p.44. & Ibn Hazm,
All Ibn Ahmed, AI-Muhali, Vol. X, Dar al-Itehad al-Arabi li al-Teba'a, Cairo, 1969, p. 210.
58 Ye'or, Bat, The Dhimmi, Jews and Christian under Islam, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, London, 1985, p.49.
59 Sherwani, Haroon Khan, Muslim Political Thought and Administration, Munshiram Manoharlal Publisher, 1977, pp. 27-
28.
60 Al- Jasas, Abu Bala- Ahmed Ibn All Al-Razi, Ahkam al-Qur'an, Vol. II, Matba'at al-Awqaf al-Islamiyyah, Alasatanah,
1335 AH, p. 460.
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2) They shall not refuse the Muslims entrance into their
churches, by night or day;
3) They shall also open the doors of their houses to all
passengers and travellers;
4) If any Muslim is on a journey, they are obliged to entertain
him gratis for the period of three days;
5) They should not talk openly of their religion, nor persuade
anyone to join it, neither should they hinder any of their relations
from becoming Muslims if they have an inclination to it;
6) They shall respect Muslims, for example, if they were seated
they should stand;
7) They should not be like the Muslims in their dress, caps,
shoes, turbans, nor should they part their hair like Muslims do, nor
should they speak in the same way or use the same names as
Muslims;
8) They shall not use saddles, bear arms, or use Arabic in the
inscriptions of their seals;
9) They shall not sell any wine;
10) They must always wear the same kind of clothes with a girdle
around their waists;
11) No cross is to be placed upon their churches. Crosses and their
books must not be displayed openly in the streets of the Muslims;
12) They shall not ring, only toll, their bells, nor shall they take
any servant that had once belonged to the Muslims;
13) Their houses shall not overlook Muslim houses.
These rules were met with great criticism. Jirji Zaydan, for example, insists,
The text of the charter displays a desire to persecute and oppress
the Christians that is unlike what appears in the other charters
and treaties that belong to the beginning of Islam; it is also
unlike what is otherwise known of Oniar's justice and gentleness
towards the people of the Covenant [Dhimmis] and can be
inferred from the narrative of his life. That life exhibits veracity
in thought, word, and deed, and so when a Moslem injured a
61 Ockley, Simon, The History of the Saracens, 4th Edit., Henry G. Bohn, London, 1847, pp. 211-212.
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Christian it was Omar 's custom to obtain satisfaction for the
injured party, even though the Moslem was one of the most
eminent of the Companions.62
Zaydan then mentions al Mawardi's twelve conditions and duties, which agrees
with the text of Umar's charter, except that it is arranged in headings and clauses.
According to al-Mawardi these conditions divided into two categories, the first six are
obligatory while others are desirable. Zaydan mentioned these twelve duties;
however, in his first condition, he combined three points- who has to pay, the amount
of Jizyah, and the penalty if he refuses to pay it.63
Under these conditions and duties, the convention may subsequently become void
if the Dhimmis performed one of the following:
1) Reviling or showing any disrespect to the Holy Qur'an;
2) Insulting the Prophet of Islam;
3) Attacking the religion of Islam;
4) Injuring the life or the property of a Muslim. Nor should they
abjure his belief or induce him to apostatise;
5) Marrying Muslim women or entering into sexual connection with
them;
6) Co-operating with the enemy, such as disclosing secrets of the
Muslims to the enemy or passing on intelligence to the enemy.
The next conditions are desirable conditions. Non-Muslims are not required to do
any of these unless they are written in the convention. However, unlike the previous
conditions, non-performance of any or all of these are not considered to terminate the
convention:
7) Drinking wine or eating pork or showing their crosses in public
(some added that they are not permitted to sell wine and pork);
8) Changing their outward appearances by wearing distinctive
clothes.
62 Zaydan, Jurji, History opslamic Civilization, Vol. IV, E. J. W. Gibb Memorial, Leyden, 1907, pp. 126-127.
63 Ibid., p. 129.
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9) Riding on horseback, but they are allowed to ride donkeys and
mules.
10) Their houses should not be higher than Muslims' houses.
11) Ringing their church bells loudly or raising their voice loudly in
prayer or their talk of Jesus.
12) Their dead should not be wept over loudly and their burial must
be concealed from Muslims. They must be buried in a place away
from Muslim quarters.
These obligatory and non-compulsory conditions show that Joseph Schacht was
mistaken when he clamed that,
Neither offences against individual Muslims, including even
murder, nor refusal to pay the tribute, nor transgression of the
other rules imposed upon the non-Muslims, are considered
breaches of the treaty."
Truly speaking, the occurrence of one of the previous offences mentioned by
Schacht should breach the convention, though in the words of Ann Lambton,
The essential condition imposed upon them [the Dhimmis] was
the obligation to pay Jizyah.65
The Shari 'ah has imposed obligations on Muslims toward the Dhimmis because
they are under the pledge of Allah, his Messenger, and the pledge of the Muslim
community; they are under the protection of Islam. According to the Shari 'ah, they
are guaranteed the protection of their life, property, and honour, and they enjoy all the
legal rights enshrined in exactly the same way as Muslims in the Shari'ah. These
obligations towards the non-Muslims are summarised by (Amir Siddiqi) as follows:
1) The Islamic State has to offer them the full protection from both
external and internal ignominious acts or attacks against them.
2) They are exempted from military conscription unless they want to
enlist.
64 Schacht, Joseph, An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford University Press, London, 1975, P. 131.
65 Lam bton, Ann K. S., State and Government in Medieval Islam, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985, p. 204.
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3) The Islamic State is fully responsible for providing a living for
the non-Muslim permanent resident who cannot work or cannot find
a decent job.*
4) Non-Muslims who live within the Islamic State have to use the
Islamic Court in all their legal cases. However, the Islamic Court
shall provide them with a permanent, respectable expert for the
cases involving their creed and personal statute, under full
supervision of the Islamic Court.
5) The Islamic State shall enact the necessary law to determine the
type of professions in which they shall be allowed to work.
6) Non-Muslims have the full right to leave the Islamic State
temporarily or permanently at any time. All travel rules and
requirements designed for the Islamic State's citizens, such as the
necessity of documentation and permission, applies equally to the
Dhimmis unless their departure affects the security of the state.
7) Their children must enjoy all the levels of education in Islamic
State. Moreover, they can establish their own educational
institutions that will be supervised by the Islamic authority.
8) Finally, all other regulations and laws not concerning religious
duties, which apply to the Islamic State other citizens shall be tacitly
applied to all non-Muslim permanent residents. 66
Dhimmis have to pay three sorts of taxes to the Islamic state: Jizyah, Kharaj, and
the Tithe.
4.4.1) The Tribute Jizyah
Jizyah was initially known during the time of the Pharonic Egyptian. It was found
on the papyri of the first (seventh) century besides the Jizyah as the principal tax in
gold, only the payment in kind is mentioned. For the Sassanians and Byzantines the
Refer to the story of Caliph Urnar I with the Jew in Hamidullah, Muhanunad, The Muslim Conduct of State, Sh.
Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1977, pp. 113-114.
66 Siddiqi, Amir, Non-Muslims Under Muslim Rule & Muslims Under Non-Muslim Rule, The Jamiyatul Falah Publications,
Karachi, 1969, pp. 1-9.
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main source of revenue, and hence of the tribute payment, was the land-tax, which
bore the Aramaic of Kharaj. This term was identified with the Arabic Kharaj .67
Muslim jurist agreed on the meaning of Jizyah to be: "the amount of money that
Dhimmi pays to the Islamic authority, or the contract that regulates this payment."68
They differ, however, in defining the term itself. While Ibn Taymiyyah, for instance,
defines it as,
The tax which is imposed on the heads of the people of the book
(Christians and Jews) who join the Dhimmah of Muslims.69
Ibn Qudamah, on the other hand, defined it as,
The payment taken from the disbeliever for his living in the Dar
al-Islam every year.7°
Moreover, they still differ in dealing with the effects of Jizyah on the status of the
Dhimmis. In connection with this, al-Bahuti, for example, defined Jizyah as,
The acknowledgement of some non-Muslims of their atheism with
the condition of payment of the Jizyah and following the revisions
of the religion.71
Dissimilarly, al-Mawardi defined it as,
The People of the Book shall admit of staying in the Dar al-Islam
with a Jizyah they pay for themselves every yearn
From another point of view different to the above two, al-Ghazali illustrated it as,
By the payment of the Jizyah, they acknowledge that they have
been protected and defended in our country and that they owe
obedience from their side.73
67 •Gibb, H. A. R. & H. Kramers, Short Encyclopedia Ofislatn, E. J. Bill, Leiden, 1974, p. 92.
68 Ibn Qudahmah, AbdulRahman Ibn Muhammad, Al-Sharh al-Kabear, Vol. II, Matba'at al-Manar, 1348 All, pp. 201-
202 & Ibn Hazm, All Ibn Ahmed, Al-Muhalt, Vol. IV, Dar al-Itehad al-Arabi Ii al-Teba'a, Cairo,1969, p. 228.
69 Ibn Taymiyyalt, TaquIDean Ahmed, AI-Sysasah al-Shar'tyah, Dar al-M'arifah, Beirut, 1969, pp. 113-114.
70 Ibn Qudamah, Abdulah Ibn Ahmed, Al-Mughnt, Vol. IX, Matba'at al-Manar, 1348 All, p.328.
71 Ibn Al-Najar, TaquIDean Muhammad Ibn Ahmed, Montaha al-lradat, Vol. II, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, p. 127.
72 Al-Mawardi, All Muhammad, Al-Hawt al-Kabtr, Vol. XIX, Maktabat al-Azhar, Cairo, p. 163.
73 Al-Ghazall, Muhammad Ibn Muhamntad,A1-Wajeaz, Vol. II, Matba'at Hoash Kadam, 1318 AH, p. 198.
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Regardless of the juristic disagreement on the definition, what can be concluded is
that the jurists agree that the status of Dhimmah is strongly connected with the
payment of the Jizyah; without the Jizyah there is no Dhimmah status.
The legislation does not provide any details about the currency in which Jizyah is
to be paid. In the time of the Prophet Muhammad it was sometimes paid in gold, as
happened with the people of Yemen and Tabouk, and sometimes in the form of
ornaments, garments, and cattle, as in the Jizyah of the people of Najran. Jizyah was
sometimes assessed for an entire village and in other times it was a per capita (poll)
tax. Its value might be increased or decreased according to the condition of the people
and the need of Muslims. 74
 The case of Cyprus gives an example of such a condition.
It was during the time of Caliph `Uthman the Jizyah was 7200 golden Dinars, then the
Caliph AbdulMalik Ibn Marwan added 1000 Dinars, Caliph Umar II cancelled that
addition, then Caliph Hisham Ibn AbdulMalik returned the 1000 Dinars, this
remained the same until the time of the `Abbaside Caliph Abu Jalar al-Mansour who
returned the Jizyah to its original amount.75
In brief, Jizyah is a tax on Dhimmis who live in the Dar al-Islam. Other Muslim
citizens bear many financial burdens, such as Zakah and other burdens. Jizyah was
paid in return for the benefit of public services from the Islamic State, its protection
and preservation of them from any internal or external aggression. Moreover, Jizyah
is in return for their exclusion from their duty of military service for the Islamic
State. 76
 Jurist al-Khateab remarked that,
Jihad is not for the non-Muslim even if he is one of the People of
the Book [Dhimmis], as he pays the Jizyah to us in order to
defend him, not for him to defend us.77
Afzal Iqbal comments on this issue. He said,
74 Ibn AI-Athear, All Ibn Muhammad, Al-Kamil ft al-Tarellch, Vol. II, Dar Sader, Beirut, 1979, p. 191 & Al-Shawkani,
Muhammad All, Nail al-Awtar, Vol. VIII, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1952, p. 65.
75 Al-Beladhuri, Ahmed Ibn Yahya, Funth al-Madan, Maktabat al-Nandha al-Masriyah, Cairo, 1951, p. 159.
76 AI-Sarkhasi, Muhammad Ibn Aluned,A1-Mabsut, Vol. X, Matba'at al-Sa'adah, Cairo, 1931, p. 78.
77 Al-IChateab, Muhammad, Al-Igna'a, Vol. IV, Matabe'a al-Slia'b, Cairo, 1966, p. 227.
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In case, however, they [the Dhimmis] are employed on military
duty, the normal tax is payable by them [the Jizyah] was no
longer due to the treasury.78
Jurists disputed who should and who should not pay Jizyah. On the one hand, the
Shafei'ites and the Hanbalites, agreed that Jizyah shall be accepted only from the
People of the Book (i.e. Jews and Christians) even if they were Arabs or Magi who
worship fire. 79 On the other hand, the Hanafites and the Malikites assumed that Jizyah
is taken from all non-Muslims except from the Arab idolaters (heathen). 8° Later jurists
agreed that Jizyah is not accepted from the Arab idolaters. 81
 Some such as al-Awza'i,
al-Thawri, and some of the Malikites agreed that Jizyah should be taken from all non-
Muslims, whether they are scripturaries, idolaters, Arabs, or non-Arabs.82
Under certain conditions jurists excluded Dhimmis from paying the Jizyah. These
were:
a) Embracing Islam. Jizyah will be void completely if a Dhimmi embraces Islam,
whether he embraced it during the year or after Jizyah elapsed. Nothing is to be taken
from him even if he had not paid Jizyah for many previous years 83 and the status of
Jizyah will be changed to Zakah. Jurists admitted that with the evidence of the
Prophetic Hadith "No Jizyah shall be paid by a Muslim."84
Some jurists, particularly the Shafei'ites and Hanafites, considered that Jizyah is to
be cancelled for the full year in which the Dhimmi embraced Islam. However, Jizyah
for the years preceding his embrace of Islam, it shall be a debt which he has to pay.
78 lqbal, Afzal, The Culture of Islam, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 1967, p. 87.
79 Al-Shaferi, Muhammad I bn Idris, Al-Umm, Vol., IV, Al-Matba'ah al-'Amereyah, Cairo, 1322 AH, pp. 97 & 105. & Al-
Ramli, Muhammad Ahmed, Nehayat al-Muhtaj ila Sharh al-Minhaj, Vol. VII, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, p. 221.
80 Al-Kasani, Abu Bala. Ibn Mas'aud, Bada'ea al-Sanay'a fi Tarteab al-Sharay .a, Vol. VII, Sharekat al-Matbou'at al-
`Alamyah, 1327 AH, p 110. & Al-Sarkhasi, Muhammad Ibn Ahmed, Sharh al-Siyar al-Kabir, Vol. I, Hyderabad, 1335 AH,
p. 102.
81 AI-Jawziyah, Muhammad Ibn Abu Bakr Ibn Al-Qayyim , Ahkam Ahl al-Dhimmah, Damascus, Matba'at Jami'at
Dimishq, 1961, p. 20.
82 Al-Zohaily, Wahbah, Athar al-Harb fi al-Figh al-Islami, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1981, p. 714.
83 Ibn Hamam, Kama! Al Dean, Fath al-Qadear, Sharh al-Hedayah Ii al-Marghalam, Vol. VI, Mat ba'at al-Halabi, Cairo,
1356 AIL p. 55 & Al-Sarkliasi, Muhanunad Ibn Ahmed, Al-Mabsut, Vol. X, Matba'at al-Sa'adah, Cairo, 1931, p. 80-81 &
Ibn Al-Najar, TaquIDean Muhammad Ibn Ahmed, Montaha al-lradat, Vol. II, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, p. 130 & Al-
Kasani, Abu Bahr Ibn Mas'aud, Bada 'ea Al Sanay'a fi Tart eab Al Sharay'a, VoL IX, Sharekat al-Matbou'at al-`Alamyah,
1327 AH, p.4334.
84 Ibn Hanbal, Ahmed Ibn Muhammad, Musnad al-Imam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal, Vol. III, Dar al-Ma'aref, Cairo, 1980, p. 291.
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However, some jurists did not accept this view. They assumed that Jizyah shall not
cease even in the year in which the Dhimmi has embraced Islam. In their view it must
be paid for the part of the year preceding his conversion to Islam, because Jizyah is a
debt which shall not be erased. As Jizyah is a compensation for sparing life and
providing peace and security which are enjoyed by the Dhimmi, he has to pay for
these benefits received.85
An argument against the view of the Shafei'ites and Hanafites that Jizyah of pre-
Islam years of the Dhimmi still remains as debt is that cancellation of Jizyah will
encourage unbelievers to embrace Islam. This view is supported by the strong
Prophetic Hadith,
Islam wipes out all the previous (sins] missed.86*
b) The Death. Jurists of the Hanafites, Malikites agreed that Jizyah is cancelled by
death for the year or the years before the Dhimmi died and for the full amount or part
of it (based on his financial status). Accordingly, nothing is to be taken from the
inheritance of the deceased against what he had to pay of Jizyah. 87 However, the
Shafei'ites differentiate between death during the year and death after the due date of
the Jizyah payment. If the Dhimmi died during the year of the Jizyah, this did not
cancel the Jizyah, either for the part of that year or the years preceding it.88
In connection with this, since Jizyah is paid at the end of the year it should be
noted that the juristic opinion which calls for cancellation of the Jizyah for the
Dhimmi during the full year in which he died meets the condition of necessity. That is
the deceased Dhimmi could not pay this tax at the end of the year due to his death
which owes nothing to his own will, but is the will of God. As for the arrears of debts
for previous years, these are not to be cancelled (unless he was poor) as he joined the
Islamic State for protection and all the other rights of the Dhimmis for which he must
85 Al-Sherazi, Ibraheam Ibn All, Al-Muhatheb, Vol. II, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, p. 252 & Ibn Qudahmah, Abdulah Ibn
Aluned, Al-Mughni, Vol. IX, Matba'at al-Manar, Cairo, 1348 AH, p.342.
86 Matraji, Mahmoud, Translation of Saheh Muslim, Vol. I, Dar Al-Fikr, Beirut, 1993, p. 155-156.
* This means that: when a non-Muslim embrace Islam, all sins he committed regarding worship will be wiped. However,
offences committed against people will not be wiped unless they (the people) forgive him (the non-Muslim).
87 Al-Zaila'ai, Fakhr Al-Dean Ibn Utlunan, Tabyyean al-Haqa 'hi, Vol. III, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1991, p. 278.
88 Ibn Sallam, Abu `Ubayd al-Qasim, Al-Amwal, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1975, pp. 66-67.
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pay. Therefore, in order not to have procrastination and wasting of the financial rights
of the Islamic State, this right should be taken from his inheritance.
c) Overlapping the Jizyah. The Hanafites jurists decided that a Dhimmi whose
payment of Jizyah has not been collected over several previous years for whatever
reason shall pay only the Jizyah of the present year. 89 They argued that there is no
need to collect the Jizyah from previous years because the purpose of this tax can be
achieved by the payment of a single year. That purpose is not to maximise revenue for
the Islamic State: it is to ensure that the non-Muslim citizen of the Islamic State
shows lowliness, humiliation and his subjection to the rule of Islam. If the Dhimmi
paid Jizyah for all the past years when his non-payment was discovered, then the
intention of the tax would be to accumulate money for the Islam state instead of
securing the required attitude and pattern of behaviour by the Dhimmi. 90
In addition, Jizyah has been legislated as a penalty to the non-Muslims for their
disbelief in Islam. Thus, if Jizyah is imposed for past non-payment this would be
undesirable because a retrospective punishment. The purpose of Jizyah as punishment
is achieved within the current year and additional retrospective Jizyah would
constitute needless, purposeless punishment. 91
Against this view was that of Ibn al-Qayyim, of the Hanbalite, and Abu Yusuf, of
the Hanafite. They held the view that the debt ofJizyah shall not expire as a result of
non-payment over time. They held it should be collected completely for all past years
because it is a debt to the Islamic State for its protection for those years which has not
been cancelled by the creditor, the Islamic State. 92 In other word, like all financial
obligations by debtors, it has to be met in full in the absence of cancellation (or other
modification of the terms of the debt) by the creditor.
89 Al-Sarkhasi, Muhammad Ibn Aluned, Al-Mabsza, Vol. X, Matba'at al-Sa'adah, Cairo, 1931, P. 82.
919 Ibn Hamam, Kamal Al Dean, Fath al-Qadear, Sharh al-Hedayah h al-Marghalara, Vol. VI, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo,
1356 AH, p. 55.
91 Ibid.
92 Al-Jawziyah, Muhammad Ibn Abu Bakr Ibn Al-Qayyim , Ahkatn Ahl al-Dhaninah, Damascus, Matba'at Jami'at
Dimishq, 1961, p. 61.
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d) Failure of protection . If the Islamic State cannot protect the Dhimmis, Jizyah is
no longer owed. There is evidence that Jizyah was in return for protection because
when some Moslem leaders felt that they were not able to protect the Dhimmis they
returned the Jizyah to them. For example, when the Romans collected their forces to
attack the northern borders of the Islamic State, the Muslim commander Abu Ubaidah
Ibn al-Garrah wrote to all his rulers to return the Jizyah .to all Dhimmis who had paid
it to the Islamic State.93
e) Loss of necessity. In the cases of poverty, illness, blindness and senility the
Jizyah payment is automatically cancelled. If one of these causes occurs within the
payment year, Jizyah payment is not required, and Dhimmis have to be supported by
the Islamic authority through Muslim public treasury (Bait al-Mal). It has been
narrated by al-Tabari that Caliph Umar II sent to his governor of Khurasan to "collect
Jizyah firmly if they can afford to pay it, or if you appeal against exacting payment
due to the lack of money, write to me and I will enable you to provide (the Dhimmis)
for their needs."94
Jurists stipulated that Jizyah is due annually on every Dhimmi who is male, of
military age, adult, free, and in work. They exempted Dhimmis who are monks,
hermits, women, poor, children, and slaves from paying the Jizyah. The amount of the
Jizyah to be collected was eighty-four Dirhams for the rich, twenty-four Dirhams for
the middle classes, and twelve Dirhams for ordinary and working classes, such as
tailors and farmers. 95 Jizyah, moreover, has not to be levied beyond the capacity of
any Dhimmi . In the Prophetic Hadith it states,
Whoever oppresses a Dhimmi subject or taxes him beyond his
capacity, then I shall be the opposite party to him in the
litigation.96
Jizyah, moreover, has to be collected with kindness and condescension to the
Dhimmis by the tax collector without any disgrace of insult or humiliation. Imam al-
Shafei'i stated,
93 Abu Yusuf, Y'aqub Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Habib, Al-Kharai, Al-Matba'ah al-Salafyah, Cairo, p. 166.
94 AI-Tabari, Mohamad Ibn Jarear, Tareikh al-Umam wa al-Muluk, Vol. IV, al-Matba'ah al-Hussayniyah al-Masriyah,
Cairo, p. 70.
95 Abu Yusuf, Y'aqub Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Habib, Al-Kharaj, Al-Matba'ah al-Salafyah, Cairo, pp. 69-72. & 253-256.
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Jizyah should be taken in general without beating or abusing the
Dhimmis. Humility means that they must implement the order,
not be beaten or harmed.97
Jurist al-Nawawi commentated on al-Shafei' s view,
This means of treatment, which means degrading them, is null
and void and carrying it out is a big mistake.98
Jurist Abu Yusuf said,
Nobody of the Dhimmis should be beaten [to force them] to pay
Jizyah. They must not be left under the sun, and no harm should
be done to their bodies. They must be treated kindly and be
imprisoned until they give the Jizyah, then they should be taken
out of the prison.99
However, in some cases if Dhimmis are obstinate or procrastinate in payment but
are capable of paying Jizyah, resorting to imprisonment of such Dhimmis is
permissible. Abu Thawr, for example, mentioned,
They (the Dhimmis) should be treated kindly in collecting the
Jizyah. They should not be beaten or imprisoned unless one of
them has a contract and has not fulfilled it, so the Imam may
imprison him.vm
In the Sunnah, there are various Prophetic Hadiths, which warn Muslims against
any high handedness towards the Dhimmis. The Prophet is reported to have said,
Whosoever persecuted a Dhimmi or spoilt his right or took work
from him beyond his capacity, or took something from him with
evil intentions. I shall be a complainant against him on the Day of
Resurrection.101
Most notably, according to verse which was introduced in the Qur 'an,
( Y	 Z.192) • C..1.9..)"2 e16-9
. . . with willing and feel[ing] themselves subdued. (9: 29)
96 Ibid.
97 Al-Shafel'i, Muhammad A., Al-Umm, VoL IV, Al Matba'ah al-'Amereyah, Cairo, 1322 AH, p. 127.
98 Al-IChateab, Muhammad, Al-Igna'a, Vol. II, Matabe'a al-Sha'b, Cairo, 1966, p. 247.
99 Abu Yusuf, Y'aqub Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Habib, d41-Kharcy, Al-Matba'ah al-Salafyah, Cairo, p. 123.
100 Al-Tabari, Mohamad Ibn Jarear, Ikhttlaf al-Fogaha ', Leiden, 1933, p.232.
101 AI-Bayhaqi, Ahmed Ibn Al-Hussein, AI-Sunan al-Kobra. Vol. IV, Dar	 Beirut, 1994, p. p. 205.
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Imam al-Shafei'i explained this verse as referring to the domination Hulan of
Islam, which the Dhimmis were under. On the authority of this passage, he demanded
a very humiliating method of paying Jizyah, and that Dhimmis are obliged by the
provisions of Islam, subjected to Islam and to the sovereignty of the Islamic State.102
When examining jurists explanation of the motives for paying Jizyah, their
consensus is replaced by differences of view. Ibn al-Qayyim argued that,
Since Dhimmah requires non-Muslims to pay Jizyah, these
agreements were meant to punish the non-believers. This opinion
reflects the prevailing tense relationship between Muslims and
others. 1°3
A. AbuSulayman has explained Ibn al-Qayyim's position on three grounds. These
are:
1) The cumulative effect of centuries of tension in communal
relationships within the Muslims territories;
2) The effects of the Mongol and Crusaders invasions;
3) The general confusion in understanding the theoretical bases of
Islam. 1°4
However, AbuSulayman's explanation does not provide the real meaning of Ibn al-
Qayyim' s position. This is because the differences among the Muslim jurists, Ibn al-
Qayyim is one of them, are not related to AbuSulayman'3 grounds. They basically
belong to Tjtihad in explaining Islamic rules and judgements according to the Holy
Our 'anic texts and the Prophet's Hadiths.* Religious verdicts were usually not
subjected to the effects of invasions, cumulative effect of centuries of tension in
communal relationships, or conflicts and enmity among Muslims and others. That is
because the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims is governed by Islamic
principles, and not by historical events. Khalid Ishaque, for instance, argues that,
102 Al-Shaferi, Muhammad A., Al-Urnm, Vol. IV, Al Matba'ah al-'Amereyah, Cairo, 1322 All, p.223.
MAbuSulayman, AbdulHanild A., Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations, HOIT, Herndon, 1994, P. 28.
104 Ibid., pp 28-29.
See the causes of disagreement among Muslim jurists in chapter II, 2.5.
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Some early personalities have acquired a dominant position in
Islamic studies such that their decisions or views, even though
their time frame has changed, are held to be sacrosanct, and
anyone suggesting a change is charged with blasphemy.105
Islam paid serious attention to the Dhimmis and concerned itself with their affairs.
Dhimmis had a kind of social security against infirmity, sickness and indigence. An
example of which is mentioned in the treaty between the Muslim commander, Khalid
Ibn al-Walead, and the Christians of Iraq,
Old people who are unable to work, the sick and poor people
who are supported by their families will be exempted from paying
Jizyah, and they will be financially supported by the Muslims as
long as they live in the Dar al-Islam. 1°6
f) Sharing the Islamic Military forces. If Dhimmis serve in the Islamic armed
forces or give aid, such as military or logistical support to the Islamic military forces,
they will be automatically exempted from paying Jizyah. For example, that the
Muslim commander Habib Ibn Musallama al-Fohry invaded "al-Garagouma". Its
people asked him for protection in return for their help and support for the Muslims in
the mountain of "al-Luckam". They pledged help to Muslims in their wars, but did not
get the spoils of war from the defeated enemy of the Muslims.m7
g) Exemption by the Imam. Jizyah is tax similar to any other tax and can be waived
whenever it is deemed necessary. In the history of the Islam they are many rulers who
have abolished payment of Jizyah by Dhimmis. The Prophet Muhammad himself
expressed the wish to exempt all the Copts from paying Jizyah; when his son Ibrahim,
by his Coptic wife Mariah, died. The Prophet is reported to have said,
Had Ibrahim survived, I would have exempted all the Copts from
paying the Jizyah.108
Had the Jizyah been obligatory in all circumstances on Dhimrnis, the Prophet
would have never expressed his desire of exempting the Copts. From this it may be
105 Khalid Ishaque, Problems of Islamic Political Theory, in Mumtaz Ahmad, State Politics and Islam, American Trust
Publications, Indianapolis, 1986, p. 25.
106 Al-Badawi, Ism'ael, Ikhtisasat al-Sultah al-Tanfithiyah fi al-Dawlah
	 yah, 1' Edit., Cairo, 1977, p.183.
107 Al-Beladhuri, Ahmed Dm Yahya, Futuh al-Buldan, Maktabat al-Nandha al-Masriyah, Cairo, 1951, p. 164.
108 Ibn Sa'ad, Muhammad, Ketab al-Tabagat al-Kubrah, Vol. I, Dar Beirut, Beirut, 1980, p. 144.
192
Chapter IV
concluded that permanent reconciliation on the basis of Jizyah or not is possible
according to interests, needs and the traditions followed by the Islamic State.
4.4.2) The Land Tax al-Kharaj
The word Kharaj is derived through the Persian from Aramaic halak as used in the
Persian Empire. It originally meant tribute in a general sense to which unbelievers in
Muslim lands were liable. 109 Some Muslim jurists, particularly Imam Abu Hanifah,
therefore, used the term Kharaj as a synonym for Jizyah. m However, the remainder
of Muslim jurists used it to denote the land tax which Dhimmis have to pay to the
Islamic authority. 111 Jurist al-Jasas in his work Ahkam al-Qur 'an defined Kharaj as
follows,
It is a compulsory financial payment by the Dhimmi for his
land. 112
It should be noted that in the Shari 'ah there is a sort of territory called the tithe
lands al-Ardh al-Ashreah. This land belongs to people who embrace Islam without
prior suppression or defeat in war, and were not subject to taxation before the
appearance of Islam. The land of Madinah is an example of such a territory, owned by
genuine landlords, Arabs or non-Arabs. Such lands are not subject to the tax of
Kharaj . The only tax that should be paid is the Zakah, that is, a tithe or 1/2 tithe."3
Legislation and the organisation of the collection of Kharaj occurred during the
time of the Caliph Umar I. It is of two kinds:
1) The land's product Kharaj. It is imposed on the land according to its area and
agricultural products. Caliph Umar I legislated that on each arable or cultivated
1139 Gibb, H. A. R. & H. Kramers, Short Encyclopedia Of Islam, E. J. Bill, Leiden, 1974, p. 245.
110 Abu Yusuf, Y'aqub Ilm Ibrahim Ibn Habib, Al-Kharaj, Al-Matba'ah al-Salafyah, Cairo, p.132.
111 Ibn Hamam, Kamal Al Dean, Fath al-Qadear, Sharh al-Hedayah ii al-Marghalam, Vol. IV, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo,
1356 AH, p.367.
112 Al- Jasas, Abu Bakr Ahmed Ibn All 	 Ahkam al-Qur'an, Vol. III, Matba'at al-Awqaf al-Islamiyyah,
masatanah, 1335 AH, p. 430.
113 Abu Yusuf, Y'aqub Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Habib, Al-Kharaj, Al-Matba'ah al-Salafyah, Cairo, pp. 144-145.
193
Chapter IV
land the tax should be levied on every Kafeas and on each Gareab.* The amount
was a Dirham on each cultivatable piece of land, and five Dirhams on a Gareab
of vegetables, ten Dirhams for the Gareab of grapes. H4 However, the Hanafites,
the Hanbalites, and the Shafei'ites stipulated the utilisation of the land as the
decisive factor. Thus, cultivatable land requires that the landlord pays the
Kharaj even though he may not have planted it. 115 Such Kharaj has to be paid
annually and if the product of the land fails for some reason Kharaj has to be
cancelled for that year.116
2) The Estimated Kharaj. Under this sort of Kharaj the payment due differs
from one land to another. The Hanbalites and the Shafei'ites agreed that this is
the decision of the Imam or who ever is empowered to raise or lower the
Kharaj. It is not necessary to follow the amount imposed by Caliph Umar 1.117
The Hanafites, on the other hand, agreed that Imam can lower the Kharaj but
insisted he could not raise it." In support of the first view, it should be noted
that Kharaj payments did vary from time to time and the authoritative
observation of Abu Yusuf suggests that Caliph Umar I intended this outcome,
When Caliph Umar legislated the Kharaj, he did not say, "this
Kharaj is determined forever and also who has to pay it." [Nor
did he say] "it is not permissible either for me or for the Caliphs
after me to lower or raise its sum. "119
Muslim jurists stipulated the factors which a collector of the Kharaj has to take
into account when estimating the tax on any land. They are: the area of land, its
products and their values, its remoteness from cities, and its productivity.I20
* The Gareab is an old Islamic cadastral measure, each Gareab equals 1366.0416 cm. The Kafeas is an old Islamic scale of
weight, each Kafeas equals 2.751 kg. See Al-Rayis, Muhammad Dhiy' al-Dean,A1-Kharaj fi al-Dawlah al-Islatniyyah,l'
Edit., Matba'at Nandhat Masr, Cairo, 1957, p. 277-279 & 302-305.
114 AI-Sarkhasi, Muhammad Ibis Ahmed, Al-Mabsut, Vol. X, Matba'at al-Sa' adah, Cairo, 1931, p.79.
115 Al-Bahrawi, AbdulRahman al-Hanafi & Others, AI-Fatawa al-Hindiyah, Vol. II, Al-Matba'ah al-Ameriyyah, Bulaq,
1310 AH, p.237. & AI-Mawardi, Ali Muhammad, AI-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah wa al-Welayat al-Denyah, Dar al-Ketab al-Arabi,
Beirut, 1990, p. 154. & Abu Y'ali, Muhammad Ibis al-Hussein al-Far'a,A1-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1994,
p. 151
116 AI-Sarkhasi, Muhammad Ibn Ahmed, Al-Mabsza, Vol. X, Matba'at al-Sa'adah, Cairo, 1931, pp. 82-83.
117 Ibn Al-Najar, TaquIDean Muhammad Ibn Ahmed, Montaha al-lradat, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, p.734.
118 Al-Bahrawl, AbdulRahman al-Hanafi & Others, Al-Fatawa al-Hindiyah, Al-Matba'ah al-Ameriyyah, Bulaq, 1310 AH,
pp. 238-239.
119 Abu Yusuf, Y'aqub Ibis Ibrahim Ibn Habib, Al-Kharaj, Al-Matba'ah al-Salafyah, Cairo, p. 84.
120 Al-Mawardi, AD Muhammad, Al-Ahkatn al-Sultaniyah wa al-Welayat al-Denyah, Dar al-Ketab al-Arabi, Beirut, 1990,
pp. 143-144. & Abu	 Muhammad Ibis al-Hussein al-Far' a, Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1994, pp.
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Accordingly, the Hanafites, the Hanbalites and the Shafei'ites such Kharaj has to be
collected on every seasonal crop and cancelled if the land has not been planted.
However, if the landlord has failed to plant it due to personal incapacity, the Hanafites
agreed that the Imam has to take the land and collect the Kharaj by either: (i) selling
the land; (ii) financing its planting; (iii) renting it to others who will plant it. However,
the Shafei'ites and the Hanbalites insisted that the Imam has to enforce the landlord to
either rent the land or sell it. Abu Yusuf saw that the landlord had to be supported by
the Islamic authority to be able to work and plant his land. 121
Regarding the lands that have to be subjected to Kharaj, jurists divided as
follows: 122
1) Those which are conquered by force. Ibn Sallam in his book Al-Amwal noted
that the Caliph Umar I refiised to exempt a Dhimrni of Iraq who embraced
Islam from paying the Kharaj because his land was conquered by force. 123
2) Those which formed part of a treaty between their owners and the Muslims.
They are of two sorts:
a) Where reconciliation through treaty provides that the land
should be used for the benefits of Muslims, it is permitted by
the Imam for them to continue their ownership and pay the
tax. This land is subject to a levy which is determined forever
and does not end if the owners adopt Islam, or if they are
evacuated and replaced by other Dhimmis. These lands cannot
be sold as they are consecrated. Those who live in them
should pay alms therefore.
b) If polytheists conclude a treaty of reconciliation with the
Muslims, their land will continue to be owned by them as long
as they are non-Muslims and continue to pay Kharaj, which in
this context is similar to Jizyah. If they become Muslims the
tax is no longer paid and as Muslims they have to practice all
150-151 & Ibn Hamam, Kamal Al Dean, Fath al-Qadear, Sharh al-Hedayah Ii al-Marghalaru, Vol. IV, Matba'at Mustafa al-
Halabi, Cairo, 1356 AH, p.363.
121 Ibn Abdin, Muhammad Amin, Rad al-Mukhtar ala al-Dur al-Mukhtar, VoL III, Al-Matba'ah al-Ameriyyah, 1326 Ali,
pp. 364-365.
122 Al-Marghitani, All Ibn Abu Bahr, A1-1-ledayah, Sharh Bidayat al-Mubtade', Vol. IV, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1956,
p. 359. & Al-Kasani, Abu Bahr Ibn Mas'aud, Bada'ea al-Sanay'a fi Tarteab al-Sharay'a, Vol. H, Sharekat al-Matbou'at al-
`Alamyah, 1327 AH, p. 54-58.
123 Ibn Sallam, Abu `Ubayd al-Qasim,A1-ilinwal, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1975, p. 87.
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disposals according to Shari 'ah such as sale, mortgage and
gifts.
3) Those lands which are taken without fighting to become a part of Dar
al-Islam. Dhimmis give life to this fallow land.
4) Those tithe lands owned by Dhimmis.
Lastly, unlike Jizyah, Kharaj does not end on the lands conquered by force even if
the Dhimmi embraced Islam. The Hanafites assumed that Kharaj is a financial tax
imposed on the land which can be regarded as a rent, consequently the tenant has to
pay it regardless of his religion. However, the Shafei'ites and the Malikites differed
with the Hanafites, in their assumption that Kharaj is similar to the Jizyah in that if a
disbeliever embraces Islam he will be exempted from paying the latter and therefore
he is no longer required to pay the former tax, Kharaj.124
4.4.3) The Commercial Tax 'Us/tar
Dhimmis are obliged to pay a tax on any commercial transactions, known in the
Shari 'ah as the tithe Vushur*. It was legislated by Ijma' during the time of the Caliph
Umar 1 . 125 Vshur was imposed only upon the money Dhimmis transferred for
commercial purposes within Dar al-Islam. The sum is 1/2 tithe. Muslims also have to
pay this tax but for them it is called Zakah, and the amount is 1/4 tithe 2.5%.
Musta 'mins pay a tithe on whatever they bring into Dar al-Islam. 126 Jurists disputed
the minimum quantity required to be tithed. The Hanbalites stipulated twenty Dinars
or more to be tithed whereas the Malikites and the Hanbalites did not stipulate a
minimum quantity but stated a 1/2 tithe must be paid on any amount.127
Muslim jurists differed over the tithing of Dhhninis. Two trends can be seen:
124 Al-Mavvardi, All Muhammad, Al-Ahkam al-Sultamyah wa al-Welayat al-Denyah, Dar al-Ketab al-Arabi, Beirut, 1990,
p. 265.
* In English tithe means 1/10. However, in Shari 'ah the sum could be differ according to the financial transaction.
125 Al-Sarkhasi, Muhammad Ibn Aluned,A1-Mabsut, Vol. II, Matba'at al-Sa'adah, Cairo, 1931, P. 199.
126 Ibn Sallam, Abu `Ubayd al-Qasim,A1-Amwal, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1975, P. 533 & Al-Kasanl, Abu Bakr Ibn Mas'aud,
Bada'ea al-Sanay'a fi Tarteab al-Sharay'a, Vol. II, Sharekat al-Matbou'at aPAlamyah, 1327 AH, p35 & Ibn Qudamah,
Abdulah Ibn Ahmed, AI-Mughnt, Vol. VIII, Matba'at al-Manar, 1348 All, p. 518.
127 Ibn Qudamah, Abdulah Din Ahmed, Al-Mughm, Vol. VIII, Matba'at al-Manar, 1348 AH, 519 & Ibn Sallam, Abu
`Ubayd	 AI-Amwal, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1975, pp. 535-536.
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1) Jurists of the Hanafites, the Malikites, and the Hanbalites considered that the
tithe was imposed upon the Dhimmis from the earliest days of Islam. They based this
view on two pieces of evidence. The first was the Prophetic Hadith No tithe on
Muslims, but it is on the Jews and Christians." 128 The second piece of evidence was
the command of Caliph Umar I to Imam Anas Ibn Malik to collect 1/4 tithe from
Muslim and 1/2 tithe from Dhirnmi and a tithe from Harbi .129
2) The Shafei'ites maintained that no tithe has to be collect from the Dhiminis
unless there is a reconciliation between them and the Islamic State. 130 This was
confirmed by the words of al-Shawkani,
What is imposed on Jews and Christians [the People of the Book]
under conciliation treaties is to pay Jizyah or tithes and nothing
else.131
Jurists, moreover, differed over tithing of forbidden goods (under Islam) such as
wine and pork. The Hanafites and the Malikites agreed to tithing wine and pork if it
was traded. The Hanbalites and the Shafei'ites did not permit tithing of such items. 132
4.5) Summary and conclusion
The conclusion of this chapter relate to permanent or temporary non-Muslim
residents in the Islamic State, which are matters of Islamic international relations.
That is why, in both cases, their relationship with the Islamic State is regulated by a
treaty.
Permanent non-Muslim residents (Dhimmis) are full citizens of the Islamic State
and the treaty which governs their relations with the Muslim citizens is a permanent
one. Its principal feature was reciprocity by which the Dhimmis receive protection
128 Al-Shawkani, Muhammad Ali, Nail al-AIM:1r, Vol. IX, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1952, p. 237.
129 Al-Shaybani, Muhammad Ibn Al-Hassan, Al-Siyar al-Kabear, Vol. V, Al-Dar al-Mutahedah Ii al-Nashr, Beirut, 1975,
p. 2134 & Ibn Sallam, Abu '11bayd al-Qasim,Al-Atnival, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1975, p. 410 & Ibn Qudamah, Abdulah Ibn
Ahmed, Al-Mughni, Vol. IX, Matba'at al-Manar, 1348 Ail, p. 340.
130 Al-Ithateab, Muhammad, Mughni al-Muhtaj ila Ma'arefat Ma'ani al-Path al-Minhaj, Vol. IV, Matba'at al-Halabi,
Cairo, 1958, p. 247.
131 AI-Shawkani, Muhammad Ali, Nail al-Awtar, Vol. IX, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1952, pp. 238-239.
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from the Islamic State in return for the payment of a poll tax (Jizyah). All terms,
conditions and obligations of the treaty must be written and are concluded between
the Islamic State and a non-Muslim political entity such as a state, city, tribe or group
of people.
The Dhirnmah treaty has two very important consequences. The first of these is
that it can terminate an existing war and end the hostile relations between the Muslims
and the non-Muslims when they become Dhimmis. A second important effect of the
Dhimma treaty is that Dhirnmis become citizens of the Islamic State through the treaty
and their permanent residence therein. Therefore, Muslim jurists affirmed and insisted
that the Imam, his deputy or the Imam's representative must conclude this treaty; it is
void treaty if someone other than those mentioned previously concludes it.
Since the relations between the Islamic State and its non-Muslim citizen/residents
is a contractual one, the treaty is terminated if its terms are not fulfilled. In addition to
non-payment of Jizyah the Dhimma treaty becomes void if the Dhimmis performed
any one of the following actions:
II) Reviling or showing any disrespect to the Holy Qur 'an;
2) Insulting the Prophet of Islam;
3) Attacking the religion of Islam;
4) Injuring the life or the property of a Muslim. Nor should they
abjure his belief or induce him to apostatise;
5) Marrying Muslim women or entering into sexual connection with
them;
6) Co-operating with the enemy, such as disclosing secrets of the
Muslims to the enemy or passing on intelligence to the enemy.
For its part, the Islamic State must provide its non-Muslim citizens with full
protection, freedom to practise their religion and treat them like Muslim citizens
132 Al-Margliitanl, All Ibn Abu Bakr,Al-Hedayah, Sharh Bidayat al-Mubtade', Vol. I, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1956, p.
535 & Al-Kasani, Abu Bakr Ibn Mas'aud, Bada 'ea al-Sanay'a fi Tarteab al-Sharay'a, Vol. II, Sharekat al-Matbou'at al-
`Alamyah, 1327 AH, p. 38, & Al-Bahuti, Manson' . Ibn Uonis, Kashaf al-Qma ', Vol. I, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1982, p. 727.
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except that it exempts them from the duty of Jihad, otherwise it voids its treaty with
this group.
Musta'mins are temporary non-Muslim residents in the Islamic State and their
relationship is regulated by a temporary treaty — written or unwritten - with that state.
By it the Islamic State provides a Musta'mM with protection (A man) covering the
period of his temporary residency. Unlike the Dhimma treaty, which is between the
Islamic State and a group, the treaty of Aman is between the Islamic State and a non-
Muslim individual. Originally Aman was given by a Muslim individual to a non-
Muslim, as the Prophet's daughter gave to her non-Muslim husband, but in a later
development Aman was given by the Islamic State exclusively. It can be terminated if
a Musta'min leaves the Islamic State, or the duration of Aman expires, or if
Musta'min has concealed a harmful purpose or his presence in the Islamic State is
harmful to Muslim interests.
Finally, an important conclusion of this chapter is that Muslim jurists treated Aman
as a treaty or contract because it was a pledge of protection to a Harbi and pledges
had the status of covenants, treaties or contracts in classical Figh. It was noted
however that Alvan did not count as a treaty in international law, because treaties can
only be made by parties which are formally equal and where there is a reciprocity in
the terms of the agreement. In the Shari'ah, the legal status of Muslims is not equal to
that of non-Muslims because of the importance it attaches to the distinction between
belief and unbelief. Secondly, where only one side benefits, as is the case in Aman (a
Musta'min receives protection from the Islamic State) while the other party, the
Islamic State, receives no tax (unless he is involved in commerce) or other benefit
from the Musta'mM, then the arrangement lacks the element of reciprocity essential to
a contract or treaty in international law. Consequently, Aman as a pledge of protection
to temporary non-Muslim residents of the Islamic State does not count as a treaty in
international law, though in Islamic international law it is a clear example of a
temporary treaty with non-Muslims.
This chapter has examined two special kinds of treaty, Dhimma and Aman. In the
next chapter the general features of all treaties will be examined in addition to the
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special features of treaties of friendship and commodities exchange, the truce treaty,
and finally the conciliation treaty.
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5.1) Introduction
Over the laws of treaty, the Shari 'ah and modern international law meet and differ
in some aspects. In the Shari 'ah treaties are classified according to the nature of
relations between the parties, while the subject matter of a treaty is not considered.
Therefore, in the Shari 'ah there are only two kinds of treaties, whatever their subject,
(i) permanent treaty; (ii) temporary treaty.' A second feature of Islamic treaties is that
the parties are always non-Muslims and the Islamic State. By contrast in international
law several distinctions are drawn between treaties and, of course, the parties are not
normally identified by religion.
In international law a treaty obtains its character according to its subject matter.
Therefore there are various kinds of treaty such as commercial, military and trade
treaties. Treaties in international law present a great variety of other aspects according
to their elaboration, interpretation, modification, effects, violation and so forth, all of
which call for a specific analysis. Paul Reuter holds that the basic means of classifying
treaties in international law is numeral, that is, by the number of the parties. This means
treaties can be classified under two categories, either: bilateral or multilatera1. 2 Ali Abu
Haif added another method to categorise treaties according to their duration, therefore
they are either a temporary treaty or a permanent treaty.' Aziz Muhammad suggested
another categorisation of treaties linked to their theme. He divided treaties into two
kinds (i) Contractual treaties, which aims to achieve legal results among the concluding
parties. Examples of such treaties are coalitions, trade treaties, joint defence and
friendship treaties. (ii) Legislated treaties, which include general rules regulating the
parties. An example of such treaty is the United Nations Charter.4
The purpose of this chapter is to analysis the Shari 'ah's rules regarding treaties,
including when they are lawful and when they are forbidden, who has the authority to
make treaties, and how treaties are formed, revoked or abrogated. Where it is relevant
1 Abu Half, All Sadiq, Public International Law, 12 th Edit., Knowledge Foundation House, Alexandria, 1972, pp. 526-627.
2 Reuter, Paul, Introduction to the Law of Treaties, Pinter Publishers, London, 1989, pp. 27-28.
3 Abu Half, All Sadiq, Public International Law, 12th Edit., Knowledge Foundation House, Alexandria, 1972, p. 526.
4 Muhammad, Aziz Shokry, An Introduction To Public International Law, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1973, pp. 376-377.
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and illuminating, comparisons will be made with the counterpart provision or rule in
international law. In this chapter four kinds of treaties will be analysed: treaties of
friendship, truce, conciliation, extradition. In the previous chapter (IV) the (temporary)
Aman and (permanent) 'Ahd al-Dhimma convention were extensively examined, both
of which are traditionally classified as treaties. It was found that Aman did not qualify
as a treaty in international law because of the absence of reciprocity, though in classical
Figh it is treated as a legal covenant. On the other hand, the `Ahd al-Dhimma was
found to count as a genuine treaty international law in addition to one in Islamic law
since the payment of Jizyah in return for protection by the Islamic State secured the
necessary element of reciprocity. Neither Aman nor `Ahd al-Dhimma will be re-
examined further in this chapter therefore. Finally, two important kinds of treaty are
omitted from this chapter because of the extensive literature involved and their
fundamental importance in the context of this thesis. These are treaties of neutrality
and alliance, and they will be analysed in the two following chapters.
5.2) Definitions of treaty
In Arabic a treaty is a pledge (4). Several things may be pledged, for example, to
safeguard and protect person/s; anything sworn on oath such as "I swear to God, I will
. . ." or promised in such a way as to create a binding obligation, such as a guarantee; a
mutual pledge or covenant/contract . Pledges may also be of allegiance, such as those
in the letters sent to the Imam by local Muslim governors in the Islamic Empire to
stress the justice and equity of their administration and their fidelity to the ruler of the
Islamic State, the Imam 5 (Only where there are mutual pledges by the two parties will
a contact or treaty exist in international law. Thus the meaning of treaty in Arabic is
much wider than in contemporary international law).
Closely related to the term pledge is the word vow (L11) which has four meanings:
pledge, accord, swearing an oath, and kinship. Arabic scholars have differed in defining
vow, some defined it as an oath; where others see that it is a pledge and protection
since there is some difference between the two terms. Still others understand vow as
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one of God' names to whom is ascribed all perfection and majesty. 6 However, the
words vow, pledge, covenant and oath are linguistically different, but they can be used
to convey the same meaning with some specific explanation.7
Pledge, it has been noted above, may be mutual as well as unilateral. Whenever two
persons or two groups agree upon, or commit themselves, to fulfilling an agreement
for their mutual benefit and if they confirmed and documented it in a way that would
ensure care, commitment, and fulfilment, then it is called a "covenant." In the Arabic
language, the term "covenant" is derived from the word "rope" or "binding cord." If
they (i.e. the two parties) stress their pledge by swearing, then it called an "oath."
Clearly, then, using vow as pledge is the general meaning of the term. In the Arabic
language, moreover, the denotation of swearing is derived from the word meaning
"oath" and hence is called the Covenant of Allah.8
The term treaty did not appear in early Islam, either in the text of the Holy Qur'an
or in the Hadiths. Closely connected terms like agreement and contract are not present
either. The terms pact and pledge as synonyms for treaty first appear in the Figh
literature of the Islamic jurists. They also used the term safeguard Aman instead of the
word treaty. The jurists agreed that the treaty of fundamental importance was that of
reconciliation between Muslims and non-Muslims. For example, Jurist al-Kasani
defined treaty as reconciliation,
Reconciliation is a treaty for peacemaking and ending fighting.
When we say that two groups have reconciled, it means that they
pledged not to fight each other.9
Al-Asfahani characterised a treaty as that which organises the relations of the non-
Muslims with the Islamic State,
5 AI-Bostani, Karam & Others, Al-Monged fi al-Loughah al-Arabiyah, Dar Al-Shoroug, Beirut, p. 535.
6 Ibn Kathear, Emad Al-Dean Ism'ael, Tafsear al-Qur'an al-Atheam, Vol. IV, Dar Ehya'a Al-Kotoub al-Arabiah, Cairo,
1932, p. 120.
7 Al Zohaily Wahbah, Athar al-Harb fi	 al-Islam!, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1981, p. 345.
8 Ridha, Muhanunad Rashead, Tafsear al-Manar, Vol. V, Matba'at al-Manar, Cairo, p. 185.
9 Al-Kasanl, Abu Bake Ibn Mas'aud, Bada'ea al-SanayajI Tarteab al-Sharay'a, VoL IX, Sharekat al-Matbou'at al-`Alamyah,
1327 AH, p. 3424.
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It is connected with a disbeliever who enters [Dar al] Islam for
protection or whoever has [made] pledges with Muslims.10
Reconciliation is also central to al-Mawardi's conception of treaty which is defined
as the agreement between the Islamic State and non-Muslims for a cease-fire,
It is the case when Harbis [are] reconciled to stop fighting for
more than ten years . . . It is peace and reconciliation upon a
pledge to forbid fighting and strife"."
In the light of this discussion, the meaning of a treaty in Islamic Figh is: "A legally
binding agreement between two parties with a full commitment to keep the provisions
of the agreement, especially reconciliation, truce or peace-keeping between Muslims
and polytheists, which is based upon mutual pledges. 12
 It will be shown later in this
chapter that these pledges are normally written in a treaty document.
Finally, under the Shariah treaties between the Islamic State and non-Muslim
states or political/religious groups are no different from contracts made between
individuals. The public character of treaties in Western theory and the private nature of
contracts is absent from classical Figh in which the public/private distinction is not
made. As Hamed Sultan has pointed out every part of the Shari 'ah treats individuals
and groups (including states) at the same level because every part comes from the
same source. For this reason also the Shari'ah does not distinguish external from
internal spheres, according to Sultan. It organises them equally.13
The Islamic conception of treaty may be usefully contrasted with the idea of treaty
in international law. First, in international law a treaty always involves mutual pledges
between the parties to it.* L. Oppenheim has defined international treaty as,
10 Al-Asfahani, al-Ragheb,Mufrodat al-Qur'an al-Kaream, Al-Matba'ah al-Mayrnartlyyah, Cairo, 1324, p. 100.
11 Al-Mawardi, All Muhanunad,Al-Hawi al-Kabm, Vol. XIX, Matba'at al-Azhar, Cairo, p. 113,203.
12 Al-Sarkhast, Muhammad Ibn Ahmed, Sharh al-Siyar al-Kabir, Vol. IV, Hyderabad, 1335 AH. p. 154.
13 Sultan, flamed, Ahkam al-Qanoun al-Dowah fi al-Shari 'ah al-Islamiyyah, Dar al-Nandha, Cairo, 1970, pp. 206-207.
* Paul Reuter has noted the considerable variations between the terms used in the International Law of treaties when he said "The
meaning of most of the terms used in the modem law of treaties is extremely variable, changing from country to country and from
Constitution to another, and it could even be said to vary from treaty to treaty: each treaty is, as it were, a microcosm laying down in
its final clauses the law of its own terms." This observation has been neglected in the brief account of treaties in International Law for
reasons of space and because it might be thought to be an exaggeration of the differences.
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A pledge or a concluded contract between two states or more
regarding various affairs taken by concerned parties."
However, in the eight edition of his book International Law Oppenheim redefines
the international treaty as follows,
International treaties are any convention that has a contractual
nature between States, or organisations of States, creating legal
rights and obligations between the parties."
In other words, a treaty in international law has a narrower meaning than in Islam
where any single pledge is treated as a treaty. All Abu Haif, for instance, has pioneered
a method to explain this approach,
The point behind the opinions given by most of the western
scholars is that the term "treaty" should be given to the
important international conventions which have political concern
as political conventions and it is changed to "convention" or
"accord" according to the importance of reconciliation and
coalition or like. What is concluded by states away from political
affairs has no practical results. It is customary to use the term
treaty or convention as two synonyms."
International law like the Shari'ah, conceives that treaties will normally take a
written form. For example, Lord McNair has defined a treaty as,
A written agreement by which two or more States or international
organizations create or intent to create a relation between
themselves operating which the sphere of international law.
Expression of concurring wills attributable to two or more
subjects of international law and intended to have legal effects
under the rules of international law."
And in the Vienna Convention of 1969 treaty is defined as follows,
An international convention agreement concluded between States
in written form and governed by international law, whatever
14 .Oppenheim, Lauterpacht Hersch, International Law, D. Mckay, New York, 1952-1955, p. 877.
15 Jennings, Robert & Watts, Arthur, Oppenhenn's International Law, Vol. I, 9th Edit., Longman, London, 1992, p. 1199.
16 Abu Half, All Sadiq, Public International Law, 12" Edit., Knowledge Foundation House, Alexandria, 1972, p. 527.
17 Reuter, Paul, Introduction to the Law of Treaties, Pinter Publishers, London, 1989, p. 23.
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embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments and whatever its particular designation."
The Vienna Convention concerns only the written conventions between the states
regardless the form and the title, and it excluded the verbal agreements. In figure (g) of
article 2 of the Vienna Convention,
'Party' means a State that has consented to be bound by the
treaty and for which the treaty is in force.
Article 2 introduces a further difference between treaties in the international law and
the Shari 'ah. In international law, as it makes clear, the parties to a treaty must be
states. By contrast, in the Shari 'ah one party to a treaty is the Islamic State but the
other party may be either a Harbi state, a Harbi group such as a tribe, or a non-
Muslim individual person. In particular, there is no counterpart in international law to
the so-called "safeguard covenant" (Aman) or to the Dhimma treaty between the
Islamic State and a non-Muslim group of citizens, by which they acquire their
citizenship of the Islamic State. Not only is there this difference in the conception of
parties to a treaty, but also the Islamic treaty is always between a Muslim party and
non-Muslims. This crucial feature of treaties arises from the fact that they form part of
Islamic law and embody religious concepts. In international law this religious
difference in the parties is not an element of a treaty, nor do religious concepts form
the context and, to some extent, the content, of international law treaties.
5.3) Incentive of treaties
There are different motives for concluding treaties according to the goal being
pursued. Under the Islamic law, treaties have to fulfil the nation's welfare, spread
justice and prevent insecurity, conflict and bloodshed. Islam approves treaties that pay
regard to justice and equity, and offer support. 19
 Apart from these motives, two other
incentives to conclude treaties under the Shari 'ah are also of special importance:
18 Jennings, Robert & Watts, Arthur, Oppenheitn's International Law, VoL I, 9th Edit., Longman, London, 1992, p. 1199.
19 Al-Deak, Malunoud Ibraheam, Al-Mu 'ahadat fi al-Shari 'ah al-Islatniyyah was al-Qanoun al-Dowali al- 'Aatn, Matabe'a al-
Bayan, Dubai, 1984, p. 106.
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1) To block or to ward off an anticipated danger or avoid a probable distress. In
such conditions of necessity, such as an avoidable danger to the Ummah, the Imam can
and should take the initiative and conclude a treaty to avert the danger. An example of
such treaty was the one concluded by Prophet Muhammad with the Jewish tribes of
Madinah, when he arrived at that city, in order to ensure their hostility was avoided
and that they refrained from attacking the new Islamic State.2°
2) For the benefit and to the advantage of the Ummah. The motive of such treaty
could be the wishes of Muslims for their enemy to adopt Islam, to submit to Islam's
power or, if Muslims are not strong enough to face the enemy in battle, to originate a
cease-fire. 21
 An example of this was the Prophet's treaty of Hudaybia. Al-Marghastani
of the Hanafites argued that a treaty which reconciled their enemy to the Muslim state
was to the advantage of Muslims and he characterised it as a kind of non-military
Jihad that replaces the armed conflict,
If reconciliation with the enemy is to the advantage of Muslims,
it [the treaty] becomes a significant Jihad, as long as it keeps
Muslims safe and avoids evil. If the treaty is not for the common
advantage of the Muslims it will not be a significant image of
Jihad, especially when there is no specific time of
reconciliation. 22
Continual benefit to the Ummah was not an essential element during the period
when a treaty was in force, however. The existence of the pledge made the treaty
unconditional and performance of the treaty by Muslims was not conditional on its
continuing advantages to them,
It is not necessary to keep the motive of interest [of the Ummah]
during the treaty period, because this opinion contradicts the
most important principle of Islam which is keeping the
commitment. According to the Prophet Muhammad's Hadith:
Pledge is faithfulness not perfidy.23
20 Lings, Martin, Muhammad, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, p1983, pp. 125-130.
21 AI-Deak, Malunoud Ibraheam, Al-Mu 'ahadat fi al-Shan 'ah al-Islamiyyah was al-Qanoun al-Dowah al- 'Aam. Matabe'a al-
Bayan, Dubai, 1984, pp. 106-107.
22 Lings, Martin,Muhammad, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, p1983, pp. 125-130.
23 Al-Marghastatui, All Ibn Abu Bakr, Al-Hedayah fi al-Mobtada', Vol. II, Matba'at Al-Halabi, Cairo, p. 138.
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In summary, Islam allows many incentives for making treaties according to the
legitimate purposes they serve. They should all be concluded for the common benefit
of Muslims, by for example, promoting public utility, removing harm, easing a mission
or spiteing an enemy. They must be based on the terms of Shari 'ah and according to
what the Imam and his advisors decide is for the welfare of Muslims.
It may be useful to compare the Islamic point of view on the goals and motives for
making treaties with those of international law. It agrees with the Shari 'ah that treaties
have a huge variety of goals - political, social, military, economic, legislative,
permanent or temporary and so on - and consequently of motives for making them.
According to the Vienna Convention the purpose of treaties may be any of the
following:
1) Reconciliation between conflicting states;
2) Exchanging various benefits and utilities;
3) Military treaties as "joint defense treaties" between states;
4) Promotion of social and cultural matters;
5) Organizing navigation among states;
6) Changing borders of the state territories;
7) Protecting general sovereignty rights, citizens' rights, residence, and
others.
These goals and the corresponding motives for making a treaty in international law
are also legitimate purposes and hence valid motives under the Shari 'ah .24
However, they differ over the rules that validate them, those of the Shari 'ah or
international law. A treaty concluded by a Muslim with a non-Muslim must be subject
to the Shari 'ah and fulfil its requirements if it is to be valid. It is not invalidated if it
conflicts with international law. A treaty concluded under international law, whoever
are the parties, must comply with, and not contradict, the rules of international law. If
24 Al-Meheari, Sneed Abdullah, AI-Alm/at al-Kharejiyah Ii al-Dawla al-Islamiyyah, Muasasat al-Resalah, Beirut, 1995, pp.
192-194.
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a treaty conflicts with the Shari'ah it is not thereby invalidated from this international
(secular) legal point of view"
5.4) Legitimate prerequisites for concluding treaties
In Islam, each treaty has to satisfy specific conditions to be legitimate and binding.
These conditions have to be harmonise with the instructions of the Shari'ah and
achieve common-good for both concluded parties. Thus, treaties which are not based
on proper principles, rightness, justice, settle disputes or bridge any differences, cannot
bring any welfare to the concluding parties and sound rules are liable to corruption and
disrespect. Therefore, according to the Shari 'ah those treaties will result in the desired
objectives and assure the nation stability, established prerequisites consist of the
following categories:
5.4.1) The authority
According to the Shari 'ah, the Imam is the supreme leader of the Ummah or who
ever the Imam appoints as his deputy. As Islam considers the nation policy to be
legitimate policy in the matters of interest delegated to the ruler so as to bring welfare
to Muslims, even in absence of a legal term. The Shafei'ites, the Malikites and the
Hanbalites Schools of Figh, insisted that the Imam or his deputy shall represent the
Muslim party of convention. It is an important issue because the Imam, is the only
person entitled to handle Muslim matters, being the best to recognise Muslims interest.
If ordinary Muslims or even political leaders conclude any contract on behalf of the
Ummah, without any authorisation from the Imam, then the contract is void.26
However, the Malikites assume that it is the Imam 's decision to ratify or revoke the
contract (treaty) according to whether it is in the Muslims' benefit or not. 27
 In this
regard, Ibn Qudamah noticed,
Truce or protection treaties cannot be concluded except by the
Imam or his deputy and not by anybody else. These treaties are
contracts with disbelievers; so the extensive view of the Imam in
25 Shokri, Mohammed Aziz Dr., Introduction to International Law in Peacetime, Dar al-Flkr, Cairo, 1973, p. 382.
26 Ibn Qudalunah, Abdulah Ibn Aluned,A1-Mughni, Vol. VIII, Matba'at Al-Manar, Cairo, 1348 AH, p. 459.
27 Ibn-Mousa, Klialeal Ibn Isliaq, Mzikhtasar Khaleal fi Figh al-Imam Malik, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, p. 92.
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what is good for Muslims is essential in this case. Authorising
any other person to conclude treaties rather than the Imam or his
deputy, including stopping Jihad permanently, will be invalid28
Al-`Aucibi of the Shafei'ites agreed,
The truce with any other non-Muslims nation or territory cannot
be concluded except by the Imam or the person he deputises,
because if it is left to any unauthorised individual to conclude
truces for Muslims with non-Muslims (with whom fighting is the
alternative) the harm will be greater. Authorisation is only given
to the Imam or his deputy. If the Imam views that the truce leads
to prosperity, he will conclude it; otherwise, he will not approve
11. 29
The Malikite jurists allow treaties to be concluded by people other than the Imam,
but they are invalid until approved by him,
Treaties that are concluded by individuals, groups or army
leaders should be reported to the Imam. If he approves, treaties
will then be valid30
A modern scholar, Majid Khadduri, holds that deputies of the Imam may conclude
truces, treaties of friendship and cease-fire treaties whenever needed, but always
subject to his approval,
In the conduct of foreign relations, the Imam may delegate his
powers to the commanders in the field or to provincial
governors; these were often given full powers to negotiate, to
conduct a jihad and to divide the spoil. But the Imam retains a
veto by his right to refuse to ratify a treaty or by his right to
repudiate any arrangement, should it prove harmful to Muslim
interests. He may even punish his deputies if they act contrary to
what is deemed to be Islam's interests.31
In Islamic history, all treaties after the time of the Prophet Muhammad were signed
by the commanders of the Islamic army and approved later by the Caliph. An exception
was that treaty between the Caliph Umar I and the Patriarch of Jerusalem. The
28 Ibn Quthunah, Abdulah Ibn Ahmed, Al-Mughni, Vol. IX, Matba'at al-Manar, 1348 AH, p.298.
29 APAuqbi, Muhammad Ibn Hussein, Takmelat al-Magmou 'a 'ala Sharh al-Muhathab, Vol. XIX, p.439.
30 Al-Meheari, Sneed Abdullah, Al-Alagat al-Kharefiyah ii al-Dawla al-Islatniyyah, Muasasat al-Resalah, Beirut, 1995, p.
247.
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Patriarch demanded that the treaty should signed by the Caliph himself rather than by
his representative. 32 According to the Shari'ah, the Imam or his authorised
representative only are entitled to conclude a treaty. The Shari'ah does not stipulate
whether the signatory to the treaty from the opposite party is of the same rank or not;
he could be the head of state, or the leader of a religious group, or even a governor of
a territory. There are even examples where the head of the opposite party is not
involved in signing a treaty on behalf of his group. The Prophet did not asked the
leaders of the Quraish to sign the treaty of Hudaibiya, with himself as the other
signatory, as head of the Islamic State. Consequently, a representative of the Quraish,
but not its leader, signed on behalf of this group.33
It has seen in the previous chapter that Aman was originally pledged by individual
Muslims to Harbis in the Islamic State on a temporary basis. Subsequently, only the
Imam or his approved deputy had the authority to make this pledge of protection.
Reviewing the juristical opinions, it is clear that there was unanimity among them
that only the head of the Islamic State, the Imam, or his deputy was entitled to
conclude a treaty with Harbis. Any other treaty concluded with Harbis is invalid
unless it is expressly approved by the Imam. Inevitably, this meant that legitimate
protection could not be given by Muslim rebels in territory which they control and
which jurists regarded as either inside or outside Dar al-Islam.
Comparing this Islamic legislation with the modern theory of decision-making, it
could be said, in summary, that the foreign policy scholars of international relations
such as Graham Allison, attempt to explain foreign behavior in terms of the Rational
Actor Model or "Classical" Model, in which policy choices are seen as the more or less
purposive actions of unified governments based on logical means of achieving given
objectives. The Rational Actor Model has proved useful for many purposes, such as
the output of sub-national organisations following standard operating procedures, or
31 IChadduri, Majid, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1979, p. 153.
32 Hamidullah, Mohamad, Al-Wathaeg al-Styasyah h al-Ahd al-Nabawy wa al-Khelafah al-Rashedah, 6th Edit., Dar al-Nafals,
Beirut, 1987, pp. 482-483, 487 & Al-Tabarl, Muhammad Ibn Jarear, Taretkh al-Umatn wa al-Muluk, Vol. IV, Al-Matba'ah
al-Hussayniyah al-Masriyah, Cairo, p. 159.
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engaging in a problem-solving search. 34 Allison's explanation of the decision-making
approach has focused on the organisational process which explains government action
as the output of large organisations functioning according to standard operating
procedures and search processes. 35 Although, the decision-making process is
continuous, three stages can be identified. These are: the pre-decision stage, which
refers to the period preceding the taking of a decision; the choice stage, which refers
to the period during which the decision is made; and the post-decision stage, which
refers to the period after the decision is taken. Allison, however, distinguished three
models:
1. The Rational Policy Model. This approach assumes that the government is
the primary actor in world politics. It even argues that all governmental actions
are planned and were intended to meet different demands.36
2. The Organisational Process Model. This approach envisages governmental
behaviour less as a matter of deliberate choice and more as independent outputs
of several large organisations, only partly co-ordinated by government
leaders.37
3. The Bureaucratic Politics Model. This model offers an alternative
perspective to the rational actor approach. It draws considerable attention to
the foreign policy literature and explains the impact of organisational behaviour
on decision-making. Moreover, this approach explains that governments
consist of individuals who have significant discretion: here power is shared,
action is not.38
33 Banaja, Saeed Multanuned, Al-Mabade al-Asasiyah ii al-Alaqat al-Dowaliyah wa al-Doblotnasiyah Waqt al-Sibn wa al-
Harb, Moasasat al-Risalah, Beirut, 1985, p. 62.
34 Allison, Graham T., Essence of Decision, Explain the Cuban Missile Crisis, Little, Brown, Boston, 1971, pp. 10-30.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 5.
37 Ibid., pp. 67.
38 Ibid., pp. 144-145.
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In the context of the classical Islamic State, in which the Imam is the supreme ruler
of the Ummah, decisions about making treaties are taken by him or by whomever the
Imam appoints as his deputy, as has been shown above. His decisions as the major
actor should be directed towards achieving the objectives of the Ummah (see the next
section 5.4.2), consequently the Rational Policy Model seems more applicable to the
position of the Imam as decision-maker than either of the other two models of Alison,
namely, the Organisation Process and the Bureaucratic Politics models. This is because
the Rational Policy model is exclusively focused on the key decision-maker, unlike the
other two models which include a role for other organisations in the foreign policy
decision-making process. In the writing of the Muslim jurists attention is paid
exclusively to the role of the Imam or his deputy in concluding treaties: no attention is
given to role of other organisations, if any, in this process. The limited applicability of
decision-making theory in this context highlights the major difference between a
Western theory of international relations and the classical Sunni theory. The Western
theory is purely empirical and claims to explain how policy decisions are in fact made.
By contrast, the Islamic theory is normative and is concerned not with how foreign
policy decisions are reached in the Islamic State, but with the issue of who is entitled
or authorised to make decisions in foreign policy etc.
In international law, by contrast to the Shari 'ah, treaties may be negotiated by the
head of state or his deputies. Whether or not it is then valid will depend upon the law
of the state/s concerned. In many cases a negotiated treaty only becomes valid if it has
been approved by the legislature. Article 46 of the Vienna Convention makes it clear
that whatever is the exact provision of a state's internal law a treaty will not violated if
it is valid."
5.4.2) Terms of the treaty
In Islam, a treaty exists once the terms had been agreed between the parties even
though the terms are yet to be written down. It then becomes binding on both
39 Akehurst, Michael, A Modern Introduction to International Law, 3° Edit., George Allen and Unwin, London, 1977, p 130.
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parties. 40 However, mere agreement on the terms by the parties is insufficient to lead
to a valid treaty. For that to happen the terms agreed upon must be legitimate from an
Islamic point of view, that is, in conformity with the Shari'ah. The Prophet
Muhammad is reported to have said,
Any stipulation which contradicts the Book of Allah is invalid.41
It might appear that this Hadith was contradicted by what the Prophet Muhammad
did in the treaty of Hudaybia when he accepted the Quraish's condition that he and his
companions have to return to Madinah without practising the Lesser Pilgrimage
(`Umrah ) that year. In reality, the Prophet's decision was not in conflict with the
Islamic commands, because in such a case the leader can make his decision according
to the Muslims' interest, and under the condition of necessity. 42 Necessity is given an
extensive place in the works of the Islamic jurists. But it had to be flexible in practice
and could even diverge from an Islamic rule where this was justifiable in the estimation
of the owners of objective opinions (Ahl al-hal wa al-Aqd) and jurists.43*
The legal rules decide the previous point comes under "necessity permits the
forbidden" and "if two evils contradict, the lesser should be committed' and
"preventing evils." 44 The situation, moreover, is to be an exceptional when it is found
that the regular conditions with their terms cannot satisfy the required interests. This
situation needs to be faced by some other rules that suit the exceptions new to Islam
society. Muslim jurists, moreover, concluded the necessity as follows:45
1) It should be found not expected such as under a severe blockade
or fear of losing lives and properties.
40 Al-Shaybani, Muhanunad Ibn AI-Hassan, Al-Slyar al-Kabear, Vol. IV, AI-Dar al-Mutahedah II al-Nashr, Beirut, 1975, p.
60.
41 APSqalani, Shehab Aldean Abu Alfadhl, Fath al Bari bi Sharh Saheah Al Bukhari, VoL V, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo,
1378 AH, p. 353.
42 Ibn Hazm, All Ibn Ahmed, Al-Muhali, Vol. VII, Dar al-Itehad al-Arabi li al-Teba'a, Cairo, 1969, p. 493.
43A1-Mawardi, All Muhammad, Al-Hawi al-Kabir, VoL XIX, Maktabat al-Azhar, Cairo, p. 206 & Ibn Hazm, All Ibn Ahmed,
4l-Muhali, Vol. VII, Dar al-Itehad al-Arabi II al-Teba'a, Cairo, 1969, p. 493.
For further details and examples see footnotes 19-21.
44 Ibn Najeam, Zain Al-Dean Ibn Ibraheam, Al-Ashbah wa al-Nadhaer, Dar al-Film, Damascus, 1986, p. 89.
45 Ibid.
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2) Impossibility of behaving or taking action if the usual conditions
make it impossible for the individual or the public authority to
behave according to legitimate principles while making choices.
3) The harm gained by the exceptional action is less than that of the
usual one.
4) The working of the necessity rules is limited to the time of their
need and is not to be extended after.
5) It has to be estimated accurately just to face the harm according to
the Qur'anic verse,
( I V r ::11.1.11)
 .	 A NI	 j EL4	,j1a.41a1
But if one is forced by necessity without wilful disobedience nor
transgressing due limits, then is he guiltless ... (2: 173)
Consequently, if a treaty deviates from this fundamental condition and the Holy
Qur 'anic teachings, then it is considered to be void. The strong viewpoint of Islamic
jurisprudence stresses that "a treaty cannot be divided" which means that it is not
acceptable to agree upon some terms and reject others. 46 However, because the treaty
is a contract between two parties by virtue of specific terms, therefore Muslim jurists
agreed and insisted that the Islamic authority has to carry out all terms of the contracts,
as well as the other party/s have to carry out and fulfil the correct legalised terms, but
they do not have to fulfil or keep the incorrect terms. Moreover, if the treaty concludes
unfair terms, or conflicts with the moral principles or criminal law - such as the drugs
trade - Islam consider it as illegal treaty and has to be void. The Holy Qur'an
mentions,
(:)1 	 1.9-1.11.9	 t1:311 (.0.1c I jj..91).5. j 0 ,510 ,9 .).111 (sic 1.9.1.91.31.1
(V	 .
Help ye one another in righteousness and piety, but help ye not
one another in sin and rancour; fear Allah: for Allah is strict in
punishment. (5: 2)
However, there was a dispute between jurists on the essential terms of contracts,
therefore they (i.e. the Muslim jurists) divided into two groups, each has its own creed
and followers.
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1) The Hanbalites considered the terms of treaty to be correct as long as God does
not forbid them and the terms do not contradict Shari 'ah . Even if one of the terms is
essential to achieve the purpose of the treaty, it is still forbidden if it is in conflict with
the Shari 'ah. Legal correctness is the basis of treaty terms, on this view, and no term is
forbidden or nullified unless it contradicts Shari 'a/i. On this view of treaties every term
must be lawful if the treaty is to be lawful: if just one term contradicts the Shari 'ah or
its principles then it invalidates the entire treaty.47
2) The Hanafites, the Shafei'ites and the Malikites all stress that the legally valid
terms of a treaty are those which satisfy both parties or which they considered to be
legitimate according to specific evidence that is used in proving Shari 'ah terms such as
Qiyas, Istihsan, Maslahe Any terms not mentioned or permitted by these
Islamic sources, they considered as unlawful or void. However, if a treaty contains, for
example, nine lawful terms and one that is unlawful, that treaty as a whole is not
nullified by that one term. The legal consequence of this term is that it is not binding on
the parties, while the remaining lawful terms have a binding effect on bothap rties.48
The previous debate leads to the conclusion that the Imam has to be confined by
two conditions when he concludes a treaty and fulfils its terms:
a) The general interest of the Islamic State must be served, as all
jurists unanimously agree.
b) The subject of the contract is not to be of what is forbidden or
what contradicts the spirit or general bases of the Shari 'ah.
The words of Faraj Sanhory support the previous scholars' debate. Sanhory
remarked,
The power authorised to the Imam is not an infinite one, but the
Shari'ah draws the limits and the frame that the leader has to
46A1-IChateab, Muhammad, Mughni al-Muhtaj ila Ma'arefat Ma'ani al-Fath al-Minhaj, Vol. IV, Matba'at al-lIalabi, Cairo,
1958, p. 263.
47 Ibn Tayttilyyah, TaquIDean Ahmed, Fatawa 1bn Taytniyyah, Vol. III, Riyadh, 1381 AH, p. 326.
For further information regarding these terms, see chapter II.
48 Al-Adawy, Malunoud Shawkat, Nadhanyat al- 'Aqd, AI-Azhar University, 1976, Cairo, p. 139.
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practice his authority within. He is not allowed to go beyond
them.°
As a result, the ruler and political powers in the Islamic State have been specified by
the Shari'ah through clear, binding rules and bases which must not be violated, as
Fouad al-Nadi stated,
The political power in the Islamic State is dependent upon the
interest achieved by concluding the treaty. If there is no benefit
or there is a harm, the Head of the Islamic is not allowed to
practice this power since it is against Islamic law. Concerning
reconcilement treaties, jurists put some conditions as: The treaty
has to achieve the general interest of an Islamic State, have a
limited period of time and should be free from invalid or
incorrect clauses. All these conditions represent limits that the
Caliph is not allowed to go beyond."
The jurist al-Sarkhasi decided that a legally valid treaty must fulfil two conditions: it
must be made by a competent, legitimate authority (and not by, for example, those
who usurp government by assassination) or by legally valid terms which do not conflict
with Islamic law. If either condition is not fulfilled the treaty lacks legal validity.51
Moreover, Muslim jurists determined which illegitimate terms make a treaty void.
Jurist al-Bahuti, for instance, in his work Kashf al-Oina' summarised these terms as
follows,
1) If terms interdict a clear Islamic rule.
2) If terms are against the dignity and of Islam and Muslims and they
magnify the strength of polytheists.
3) If terms stipulate that enemy seizes control over Muslims lands and
practices illegitimate acts on these lands.52
Imam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal, moreover, illustrated a clear view of the Hanbalites
School in this theme when he mentioned,
49 Sanhory, Faraj, Tareikb	 al-Islami, Literature, The Higher Institute of Law, Cairo University, Cairo, p. 58.
50	 Fouad Muhanunad, Mabda al-Mashro'aia wa Dhawabit Khodou 'a al-Dawlah ii al-Qanoun fi al-Fiqh al-Islami,
Edit., Dar al-Kitab Al-Jame'l, Cairo, 1980, p. 194.
51 Al-Sarkhasi, Muhammad Ibn Ahmed, Sharh al-Siyar al-Kabir, Vol. V, Hyderabad, 1335 AB, pp. 1786-1787.
52 AI-Multi, Mansour Ibn Uonis,Kashafal-Qina ',Vol. III, Dar Al-Fikr, Beirut, 1982, pp. 112-114.
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One illegitimate term will make the whole treaty invalid 53
In addition to the above assumption, Ibn Qudamah said,
The treaty is to be void if it contains an illegitimate term except
when the two parties agree on revoking the treaty whenever any
party wants to. Polytheists may use this term to violate peace and
security that makes the treaty meaningless.54
5.5) Stages of treaty
According to the Shari'ah, the procedural technique of conclude an Islamic treaty
can be broken down into six stages, which are:
5.5.1) Negotiation
It is the first stage where parties discuss the terms and conditions of what is to be
agreed upon. This procedure was known since the early time of Islam. An example of
that is the negotiation between the Prophet Muhammad and the Quashes prior to
concluding the treaty of Hudaybiya when both parties stated and discussed their
proposed terms and conditions. 55 In the words of Majid Khadduri,
While pilgrimage was an immediate reason for entering into
treaty negotiations, the circumstances on both sides indicated
that at last temporarily there was an equilibrium of power.56
5.5.2) Written treaties
Islamic Shari 'ah assumes when the terms of the treaty are agreed, they are mutual
pledges but not yet a treaty. For a treaty to develop from these pledges they have to be
first written down. 57
 Examining the Islamic treaties, it appears that the forms of
treaties were very short because they were for a specific purpose: either for a cease-
53 Ibid.
54 Ibn Al Najar, TaqulDean Muhanunad Ibn Aluned, Montaha al-Iradat, Vol. I, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, p.328.
55 Al-Mubarakphuri, SafiulRalunan, The Sealed Nectar, Biography of the Noble Prophet, Maktaba Dar us Salam, Riyadh,
1995, pp. 340-341.
56 Khadduri, Majid, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, Jolm Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1979, p. 211.
57 Al-Sarkhasi, Muhammad Ibn Ahmed, Sharh al-Siyar al-Kabir, Vol. IV, Hyderabad, 1335 AH, p. 60.
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fire and conciliation (Muhadanah), or a poll tax Jizyah, or to safeguard/protection
(Aman). Treaties usually started by mentioning the names of God thus "In the Name of
God, the Most Gracious, the Most Mercifur 58 followed by the names of parties and
their ranks (the rank of the Prophet was: Muhammad the Messenger of Allah) then the
main body or purpose of the treaty and its terms. These were expressed in very clear
phrases to avoid any misunderstanding. 50" The procedure of writing agreements is one
of Islam's principles of treatment, both among the Muslims themselves and with
others. This was mentioned in the Holy Qur'an in various places, in which it is
legislated that writing is a general principle to affirm agreements. The following verse
is an example of that,
JALI14 	 44.9 D -Ogi Led"" 3+1 LI-I)	 .1%-14.1.15 1:4 1-9141.
4111	 4:0 3144-9 ‘7111.A Z11 4-Za	 ‘741.	 4-5
( 1. AY	 . U.a. 4.14
0 you who believe! when ye deal with each other, in transactions
involving, future obligations in a fixed period of time reduce them
to writing let a scribe write down faithfully as between the
parties: let not the scribe refuse to write: as Allah Has taught him,
so let him write. Let him who incurs the liability dictate, but let
him fear Allah his Lord and not diminish aught of what he owes.
(2: 282)
After the expansion of the Islamic Empire, and particularly during the Umayyad era,
treaties became more complex, therefore the Caliphs invented a new position called
"the writer of messages". His duty was to draw up, write and then stamp the treaties
and the official letters of the Caliph.60
5.5.3) Signing treaties
This procedure was known since the time of Prophet Muhammad. He stamped
every letter and treaty written on his behalf. 6 ' It was mentioned previously that in the
58 Al-Saleh, Subhi,A1-Nudhom al-Islamtyyah, Beirut, 1968, p. 305.
59 Ban*, Saeed Muhanuned, Al-Mabade al-Asasiyah ii al-Alaqat al-Dowahyah wa al-Doblomasiyah Waqt
	 wa al-
14arb, Moasasat al-Risalah, Beirut, 1985, p. 64.
The Islamic treaty does not has a specific form, it defer from one to another according to its subject. However, it has to have the
main elements which have mentioned in this part.
60 Sultan, Hanuned, Ahkam al-Qanoun al-Dowali al-Shari 'oh al-Islamiyyah, Dar al-Nandha, Cairo, 1970, p. 208.
61	 Mohamad,A1-Wathaeq al-Slyasyah h al-Ahd al-Nabawy wa al-Khelafah al-Rashedah, 6 th Edit., Dar al-Nafals,
Beirut, 1987, p.
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Shari 'ah the Caliph or whomever he authorised are only persons entitled to sign and
stamp the treaty. Islamic treaties therefore always bear the names, the signatures and
their date as well as the stamps of the authorised persons. 62 Moreover, it may be said
that the Islamic treaty was unique at this time where it required witnesses to put their
signatures on the treaty. Searching for this method in the counterpart treaties in
international law shows that this procedure is not required.
5.5.4) Ratification of treaties
In the Shari 'ah, confirmation of any treaty concluded or to be cancelled has to be
done either by the directed approval of the Imam or through the use of consultation on
the part of the supreme jurists (Shurah). After these informal consultations there
emerge later the Advisory Council Majlis al-Shurah which confirms such treaties. An
example of the first procedure was the Hudaybia treaty where the Prophet Muhammad
approved the treaty without consulting his followers. 63
 An example of the second
procedure was the treaty between the Islamic State and the Cypriots during the time of
`Abbasides and under the governorship of Abdulmalik Ibn Salih Ibn 'Abbas. When the
Cypriots raised a rebellion the governor was forced to cancel the treaty, and so he
addressed a question to leading jurists of his time such as al-Layth Ibn Sa'ad, Imam
Malik Ibn Anas, Sofyan Ibn Tyayna, Musa Ibn A'yun, Ismael Ibn `Ayyash, Yahya Ibn
Hamza, Abu Ishaq al-Fazari and Makhlad Ibn al-Hussein seeking a legal opinion to
justify his decision.64
5.5.5) Exchange and deposit of treaties
Such a process was known prior to Islam. The document of the boycott by the
Quraish of the Banu Hashim and Banu AbdulMutalib because of their support for the
Prophet Muhammad in the period of his early calling to Islam is an example for such a
62 Ganzori, AbdulAdheam,Mabade 'a al-'Alatiat al-Dowalyah al-Islatniyyah, Maktabat al-Mat, Asyot, p.386.
63 AI-Mawardi, All Muhammad, Al-Ahkatn al-Sultaniyah wa al-Welayat al-Denyah, Dar al-Ketab al-Arabi, Beirut, 1990, p.
165.
64 Al-Beladhuri, Ahmed Ibn Yahya, Futuh al-Buldan, Maktabat al-Nandha al-Masriyah, Cairo, 1951, pp. 159-160.
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procedure. In order to confirm their support of that document, the Qurashi hung it
inside the K'abah. 65 In Islamic history, Prophet Muhammad always insisted on two
written copies of each treaty. As for instance, he did in the case of the treaty of
Hudaybia.66
5.5.6) Legitimacy of the treaties
This is the final and the most important stage of every treaty. Searching the
SharPah, it can be found different Divine verses and Prophetic Hadiths order and
encourage Muslims to conclude treaties with non-Muslims, and it insists that Muslims
have to respect and fulfil their obligations and not break them. Wahbah al-Zohaily, for
instance, has mentioned that,
Islam established the structures of treaties firmly and as a way of
achieving the interest of all Muslims. The Imam, the Muslim
supreme ruler, has the right to pledge with non-Muslims for the
sake of religion and the benefits of Muslims.°
The legitimacy of treaties is to be found in both the Qur 'an and Sunnah as follows:
a) In the Holy Qur'an it is revealed that Islam rejected all polytheists, with the
exception of allies during the fixed period of the pledge. Allah is concerned with allies
of the Muslims who keep their commitment. Allah, moreover, has directed Muslims to
conclude peaceful relations and reconciliation-truce treaties with those who fail to
keep their pledge. Muslims should accept peace,
. . . 411 alQ LISSIJ1-4-1C41111Lail-P4
But if the enemy incline towards peace, do thou (also) incline
towards peace, and trust in Allah ... (8: 60)
Where a peace treaty exists already, the Our 'an recognises that other non-Muslims
may join the non-Muslim party to that peace treaty.
65 Hamidullah, Mohamad,Al-Wathaeq al-Siyasyah h al-Ahd al-Nabauy wa al-Khelafah al-Rashedah, 6" Edit., Dar al-Nafais,
Beirut, 1987, p. 44.
66 Ibn Hisham, Abd Almalik,A1-Syrah al-Nabawyah, Vol. II, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1955, 747.
67Al-Zohaily Wahbah,Athar al-Harb fi	 al-Islami, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1981, p. 349.
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Except those who join a group between whom and you there is a
treaty (of peace) ... (4: 90)
A peace treaty with non-Muslims endures so long as they fulfil their side of the
agreement,
. . •	 I j JAL—tu. 
(t
(But the treaties are) not dissolved with those Polytheists whom
ye have entered into alliance and who have not subsequently
failed you in ought, nor aided any one against you ... (9: 4)
In this situation Muslims are obliged to fulfil their side of the agreement,
(t	 . . .	 011 ts.4.4. Ni.4, I
So fulfil your engagements with them to the end of their term ...
(9:4)
Muslims have been commanded by Allah to keep their commitments towards all
their engagements in covenants, pledges, treaties, and vows. In the Holy Qur'an, Allah
stresses and confirms the fulfilment of concluded treaties, and illustrates these pledges
as His Covenant. In the Shari'ah, any covenant concluded between two parties started
or ended by the Name of Allah, or containing any vows/oaths in the Name of Allah, is
called the Covenant of Allah (AI ae-c.). This is confirmed by the Holy Qur 'anic verses,
L:J1 N-As 4,1a. 41 ellx+ sij
 à Ji .114 4:jk.11	 I:11 41 42.0 14i ji
(i I: dA.111) . cjjasti.11...
Fulfil the Covenant of Allah when ye have entered into it, and
break not your oaths after ye have confirmed them; indeed ye
have made Allah your surety; for Allah knoweth all that ye do.
(16: 90)
And,
t	 . 	l-10.1.41jijij . . .
. . . and fulfil (every) engagement, for (every) engagement will be
enquired into (on the Day of Reckoning). (17: 34)
In other place, God describes Muslims whose fulfil their engagements by,
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(Y
... It is those who are endued with understanding that receive
admonition. Those who fulfil the Covenant of Allah and fail not in
their plighted word. Those who join together those things which
Allah hath commanded to be joined, hold their Lord in awe, and
fear the trrible reckoning. (13: 19-21)
In this regard, al-Qurtobi in his efforts to explained the previous verses commented
that,
These verses of the Holy Qur'an show that complete piety and
upright morality are a fulfilment of pledge.68
Because of the significance of fulfilling treaties, the Holy Qur'an stresses and
confirms their legitimacy. The Qur 'an reveals Allah as cursing and threatening those
who fail to fulfil their pledges, covenants and treaties,
c c14,2.94 	 -.1 41 JAI LA .jj4iij444. az? CJA 41 40 (...J.9.4,24.
(V	 :sc j11) .	 Jur+	 Nr!	 ji	 j)11
But those who break the Covenant of Allah, after having plighted
their word thereto, and cut asunder those things which Allah has
commanded to be joined, and work mischief in the land; on them
is the Curse; for them is the trrible Home. (13: 25)
In another verse, Allah describes those who break their obligation as losers in the
life,
41-1 Ci.91"6J4 (.1."2.94 (.:)1	 41 JAC 1- (.:1921211.-9 44. 4 aki L)-4 	 aic. C.LP;a4.
 V :;5411) .	 .,„1.1.111i. Ji u;231
Those who break Allah's Covenant after it is ratified, and who
sunder what Allah has ordered to be joined, and work mischief
on the earth; these cause loss only to themselves. (2: 27)
From the Holy Qur'an there is a clear message that the promises in treaties must be
kept and their terms fulfilled. It is in this sense that treaties are legitimate; they are
legitimated by Allah.
68 Al-Qurtobi, Muhanunad Ibn Aluned, AI Jame'a lj.4hkam al-Qur'an, Dar al-Kotoub, Cairo, 1369 AH, p.239.
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b) In the Sunnah can be found various examples of the Prophet's conduct and
statements by him confirm the legitimacy of treaties in Islam. Taking his conduct first,
the Prophet Muhammad concluded numerous treaties with non-Muslims. 69 His first
treaty with them was concluded after his emigration from Makkah and was with the
Jews and polytheists in Madinah and the surrounding areas. AbdulRahman Azam has
described this treaty as,
It is one of the most precious, interesting and honourable
international conventions in Islamic history. It deserved to be a
beacon for Muslims in the principles of their relations with non-
Muslims. Besides, it marks the commencement of the Islamic
State as a recognised state."
Jurist Muhammad Hamidullah describes it as,
A contract of good neighbourliness, of defensive alliance and of
co-operation against the enemy. It aims at establishing and
maintaining communities, each with its sovereignty over its own
people and freedom of religious propaganda. All the signatory
parties are to support each other and protect their beliefs and
homes against enemies.71
The treaty of Madinah* between Muslims, Jews and polytheists was the first Islamic
international treaty. Through it, the Prophet Muhammad founded the Islamic State and
established its relations with other political entities. Muslims became citizens of this
state as a single unified nation, regardless of their race and party spirits. The Prophet
Muhammad set the curriculum and principles of the important treaties such as
Hudaybiya treaty with Quraish tribe in 628 AD which can be considered as a basic
pledge for non-Muslims to enjoy Muslim protection.
In his Hadiths, the Prophet Muhammad affirmed that commitments must be kept,
pledges fulfilled and treaties implemented. He is reported to have said that,
69 For treaties of the Prophet see Hrunidullah, Mohrunad, Al-Wathaeq al-Siyasyah ii al-Ahd al-Nabawy wa al-Khelafah al-
Rashedah, 6" Edit., Dar al-Nafais, Beirut, 1987, pp. 43-369.
70 Azam, AbduiRalunan, A1-Risalah al-Khalidah, 1 `t Edit., Jordanian Ministry of Education, Aman, 1975, p. 92.
71 Ihunidullah, Mohamad, The Muslim Conduct of State, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1977, pp. 264-265.
* See the MI text of the treaty in appendix I of this thesis.
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No faith in whoever is untrustworthy. He has no religion [he is
not a Muslim] who does not fulfil his pledge. 72
In another Hadiths, the Prophet insisted that,
On the Day of Judgement, there will be a flag for every person
guilty of the breach of faith. It will be raised in proportion to the
extent of his guilt; and there is no guilt of treachery more serious
than the one of committed by the ruler of public. 73
And,
Whosoever has concluded a pact with others, he should neither
tie a knot nor open it on (that bond) until its time expires.74
From these Prophetic Hadiths, it may be concluded that in Islam the principle of
pledges is fidelity not without perfidy. This view was confirmed by Ibn Hazm when he
noted that,
The Prophet paved the way for spreading the call to Islam
awal by pledging non-Muslims, urging faithfulness and
concluding peace and reconciliation conventions with peace
lovers who are not blocking D' awa way. He also reconciled the
tribes that settled between Madinah and Red sea coast like
"Banu Dhumrah" after the first invasion that he led, the "Al-
lbowa" battle or 'Divan " battle.75
Ahmed Safwat sites the text of this reconciliation treaty and its terms in his book
Jamharat Rasa 'el al-Arab as follows,
This is a message from Muhammad the Prophet of God to Banu
Dhumrah, you are safe for your property and lives; you are
supported to win the victory over your enemy; but you are not to
fight God's religion. If the Prophet calls for your support, you
act and reply. In return, you will have the protection of God and
His Messenger, and you will have victory over your enemy if you
are righteous. 76
72A1-Bayhaqi, Aluned Ibn AI-Hussein, AI-Sunan al-Kobra, Vol., IX, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1994, P. 231.
73 Matraji, Malunoud, Translation of Saheh Al Bukhari, Dar al-Filo, Beirut, 1993, p. 328.
74 Al-Azadi, Abuda'ud Sulayman Ibn Al-Ash'ath, Sunan Abuda 'ud, VoL III, Al-Maktabah al-Asryyah, Beirut, 1950, p. 83.
75 Dm Hisham, Abd Almalik, Al-Syrah al-Nabauryah, Vol. II, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1955, p. 54.
76 Safwat, Ahmed Zaid, Jantharat Rasa 'el al-Arab, Vol. I, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1936, p. 70.
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Like the Holy Qur'an, then, the Prophetic Sunnah legitimated: pledges, covenant
and treaties. Thereafter, the Caliphs followed the Shari 'ah commands over pledges,
covenants and treaties. For example, Umar I gave the Christians of Jerusalem an
integral protection* for their property, souls, and churches with no harm to their
religion, property and churches. This was under one condition, that none of the Jews
were allowed to live in Jerusalem according to the request of the Patriarch of the
city.77
The legitimacy of treaties has a third aspect. The actual treaties, such as the
Constitution of Madinah, concluded by the Prophet form part of the legislation of the
Shari'ah. In this way, their legitimacy was enhanced over that which the Prophet
conferred by his Hadiths and his acts of concluding treaties. Given this legitimacy of
treaties, their fulfilment is part of and dependent upon their faithfulness towards Islam.
International law meets with the Shari 'ah in stressing that all parties have to respect
their obligations. Treaties in international law are binding and states have to be bound
by them. Therefore states are not permitted unilaterally to terminate an in-force treaty
for any reason. In connection with that, article 26 and the first part of article 27 of
Vienna Convection insisted that,
- Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must
be performed by them in good faith.
- A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as
justification for its failure to perform the treaty.78
However, unlike the Islamic State, the international community has procedures and
sanctions which have been legislated by its organisations against states which change
the scope of the operation of a treaty, alter its rights or obligations, cheating on its
fulfilment, or in other ways fail to fulfil the terms of a treaty. The international
community or its organisations may act against such breaches of treaties by public
condemnation, by commercial and other sanctions in addition to political embargoes
* This pledge became known as "the Pledge of Umar." According to various scholars it organised the relations between the Muslims
and religious groups who were living in the Islamic territory.
Al-Tabari, Mohamad Ibn .larear, Tareikh al-Utnan, wa al-Aduluk, Vol. V, Al Matba'ah at Hussayniyah at Masriyah,
Cairo, p. 2405.
78 Reuter, Paul, Introduction to the Law of Treaties, Pinter Publishers, London, 1989, pp. 172-173.
226
Chapter V
against the non-implementing states, and, finally, by using military force to compel
states to perform their international obligations.
In the matter of the stages of treaties in the Shari 'ah, there is a parallel with
international law and its multiple treaty stages. In international law, a treaty text is first
drawn up, this draft is then authenticated and further revise if necessary. After this it is
approved by the parties, then formally signed and both become bound by the treaty if it
completes its final stage of endorsement by the legislature. At each stage, a number of
procedural techniques come into play: initialling, signature, exchange, deposit or
communication of certain instruments, and various notifications. However, these
techniques have no magical power of their own. Their legal effect essentially depends
on the meaning given to them by the parties. This meaning in turn is established by
usage and by the conduct of the parties in each particular case.79
Therefore, it could be concluded that the international law meets with the Shari 'ah
in organising the procedural technique of the treaty.
5.5.7) Termination of treaties
A treaty which has been negotiated, written down, signed, exchanged, deposited
and ratified is then normally implemented in practice. Pledges, covenants and treaties in
Islam are treated as having a sacred character and are, therefore, to be respected.
Fulfilment of a pledge or treaty is a sign of genuine Faith, while its revocation is a sign
of hypocrisy. Fulfilment, moreover, is considered as a first degree of fulfilment with
Allah before it is with the others. Commitments should be permanently respected since
their fulfilment is required in the Holy Qur 'an:
• N4.is t s,1. a LI	 j Ue .4s j:i 1%4 d...41 I jmair.i	 2.1.aAtz	 airsu ji
(4 I :3a.111)
Fulfil the Covenant of Allah when ye have entered into it, and
brake not your oaths after ye have confirmed them; indeed ye
have made Allah your surety; for Allah knoweth all that ye do.
(16: 91)
79 Ibid., pp. 44-45.
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Specifically, the fulfilment of agreements is required by the Shari'ah through the
clear injunction in the Holy Qur'an,
( i :Z.1 .351) • Vii14.31 ,n4, 4 1111
	 NA" v-1) 16.14z N4M1J4-Ili
So fulfil your engagements with them to the end of their term: for
Allah loveth the righteous. (9: 4)
The Muslim is bound in all his behaviour by the law of Allah and he is not allowed
to cross the limits set by Allah in his life. Even in his love and enmity, starting and
ending relations, engaging in conciliation or hostilities, he is obliged to deal with the
others by the honour of Islam and its word. For example, the Qur 'anic injunction to do
good and avoid evil (7: 15784 9: 71) is applied elsewhere in the Holy Qur'an to the
matter of enmity or hostility,
4-1Slac,	 j 43, 411114i c (:).4m.%i vA (01114 t.i.1 c ;11.?.m11	 kuma.31
j
Nor can Goodness and Evil be equal. Repel (evil) with what is
better: then will he between whom and thee was hatred become
as it were they friend and intimate. (41: 34)
In general, the honour of Islam requires that the Muslim should,
Loia	 ji	 J114
. . . and turn off Evil with good: for such there is the final
attainment of the (Eternal) Home. (13: 22)
Thus, in Islam when a treaty is concluded between Muslims and others, it should be
fulfilled as long as its terms conform to the letter and spirit of Islamic law and it brings
welfare to Muslims. If the Imam dies or is dismissed from office the treaty he
concluded is not terminated. A treaty concluded by the Imam is on behalf of the
Islamic State and therefore continues to be legally binding upon the state and his
successors after he ceases to be its head. They must continue to fulfil its terms."
If a treaty is to be terminated on the Muslim side it can only be done by the Imam as
he alone in the Islamic State has authority to make or confirm a treaty/pledge and also
to terminate one." A treaty may also be terminated by non-Muslims either by
80A1-Ithateab, Muhammad, Mughni al-Muhtaj ila Ma'arefat Ma'ani al-Fath al-Minhaj, Vol. IV, Matba'at	 Cairo,
1958, pp. 261-262. & Al-Nawawi, Yallya Ibn Sharaf, Rawdat al-Talibean, Vol. X, Dar al-Filcr, Beirut, 1993, p. 337.
81 AI-Badawi, Ism'ael, Iklasasat al-Sultah al-Tanfithiyah fi al-Dawlah
	 l't Edit., Cairo, 1977, p. 194.
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revocation or by abrogation. It is important to distinguish between abrogation and
revocation in Islam. Revocation is considered to be the failure to keep commitments
undertaken in the treaty/ pledge and can be done by one of the two parties. It is a
breach of the treaty/agreement, it is considered as perfidy because it is not preceded by
a caution or warning and it legally terminates the treaty in the Shari 'ah. The Shari 'ah
requires the fulfilment of a treaty and consequently forbids its revocation by the Imam.
In the case of revocation of a truce treaty the result is to restart the war by the side or
the sides on which perfidy occurs. 82 Abrogation, on the other hand, means a legal
procedure of agreement by both parties to end a treaty for a specific reason or reasons.
For example, if the two contracting parties show no desire to fulfil the treaty up to the
end of its term they may agree to abrogate this treaty. Another example would be the
abrogation of a treaty when its time limit expires and the two parties do not renew it.
A third possible example of legal abrogation is where one of the two parties to the
treaty ceases to exist as a legal entity and there is no successor regime to inherit its
legal obligations. In practice, in the classical Fiqh, the only method of abrogation was
the expiry of the treaty and its non-renewal.
In the Shari 'ah the legal consequences of terminating a treaty are as follows:
1) Abrogation:
a) By expiry of the treaty's time limit. With the exception of the Dhimma
treaty, all treaties concluded by the Imam must be limited to a specific
period of time and the fulfilment of the terms is limited to this temporary
period. Once the terminal date has been reached, the treaty is no longer
valid and is terminated. The options open to both parties are either to
continue this new legal state, renew the treaty for a further period of time,
or conclude a new treaty. Jurists agreed that a treaty period might be
82 Madkour, Muhammad AbdulSalam, Al-Madkhal ii al-Fiqh al-Islami, Dar al-Nabdha al-Arabiyah, Cairo, 1960, p. 58.
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extended to exceed the agreed limit if it is for the general benefit or welfare
of the Muslim community.83
b) By mutual agreement: if a contracting party does not want to keep the
treaty to its end, the party seeking abrogation should inform the other
party in writing or through messengers or its ambassadors. Provided the
other party agrees to this arrangement, the treaty is abrogated. But, in the
absence of such an agreement, the treaty will be unilaterally revoked if the
initiating party proceeds with its intention to terminate the treaty.84
2) Revocation:
a) Violation of the treaty's provisions: Islam recognises that a treaty is revoked
by the non-fulfilment of its terms by one or both parties, or by the actions of a
party which conflicts with those terms. The legal consequence of a non-
Muslim party violating a treaty in either of these ways is for this revocation of
the treaty to terminate it. The further legal consequence of this revocation is
explicitly stated in the Qur'an,
talijk+.1	 j
(	 :;4-.1-9111) • C.19'04 •serLd
But if they violate their oaths after their covenant and
attack your Faith, fight ye the chiefs of the Unfaith: for
their oaths nothing to them: that thus they may be
restrained. (9: 12)
b)Treachery or betrayal. Whenever the non-Islamic party to a temporary treaty
acts treacherously toward the Islamic State, the treaty has been revoked and
the Islamic legal consequence is its termination. Moreover, if the Islamic State
as a party to such a treaty has good grounds for supposing that such treachery
can be anticipated by the other party then again the treaty is revoked and
legally terminated.
83 Al-Ramli, Shams Al-Dean Multanunad Ibn Shihab al-Dean, Nehayat al-Muhtaj ila Sharh al-Minhaj, Vol. VIII, Matba'at
al-Halabi, Cairo, 1386 AH, p. 101.
84 Ghanemi, Muhammad Tal'at, Ahkatn al-Mu 'ahadat fi al-Shari 'ah al-Islatniyyah, Monsha'at al-Ma'arif, Alexandria, pp.
144-146.
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If thou fearest treachery from any group, throw back
(their covenant) to them, (so as to be) on equal terms:
for Allah loveth not the treacherous. (8: 58)
Mere suspicion of future perfidy is, however, not sufficient. The expected treachery
of the non-Islamic party should have noticeable indications such as picking a quarrel
with Muslims, committing malicious offences against them and violating some of the
treaty's terms. In such cases, the treaty is revoked by the Muslims even when it is not
yet expired and up to that point still in force. This is the only situation in which the
Imam is permitted to unilaterally revoke a treaty. Once he knows of the treachery or
the betrayal by the non-Muslims he is not allowed to use military force against them
until they have been notified that the Islamic pledge has been revoked (so that they are
not taken by surprise). 85
 Al-Sherazi in his book Al-Muhatheb confirmed this,
When the Muslim ruler sends a message to the adversaries' ruler
informing him of the justified pledge revocation, the Muslims
have to give enough time to be sure that this notification has
reached all parts of the adversaries country. Otherwise, Muslims
will not do any act of aggression on their enemies since it will be
considered as an act of treachery that is not a conduct of a real
Muslim. 86
Islam stresses that a warning and notification of the revocation of a treaty/pledge
must be given to the other party three days before rescinding the pledge. This
requirement cannot be legally avoided by the Muslims befOre undertaking hostilities
against their former treaty partners. However, resort to armed conflict is only
legitimate after the other party's response to notification of revocation of pledge leaves
the Muslims with no alternative but that of fighting. Since the consequences of rash
actions are heavy, Muslims are required to be patient and give the other party the
opportunity to make amends, abide by his commitments and thereby remove the need
for war."
85 Sabiq, Sayed, Frah al-Sunnah, Vol. III, Il th Edit., Dar al-Fath 11 al-A'alam al-Arabi, Cairo, 1994, pp. 98-99.
86 Al-Sherazi, Ibraheam Ibn Ali, Al-Mnhatheb, Vol. II, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, p.263.
87 Sabiq, Sayed,Fiqh al-Sunnah, Vol. III, ll w
 Edit., Dar al-Fath Ii al-A'alam al-Arabi, Cairo, 1994, pp. 96-108.
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In the case of Dhimmis, a different legal rule applies in the case of their treachery.
'AO al-Dhimrna is a permanent treaty and cannot be revoked by the Dhimmi group.
As citizens of the Islamic State, the Dhirnmis are under the control of the Islamic
authority and it does not fear harm from them as it does from Harbis outside the
Islamic State." When some Dhimmis act treacherously the Dhimma treaty is therefore
not revoked for all Dhimmis, but only for those who have acted in this way. In the
legal opinion of Imam al-Shafei'i,
Dhimmification is not to be revoked for all Dhimmis, revocation
is only for those who act treacherously.89
4) War. In international law, all treaties are terminated by war. 90 However, this
is not true in the case of Shari 'ah . The truce treaty is ended by war, but classical
Muslim jurists held that neither Aman nor commercial treaties would be effected by
the legal status of war between the Islamic State and Harbis. As has been shown in
chapter IV, Aman is given to individual Harbis whose country is hostile to the
Islamic State. It is not given to the people of Dar al- `Ahd whose country has a
truce treaty with the Islamic State.
Commercial treaties continue during the state of war provided that the
merchants are not dealing in commodities that strengthen the situation of hostile
state." However, it could be argued that all commercial transactions with the
enemy should be cancelled because the entire economy directly or indirectly
supports the war effort of a country the life of which it is a mainstay. A more
drastic measure than forbidding trade in certain goods was undertaken by the
Prophet Muhammad before the battle of Badr. He imposed a complete trade
embargo on the Quraish by cutting their trade route in order to tighten the
88 Al-Sherazi, Ibraheam Ibn Ali, Al-Mzthatheb, Vol. II, Mat ba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, p. 263. & Ibn Qudamah, Abdulah Ibn
Aluned,A1-Mzighm, Vol VIII, Matba'at al-Manar, 1348 AH, p. 463.
89 Al-Shaferl, Muhammad A., Al-Utnm, Vol. IV, Al Matba'ali aPAmereyah, Cairo, 1322 AH, p. 107.
90 Oppenheim, M. A., International Law, Vol. II, 7" Edit., Longmans, London, 1952, p. 302.
91 Al-Sarkhasi, Muhammad Ibn AJuned, Al-Mabsut, Vol. X, Matba'at al-Sa'adah, Cairo, 1931, p.88 & Al-Kasani, Abu
Bakr Ibn Mas'aud, Bada 'ea al-Sanay'a fi Tarteab al-Sharay'a, Vol. VII, Shareliat al-Matbou'at al-`Alamyah, 1327 AH, p. 102
& Al-Sherazi, Ibrahim Ibn AIL Al-Muhatheb, Vol. I, Matba'at al-Halabl, Cairo, p. 281.
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Muslim's grip around their throat and force them to change their attitude towards
Muslims.92
Despite this example of the Prophet, Classical Muslim jurists only prescribe the
restriction of trade with enemy merchants: they do not recommend it ends completely.
The argument for this, and the remainder of the jurists prescriptions on commercial
treaties are examined in section (6.6.1) below.
5.6) Kinds of treaties
It has to be said, initially, that the classical Muslim jurists did not distinguish
between a treaty and a contract, they considered all relations between the Islamic
authority and its Muslims and non-Muslims citizens are contract such as the election of
the Imam Bay 'ah, the poll-tax the Jizyah and so on. 93 However, modern Muslim
scholars made the distinction by the beginning of the 20 th century. They distinguish a
treaty from a contract in two respects: (i) the parties; and (ii) the subject. In a contract,
the parties may be individuals or groups in addition to states. In any treaty, on the
other hand, the parties are two or more states who conclude an agreement which is
formally signed by authorised persons such as the heads of state or their
representatives. The treaty's subject is a kind of international relations, affecting
importantly the relations among states of the international community. In the case of a
contract, however, almost anything other than this is the subject matter of the binding
agreement. A contract will count as a treaty if its parties are both states and its subject
matter is to do with their relations. 94 This distinction is not made in classical Figh. The
parties to a contract may be states, groups or individuals, but this is also true of
treaties. Similarly, there is no distinction in their subject matter; treaties are not
restricted to relationships between states as modern Muslim scholars have argued.
It has been mentioned earlier that Muslim jurists classified treaty under two
categorisations: the temporary and the permanent treaties. Most treaties concluded
92 Lm' gs, Martin,Muhammad, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1984, pp. 135-137.
93 Ghaneml, Muhammad Tal'at, Ahkam al-Mu 'ahadat fi al-Shari 'ah al-lslamiyyah, Monsha'at al-Ma'arif, Alexandria, p.46.
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during the time of the Prophet, the four Orthodox Caliphs, the Ummayyads, and the
`Abbasids eras were temporary treaties. The only permanent treaties were the
protection pledges to non-Muslim individuals of the Islamic State, which called 'Ahd
al-Dhimma. 95 The motives behind that, have been explained by Wahbah Al-Zohaily,
who mentioned,
Enmity, non-truce and continuous war status between the
Muslims and other states or communities were the main reasons
which persuaded Muslims to refuse concluding any permanent
treaty with the non-Muslims. Recently, it could be said that
concluding a permanent peace treaty among the Muslims and
others is lawful because the main object of calling for Islam is
achieved within its natural field through the Propagandists and
the Preachers to Islam.96
Muslim jurists limited the Islamic treaties to the purposes of: friendship and trade
exchange, conciliation, protection pledges, safeguard covenants, and armistice
treaties. 97
 Therefore, these treaties will be discussed in the following part according to
the previous classification, concentrating initially on the temporary treaties and latter
on the permanent one.
5.6.1) Treaties of friendship and commodities exchange
Islamic jurists of the classical period conventionally treat these two kinds of treaty
together in their treatises on Fiqh and this convention will be followed here. The
reason for so doing will be explained at the end of the section.
The aim of such treaties is to create a situation of goodwill and co-operation,
particularly in the commercial field. Commerce, according to the Shari 'ah, is one of
the professions which if practiced within the bounds of the Islamic law might secure
the Muslim worldly recompense without compromising religious duties. In the words
of Majid Khadduri,
94 Shalabi, Mohammed Mustafa, Al-Itladkhalfi al-T'areaf bi al-Fiqh al-Islami, Dar al-Nashr aPArablyah, Beirut, 1969, p.
367.
95 Al Makrizi, TaquIDean Ahmed Ibn Ali, hnta 'a al-Asma 'a, VoL XI, Lajnat al-Taleaf, Cairo, 1941, p. 448.
96 Al-Zohaily, Wahbah, Athar al-Harb fi al-Fiqh al-Islatni, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, p.354.
97 Gabir, Hosny Muhammad, Al-Dawlah wa al-'Alaqat al-Dwaliyah II al-Islam, Document in Al-Azhar Library, p. 50.
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Throughout Islamic history, commerce was highly esteemed and
the merchants contributed to the wealth and prosperity of society
at the height of Muslim power. Although few were the merchants
who could influence public policy, there were men in business,
like the jurist Abu Hanifah, whose influence surpassed many in
high authority. The process of exchanging commodities among
nations, honoured by the Arabs before Islam, persisted
throughout the centuries as one of the most sign /I cant
professions in Muslim society.98
Among the examples of the Islamic friendship and commodities exchange treaties
comes the that treaty concluded by the ruler of Egypt during the time of the Caliph
Uthman Ibn Affan with the Christians of Nubia, which stipulated amity, good
neighbourliness as well as mutual assistance where the ruler supplied them with food,
grain and slaves.99
However, jurists bound the Muslim merchants to abide by the general rules of the
Islamic transactions, which define the contents and stipulations of a contract which has
to be free from usury and illegitimate commodities such as wine, pork flesh along with
other items forbidden by the Shari'ah. loo Friendship and commodities exchange
treaties should be temporary according to Muslim jurists. They assumed that the
duration of this type of treaties would be less than four months, basing their judgement
on the Qur 'anic verse,
L.5..),...
 LI cjij LI 4 j-4.a.4 ..}.4-6 —5.ii i J-4.1Zi j jiali A.a.4j1 ultiii 4,fia 1 ..s,a+uli
( V : .414A) .C.j.pil-Cli
Go ye, than for four months, (as ye will), throughout the land, but
know yet cannot frustrate Allah (by your falsehood) but that Allah
will cover with shame those who reject Him. (9: 2)
There is a consensus among the Malikite jurists to prohibit commercial transaction
with Dar al-Harb, therefore such treaty is considered to be void. 101
 However, the
majority of jurists, particularly the Hanafites, were more tolerant and expatiated on the
98 Ithadduri, Majid, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, John Hopkins Press, Balthnore, 1979, P
. 224.
99 Gibb, H. A. R. & H. Kramers, Short Encyclopcedia Of Islam, E. J. Bill, Leiden, 1974, p. 69.
100 Al-Shaybani, Muhammad Jim Hussein, AI-Siyar al-Kabear, Vol. I, Al-Dar al-Mutahedah li al-Nashr, Beirut, 1975,
p. 133
101 Ibn Roshd, Muhammad Dm Ahmed, Moqadimat Ibn Roshd, Vol. II, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1991, p. 278.
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obligations of Muslims who are involved in such transactions with Dar al-Harb as well
as its citizens. Al-Kasani remarked,
Jurists stated that it was a usual practice that Muslim traders
enter a hostile state and the Harbis enter an Islam state; and they
exchange clothes, commodities, food and the like except items
used as war supplies. 1°2
It is noteworthy to state that commodity exchange with the Harbis should be in
accordance with safeguard covenants Aman that given to them. The jurists formulated
certain limitations upon the free exchange of commodities with the merchants of Dar
al-Harb and the kinds of commodities imported as well as the advantages accrued to
Dar al-Islam regarding the exchange of commodities with other countries. 103 The
general principle was explained by Imam al-Ghazali, who said
It is legitimately forbidden to export to the Dar al-Harb or to any
other hostile state weapons and war materials, fiods, horses or
war supplies. 104
One of the limitations determined by most of the jurists on the free exchange of
commodities with the merchants of Dar al-Harb was payment of the tithe Aushour,
the percentage of 10 % tax on their commodities. 1 ° 5 The imam is the only one who is
entitled to lower or raises this tax according to the interests of the Islamic State.
Moreover, the first Caliph who set the tithe tax was the Orthodox Umar I. It has been
narrated that Abu Mousa al-Ash' an wrote to Umar informing him that Muslim traders
who went to Dar al-Harb paid taxes of 10% to the authority of that state. Umar
replied:
Take from the merchants of the Dar al-Harb whatever they take
from the Muslim merchants, and take from the Dhimmis half of
the set tax; and from Muslims one Dirham for each 40 Dirhams
provided that the trade exceeds 100 Dirhams. If the trade value
102 Al-Kasani, Abu Bakr Ibn Mas'aud, Bada 'ea Al Sanay'a fi Tarteab Al Sharay'a, Vol., VII, Sharekat al-Matbou'at al-
`Alamyah, 1327 AH, p. 102.
103 Al-Ghazali, Muhammad Ibn Muhammad, Kitab Ihya'a 'Ulum al-Dean, Vol. II, Matba'at Mash Kadam, 1334 AH, pp.
59-60.
104 Ibn Hazm, All Ibn /tinned, Al-Muhali, Vol. VII, Dar al-Itehad al-Arabi II al-Teba'a, Cairo, 1969, p. 962.
105 Ibn Hamam, Kama! Al Dean, Fath al-Qadear, Sharh al-Hedayah Ii al-Marghalam, Vol. III, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo,
1356 AH, p. 224.
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is 200 Dirhams take 5 Dirhams and if it is more take with the
same ratio.106
It may be inferred from this that the Islamic authority was dealing with foreign
merchants according to equality or retaliatory measures.
It is worth mentioning that commercial treaties and treaty of friendship were
conventionally bracketed together in classical Fiqh, and this convention has been
followed here. The reason for their conjunction is that the non-Muslim subject of these
two treaties was normally the same individual, a merchant. Such a merchant who
traded within the Islamic State will receive Aman (temporary protection) from the
Islamic authority and the commercial treaty of buying and selling could obviously be
concluded within a few months. During that period and under the protection of the
Islamic authority and all Muslim citizens of the Islamic State that individual is very
likely to be party to a treaty of friendship. Its temporary nature therefore reflects the
temporary residence of this merchant Musta 'min in Dar al-Islam.
It is arguable that there is a second non-mercantile situation in which a friendship
treaty may be concluded. This is after a war between the Islamic State and the Harbis
and the establishment of Dar al-Sulh or al- 'Ad. This Dar has been defined (4.3.4) as
the territory which is not under Muslim rule, yet is in tributary relationship to the
Islamic State by temporary truce (Sulh mo'waqt). 107 For the duration of this third
position between Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam, it is reasonable to suppose a
friendship treaty is concluded between the two former belligerents, the Islamic State
and the people of Dar al-SulhfAhd.
5.6.2) Truce treaty
In Arabic, such a treaty is called Muhadana	 Hudna is the singular. It means
a cease-fire between two parties for a certain period of time. In juristical work, the
Shafei'ites defined it as,
106 Abu Yusuf, Y'aqub Ibn Ibrahim ibn Habib, Al-Kharaj, Al-Matba'ah al-Salafyah, Cairo, p. 135.
107 See chapter III, 3.3.4.
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The conciliation with Harbis, whether they keep their religion or
convert, to stop fighting for a certain period of time, whether or
not a recompense is given.108
Scholar al-Kasani, of Hanafites, defined truce as,
It is the condition of conciliation during which each party is to
refrain from fighting the other party.109
The Malikites defined it as,
It is conciliation with Harbis to refrain from fighting for a
certain period of time, with or without giving recompense.110
H. Gibb and H. Kramers have defined the Islam's view of truce as,
Evidently, dislike the implication that there could be any territory
in a status of neither Islam nor war, and therefore outside of
Muslim conquest, maintained that this was not relay a Sulh or
'Ahd but only a trust (hudnah) and arrangement for an exchange
of commodities.!"
Concluding truce treaties fulfilled only between the authorities of belligerents, and
has to be signed by their leaders, their deputies or the delegated persons such as
commanders of armies with a stipulation that they have to have full authority from
their leaders. If the opposite party is a representative of a territory, then the Muslim
ruler of any adjacent territory is to conclude the truce treaty with him."2
In the regulation of such treaties, Muslim jurists agreed that truce treaties are of
two kinds: (i) those of general truce - to stop fighting in all fields of war; and (ii) those
of specific truce - to stop fight in one particular the war fields. According to time, they
are either unlimited, which means that any party may resume fighting at any time after
108 Al-IChateab, Muhammad, Mughni al-Muhtaj ha Ma'arefatMa'ani al-Fath al-Minhaj, Vol. IV, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo,
1958, p.260.
109 Al-Kasani, Abu Baia' UM Mas'aud, Bada'ea Al Sanay'a fi Tarteab Al Sharay'a, Vol., IX, Sharekat al-Matbou'at al-
4 mainyah, 1327 AR, p. 3424.
110 Ibn Qudahmah, AbdulRalunan Ibn Muhanunad, AI-Sharh al-Kabear, VoL II, Matba'at al-Manar, 1348 AH, p.206.
111 Gibb, H. A. R. & H. Kramers, Short Encyclopedia Of Islam, E. J. Bill, Leiden, 1974, p. 69.
112 Al-Zohaily, Wahbah, Athar al-Harb fi al-Figh al-Islami, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, p.357.
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notifying the other party or they are limited to a certain period of time after which any
party can resume fighting when the two parties cannot reach an agreement for
conciliation, 113
 However, jurists differed according the margin of time, while the
Shafei'ites assumed that truce can never last for more than 10 years referring to the
case of Hudaybia treaty, 114
 other jurists, such as al-Mawardi, assumed that it should
not be more than four months, 115
 based on the Holy Qur'anic verse,
jts.11 4.;.1.4	 cjij 4 4.)+2.4	 1..9.za1jt.
	
14.,.+4A
Go ye, than for four months, (as ye will), throughout the land, but
know yet cannot frustrate Allah (by your falsehood) but that Allah
will cover with shame those who reject Him. (9: 2)
Other jurists, such as al-Bahuti, adopted the view that the duration could be less
than a year. 116
 However, it may be said that limitation of time has been left to the
Imam unless the parties stipulated in the treaty a particular time for it to have validity.
In classical Fiqh, a valid truce treaty will always be temporary, however long or short
is that period of time. However, Muslim jurists still dispute about the limitation time of
the treaty, they hold the same views of the previous treaty. Yet, the Shafei'ites hold
that timing treaty is for people not for properties, therefore they permitted conciliation
to be given for unlimited time for properties as well as women 117*
This is also true of treaties which are renewed after they have expired. Here, the
treaty may be explicitly renewed for a further period of time or it may be renewed
implicitly for a further period of time, provided that neither party objects by word or
deed. Thus, it may appear that truce treaties during the period of the classical Fiqh
became permanent because they lasted very much longer than ten years, for example
the treaty with Nubia during the time of the third Orthodox Caliph `Uthman. In reality,
113 Al-Badawi, Ismael, Ilchasasat al-Sultah al-Tanfithiyah fi al-Dawlah al-Islamyyah, 1 `  Edit., Cairo, 1977, P. 127.
114m_shee., Muhammad A., AI-Umm, Vol., IV, Al-Matba'ah al-'Amereyah, Cairo, 1322 All, pp.110, 111.
115 Al-Mawardi, All Muhanunad, Al Ahkam al-Sultaniyah wa al-Welayat al-Denyah, Dar al-Ketab al-Arabi, Beirut, 1990, p.
138.
116 Al-Bahuti, Mansour Ibn Uonis, Kashafal-Qina', Vol. III, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1982, p. 95.
117 Al-Shafel'i, Muhammad A., Al-Umm, Vol. IV, Al-Matba'ah aPAmereyah, Cairo, 1322 AH, p. 111. See also, Gabir,
posny Muhammad, Al-Dawlah wa	 al-Dwaliyah fi al-Islam, Document in Al-Azhar Library, pp. 53-54.
This is because, on the one hand, women do not always practice or become involved in wars or military activities. On the other
hand, properties, as personal belongings, under a valid treaty affecting them and cannot be attacked or taken by the Islamic State,
even if the treaty with the non-Muslims owners of the properties is terminated or cancelled for any reason.
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such treaties were simply continually renewed but temporary truces and that no
permanent condition of peace obtained. Similarly, al-Qaradawi has argued
authoritatively that a permanent peace treaty between an Arab state and Israel was
invalid from the Islamic point of view, inter alia, because it claims to be permanent
and not a temporary truce treaty. 118 Such a treaty is only valid from the (secular) point
view of international law.
Based on the previous debate, it could be said that status of hostility remained but
was suspended during the period of truce between the two belligerents. Once the truce
ends the belligerents resume their rights of fighting until another truce ends the conflict
or it is ended by the victory of the Islamic State. If the Harbi state wins this war the
post war condition will not be regarded as permanent by the Islamic State, but a
suspension of hostility. H9
 The international law relating to a cease-fire has similarities
to this part of the law of Shari ' ah In the words of Oppenheim,
They [the belligerents] are in no wise to be compared with peace,
and ought not to be called temporary peace, because the
condition of war remains between the belligerents themselves,
and between the belligerents and neutrals, on all points beyond
the mere cessation of hostilities.120
A variant of this treaty is where non-Muslims not only establish a cease-fire, but
also seek protection from the Islamic State. This variant treaty is for the Musalihoun, a
group of people which seeks protection from the Islamic State and which, if it is within
its power, is given to the group against its Harbi enemies. Moreover, if the treaty is
concluded in return for money paid by them to the Muslims, but Muslims fail to
provide that protection in the duration of the treaty, Muslims should not take the
money. If they already have taken all/or part of it, they should return it to the group.121
There is a further condition that is almost essential to truce treaties, that is, the way
in which compensation for military losses in war falls on the belligerent states. Islam
118 Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf, AI-Quds fi al-Wa'y al-Isla* Journal of Islamic Jerusalem Studies, Vol. I, Dunblane, Winter 1997,
p. 14.
119 AI-Sarkhasi, Muhammad Ibn Ahmed, Al-Mabsut, VoL X, Matba'at al-Sa'adah, Cairo, 1931, p. 89.
120 oppenhelm, Lauterpacht Hersch, International Law, Vol. II, D. Mckay, New York, 1952-1955, pp. 546-547.
121 A1-Sarkhasi, Muhammad Ibn Ahmed, Sharh al-Siyar al-Kabir, Vol. V, Hyderabad, 1335 AH, pp. 1862-1863.
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accept this condition, provided it is explicitly agreed in the treaty. However, what it
does reject is the humiliation of the former enemy by forcing it to pay excessive
reparations. The Shari 'ah point of view is that compensation for losses is permissible
but not to a punitive level. Moreover, Islam permits compensation to be paid for up to
the value of the enemy losses in the truce treaty where the Muslims were the
aggressors in the conflict.122
5.6.3) Conciliation treaties
Although the term conciliation (4...11_,..) is frequently used in conjunction with truce
treaties (see above section 5.6.2) it is possible that there may be conciliation treaties
which are not connected to a truce, which are not treaties of alliance, such as the
Declaration of Madinah, and are also neither Dhimma treaties nor Aman pledges. This
possibility is not recognised in classical Fiqh and for this reason the discussion which
follows is highly tentative. The reason for the analysis that follows is that not only is
there a juristically unrecognised type of treaty, but also this type of treaty— if it exists-
is unique in having no direct or indirect connection with Jihad. Other treaties are
linked to Jihad in various ways: (i) truce treaties suspend Jihad for a fixed period of
time; (ii) alliance treaties with non-Muslims are formed in order to pursue Jihad, (iii)
Dhimma treaties are often, but not always, made after the Harbis have been defeated
in Jihad. For those Harbis who do not become Dhimmis after a Jihad, they are always
vulnerable to a Jihad so long as they remain Harbis instead of becoming Dhimmis . (iv)
Pledges of Aman are made to Harbis whose country is in armed conflict with the
Islamic State and commercial treaties with Harbi merchants will continue to be
implemented during the Jihad against their country.
A conciliation treaty is close to a truce treaty because it is concerned with
establishing peaceful relations between the Islamic State and non-Muslim groups.
However, this does not mean either is a peace treaty in the modern international law
sense of the term because such a peace treaty legally terminates a state of war between
two belligerents, normally after a period of cease-fire. However, in classical Fiqh no
122 Al-Shawkanl, Muhamad All, Nail al-Awtar, Vol. IV, Mat ba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1952, p. 46.
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such treaty is possible. Hostilities can be suspended for a specific period of time by the
truce treaty, but Islamic law, as interpreted by the jurists of the classical period, allows
no possibility of permanently terminating hostilities with Harbis. The cease-fire or
truce treaty, it has been previously noted, is frequently linked with conciliation, as for
example in the Malilcite view already cited,
It is conciliation with Harbis to refrain from fighting for a
certain period of time, with or without giving recompense.123
The distinction between a truce treaty which leads to conciliation of Harbis to the
Islamic State and a conciliation treaty is that in the latter case the peaceful relations
established by the treaty do not follow an armed conflict between the Muslims and
non-Muslims. A conciliation treaty, properly speaking, does not suspend hostilities that
actually exist, but is a pact intended to prevent such hostilities occurring. The treaty
concluded by the Prophet Muhammad with the Jews tribe of the north of Madinah
after the battle of Khaybar is an example of conciliation in a truce treaty. The Prophet
Muhammad accepted their request for conciliation with the Islamic State in return for
relinquishing half of their lands and allowing them not to convert to Islam instead. 124 In
this example the Prophet followed the Holy Qur'an,
(II :0.41) . 41 Ls.iQ LIssij 1+1 c.4.1.i 4.,111_,..4 a j
But if the enemy incline towards peace, do thou (also) incline
towards peace, and trust in Allah ... (8: 60)
This clear example of truce and conciliation treaty may be contrasted with several
other peace pacts concluded between the Prophet as head of the Islamic State and the
heads of non-Muslim groups.
The Prophet wrote a letter to the (Makokus) of the Egyptian Copts calling him and
them to convert to Islam. The Prophet assured him of the safety of him and his people
and of their heavenly reward if they did so, and their sinfulness if they refused the call
to Islam. In response to this call the Makokus invoked peace upon the Prophet,
welcomed his envoys and stated he had read and understood his call to Islam. He
—
123 thn Qudahmah, Abdulltalunan Ibn Muhanunad, AI-Sharh al-Kabear, Vol. II, Matba'at al-Manar, 1348 All, p.206.
124 Ibn Al-Qayyhn, Shams Al-Dean Muluumnad Ibn Bala-, Zad al-M'aad, Vol. HI, Al-Matba'ah al-Masriyah, Cairo, 1914,
143-144.PP.
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declared his belief that God had sent Muhammad as his final Messenger and revealed
to him the Holy Qur'an and said he would be the first to walk to the Prophet [i.e.
accept his call to Islam], but because he ruled a great kingdom he could not do so.
Finally, he sent two respectable female slaves, a cloak and a mule to ride.125
It is obvious from this exchange of letters that the seven stages of making a treaty
(see section 5.5.7) are absent, so formally or de jure no treaty existed. Nevertheless, it
could be argued that there was a de facto peace pact for the following reasons. First,
the Makokus made several friendly gestures to the Prophet, including welcoming his
envoys, sending him various presents, recognising him as the seal of the Apostles and
Messenger of the revealed Qur 'an, and indicating his frustrated desire to accept the
call to Islam. This indicates a strong desire to have good relations with the head of the
Islamic State on the part of the Coptic leader that is, his desire to achieve conciliation
with the Muslims. Second, the Makolcus never paid Jizyah to the Islamic State and so
the Coptic community never became Dhimmis at this time. Third, during the lifetime of
the Prophet and the Caliphate of Abu Bala, the Islamic State enjoyed peaceful relation
with the Copts until the conquest of Egypt under Caliph Umar I, a peaceful status
which an unwritten understanding between the Muslims and the Copts would help to
explain.
The treaty of Maqnah (year 5 or 9 after the Hijrah) is in fact a long letter which the
Prophet sent to Hunanyah and the people of Khaybar and Macinah 126 . It too lacks the
several stages of concluding a treaty, like the letter to the Makokus. In it the Prophet
stated that he had received a revelation that the people of Macinah could return to their
villages and houses under the protection of Allah and the Prophet, where they would
become a self-governing community. Yet no Jizyah would be required of them, and
they would not be treated as Dhimmis in other ways (for example in their clothing or
shaving their heads). The letter also stated that no Muslim army would attack them and
that they would be helped and supported by the Islamic State, including financially, if
125 Hamidullah, Mohamad, A1-Wathae9 al-Siyasyah ii al-Ahd al-Nabawy wa al-Khelafah al-Rashedah, 6th Edit., Dar al-
Nafais, Beirut, 1987, pp. 135-139.
126 Ibid., p. 124. The author notes doubts about the authenticity of this document. One of the reason why some scholars have
doubted it is because it is written by Ali Ibn Abu Talib in Hebrew.
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they needed it. 127
 But unlike the alliance treaty with Jews of Madinah, there was no
provision for mutual help, including military assistance. For this reason, the treaty was
no more of an alliance treaty than it was a Dhimma treaty. The conciliatory character
of the treaty was shown not only in the return of the villagers in safety and under
protection, but also in the fact that they were not prevented from entering Mosques.
However, there is no evidence either in al-Tabari, or in al-Waqidi or even in al-
Magreasi, that the Jewish tribe of Maqnah had previously been defeated in a war
against the Islamic State. For this reason it was not a conciliatory truce treaty, but an
independent de facto conciliation treaty.
Although those these documents do not constitute treaties in the formal, legal sense,
nevertheless, it is reasonably clear that as head of the Islamic State, the Prophet was
attempting to achieve a conciliation between that state and the Copts, in the first case,
and between it and the people of Magnah, in the second case. Yet, in neither case had
there been a preceding of war with the conciliated group and so neither was a truce
treaty. From various provisions in the Prophet's letters there are several reasons for
supposing that they are not treaties of Dhimma or alliance. And so, it seems not
unreasonable to conclude that in both cases an additional kind of treaty is involved, a
conciliation treaty.
5.8) Jurisdiction of criminal law and extradition treaties
Under the Shari 'ah, crime can be categorised under two headings: (1) Crimes for
which there is a fixed penalty; (2) Crimes where the Qadi decides the punishment the
so-called T'azear .* Generally speaking, the rules of these two criminal codes in
Shari'ah are enforced on all crimes committed in Dar al-Islam regardless of the
nationality or the religion of the doer, including all Muslims, Dhimmis, and
Music' 'mins. If, however, a crime is committed in Dar al-Islam but the criminal
127 Ibid., pp. 121-124. See this document in appendix II.
* Under the Shari 'ah, T'azear or discretionary punishment starts from flogging through jail and exile to an Islamic territory and
could even as far as capital punishment.
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absconds to Dar al-Harb to escape punishment, the punishment does not lapse or
become null and void, whether the criminal is a Muslim or non-Muslim.128
Crimes committed outside Dar al-Islam have a different legal position. Whether
they were committed by Muslim or non-Muslim residents of Dar al-Islam the general
rules is that the Shari ' ah is not legally applicable to these crimes and the offenders.
This is because the Imam 's duty is to implement punishment under the Shari' ah within
territories under his authority. Since Dar al-Harb is outside the Imam's authority, and
he lacks the ability to enforce Shari'ah punishments there, such punishment is not
obligatory.129
An exception to the rule that the Shari'ah law and punishment do not apply in Dar
al-Harb can occur during wartime. If Muslims soldiers are camped in Dar al-Harb and
within the camp a crime is committed either by a Muslim or non-Muslim that crime is
punishable as if it were committed in Dar al-Islam. That it is subject to the Shari 'ah
law. The reason for this is that the Muslim encampment is held by solders of the
Islamic State and therefore subject to its control. Given this control, the authority of
the Imam to implement the Shari'ah within the encampment exists and therefore the
crime is treated as if it is committed in Dar al-Islam. Any crimes committed outside
the Muslim camp are not subject to the Imam's authority and must be treated like any
crime committed in Dar al-Harb.130
Jurists were agreed upon the legitimacy of applying the Shari'ah to crimes
committed within the Muslim camp in Dar al-Harb, but they differed over the timing
of implementing the punishment. The Hanafites and Hanbalites suggested that
punishment should be delayed until return to Dar al-Islam. 131 The Malikites and the
Shafei'ites held that punishment should be executed immediately, provided the
128 Al-Kasani, Abu Bala Ibn Mas'aud, Bada 'ea al-Sanay'a fi Tarteab al-Sharay'a, Vol. VII, Sharekat al-Matbou'at al-
'Alamyah, 1327 AH, p. 131.
129 Audah, AbdalQadir, Al-Tashri ' al-Jinai ' al-Islann, Mu'asasat al-Risalah, Cairo, 1994, p. 280.
130 Ibid., 1). 132.
131 Ibn Haman, Kamal Al Dean, Fath al-Qadear, Sharh al-Iledayah li al-Marghalani, Vol. IV, Matba'at Mustafa al-Halabi,
Cairo, 1356 AU, p. 154 & Ibn Qudamah, Abdulah Ibn Aluned,A1-Mughni, Vol. X, Matba'at al-Manar, 1348 AII, pp. 439,
537.
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commander was entitled to do this. 132 If the commander lacked this authority,
punishment would not be implemented until the criminal was returned to Dar al-Islam.
Umar I was the first to delay the punishment of Muslim soldiers until they returned to
Dar al-Islam, 133 even though as Caliph he was entitled to impose the punishment on
the criminal within the Muslim camp.
Under the condition of necessity the Shari'ah permits the Imam to conclude a
treaty of extradition. Where such a treaty exist the Islamic State is obliged to extradite
a person accused of a crime in the non-Islamic State. Muslim jurists, however,
disputed the precise condition of extradition. The Malikites argued that when an
extradition treaty with a non-Muslim state existed, the terms of that treaty must be
fulfilled when application was made to the Islamic State for the extradition of an
accused person. 134
 The Hanafites and some Malikites jurists differed from the majority
Malikite position by arguing that extradition from the Islamic State could only be of
non-Muslims. Muslims, they held, should not be extradited to a non-Muslim state as
this would give non-Muslims mastery over Muslims. 135 The Shafei'ite position differed
from both the Hanafite and Malilcite views. They held that a person could only be
legitimately extradited to a non-Muslim state if that person had a tribe there to defend
him. If the accused person had no such tribe then extradition was not lawful. This view
was based on the fear that extraditing Muslims to a non-Muslim state would lead to
polytheists tempting the Muslim away from Islam. 136
 Although the Shafei'ites view
was clearly intended to applied to the extradition of Muslims, it does not appear to be
applicable to non-Muslims since they need no tribe to safeguard them from apostasy.
The Hanafite, Shafei'ite and minority Malikite juridical positions are at variance with
Prophetic practice. After concluding the agreement of the Hudaybiya treaty, the
Prophet Muhammad returned the Qurashi, Abu Jandal, to his people in Makkah who
132 Ibn Qudamah, Abdttlah Ibn Aluned,A1-Mtighm, Vol. II, Matba'at al-Manar, 1348 AH„ p. 258. & Anas, Malik Ibn, AI-
moddowanh al-Kobra, Vol. XVI, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1991, p. 91.
133 Al-Qurashi, Ghalib AbdulKall, Dr., Awlawiyah al-Faroug al-Siyasiyyah, Dar al-Wafa'a ii al-Tiba'ah wa al-Nashr,
mapsorh, 1990, pp. 318-319.
134 Ibn Qudamah, Abdtdah Ibn Ahmed, Al-Mughni, Vol. X, Matba'at al-Manar, 1348 AIL p. 510.
135 Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 296.
136 Al-Sherazi, Ibraheam Ibn Ali, AI-Muhatheb, Vol. III, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, p.277.
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had requested his extradition. 137
 Abu Jandal was not accused of any crime except that
of converting to Islam which, from the Quraishs point of view, was a criminal offence.
A special condition applies to the extradition of a Musta'min. Provided there is an
extradition treaty in force he cannot be extradited to any non-Islamic State except the
one that is a treaty partner as this would contradict the Aman given to him. The
general rule is that an extradition treaty between the Islamic State and the non-Islamic
State must conform to the condition of Aman given by the Islamic State and only to
this state is extradition legitimate.138
Where there is no extradition treaty, the Islamic State will not extradite any citizen,
whether Muslim or non-Muslim (including the Musta'mins), to a non-Islamic State
that requests their extradition, whatever the crimes of which they are accused. This
provision of the Shari'ah also prohibits the extradition of a Muslim who holds the
nationality of a state within Dar al-Harb if he emigrated from there to Dar al-Islam.139
If a crime is committed in the Islamic State there is no possibility of extradition. The
accused person is tried under the Shari'ah as previously noted. However, in the
present day where there is more than one Islamic State the question of extradition from
one to another can arise. Jurists now argue the Shari 'ah does prevent extradition of a
wanted person to another Islamic State on criminal charges, unless that person had
been previously tried and punished for that crime according to the Shari 'ah. Islamic
law prohibits a person from being punished twice for a crime committed. Jurists argued
that extradition from one Islamic State to another where the accused person has not
already been tried and punished is legitimate as both states are part of Dar al-Islam.
Each Islamic State is considered as a part of Dar al-Islam and a representative of
Islam, so that there is no objection to extradition as long as the legal provisions of both
states are the same. 140
 In the later period of the `Abbaside Empire it could be argued
the Islamic State had broken up into three Islamic states based in Spain, Egypt and at
137 Al-Mubarakphuri, SaflulRalunan, The Sealed Nectar, Biography of the Noble Prophet, Maktaba Dar us Salam, Riyadh,
1995, pp. 341-342.
138 Audah, AbdalQadir, Al-Tashri ' al-Jinai'	 Mu'asasat al-Risalah, Cairo, 1994, pp. 300-301.
139 Ibid.
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Baghdad. However, classical Fiqh ignored these divisions and continued to assume the
existence of a single Islamic State whose head was the Imam or `Abbaside Caliph.
Therefore, the question of extradition from the Islamic State to another Islamic State
could never arise. All that was legally possible was the removal of an accused person
from one region to another for trial within the Islamic State.
Expulsion and exile by the Islamic State in accordance with the Shari 'ah has some
affinity to extradition. No Muslims can be lawfully exiled from Dar al-Islam to Dar al-
Harb, just as they cannot be extradited in the absence of the extradition treaty. This
same provision applies to Dhimmis. However, both Muslims and Dhimmis may be
lawfully exiled to another region within of Dar al-Islam. 141 Temporary non-Muslim
residents of the Islamic State cannot enter Dar al-Islam except with Aman or as
consequence of a conciliation treaty between his country and Islamic State. The
Islamic authority is entitled to expel such a person once the period of their temporary
residents has ended. It also has the right to expel temporary non-Muslim residents
before the expiry time if they violate public security or if they become suspicious as for
example if they are suspected of spying. 142
5.9) Summary and conclusion
One of the two main conclusions of this chapter is that the parties to treaties in
Islam are always non-Muslims and the Islamic State. In classical Fiqh there is no
evidence of treaties between members of the Muslim Ummah. This confirms our
hypothesis that Islamic international relations are always between believers and
unbelievers, whether at the level of individuals, groups or states, and never between
Muslims in any capacity. In this respect, Islamic international law differs from Western
international law where the latter identifies the parties to a treaty as states and does not
distinguish between them in terms of religion. A second conclusion was that in Islamic
141:1 Audah, AbdalQadir,A1-Tashri ' 	 Mu'asasat al-Risalah, Cairo, 1994, pp. 297-299.
141 p 304.
142 Al_sherazi, Ibraheam Ibn Ali, Al-Muhatheb, Vol. II, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, p. 294. & Ibn Qudamah, Abdulah Ibn
Ahmed, AI-Mughni, Vol. X, Matba'at al-Manar, 1348 AH, p. 520 & Ibn Hamam, Kamal Al-Dean, Fag? al-Qadear, Sharh al-
Hedayah ii al-Marghalani, Vol. IV, Matba'at Mustafa al-Halabi, Cairo, 1356 AH, p.294.
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law there are two kinds of treaty, whatever their subject matter, permanent and
temporary treaties.
In Islam, each treaty has to satisfy specific conditions to be legitimate and binding.
First its terms have to be in harmony with the instructions of the Shari 'ah and achieve
common-good for both parties. If the treaty includes unfair terms, or conflicts with
moral principles or criminal law - such as the drugs trade - Islam consider it as illegal
treaty and is void. Second, in Islam, a legally valid treaty must made by a competent,
legitimate authority. According to the Shari 'ah, the Imam or his authorised
representative only are entitled to conclude a treaty. If ordinary Muslims or even
political leaders conclude any contract on behalf of the Ummah, without any
authorisation from the Imam, then the contract is void. The Shari 'ah does not stipulate
whether the signatory to the treaty from the opposite party is of the same rank or not.
In Islam a formal treaty has to be negotiated, written down, signed, exchanged,
deposited and ratified then normally implemented in practice. Unlike international law
where a treaty involves mutual pledges by the parties to it, in Islam a unilateral pledge
may constitute a treaty. When a treaty is concluded between Muslims and others, it
should be fulfilled as long as its terms conform to the letter and spirit of Islamic law
and it brings welfare to Muslims. Where the terms of a treaty conflict with those
objectives, the treaty is not binding upon Muslims, either in its entirety or only on
respect of those particular terms. The Shari 'ah obligates all Muslims to carry out
provisions agreed upon in the covenant and show full respect to the agreement made
by the Imam or his authorised representatives. If the Imam dies or is dismissed from
office the treaty he concluded is not terminated. A treaty concluded by the Imam is on
behalf of the Islamic State and therefore continues to be legally binding upon the state
and his successors after he ceases to be its head. The Imam alone in the Islamic State
has authority to terminate a treaty. A treaty may be terminated by non-Muslims either
by revocation (the failure to keep commitments undertaken in the treaty/ pledge and
can be done by one of the two parties), or abrogation (a legal procedure of agreement
by both parties to end a treaty for a specific reason or reasons).
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Comparing this Islamic legislation with the modern theory of decision-making of the
international relations, it has been found that among the three models of decision-
making the Rational Policy Model seems more applicable to the position of the Imam
as decision-maker than either of the other two models, namely, the Organisation
Process and the Bureaucratic Politics models. The Rational Policy model is
exclusively focused on the key decision-maker, unlike the other two models which
include a role for other organisations in the foreign policy decision-making process.
However, the limited applicability of decision-making theory in this context highlights
the major difference between a Western theory of international relations and the
classical Sunni theory. The Western theory is purely empirical and claims to explain
how policy decisions are in fact made. By contrast, the Islamic theory is normative and
is concerned not with how foreign policy decisions are reached in the Islamic State, but
with the issue of who is entitled or authorised to make decisions in foreign policy etc.
In addition to the Dhimma, Aman and alliance treaties discussed in other chapters,
this chapter analysed four kinds of treaty: treaties of friendship and commodities
exchange, truce treaties, the conciliation treaty, and extradition treaty. Taking each of
these four in turn:
Commercial treaties and friendship treaties were conventionally bracketed together
in classical Figh, because the non-Muslim subject of these two treaties was normally
the same individual, a merchant. Such a merchant who traded within the Islamic State
will receive Aman from the Islamic authority and the commercial treaty permitting him
to buy and sell. Such a person would almost certainly receive friendship in the form of
good well and cooperation, particularly in the commercial field, through a friendship
treaty. Because of the temporary nature of Aman, and because his commercial dealings
could normally be concluded within few months, it is very likely that this treaty of
friendship will be temporary in keeping with his temporary residence as a merchant
Musta 'min in the Islamic State.
Truce treaties are temporary and concluded only between the authorities of
belligerents. They have to be signed by their leaders, their deputies or the delegated
persons such as commanders of armies with a stipulation that they have to have full
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authority from their leaders. They are of two kinds: (i) those of general truce - to stop
fighting in all fields of war; and (ii) those of specific truce - to stop fight in one
particular the war fields. Muslim jurists differed according the margin of time, some
permit it for 10 years, the others , assumed that it should not be more than four
months, but it has been let to the Imam. Truce treaties during the period of the
classical Figh became permanent because they lasted very much longer than ten years,
notably, after the wars against the crusaders. However, the status of hostility remained
but was suspended during the period of truce between the two belligerents. A variant
of this treaty is where non-Muslims not only establish a cease-fire, but also seek
protection from the Islamic State. In the way in which compensation for military losses
in war falls on the belligerent states, Islam accept this condition, provided it is
explicitly agreed in the treaty. However, what it does reject is the humiliation of the
former enemy by forcing it to pay excessive reparations.
Conciliation treaties are often linked with truce treaties but it was found that some
conciliation treaties are not connected to a truce nor were they treaties of alliance, and
neither were they Dhimma treaties nor Aman pledges. A conciliation treaty is close to
a truce treaty because it is concerned with establishing peaceful relations between the
Islamic State and non-Muslim groups. However, the distinction between a truce treaty
which leads to conciliation of Harbis to the Islamic State and a conciliation treaty is
that in the latter case the peaceful relations established by the treaty do not follow an
armed conflict between the Muslims and non-Muslims. A conciliation treaty does not
suspend hostilities that actually exist, but is a pact intended to prevent such hostilities
occurring. The existence of these independent conciliation treaties was not noticed in
classical Figh or by modern scholars.
Finally, extradition treaties. Under the condition of necessity the Shari'ah permits
the Imam to conclude a treaty of extradition. Muslim jurists disputed the precise
condition of extradition. The Malikites argued that when an extradition treaty with a
non-Muslim state existed, the terms of that treaty must be fulfilled when application
was made to the Islamic State for the extradition of an accused person. The Hanafites
and some Malikites jurists argued that extradition from the Islamic State could only be
of non-Muslims. Muslims, they held, should not be extradited to a non-Muslim state as
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this would give non-Muslims mastery over Muslims. The Shafei'ites held that a person
could only be legitimately extradited to a non-Muslim state if that person had a tribe
there to defend him. If the accused person had no such tribe then extradition was not
lawful. This view was based on the fear that extraditing Muslims to a non-Muslim state
would lead to polytheists tempting the Muslim away from Islam. Although the
Shafei'ites view was clearly intended to applied to the extradition of Muslims, it does
not appear to be applicable to non-Muslims since they need no tribe to safeguard them
from apostasy. The Hanafite, Shafei'ite and minority Malikite juridical positions are at
variance with Prophetic practice.
A special condition applies to the extradition of a Musta'min. Provided there is an
extradition treaty in force he cannot be extradited to any non-Islamic State except the
one that is a treaty partner as this would contradict the Aman given to him. The
general rule is that an extradition treaty between the Islamic State and the non-Islamic
State must conform to the condition of Aman given by the Islamic State and only to
this state is extradition legitimate, Where there is no extradition treaty, the Islamic
State will not extradite any citizen, whether Muslim or non-Muslim (including the
Musta'mins), to a non-Islamic State that requests their extradition, whatever the
crimes of which they are accused. This provision of the Shari'ah also prohibits the
extradition of a Muslim who holds the nationality of a state within Dar al-Harb if he
emigrated from there to Dar al-Islam.
In the later period of the `Abbaside Empire it could be argued the Islamic State had
broken up into three Islamic states based in Spain, Egypt and at Baghdad. However,
classical Figh ignored these divisions and continued to assume the existence of a single
Islamic State whose head was the Imam or `Abbaside Caliph. Therefore, the question
of extradition from the Islamic State to another Islamic State could never arise. All that
was legally possible was the removal of an accused person from one region to another
for trial within the Islamic State. However, in the present day where there is more than
one Islamic State the question of extradition from one to another can arise and solution
to this problem are further evidence of the dynamic, progressive character of Figh.
Jurists now argue the Shari'ah does prevent extradition of a wanted person to another
Islamic State on criminal charges, unless that person had been previously tried and
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punished for that crime according to the Shari'ah. Islamic law prohibits a person from
being punished twice for a crime committed. Jurists argued that extradition from one
Islamic State to another where the accused person has not already been tried and
punished is legitimate as both states are part of Dar al-Islam. Each Islamic State is
considered as a part of Dar al-Islam and a representative of Islam, so that there is no
objection to extradition as long as the legal provisions of both states are the same.
In the next chapter the subject of investigation is whether the status of neutrality
was possible in Islamic international law in addition to the status of neutralisation
brought about by the implementation of truce treaties as discussed in this chapter.
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6.1) Introduction
Neutrality is an idea found in groups through the ages who prefer to be far from
disputes to avoid damage and harm. It is a materialistic incident before being a legal
system. Nations of the old ages knew neutrality as a political materialistic act, but
neutrality as an institution in international law was not recognised except in the late
Middle Ages when Grotius called for the theory of just wars. Grotius in his work Von
der Neutralitet und Assistenz in Kriegszeiten, for instance, clarified neutrality under
two general rules; the first is that neutrals shall do nothing which may strengthen a
belligerent whose cause is unjust, or hinder the movement of a belligerent whose
cause it just. The second rule is that, during a war in which it is doubtful whose cause
is just, neutrals shall treat both belligerents alike, in permitting the passage of troops,
in supplying provisions for the troops, and in not rendering assistance to persons
besieged.'
The treatment of neutrality by Grotius shows, on the one hand, that, apart from the
recognition of the fact that third parties could remain neutral, not many rules
regarding the duties of neutrals existed, and, on the other hand, that the granting of
passage of troops of belligerents, and the supply of provisions to them, was not
considered illega1. 2 Consequently, what could be found out from the previous debate
is that neutrality is of two kinds, either (i) temporary neutrality or neutrality by an
individual decision, which means a decision could be taken by a state/states in a
dispute for a temporary period in observance of this state/states for it interests with the
belligerents; (ii) permanent neutrality.
In 1758 AD, the Western scholars recognised such teaching. L. Oppenheim, for
instance, in his book International Law mentioned,
Vattel . . . used the term 'neutrality' and gives the following
definition: 'Neutral nations, during the war, are those who take
no one's party, remaining friends common to both parties, and
1 Oppenbeim, Lauterpacht, International Law, 7°' Edit., Vol. II, Longmans, New York, 1952, pp. 625-626.
2 Ibid.
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not favouring the armies of one of them to the prejudice of the
other.3
In modern Western literature, neutrality has been defined as an undertaking to
guarantee the permanent neutrality. In the work of Arnold McNair, for instance,
neutrality has been defined as follows,
The condition where a state undertakes by treaty to guarantee the
permanent neutrality of another state, the treaty usually involves
two obligations upon the guarantor: (a) a promise to respect the
permanent neutrality of the state, and (b) a promise to compel the
other state to respect the neutrality of the same state; it is to the
second promise that the word 'guarantee' is the more
appropriate, for guarantee is essentially a trilateral transaction.4
K. J. Holsti drew the distinction between neutrality and neutralisation when he
said,
Neutrality refers to the legal status of a state during armed
hostilities . . . These rules state, for example, that a neutral may
not permit use of its territory as a base for military operations by
one of the belligerents, may not furnish military assistance to the
belligerents, and may enjoy free passage of its nonmilitary goods
on the open seas and, under conditions, through belligerents
blockades. A neutralized state is one that must observe these
rules during armed conflict but that, during peace, must also
refrain from making military alliances with other states.5
Von Glahn added another distinction between the two terms when he said,
The status of permanent neutrality . . . is imposed on the
neutralized state by a group of outside powers, whereas a neutral
state voluntarily adopts its status at the outset of conflict between
others countries or even in peacetime. . . A neutralized state is
also forced to agree not to enter into an alliance requiring its
participation in any future conflict.6
Therefore, in order to understand the legitimacy of neutrality and to examine the
theme accurately according to the Islamic law, it should firstly recall the Islamic idea
3 Ibid., p. 626.
4 McNair, Arnold, The Law of Treaties, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961, pp. 239-240.
5 Holstl, K. J., International Politics, A Framework for Analysis, 3n1 Edit., Prentice/Hall International, New Jersey, 1977, p.
113.
6 Claim, Gerhard Von, Law Among Nations, '7 th Edit., Allyn and Bacon, London, 1996, pp. 54-55.
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of dividing the world into Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, which has examined early
in this thesis, in order to find out if Islam legitimises neutrality.
In fact, it was found out that the Dar al-Islam is where the Shari 'ah law is applied,
and all the inhabitants are performing their religious practices in complete freedom.
However, if the case is opposite, then it is Dar al-Harb even if it claims that it is an
Islamic State and Islam is the religion of its inhabitants. Moreover, Shari 'ah does not
embody all non-Islamic States under Dar al-Harb. A non-Islamic State that is not in
hostile relation with the Islamic State and does not threaten the society of believers
prevents the reaching of Islamic mission is considered to be out of the subject of Dar
al-Harb and the Islamic State has to have a fair and good relation with it. It could say,
moreover, that this is because Islam never starts and does not create enmity with
others.
In the Islamic theory of international relations, it can be found that when Muslim
jurists divided the world into Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb they assumed that all
non-Muslim territories are a part of Dar al-Harb unless there is a treaty to organise
their status and relations with Dar al-Islam. During the ' Abbasides, jurists added a
third domain called Dar al-`24hd* based on the situation of the conciliation treaty
between the Islamic State and non-Muslims. What could be found here, is the
impossibility of non-Muslims to adopt a neutral stance in armed hostility between the
Muslims and non-Muslims without the approval of that stance by the Islamic State.
Islam legislates that Muslims must retaliate against aggressors for their act/s of
aggression as a means of self-protection. Therefore, the base of relations between
Muslims and other non-Muslim nations or religious political entities is peace, and war
is a temporary circumstance. Permanent hostility should not prevail between Dar al-
Islam and Dar al-Harb, as relations should remain peaceful. Accordingly, Islam
admits neutrality and neutralisation as materialistic reality and as a moderate situation
between war and a peaceful relationship.
Consequently, it must seem clear that the notion and the fact of neutrality was not
distinguished by the early Muslim jurists, as they did not treat the issue in separate
* For further details see chapter III.
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literatures, or even, chapters in their works. However, they describe neutrality as
provisions partly in the laws of peace and partly in the laws of war, it is not easy to
glean all matters relevant to the main purpose in this chapter.
Among the literature dealing with the status of neutrality between the Islamic State
and non-Muslims is the modern work of Majeed Khadduri War and Peace in the Law
of Islam. In his work, Khadduri made great effort to distinguish cases of neutralisation
in the classical period of Islam which resemble the status of neutral nations in the
modern world. However, Khadduri did not analyse in detail these cases, including the
obligations involved, which he claimed to have distinguished. He considered that
there was an Islamic idea of neutrality which was a matter of fact in Abyssinia, Nubia
and Cyprus, though he did not examine their legal status in terms of the Shari 'ah. In
the absence of that analysis, Khadduri has no way of knowing whether there is an
Islamic conception of neutralisation and, if there is, whether it is applicable to those
three cases. Khadduri's assumption about neutralisation appears to be based on or at
least strongly influenced by the idea that the Islamic State remains in a permanent
state of war with the inhabitants of the states of Dar al-Harb to destroy unbelief or to
ensure that unbelievers become dependants within the Islamic State. On this view, the
whole world is divided into two hostile domains Dars and there is no room for
neutrality. Khadduri never claims neutrality to be a legal status, only neutralisation,
Neutralization, therefore, not neutrality, may be said to have
been permissible in Muslim legal theoly.7
When Khadduri talked about neutralisation he seems to have meant Dar al-Ahd or
the domain of truce treaties, though arguably he was restating the status of Dar al-
Ahd in a new way.
Khadduri's argument against the possibility of neutrality, though not of
neutralisation, depended on his view of a permanent state of war between the Islamic
State and Harbi states. Some other commentators have doubted this view of Jihad and
argued that it is employed for certain specific purposes, such as self-defence, and ends
when that purpose has been achieved. Thereafter, it is suggested, relations with the
7 Khadduri, Majid, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1979, P. 252.
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Harbis return to a peaceful condition. 8
 Rather than attempting to decide between these
two views on warfare, this chapter will examine the Shari 'ah and it application to see
whether it permits neutrality in addition to the neutralisation of which Khadduri
writes.
6.2) Definition of neutrality
In the Islamic law, the terms Hiyad and Hiyadah are used synonymously for the
modern term neutrality. Pre-Islamic and early Islamic Arab, employed the term Ptizal.
Though this term now applies only to a particular school of Muslim philosophical and
theological thought, even in the scholastic since it was suggested by the neutral
attitude with which the Mu'tazalites adopted towards the other two sects, the Sunnis
and the Kharijites.9
The terms Hiyad (31÷,), Hiyadah (..) .14.) and Ptizal (JI jk-J) were known amongst the
Arabs for a long time before Islam. However, the term Ptizal was more familiar
among the Arabs than the terms Hiyad, Hiyadah. I 'tizal (noun) derives from the verb
Azala (Ji—c-) which has different meanings, scientifically it means to isolate or
separate (one substance) from another; in politics it means depose or removal from
office; and medically means contraception or coitus interruptus, which is the act or
practice of preventing sex from resulting in the birth of a child.
What is crucial to this thesis is the use of these terms within the politics of the
Islamic State. In fact, it could be said that since the Prophet Muhammad emigrated to
Madinah, he started to conclude treaties with other tribes of the region. Some of these
treaties were bilateral alliance treaties; however, those who refused to ally with the
new state in Madinah chose to sign neutral treaties under the Prophet's conditions that
they are not to help any of the belligerents, neither Quraish nor the Muslims. 10
8 AbuSulayman, AbdulHamid A., Towards an Islamic Theory of International Relations, International Institute of Islamic
Thought, Herndon, 1994, pp. 43-44.
9 Ibn Mandhore, Muhammad Ibn Makram, Lisan al-Arab, Vol. XI, Dar Beirut, Beirut, 1956, p. 440.
10 Ibn Hisham, Abd Almalik,A1-Syrah al-Nabawyah, Vol I, Matba' at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1955, p. 591.
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Theologically, the term Mu 'tazilah did not originally means accession from
Orthodoxy, and was not, therefore, ex-cogitated by the Sunnis with the implied sense
of blame or contempt as a declaration of heterodoxy. That name was chosen, or at
least, accepted by the early Mu'tazalites in the sense of neutrals "those who
participated with neither of the two factions, viz. the Sunnis and the Kharijites," in the
grave politico-religious question as what to consider a sinful man such as whether he
nevertheless remained a believer or the commission of sin rendered him an
Unbeliever. "
6.3) Legitimacy of neutrality in Islam: the sources
In Islam, there is no objection to recognising neutrality and neutralisation as legal
systems, with the evidences from the Holy Qur 'an and the Sunnah.
6.3.1) The Holy Qur'an
The teaching on neutrality was very clear as mentioned in the Qur 'anic verse,
4.9351-114 c.); 	es..9P4	 S1/2". 1 434-9	 e..91 cj-11	 c.)4:511
lJJ	 4_91	 esJitia es#IQ. (-6 1- 1- 1	 PLI -91-9 H-4 1-914!
4t
	 C.1.911)1 	C.)-9.1-11"H • N-..L.L", 01410. /%S.14 Llx+ 1-41	 es4)
1 -9-41-9 e•L'44 eS:41 1 _911,4 4.0	 164.i 1J-4)1 kuoj .lj t(.11
:	 . U UUL ia4.40,	 Las+ 41/ ji	 41a. la.4)
Except those who join a group between whom and you there is a
treaty (of peace), or those who approach you with hearts
restraining them from fighting you or fighting their own people. If
Allah had pleased, He could have given them power over you, and
they would have fought you: therefore if they withdraw from you 
(I'tizal)* but fight you not, and (instead) send you (guarantees of)
peace, then Allah hath opened no way for you (to war against
them). Others you will find that wish to be secure from you as well
as that of their people: every time they are sent back to
temptation, they succumb thereto: if they withdraw not from you
nor give you (guarantees) of peace besides restraining their
hands, seize them and slay them wherever ye get them: in their
case We have provided you with a clear argument against them.
(4: 90-91)
11 Ibn Mandliore, Muhammad Ibn Makram, Lisan al-Arab, Vol. XI, Dar Beirut, Beirut, 1956, P. 440 & Al-Amean,
Shareaf Yahya, Mu'ajam al-Firag al-Islamiyyay, Dar al-Adhwa', Beirut, 1986, p. 227 & Gibb, H. A. R., Islam, 2nd
Oxford university Press, London, 1974, pp. 77-78 & Rosenthal, Erwin I. J., Political Thought in Medieval Islam Greenwood
Press, Westport, 1985, pp. 114-115.
* This is a verb illustrated the neutral stance.
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Al-Tabari in his work Jami' al-Bayan 'an Ta'weal al-Qur'an explained the
previous verse as follows:
It is predicted that the hypocrites among the inhabitants of
Madinah would not help their allies the Jews of Banu al-
Nadhear, but would remain neutral. Neutrality here is of the non-
believer group in elation to conflict between the Islamic State
and a Jewish tribe, in the case of fights with the Muslims.12
Like all classical Muslim jurists, al-Tabari does not treat the neutrality of the
Islamic State as a relevant topic. If it is true that other jurists commenting on these
verses have interpreted them in the wider context of Dhimmi status and Aman.
In connection with the Qur 'anic verses (4: 90-91) Jurist al-Nahas put his view to
illustrate the cause of the status of neutrality in Islam when he said,
These verses were revealed after Makkah 's conquest and war
stopped between the Prophet and the Arab polytheists. These
verses, moreover, were not abrogated 13
Al-Nahas makes it clear that those polytheists are not subject to warfare by the
Islamic State. In his account of the meaning and application of these verses in
particular "if they avoid fighting you do not fight them" where either (i) Dhimmis; (ii)
in alliance; or (iii) neutrals. 14
Therefore, it may be argued that those excluded from killing are those polytheists
who are either: (i) under the protection of the Islamic State. As a third party, this
could be achieved by seeking protection from the Islamic State within a treaty of
military alliance, or under the protection of the Islamic State through a Dhimma treaty
by which they are exempt from taking part in Jihad and forbidden to attack the
Islamic State (ii) declaring their neutrality to the Islamic State, as the verse says "if
they avoid fighting you do not fight them".
12 Al-Azadi, Abuda'ud Sulayman Ibn Al-Asleath, Sunan Abuda 'ud, Vol. XIX, Al-Maktabah al-`Asryyah, Beirut, 1950, p.
23.
13 Al-Nallas, Abu J'afar, AI-Nasekh wa A I-Mansukh, Matba'at Zak! Mujahed, Cairo, p. 111.
14 Ibid.
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(Scholar) al-Jassas in his work Ahkarn al-Qur'an gave more details for this theme.
Al-Jasas assumed,
As for those who used to enter the Islamic State and wish not to
fight either the Muslims or their own people (who are in a hostile
relation with the Muslims), then those, according to the Qur'an,
have decided to adopt a neutral stance Ptizal. That is because
they are performing Aman, which imposes upon them the duty of
not joining one belligerent or the other (i.e. the Muslims or their
own people).15
Similarly, Jurist Ibn Kathear added that in the case of non-Muslims under Aman in
the Islamic State that,
Those who want to have gains from both the two parties I The
Muslims and their own people] but feel hostility towards
Muslims, Islam does not tolerate them. God describes them as
"Others you will find that wish to be secure from you as well as
that of their people: every time they are sent back to temptation,
they succumb thereto: if they withdraw not from you nor give you
(guarantees) of peace besides restraining their hands, seize them
and slay them wherever ye get them". They pretend to love
Muslims but change when they return to their people to avoid the
harm from both sides. They realise their interests must be
protected against both sides. These are they who are a dangerous
element in their neutrality Ptizal.16
Therefore, in the authoritative interpretation of the Qur 'anic verse (4: 90-91) it has
been found that there are three versions of neutral status. These are (i) the status of
Dhimmis who are exempt from participating Jihad with the Islamic State; (ii) non-
Muslims under the protection of Aman; (iii) those who seek and offer neutrality to the
Islamic State. Hence, it should be noticed that neutrality, in the classical Muslim
literature, is being discussed in terms of individuals and the Islamic State in the first
two cases, not between the Islamic State and non-Muslim states, or between two non-
Muslim belligerents, however in the third case the relationship could be between the
Islamic State and a non-Islamic State.
15 Al- Jasas, Abu Balcr Ahmed Ibn All Al-Razi, Ahkwn al-Qur'an, Vol. III, Matba'at al-Awqaf al-Islannyyah, Alasatanah,
1335 AH, p. 190.
16 Ibn Kathear, Emad Al-Dean Ismael, Tafsear al-Qur'an al-Atheam, Vol. I, Dar Eliya'a al-Kotoub al-Arabiah, Cairo,
1932, pp. 532-533.
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6.3.2) Neutrality in the Sunnah
In the Sunnah, the terms 'Az! and Ptizal are used under all meanings. In the usage
of separation, in a Hadith narrated by Imam al-Bukhari, the Prophet is reported to
have said,
This tribe of Quraish would kill (people) of my Ummah. They (the
Companions) said: What do you command us to do (in such a
situation)r Thereupon he said: Would that the people remain aside
from them l'tizal (and not besmear their hand with the blood of the
Muslim)!
And,
The best man is . . . (he) who retires (j5AD)) to a narrow valley to
worship his Lord.
In the usage of coitus interruptus, Abu Saeed al-Khudri, a companion of the
Prophet said,
We got a female captive in the war booty and we used to coitus
interruptus (Jj--=.)with them. So we asked Allah's Apostle about it
and he said: Did you really do that? He repeated that thrice, and
then said: There is no soul that is destined to exist but will come
into existence, till the Day of Resurrection.
In the political issue, Ghalib al-Qurashi said,
Umar Ibn al-Khatab deposed (J_3=-) Khaled Ibn al-Walead from the
commandership of the Islamic armies and replaced him by Abu
Vbayda Ibn al-Jarah."
Searching the classical Muslim history of the treaties that provide for Ptizal
neutrality or documents related to the issue that contain reference to neutrality, it may
be said that they are numerous. However, a few of them are more important, which
may be quoted with interest. Ibn Higr al-'Sqalani reported,
The Prophet was to send the Muslims to invade Banu Medlig
tribe, Suraqa An Malik al-Madlagi, who was a companion of the
Prophet and of that tribe, said 7 told him [the Prophet] you
17 Al-Qurashi, Ghalib AbdulKafi, Dr., Awlawtyah al-Farouq al-Slyanyyah, Dar al-Wala'a 11 al-Tiba'ah wa al-Nashr,
Mansorh, 1990, p. 91.
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want to send to my people and I want you to make a truce treaty
with them. If your people [Quraish] embrace Islam, they will do
the same, but if they do not, do not be rough with them". The
Prophet caught Khalid's hand and told him go and do what
Suraqa wants. Khalid reconciled with Banu Medlig a truce treaty
that: "they do not provide any military help against the Prophet,
if Quraish has embraced Islam they will do the same.
Consequently, any tribe allied with Banu Medlig will be with
them and under their protection.18
It is worth mentioning that the tribe of Banu Medlij was linked with Quraish
through a so-called Elaf (.227:L4)* which was a sort of commercial treaty to offer
protection to the Quraishis when they passed through the territory of Banu Medlig.
Such a treaty was popular during that time between the Quraish and the northern
tribes on their way to Syria in Summer and the tribes to the south of Makkah
encountered on the Winter journey to Yemen. Therefore, the Prophet's treaty with
Banu Medlig is similar to what is so-called, recently, the legal status, which is a non-
belligerent in wartime that has certain rights and obligations not extended to the
belligerents. 19
 This means the tribe of Banu Medlig gave no military assistance to
either the new Islamic State or the Quraish.
Ibn Sa'ad in his work, al-Tabaqat al-Kubra, mentioned the following event,
During the war of the Prophet with the Jewish tribe of Banu al-
Nadhear, who was allied to the tribe of Ghatafan and had also
secured the promise of help on the part of the neighbouring
Jewish tribe of Banu Quraidhah. Believing in the aid of these
formidable allies, the Banu al-Nadhear refused to comply with
the request of the Prophet. Under the treaty, to contribute
towards the payment of the blood money of some of the allies
common to them and the Muslims. onsequently hey ere
besieged in the fortresses. The Banu Quraidhah, however,
remained neutral Dizal and rendered no help to the Banu al-
Nadhear. And similar to the attitude of Ghatafan.2°
18 Al- i Sqalani, Ahmed Ibn Hijr, Tahtheab al-Tahtheab ft Rejal al-Hadith, Vol. I, Majlis Da'irat al-Ma'aref, Hyderabad,
1325 AH, p. 284.
* See page 293.
19 Holsti, K. J., International Politics, A Framework for Analysis, 3" Edit., Prentice/Hall International, New Jersey, 1977, p.
113.
20 Ibn Sa'ad, Muhammad, Al-Tabagat al-Kubrah, Vol. II, Dar Beirut, Beirut, 1980, pp. 57-58.
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The neutrality to which Ibn Sa'ad refers is that of an non-Islamic tribe in relation to
the Islamic State and non-Islamic clan. There is no reference to the Islamic State as a
neutral in this passage which mentioned by al-Waqidi,
- Under the treaty of Hudaybiya, refugees from Makkah had to be
extradited even if they were Muslims. Knowing this, Abu Busair,
who escaped from Makkah, did not go either to Madinah or to
Makkah, but took refuge between the two cites. This attitude of
Abu Busair and of his comrades to live aloof is also called
I 'tizal.21
In the treaty of al-Hudaybiya between the Islamic State and Quraish, there is
provision for neutrality. Figure five of the treaty reads as follows,
• . . and that between us is a tied-up breast, and that there shall
be no secret help violating neutrality, and no acting
unfaithfully. 22
Latter, during the time of Caliph Uthman, the Muslims concluded a treaty with the
governor of Cyprus. The neutral I 'tizal in that treaty mentioned in the following part,
The Muslims would not attack Cyprus, but at the same time, they
[the Muslin's] would not defend them if any other power attacked
them. 23
This example shows, that the status of I'tizal was applied to the Islamic State. Up
to this point, l'tizal has been applied to non-Muslim political entities (Jewish tribes) in
relation to other non-Muslim political entities and the Islamic State. The only
exception to this, is where non-Muslim individuals are neutral between the Islamic
State and a non-Muslim political entity under Dhimmi status and Aman. Or where
Muslim individuals (like Abu Busair) are neutral between the Islamic State and
similar non-Muslim (Harbis) political entities.
6.4) Neutrality among the Muslims
Muslim jurists mentioned some instances of I 'tizal neutrality between the Muslims
and non-Muslims in various literatures. However, searching their literary works, it
21 AI-Waqidi, Muhammad Ibn Umar Ibn Waqid, 	 `Aalam al-Kotoub, Beirut, 1965, pp. 370-371, 387.
22 Hamidullah, Mohamad, Al-Wathaeq al-Slyasyah ii al-Ahd al-Nabawy wa al-Khelafah al-Rashedah, 6" Edit., Dar al-
Nafais, Beirut, 1987, p. 80.
23 Al-Belathuri, Ahmed Ibn Yahya, Fotoh al-Buldan, Maktabat al-Nandha al-Masriyah, Cairo, 1951, pp. 152-153.
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could be found that, nearly, none of them had reviewed neutrality among the Muslims
themselves. To highlight this theme it may be said that the Qur 'anic teaching in this
theme is very clear,
I jltiii ‘5,A`11 L5ir. 1..1 cli..1 citi 1.41.i.1 1j.,1,411 1 ,31.1.11 a+1.4:1.4.11 (:)A cjlidilla cj) j
s,1-?.
 41 c:)1 1 ..93aji Jaa) 1-4-144 1..9- 1-211 Q. Pti C.11:i 41 JAi Loll P4016 Li1-% 445 SA
(9 :1.'d_)+all)	 	
If two parties among the Believers fall into a fight, make ye peace
between them; but if one of them transgresses beyond bounds
against the other, then fight ye (all) against the one [party] that
transgresses until it complies with the command of Allah; but if it
complies, then make peace between them with justice, and be fair:
for Allah loves those who are fair (and just). (49: 9)
The Shari 'ah shows that a neutral stance by a Muslim is not always acceptable as it
admits injustice and breaks the unity of the Ummah. Islam orders the Muslims to
interfere: firstly, with peaceful methods to specify the wrongful party and try to halt
him; secondly, if he refuses then follow the Shari 'ah's order to resolve the dispute by
fighting the transgressor. The strong party in the Islamic Ummah could adopt such a
measure.
However, it is important to say that neutrality among the Muslims themselves
appeared during the time of Caliph `Uthman, where there was a great struggle
between the Companions about `Uthman's ability to rule the Ummah. They (i.e. the
Companions) divided into three groups, those who were with his deposition from
office, among these were `Amr Ibn al-`Aas, Muhammad Ibn Abu Bala, Talha Ibn
`UbaidAllah. Those who were against, among them were Mu'awiyyah Ibn Abu-
Sofyan, Saeed Ibn al-`Aas, Abdullah Ibn al-`Abas, Al-Hasan Ibn Ali Ibn Abi Talib,
Abdullah Ibn Al-Zubir. The third adopted neutrality with non-interference in the
crisis, among those were, Sa'ad Ibn Abi Wallas, Ali Ibn Abi Talib, Al-Zubir Ibn al-
`Aawam, Talha Ibn al-Zubir, `Aisha- the Prophet's widow.24
Later, during the time of Caliph Ali, another important example of a neutral stance
occurred between the Muslims and took place in the war between Caliph Ali and
' Aisha. Companions such as Sa' ad Ibn Abi Waqas, Abdullah Ibn Umar Ibn al-Khatab,
24 Al-Tabari, Mohamad I bn Jarear, Tama al-Umam wa al-Muluk, Vol. II, Dar al-Ma'arif, Cairo, 1962, pp. 665-678.
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Saeed Ibn al-`Aas and al-Mughirah Ibn Sh'ubah adopted a neutral stance in that war.25
The latter two were with `Aisha on her way to fight Ali, but they returned to the
middle way and adopted Ptizal. 26 According to al-Tabari,
Al-Mughirah Ibn Sh'ubah and Saeed Ibn lelt Makkah
with them [i.e. Aisha and her supporters] for a distance, then
Saeed asked al-Mughirah: "What is the suggestion': Al-
Mughirah replied: 7t is, I swear by God, the I'tizal, their theme
will not succeed, if he [i.e. Nu wins, we go to him and we say: it
was our mistake and we obey you. Then they adopted Ptizal.27
6.5) Neutrality among Muslims and non-Muslims
There are practical considerations in which the Islamic State admitted neutrality to
non-Islamic nations that did not become involved in any military actions against the
Islamic State, both prior to and after they concluded a treaty of neutrality. Among
these nations were Abyssinia, Cyprus, and Nubia. Majeed Khadduri names these three
countries as examples of neutralisation and many later writers have endorsed his view
without adding to it or questioning his assumption (arguably contrary to classical
Figh) that these countries harm Muslims, the Islamic State or Islam itself*
6.5.1) Status of Abyssinia, Ethiopia
To some scholars, Abyssinia is regarded as the classical example of a non-Muslim
state which Islam voluntarily declared to be immune from the Jihad. The history of
the relations of Prophet Muhammad with Negus, the Monarch of Abyssinia, put this
country in a favourable light vis-à-vis the Islamic State. Martin Lings in his book
Muhammad has reported
When the Prophet saw that although he had escaped persecution
himself many of his followers did not, he said to them: "I f ye
went to the country of Abyssinia, ye would find there a king under
25 lqbal, Alia', The Culture of Islam, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, 1967, p. 247.
26 AI-Tabari, Mohamad Ibis Jarear, Tareikh al-Urnarn wa al-Muluk, Vol. III, Dar al-Ma' aril, Cairo, 1962, pp. 3-8.
27 Ibid., p. 8.
* The statuses of these nations have been examined by various scholars, both Muslims and Westerns. Therefore the searcher
believes that nothing will be added to the historical events, only the examination of the views of some scholars, particularly of
Majeed Khadduri in this regard.
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whom none suffereth wrong". So some of his companions set off
for Abyssinia; and this was the first emigration in Islam.28
Because the Muslim emigrants were well received by the Negus, and because he
refused to hand them over to the deputation of the chiefs of Quraish but decided to
protect the emigrants, and also because of his favourable reply to the Prophet's letter
of invitation to accept Islam which persuaded the Negus to embrace it, the Muslims
were well disposed toward Abyssinia. The Prophet Muhammad is reported to have
said,
Leave Abyssinia as long as they left you.29
In his work Bidayt al-Mujtahid wa Nihayt al-Muqtasid, Jurist al-Qurtobi of the
Malikites noted,
Imam Malik said that: ills not permitted to start war with either
Abyssinia or Turks because of the narrated Prophetic Hadith."
Consequently, traditions were supported by practice. Owing to the fact that when
the Islamic State started its expansion, Abyssinia became immune from Jihad, when
all the Islamic State's neighbours territories were under an offensive attack. This is
precisely what Imam Malik meant.
However, it has to be observed that according to Shari 'ah, the country which is
excluded from the Jihad must belong either to Dar al-Islam or Dar al-Ahd.
Therefore, since Islamic Law was not enforced in Abyssinia territory — a criterion,
which determines whether a territory is Dar al-Islam or not- it could not be regarded
as part of Dar al-Islam, even though its ruler had accepted, or rather recognised, Islam
as a religion and Prophet Muhammad as the Apostle of God. M. Khadduri mentions,
If Abyssinia is neither Dar al-Islam nor Dar al-Harb, it must
therefore belong to the intermediary territory which may be
called Dar al-Hiyad, or the world of neutrality. Since it is a
territory which Islam had voluntarily declared to be outside the
28 Lings, Martin, Muhammad, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1984, p.80.
29 Al-Bayhaqi, Ahmed Ibn Al-Hussein, AI-Simon al-Kobra. Vol. IX, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1994, p. 176 & Al-Nasal, Ahmed
Ibn Shu'ayb Ibis Ali, Sunan al-Nasa'z, Vol. VI, Dar al-Bashalr al-Islarnlyyah, Beirut, 1986, p.44 & Al-Azadi, Abuda'ud
Sulayman Ibn Al-Ash'ath, Sunan Abuda 'ud, Vol. IV, Al-Maktabali al-Asryyah, Beirut, 1950, p. 162.
30 Al-Qurtobi, Muhammad Ibis Aluned,Thdayt al-Muitalud wa Nihayt al-Mucitasid, Vol. 1, Dar al-Ma'rifah, Beirut, 1981, p.
306.
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bounds of its area of expansion; it formed, accordingly, a
neutralised territory which Islam was under legal obligation to
refrain from attacking as long as it reciprocally refrained from
attacking Muslim territory.31
However, to examine Khadduri's view, it is important to recall the definition of the
domain of covenant Dar al-Ahd in order to understand the status of Abyssinia. It has
been said that Dar al-Ahd is a territory not under the Muslim rule, yet is in a tributary
relationship to Islam by agreement Sulh being generally used in Shari 'ah as the
opposite of force.* Therefore, while the relationship with Abyssinia was not
systemised by a treaty which organised the relations between the two parties, it may
be said that it was a new situation in Islamic international relations. However, what
can be understood from Khadduri's argument is that the status of Abyssinia was a
material case founded because of the difficulties, which could face the Muslims if
they thought about fighting the Abyssinians. Khadduri, moreover, relayed his
argument on a statement of the scholar Abu al-Hassan Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Hadi
who assumes that: "the reason for Prophet Muhammad's warning against an attack on
Abyssinia was "Ethiopia's roughness and the mountains and rugged valleys and seas
that lie between it and the Muslims."32
It is true that the distance which separates Abyssinia from Arabia is very far, and
the geography of that country makes it very hard for the early Muslims to travel there.
However, it may not be true that those were the reasons for the Prophet's warning,
otherwise the Muslims would not make any kind of conquest. It may be said,
moreover, that the geography of middle Asia is the same of Abyssinia where the
Muslims reached that area during the time of Caliph Umar I, which occurred after few
years of the death of the Prophet. On the other hand, the status of Abyssinia was
organised under a legal status made by the Prophet's command, which is a part of the
Shari 'ah legislation, to the Muslims under the condition that the Abyssinians would
not attack the Muslims. In connection with this, the Prophet's command was based on
the Negus' attitude toward the Muslims, and not because of any kind of truce, or
friendship treaties.
31 Khadduri, Majid, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1979, p. 258.
* See chapter III, 3.3.4.
32 Khadduri, Majid, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1979, p. 256.
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Moreover, Khadduri assumed that the status of Abyssinia was "a neutralised
territory". However, according to Holsti's definition of a neutralised state: the state
must observe neutrality rules during armed conflict but that, during peace, must also
refrain from making a military alliance with other states. 33
 Therefore, whether
Abyssinia became an ally of another state, it is impossible to tell, but there is no
evidence to support this assumption. Out of that, it could be said that Abyssinia,
during the early conflict between the Muslims and the Quraishs, was in a neutral
stance but not a neutralised territory as Khadduri assumed. Therefore, this may correct
Khadduri's assumption regarding the debate of Abyssinia in the early time of the
Islamic State.
Moreover, it has to be said that the neutral status of Abyssinia does not remain for
a long time. The Abyssinians attacked Jeddah, on the western cost of Arabia, in
150AH - 770AD - during the time of the `Abasside Caliph Abu Jalar al-Mansour,
which encouraged the Caliph to attacked Abyssinia. 34 However, there are no
convenient documents which illustrate in detail that clash between the Islamic State
and the Abyssinians.
Lastly, it can be said that the assumption of Khadduri that the status of Abyssinia
was a neutralised state is wrong, it can be said that it was a neutral stance organised
according to the request of the Prophet and under the specific condition that they (i.e.
the Abyssinians) would not attack the Muslims, but if they do the Muslims are free to
protect themselves and counter attack, which, was seen to happen during the time of
the `Abasside Caliph Abu Jalar al-Mansour.
6.5.2) Status of Nubia
Most scholars, whose deal with the Islamic theory of international relations,
classified the status of Nubia under neutral stance. However, it could be argued that
Nubia was not under neutral stance, which will be shown in the following work.
33 Holsti, K. J., International Politics, A Framework for Analysis,P Edit., Prentice/Hall International, New Jersey, 1977, p.
113.
34 Basha, Muhammad Mukhtar, Al-Tawfegat al-Ilahiya fi Mugaranat al-Tawareakh al-Hijriyah bi al-Senean al-Efranfiyah
wa al-Qipteyah, VoL 1, al-Mu'asasah al-Arabiah Ii al-Dirast wa al-Nashr, Cairo, 1980, p. 185.
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Historically, during the time of Caliph Uthman, Egypt's Governor Abdullah Ibn
Abi Sarh concluded in 651 AD a reconciliation treaty with the people of that territory
under the condition that they (the Nubians) pay the Muslims three hundred and sixty
head of slaves. The texts of the treaty reads as follows:
In the name of God the Most Gracious the Most Merciful, This is
a covenant from the Amir Abdullah Ibn Sa'ad An Abi Sarh to the
Majesty of Nubia and all the people of his kingdom, a covenant
binding upon the young and small of the Nubian people, from the
frontier of Aswan to that of 'Alwah. Abdullah Ibn Sa'ad makes
them safeguard [A man] and conciliation [Hudnah] between them
and their Muslim neighbours of south Egypt, together with other
Muslims and Dhimmis. You people of the Nubia are secure under
the safeguard of Allah and His Apostle Muhammad the Prophet
peace be upon him, that we will neither attack you nor wage war
against you, nor allow others to attack you (lit: nor make rides
against you) as long as you adhere to the conditions between us
and you. You may enter our country as travellers not as settlers,
we may enter your country as travellers not settlers. You have to
protect those Muslims or their allies who are in your country or
travel there until they depart. You have to restore to the land of
Islam [Muslim authority] every run-away slave of the Muslims
who fled to you, you must not take possession on him, nor prevent
or thwart a Muslim who comes to take him and must help him
[the Muslim] until he leaves. You have to take care of the mosque
which the Muslims have built in the courtyard of your city, you
do not prevent anyone from praying in it, you must sweep it,
illuminate it and respect it. Every year you have to pay three
hundred and sixty head of slaves to the Imam of the Muslims,
they have to be of the medium type of slaves of your country, free
from bodily defects, both male and female and not among them
extremely old men or old women, nor child under age, these you
shall hand over to the ruler of Aswan. The Muslims have no
obligation to repel an enemy who attacks you or prevent him
[engaging in military action] from the frontier of 'Alwah to the
land of Aswan. If you give refuge to a [run-away] slave of a
Muslim, or kill a Muslim or ally, or attempt to ruin the mosque
which the Muslims have built in your city, or withhold any of the
three hundred and sixty slaves, then this truce [Hudnah] and
safeguard IA man] is disavowed from you [shall be cancelled]
and we and you shall return to hostility until Allah judges
between us, for He is the best of all judges. Upon this conditions
we are bound by the covenant of Allah and His pledge and that of
His Apostle the Prophet Muhammad; and you stand pledged to
us by those you hold most holy in your faith, by the Messiah and
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the Disciples and all those you venerate in your religion and
community. Allah be the witness between us and you on that.35
With close consideration to the text of covenant, it can be seen that the main text of
the treaty is similar to any other Islamic treaty concluded between a Muslim
commander and non-Muslim territory ruler, which come as a result of the Islamic
conquest. With careful reading of the interpreted text of the treaty, moreover, it can be
said that the treaty between the Muslims and the Nubians is a merger of different
treaties in one. First, it includes a provision for general Aman and that it can be given
by the Imam only, or his representatives, to all Harbis or to a large number of them.
Under the terms of the treaty, the power and authority of the Imam or his
representatives entitles them only to guarantee safety for a large number of people.
This can be found in the following parts of the treaty:
- Abdullah Ibn Sa'ad makes them to a safeguard lAman] and
truce IHudnah
- You people of the Nubia are secure under the safeguard of
Allah and His Apostle Muhammad the Prophet of peace be upon
him.
It has been concluded in chapter IV that Aman is not given to persons of Dar al-
'Ahd because they are covered by the protection given by the treaty which organises
their status.*
It is, moreover, a conciliation truce and non-aggression treaty, as can be found
under the following article,
We will shall neither attack you nor wage war against you, nor
allow others to attack you as long as you adhere to the conditions
between us and you.
It has been mentioned in chapter V that under the Shari 'ah the Imam or his
representatives are the only ones who are entitled to estimate the duration of the treaty
as temporary or permanent, based on its importance. Moreover, the status of hostilities
35 Hamidullah, Mohamad, Al-Wathaeg al-Slyasyah Ii al-Ahd al-Nabawy wa al-Khelafah al-Rashedah, 6th Edit., Dar al-
Nafais, Beirut, 1987, pp. 530-531.
For further details see chapter IV.
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returned between the two states which had previously been involved in warfare when
the king of Nubia in 955 and again in 956 AD attacked Aswan in the south of Egypt.36
It is a treaty of extradition, the following part explains that when he said,
You have to restore to the land of Islam [Muslim authority] every
run-away slave of the Muslims who fled to you, you must not take
possession on him, nor prevent or thwart a Muslim who comes to
take him and must help him [the Muslim] until he leaves.
However, this treaty does not show the Muslims commitment regarding the same
condition. Nevertheless, it could be reciprocity because this condition applies in the
status of travelling,
You may enter our country as travellers not as settlers, we may
enter your country as travellers not settlers.
If there were commercial transactions between the Muslims and the Nubians,
where the Muslims gave the Nubians food for the same value of the slaves; then it is a
treaty of friendship and commodities exchange, which aimed to create a situation of
goodwill and co-operation, particularly in the commercial field. This could be
confirmed by the words of Majeed Khadduri,
The tribute, known as the baqt, was not in the form of fizyah, for
neither had the Nubians became Dhimrnis nor was the annual
payment a sign of submission. It was rather a reciprocal trade
agreement. 37
Similarly, Gibb and Kramers in their work The Short Encyclopaedia of Islam
mention,
Among the examples of the Islamic friendship and commodities
exchange treaties, the treaty concluded by the ruler of Egypt in
the reign of the Caliph Uthman Ibn Affan with the Christians of
Nubia, which stipulated amity, good neighbouring as well as
36 Basha, Muhammad Mukhtar, Al-Talifeqat al-Ilahiya fi ilfiiqaranat al-Tawareakh al-Himiyah bi al-Senean al-Efranfiyah
wa al-Qipteyah, Vol. I, al-Mu'asasah al-Arablah ii al-Dirast wa al-Nashr, Cairo, 1980, p. 376.
37 Khadduri, Majid, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1979, p. 260.
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mutual assistance where the ruler supplied them with food, grain
and slaves.38
Therefore, it can be found out that the status of Nubia was not organised under the
status of neutrality. Consequently, the searcher assumes that the status of Nubia does
not apply on the neutrality principle, the reconciliation concluded between the
Muslims and the Nubians could be considered as a treaty of permanent unlimited
reconciliation, even without imposing the Jizyah. However, Khadduri has a different
classification for the status of Nubia, describing it as that of neutralisation,
. • . the nature of the treaty is such that [Nubia] did not pay
tribute to Islam for the maintenance of peace . . . This status . . .
is a qualified status of neutralization.39
Hence, what can be concluded is that the exemption from paying tribute is not a
crucial cause to obtain the status of neutrality by any part of Dar al-Harb. Nubia was
neither neutral nor neutralised, but was party to a multiple treaty which organised its
relation to the Islamic State. The crucial purpose of the multiple treaty was a non-
aggression pact. This meant that the Muslims aimed to stop fighting with the Nubians
more than forcing them to adopt neutrality, to gain benefits from newly established
commercial transactions with them, and finally, to protect the Muslims and their
religious places in Nubia. It could be argued, moreover, that the conditions laid down
by the Muslims meant that it was a truce treaty under Islamic law. Unfortunately
history contains no comment from the Nubians on this treaty so their view on it is
unknown.
Lastly, what can be concluded from this part is that the treaty of Nubia was to be
adhered to by all Muslim rulers. This is because the Islamic Law of treaties insists that
Muslim rulers must respect and adhere to Islamic treaties even when they were
concluded by previous rulers. The Islamic State, during its peak military power, was
able to attack and conquer Nubia and add it to the Islamic territories.
38 Gibb, H. A. R. & H. Kramers, Short Encycloprecha Of Islam, E. J. Bill, Leiden, 1974, P. 69.
39 Ithadduri, Majid, War and Peace In the Law of Islam, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1979, p. 261.
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6.5.3) Cyprus
During the time of the Caliph `Uthman Ibn Affan, Cyprus was subject to the
Romans when it attacked by Mu'awiyyah Ibn Abi Sofyan in 648 AD. Mu'awiya
concluded a treaty with the ruler of Cyprus. Al-Tabari narrated the text of the treaty,
which read as follows,
The conciliation with Cyprus concluded that the Cypriots pay a
fizyah of 7000 Dinars to the Muslims annually, and the same
amount to the Romans, which the Muslims shall not prevent that
tribute to be paid The Muslims shall not attack the Cypriots nor
to fight on their behalf their enemies. They [the Cypriots] have to
inform the Muslims the movements of their enemies, the Romans;
the Imam of the Muslims shall designate their Patriarch among
them, and they do not marry with the Romans territories except
by our [the Muslim ruler's] permission.4°
In his work Futuh al-Buldan, Ahmad Ibn Yahya Al-Balathuri added,
The treaty concluded between Mu 'awiyyah and the Cypriots
stipulated that: when the Muslims were engaged in a naval
expedition, they would not harm the Cypriots nor were the
Cypriots under obligation to support them or anyone against
them.4'
Sir George Hill added,
Mu 'awiya exacted an equal sum, though apparently he raised no
objection to the continuation of the payment to the Greek
treasury; presumably he considered it to be no business of his if
the Cypriotes could be induced to pay twice over . . . it shows that
the Caliph made no claim to be the sole ruler of Cyprus.42
In 654 AD, the Cypriots violated their treaty with the Muslims when they offered
ships to the Romans as an aid to an expedition on the sea; therefore Mu' awiyyah re-
attacked Cyprus and confirmed with the Cypriots a treaty on the terms of the treaty
previously concluded. However, by the year 689 AD the influence of the Muslims
was considerably reduced by Caliph AbdulMalik Ibn Marwan who renewed the treaty
with the Emperor Justinain II (It had originally been made with the earlier Emperor,
40 Al-Tabari, Mohamad I bn Jarear, Tareikh al-Utnam wa al-Muluk, Vol. 11, Dar al-Ma'arif, Cairo, 1962, p. 602.
41 Al-Belathuri, Ahmed Ibn Yahya, Futuh al-Buldan, Maktabat al-Nand ha al-Masriyah, Cairo, 1951, pp. 152-153.
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Constantine IV, in 678). Under the treaty, the Caliph engaged himself to pay 1000
nomismata, 365 horses and the same number of slaves annually to the Roman Empire.
The treaty provided for the division between the two powers the revenues of Cyprus.43
In connection with this, Majeed Khadduri assumed,
The position of Cyprus was extremely precarious, ranging from a
dependent status under Byzantine or Muslim rule, to complete
independent status, when the two rival powers agreed to respect
Cyprus' independence, each [were] satisfied with half of the
annual tribute."
Majeed Khadduri, in another part of his treatise, added more details to the history
of Cyprus history when he wrote,
Cyprus was a Byzantine tributary island when it was attacked by
Mu 'awiya I in AD 648 . . . a treaty was concluded by which
Cyprus was made a buffer state . . . In AD 654, Mu 'awiya
attacked Cyprus again. . . and sent to the island 12,000 men and
created a mosque. Further, Mu 'awiya erected a city on the island
and transplanted from Balabakk (Baalbek) a few men and a
garrison that remained until Yazid, Mu'awiya's son, sent them
back and ordered the city destroyed.45
During the time of Caliph Haroon al-Rashead, the Cypriots raised a rebellion to
free their country of the Jizyah. The governor was to cancel the treaty with the
Cypriots, though AbdulMalik Ibn Salih al-'Abbas, the governor of Egypt, requested a
legal Fatwa from the jurists of his time. Among those jurists was Musa Ibn A'yun's
who said,
I have heard from al-Awza'i that: in regard to a similar case of
some people who, after conciliation with the Muslims, then
conveyed information about their secret things and pointed them
out to unbelievers [their enemies] : 'if they are Dhimmis, they
have thereby violated their covenant and forfeited their
Dhimification. It belongs to the governor; he could kill or cruci,fr
them, if he so desires. But if they had been taken by conciliation,
they are not entitled to the Muslim's Dhimma, then the governor
42 Hill, George Sir., A History Of Cyprus, Vol. I, Cambridge, University Press, 1949, p. 284.
43 Al-Belathuri, Ahmed Ibn Yahya, Futuh al-Buldan, Maktabat al-Nand ha al-Masriyah, Cairo, 1951, pp. 152-153.
44 Ithadduri, Majid, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1979, p. 263.
45 Ibid., p. 262.
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would repudiate their treaty, for Allah loveth not the
machinations of deceivers."
Another Fatwa was of Imam Malik Ibn Anas - the founder of the Malikite Sunni
School who said,
The Aman of the Cypriots is of old standing, and has been
carefully observed by their governors, because they considered
their recognition on their conditions [of the treaty] is humiliation
and belittlement, and a source of strength to the Muslims, in view
of the Jizyah paid to them [the Muslims] and the chance they had
of attacking their enemies [the Muslim's enemies].47
Examining the previous debate, as well as the historical events, it can be said that
to judge accurately on the status of Cyprus, one should find out, first, the kind of
relationships which connected Cyprus with the Byzantine Empire. Unfortunately, no
such treaty is available or even mentioned in the Islamic literature to clarify the
obligations of the two parties (i.e. the Cypriots and the Byzantine). Therefore, we
should assume that it was a matter of paying tribute, but not any other kind of
alliance.
What can be concluded concerning the status of Cyprus is that: (i) It was organised
to be an indirect alliance between the Islamic State and Cyprus. This could be
confirmed with that mentioned in the 648 AD treaty, which reads: "They [the
Cypriots] have to inform the Muslims the movements of their enemies, the Romans'*;
(ii) The status of Cyprus changes in 654 to be a part of Dar al-Islam. This was
confirmed by the word of Khadduri when he said: "Mu'crwiya erected a mosque", this
was because during the early time of the Islamic Empire, Muslims have no religious
freedom to build their places of worship unless these places are located in Dar al-
Islam. On the other hand such an assumption can be confirmed by the word of George
Hill when he said "it shows that the Caliph made no claim to be the sole ruler of
Cyprus", and Khadduri's words: "Mu 'awiya sent to the island 12000 men . . . erected
a city"; (iii) Then, in 689 the evidence is inconclusive about the precise status of
46 AI-Belathuri, Ahmed Ibn Yahya, Futuh al-Buldan, Maktabat al-Nandha al-Masriyah, Cairo, 1951, p. 161.
47 Ibid., pp. 160.
*
See similar examples in chapter VII.
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Cyprus in this period. The best conjecture is that it reverted to something like its
previous status of indirect alliance with the Islamic State.
Examining the nature of the treaty itself, it can be said that paying tribute to the
Islamic State does not mean that the Cypriots were Dhimmis, this leads to say that the
treaty concluded between the two parties was a conciliation treaty Muhadanah, which
can be confirmed by the controversial Fatwa of Jurist Musa Ibn A'yun. However, in
the Fatwa of Imam Malik, the treaty shaped by a general Aman, can be given by the
Imam or his representative who was Mu'awiya. Accordingly, one could conclude that
the status of Cyprus was not organised under the status of neutrality more than it was
arranged under a treaty of conciliation. This corrects the mistake of Majeed Khadduri
and other writers who assume that Cyprus was a neutral territory or buffer state
between the Byzantine and Islamic Empires.
6.6) Rights and duties of neutrals
The previous examples of Abyssinia, Nubia and Cyprus may be multiplied but
unfortunately none of them describes rights and duties of neutrality. The jurist al-
Sarakhasi in his great two works Sharh al-Siyar al-Kabir and Al-Mabsut, however,
reproduced the rights and duties of neutrals in various places. Not every occurrence of
them in his writings will be examined as the main features of this legal status can be
gathered from a part of the total number. Every last detail of the rights and obligations
of neutrals vis-a-vis states actually engaged in war is therefore not analysed since the
purpose of this section is to determine their principle features.
If a state [A] is in a treaty of peace with the Muslims and is attacked by a third
state [B] which took prisoners and enslaved them [of state A], subsequently the
Muslims waged an independent war against this state [state B] and captured the pri-
soners of their friendly state [of state A], they would be slaves of the Muslims. For the
third state had not violated the jurisdiction of the Muslim State in capturing them. If
the third state [state B] secures its capture, it will become the rightful owner of the
same. 48 This means, it will not be an infringement of neutrality to appropriate the
48 Al-Sarkbasi, Muhammad Ibn Ahmed, Sharh al-Sorar al-Katnr, Vol. IV, Hyderabad, 1335 All, pp. 134-135.
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property of a friendly state if it was duly acquired by a third state from whom it
passed lawfully to the Muslims.
(ii) If a Muslim citizen [A] is remaining in a foreign country [B] which has
purchased the booty captured by a third nation [C] from a fourth one [D], the Muslim
citizen may lawfully purchase that property (in spite of the fact that this state had
remained neutral in that war).49 From this, it may be understood that ownership was
vested in the country which captured the booty and that foreign countries plunder each
other and acquire ownership of persons and properties. Therefore it is lawful for the
Muslim resident to purchase this booty just as any other property owned by the
country where be is residing. Similarly, if a Muslim resides in a country that had
captured booty from a third State, he may purchase that booty, as ownership was
vested in that country of residence. If a non-Muslim country was attacked and
plundered by a third non-Muslim state, the Muslim citizen residing in the former may
lawfully purchase booty from the latter, aggressor state.
(iii) If Muslim citizens are staying in a foreign country [A] which is attacked by a
third state [C], they must not fight against that third State (which is not actually at war
with the Islamic State) except when they find their security in danger. In this case,
they may fight against that third state in self-defence (not in breach of the neutrality of
their own Muslim State). 5° The precedence of this is provided by Ja'far Ibn Abu
Talib, the cousin of the Prophet Muhammad and the other Muslims in their refuge in
Abyssinia during what was so-called the first Abyssinia emigration Hijrah. When the
Negus, the Abyssinian monarch, was in danger of losing his power and was attacked
by some of his followers, the Muslims were prepared to take up arms in favour of the
Negus because they were afraid that the new ruler might not offer them the same
asylum."
(iv) If the subjects of a foreign country come to the Islamic territory by permission
of Anian and intend to proceed to a third state which is at war with the Muslims, in
order to join forces with them against the Muslim State, passage will be denied them.
49 AI-Sarkhasi, Muhammad Ibn Aluned,,41-Mabsut, Vol. X, Matba'at al-Sa' adah, Cairo, 1931, p. 97.
50 Ibid., pp. 97-98.
51 Ibn Hisham, Abd Almalik, A1-Syrah al-Nabawyah, Vol I, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1955, p. 287.
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For the passport secured for them is only freedom of stay and freedom of return to
their own country. Beyond this, the Islamic State has the right in denying them all that
is harmful to the Muslims. No doubt if one or two of them want to proceed to the third
state for commercial purposes, this may not be denied them. 52 However, it may be
said that the case is different if they are a formidable force, in such case it will be
similar to what is called "benevolent neutrality" which is permitting public armed
forces of one state to pass through Muslim territory. This is mentioned in the
following quotation,
If they are a formidable force, and enter Muslim territory by
permission in order to cross to another territory to fight their
enemies, and they were attacked, while in the Muslim territory,
by an enemy, the Muslim State is not obliged to come to their
rescue even when it is in its power. The case is different when
non-Muslim subjects of the Muslim State are attacked by
foreigners, in which case it is the duty of the Muslim State to
protect them.53
(v) If the ships of the enemy carry goods belonging to neutral states or ships
belonging to the neutral states carry goods belonging to the enemy states. 54
 It can be
said that in such cases it comes under the specific principle that assumes "the safety of
the owner renders the property safe" which is similar to "a respect due to a property is
according to the respect due to its owner."
6.7) Islamic system of neutrality
It has been noticed that Shari 'ah recognised the idea of neutrality earlier than
international law. However, as a legal system and a part of the countries' sovereignty,
scholars of the international law recognised this theme in the late of the 1 8th century.
Nevertheless, in Shari 'ah such a notion can be traced, which resembles the modern
system of neutrality. In order to know how far such a system is jurisprudentially
accepted, it must be, initially, assumed that the Shari 'ah has approved of neutrality as
a political fact, because there were some nations, such as Abyssinia, who adopted
neutrality between the Islamic State and its enemies. Therefore, if Islam admits
52 AI-Sarkhasi, Muhammad Ibn Ahmed, Al-Mabsut, Vol. X, Matba'at al-Sa'adah, Cairo, 1931, pp. 121-122.
53 Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 109.
54 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 142.
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neutrality as a materialistic event, there is no objection to admit it as a legal system, as
what is important is the result. However, what is the system of neutrality that Shari 'ah
approves, comparing it with what it is known in the international law? Some scholars
such as Majeed Khadduri concluded that the Islamic system of a neutral state is,
The state which regards its normal relations with the entire
world as permanently hostile and permits short intervals of peace
only when regulated by treaties obviously has no place left for
the country which chooses to be on good terms with that state
and also with its enemies. If neutrality is taken to mean the
attitude of a state which voluntarily desires to keep out of war by
not taking sides, no such a status is recognized in Muslim legal
theory. For Islam must ipso jure be at war with any state which
refuses to come to terms with it either by submitting to Muslim
rule or by accepting a temporary peace arrangement. The world,
it will be recalled, was sharply divided under Muslim law into
two divisions: the Dar al-Islam. . and the Dar al-Harb . . . No
jurists, however, would approve of a country being allowed to
choose without Islam 's consent an intermediary status between
Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb. Islam refrained from attacking
certain territories which were regarded . . . Such territories,
constituting a separate division of the world, may be called Dar
al-Hiyad 55
The term "neutrality" is absent from the Shari 'ah as a legal system, nevertheless,
its meaning, it could be argued, was realised due to the establishment of friendly
relations between the Islamic State and non-Islamic political entities. In connection
with this, it should be considered that under the Shari 'ah war is a necessity for
specific purposes, and with the end of these purpose, relations between belligerents
should returns to the normal status of peace. It can be argued that the Islamic system
of neutrality is based on a legal status and not on the actual status quo. All relations
with non-Muslims have to be conducted on the basis of the Islamic religion,
especially its law. Muslims have little or no choices to make; they must follow the
commands of the Shari 'ah in their dealings with non-Muslims.
The Prophet's commands concerning Abyssinia are an illustration of this system of
legal rules governing relations with non-Muslims. All his treaties are legitimate in
Islam and as part of the Sunnah are a source of the Shari 'ah. The single treaty
between the Islamic State and Nubia, and the several treaties between it and Cyprus,
55 Khadduri, MaJid, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1979, pp. 252-253.
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are not like the Abyssinian treaty as they were concluded after the Prophet's death
under the Caliphate. Despite the fact that Abyssinia was under the general Qur ' anic
teaching "Fight all unbelievers", the Prophet in fact exempted Abyssinia from Jihad
by the Muslims because of its neutral stance in the military struggle between the
Muslims and their Quraish enemies. An additional factor was that the monarch Negus
offered shelter to the Muslim emigrants in Abyssinia and later embraced Islam,
thereby implanting the nucleus of Da 'w a in his country, that is, spreading the Islamic
mission in Abyssinia. In his effort to explain the status of Nubia, Majeed Khadduri
says,
Nubia 's position was neither Dar al-Islam, for Islamic law was
not in force in the territory, nor in Dar al-Harb. It may be argued
that Nubia was Dar al-Ahd, as it was in the treaty relations with
Islam; but since the nature of the treaty is such that it did not pay
tribute to Islam for the maintenance of peace as in other tributary
relations) but paid rather on a reciprocal basis, it follows that its
position resembles in some respects that of Ethiopia, defined by
the terms of the treaty which gave her a special status in Muslim
law. This status, agreed upon by both parties to last for the
duration of the treaty, is a qualified status of naturalization.56
However, a part of the importance of this chapter is to find out how the neutral
stance of the Islamic State could be specified toward an existing war or dispute?
Because, as said earlier, the lack of the classic literature in this issue, therefore it is
possibly saying that the position of the Islamic State is classified under the provision
of the Islamic Shari 'ah, any existing war or dispute is of four kinds:
1) Between two Muslim parties. This issue has been examined earlier in this
chapter, where Muslims have to resolve their disputes and neutrality is not accepted
among them.
2) If a war or dispute takes place between a Muslim State and a non-Muslim
political entity. According to the Islamic teaching of Muslim Brotherhood, all
Muslims have to support that Muslim State, which is a must either individually or
among the Muslim States, based on the Qur 'anic teaching which call the Muslims to
56 Ibid., p. 261.
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support each other against those who encroach upon them. Among the Qur 'anic
teaching,
( V	 :2..?_9 11) • • • t..);211-1 	 *;21-1	 (.1914.:9-411.9
The Believers, men and women, are protectors, one of another ...
(9: 71)
In the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad, there are Hadiths request from Muslims
to support each other,
The Muslim is a brother to the Muslim, he neither oppress him nor
disappoints him.57
This was Muslim brotherhood illustrated clearly during the time of the second
Caliph Abu-Bakr when he requested from the Muslims of Yemen to support the
Islamic State in its fight against the Romans of Syria.*58
3) Between two non-Muslim states. The Shari 'ah's teaching orders the Muslims
not to interfere and to adopt a neutral stance, unless one among the belligerents is an
ally of the Islamic State and asked it to fulfil the commitment of their alliance treaty.
In those circumstances, the Islamic State should fulfil it treaty obligations and uphold
that state. The Prophet himself declared war against Quraish when he found out their
responsibility in attacking his ally Banu Khuza'ah. Nevertheless, if there is a truce or
a reconciliation treaty between the Islamic State and the belligerents, such treaties
should be fulfilled by non-interference.
4) Between two non-Muslim countries with no treaties to organise the military
relations between the Islamic State and the belligerents, then the Islamic State should
adopt a neutral stance.
To sum up, the neutrality principle is to be determined in Islam as per Shari 'ah 's
provisions, and is specified by the nature of the dispute and the relation between
Muslims and others as per the concluded treaties.
57 Ibn Hanbal, Ahmed Ihn Muhammad, Musnad al-Intam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal, Dar al-Ma'aref, Cairo, 1980, Hadith no.
7756.
* See the full text of the Caliph's request in the next chapter.
58 Hamidullah, Mohamad, Al-Wathaeq al-Siyasyah Ii al-Ahd al-Nabawy wa al-Khelafah al-Rashedah, 6th Edit., Dar al-
Nafais, Beirut, 1987, pp. 397-399.
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6.7) Summary and conclusion
In this chapter Khadduri's thesis that the Islamic State can only have peaceful
relations with neutralised states is challenged by distinguishing between neutralisation
and neutrality. Neutralisation according to Khadduri is the condition of previously
Harbi states which have concluded a temporary truce treaty with the Islamic State.
Neutrality is the legal status of non-participation in war either by the Islamic State in a
war between two non-Muslim states* or the non-participation of a non-Muslim state in
a war between the Islamic State and another non-Muslim state. Such a status was not
possible on Khadduri's thesis because his interpretation of Jihad was of permanent
hostility between the Islamic State and other states suspended in a few cases for short
period by truce treaties. Khadduri's conception of permanent Jihad was challenged in
the previous chapter and rejected in favour of the view that normal relations between
the Islamic State and non-Muslim states were peaceful. It is in this context that an
Islamic theory of neutrality becomes possible.
Within the Islamic law the terms Hiyad and Hiyadah are used in a way which is
synonymous with the modern term "neutrality." In pre-Islamic and early Islamic
Arabia, the term employed was Ptizal, though, this term now applies only to a
particular school of Muslim philosophical and theological.
In the Shari 'ah there is evidence in the Holy Qur 'an and the Prophetic Sunnah to
the legitimacy of neutrality. In the Holy Qur'an, it has been found that the
authoritative interpretation of the Qur 'anic verse (4: 90-91) 
-which mentioned Atizal-
there are three versions of neutral status. These are (i) the status of Dhimmis who are
exempt from participating Jihad with the Islamic State; (ii) non-Muslims under the
protection of Aman; (iii) those who seek and offer neutrality to the Islamic State.
Therefore, neutrality, in the classical Figh is discussed in terms of individuals and the
Islamic State in the first two cases, not between the Islamic State and non-Muslim
states or between two non-Muslim belligerents. However in the third case the
relationship could be between the Islamic State and a non-Islamic State. In the Sunnah
* In the Figh literature, there is no discussion of this logical possibility. Jurists were only interested in the possibility of neutrality
by a non-Muslim state or states. Despite this, the Islamic State was, as a matter of fact, neutral in wars between non-Muslims
states during the Abbaside Empire, for example those in Northern Europe. In short, the Islamic State was often de facto neutral,
but never de jure neutral. Neutrality is always secured by a treaty with the Islamic State, but when the Islamic State is itself
neutral no such treaty exists.
283
Chapter VI
the status of I 'tizal was applied by the Prophet and after that by the Caliphs to the
Islamic State. Up to this point, I 'tizal has been applied to non-Muslim political
entities (Jewish tribes) in relation to other non-Muslim political entities and the
Islamic State. The only exception to this, is where non-Muslim individuals are neutral
between the Islamic State and a non-Muslim political entity under Dhimmi status and
Aman. Or where Muslim individuals are neutral between the Islamic State and similar
non-Muslim (Harbis) political entities.
Khadduri's thesis about neutralisation was examined in detail in the three cases —
Abyssinia, Nubia and Cyprus — which he used to argue his case. In the case of
Abyssinia, Khadduri's assumption that its status was regulated by a Sulh treaty was
incorrect. No such treaty existed. Its relations with the Islamic State were a new
situation in Islamic international relations, one which was organised at the Prophet's
command (which is a part of the Shari 'ah legislation) and by which Muslims were
forbidden to attack Abyssinians unless there were first attacked by them. The
Prophet's command was based on the Negus' attitude toward the Muslims, and not
because of any kind of truce or friendship treaties. Using Holsti's definition of a
neutralised state, it was also found that Abyssinia did not qualify as neutralised. But
on Holsti's definition of neutrality, Abyssinia was a neutral state during the early
conflict between the Muslim and the Quraish because it took no part in the conflict,
supported neither side, and made no military alliance with other states.
In the second case Nubia, Khadduri argued it had a qualified status of
neutralisation. However, after examining the treaty between Egypt's Governor
Abdullah Ibn Abi Sarh with the people of Nubia, it has been concluded that the status
of Nubia was neither that of neutralisation nor of neutrality, but it was a party to a
multiple treaty which organised its relation to the Islamic State. The crucial purpose
of the multiple treaty was a non-aggression pact. This meant that the Muslims aimed
to stop fighting with the Nubians more than forcing them to adopt neutrality, to gain
benefits from newly established commercial transactions with them, and finally, to
protect the Muslims and their religious places in Nubia. The conditions laid down by
the Muslims meant that it was also a truce treaty under Islamic law.
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In the third case, it was concluded that the status of Cyprus was an indirect alliance
with the Islamic State, confirmed in the 648 AD treaty, ' They [the Cypriots] have to
inform the Muslims the movements of their enemies, the Romans. "In 654 AD its
status changed to become arguably a part of Dar al-Islam. This was confirmed by the
word of Khadduri when he said: "Mu 'awiya erected a mosque", this was because
during the early time of the Islamic Empire, Muslims had no religious freedom to
build their places of worship unless these places were located in Dar al-Islam. On the
other hand, against this conclusion is the fact that the Caliph made no claim to be the
sole ruler of Cyprus, even though, in Khadduri's words, "Mu 'awiya sent to the island
12000 men [and] . . . erected a city". Then, after 689 AD the evidence is inconclusive
about the precise status of Cyprus. The best conjecture is that it reverted to something
like its previous status of indirect alliance with the Islamic State.
It has been concluded, moreover, that the nature of the treaty between the Muslims
and the Cypriots does not mean that they were Dhimmis, this leads to say that the
treaty concluded between the two parties was a conciliation treaty Muhadanah, which
can be confirmed by the controversial Fatwa of Jurist Musa Ibn A'yun. However, in
the Fatwa of Imam Malik, the treaty was shaped by a general Aman. Accordingly, it is
concluded that the status of Cyprus was not organised under the status of neutrality,
nor of neutralisation because there was no previous war with Islamic State, but was
arranged under a treaty of conciliation. Majeed Khadduri and other writers who
assumed that Cyprus was a neutralised or neutral territory or a buffer state between
the Byzantine and Islamic Empires are therefore mistaken.
In the Islamic system of neutrality, all cases of neutrality in Islam were organised
and legitimated on a religious basis. The Qur 'anic texts and the Sunnah tradition, as
well as the practices of the Muslims rulers, are the proofs which show that Islam
admits the neutral position of the non-Muslims political entities. Moreover, it could be
admitted that, under the Shari 'ah, neutrality is permitted, whether it is temporary or
permanent, but it should be organised under a particular treaty which specifies the
status of the neutral party as well as its obligations towards the Islamic State. Islam
admits temporary neutrality (as well as temporary neutralisation) by non-Muslims
toward an existing war between the Islamic State and non-Muslim political entities.
Permanent neutrality does not harmonise with the Islamic teaching unless it is
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organised through a treaty with the Islamic State. Islam, moreover, insists that
Muslims should respect a neutral attitude because not respecting neutrality is opposite
to the principle of fulfilling charters ordered by Islam. However, if the neutral state
violates its obligations, for example by helping the enemy, this ends the neutrality
treaty.
As for the individuals of the neutral state, if they are in the territory of belligerents
they may remain in that territory, providing that they follow the restrictions imposed
by the belligerent state in which they are living. In particular, within those restrictions,
they should make no contact with the state at war with the state in which they remain
or with any of its individual citizens. As for the effect of war on the Must'amin
individuals of the neutral state, because they enter the Islamic State under the Aman
and by an agreement between the Islamic state and their neutral state, their lives,
assets and properties are protected so long as they make no contact, or cause a
reasonable suspicion of making such a contact, with the enemy state at war with the
Islamic State.
Because of the affects of the war, in some circumstances the citizens of the
belligerents should follow the laws of their countries. Most states prevents its citizens
to contact the enemies individuals, this refers to the legislation and legal regulations
of each state. However, in Islam war does not lead to a complete severance of
commercial relations with the state fighting the Islamic State. However, it is
permissible as a military measure or as an economic pressure on enemy, to cut
commercial relations. Therefore, the trade of the neutral state has full freedom
provided that it should not strengthen one party through arms.
Although neutrality, like neutralisation, is an external relation between the Islamic
State and non-Muslims, there is a kind of Islamic neutrality within the Ummah in
certain circumstances. The teachings of the Shari 'ah shows that a neutral stance by a
Muslim in a conflict between two Muslims is not always acceptable as it admits
injustice and breaks the unity of the Ummah. Islam orders the Muslims to interfere:
firstly, with peaceful methods to specify the wrongful party and try to halt him;
secondly, if he refuses then follow the Shari'ah's order to resolve the dispute by
fighting the transgressor. The strong party in the Islamic Ummah could adopt such a
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measure. Thus, if war is waged between two Islamic sects, the Islamic State has to
follow the Qur 'anic teaching which requests from the Islamic State not to remain
neutral, but to interfere by using peaceful methods to correct the wrongful party and
try to end his aggression. However, if he refuses, the Shari 'ah orders that the dispute
is resolved by using force against the transgressor. However, Muslim individuals
could remain neutrals in such circumstance.
If non-Islamic states or political groups are not at war with the Islamic State they
may be related to it either by truce treaties and neutralisation, by neutrality treaties, by
conciliation treaties or by treaties of alliance. This last kind of treaty will be examined
in the following chapter.
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7.1) Introduction
The lack of a common definition of alliance is perhaps the first indication that the
literature is characterised by a marked absence of agreement on many issues.
Scholars use the terms alliance, coalition, pact and bloc; however, it is important to
note that some scholars differentiate between an alliance and a coalition. In the
Dictionary of English, for instance, alliance could be found under the following
definition,
A close agreement between countries, groups, families, etc. for a
shared purpose or for the protection of their interests.'
Coalition is defined as,
A union of separate political parties for a special purpose (esp.
for a government), use, for a limited period of time.2
Pact as,
A solemn agreement esp. between opposing groups or nations.3
Bloc has given the definition of,
A group of people (esp. politicians), political parties, or nations
that act together.4
There is therefore no great difference between the four definitions when they
concentrate on the parties. It is clear they must be equals; a nation has to ally with its
counterpart, another nation, families with families, states with other states. A family
or any other non-state group, however, could not ally with a state.
On other hand, various Western scholars have put their own definition on the word
alliance. Edward Gulick defines alliance as,
1
Longman., Dictionary of Contemporary English, 2nt Edit., Longman, Essex, 1987, p. 26.
2 
Ibid., p. 186.
3 Ibid., p. 739.
4 
Ibid., p. 98.
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A bilateral or trilateral agreement for offensive or defensive
purposes.'
And coalition as,
A similar agreement signed by four or more powers or a
conjunction of several alliances directed toward the same end6
In Gulick's definitions there are some distinctions which should be noticed.
However, the differences are not all that clearly stated: consequently, these terms will
be treated as essentially one and the same for the purpose of this thesis.
Among the various modern definitions of alliances, the one considered most
appropriate for the purpose of the present study is that offered by Robert Osgood, who
states,
An alliance ... reflects a latent war community, based on general
co-operation that goes beyond formal provisions and that the
signatories must continually cultivate in order to preserve mutual
confidence in each others fidelity to specified obligations.*
There are important differences between modern alliances and those commonly
found in the middle centuries. Modern alliances tend to be larger and more concerned
with internal threats. In addition, they are characterised by permanent planning,
executive machinery and a high level of military integration. Basically, the structures
of international alliances vary widely, and all sorts of patterns have appeared at
different times in ancient and modern history.'
Therefore, it is no simple matter to identify all alliances of all relevant types in the
whole Islamic era and ascertain their scope, membership and duration. Consequently,
the basic interest of this chapter is the focusing on the military alliances and those in
which military components are involved during the early time of the Islamic State and
5 Gulick, Edward V., Europe's Classical Balance of Power, Cornell University Press, New York, 1955, P. 78.
6 Ibid.
7 Osgood, Robert E., Alliances and American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1968, p. 19.
This definition could draws attention to the fact that alliances represent a special type of co-operation. This is an aspect that not
only has often been neglected, but that may be particularly relevant in the past and maybe in contemporary world.
8 Luard, Evan., The Balance ofPower, The system of International Relations, 1648-1815, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1991,
p.261.
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particularly during the time of Prophet Muhammad and the four Orthodox Caliphs.
However, the searcher will not hesitate to quote examples from other eras if there is
the need to help the aim of this study. In this chapter, moreover, the Muslim scholars
views regarding the military alliances will be reviewed and analysed in terms of a
number of important elements, such as aims, methods, structures and system.
Due to the lack of any scientific Islamic theory in this regard, the searcher will rely
on the Syrah of the Prophet to find out the important required elements of alliance
between the Islamic State and a non-Islamic political entity. * In order to achieve a full
understanding of Islamic military behaviour, it is initially important to look at the
nature of alliances. However, it should be noted that analysing alliances has a wide
range of difficulties. This was confirmed by Michael Nicholson when he argued that,
Unfortunately the analysis of alliances is not easy. That this is
likely to be a problem is indicated by the sheer numerical size of
the possibilities. 9
On the other hand, alliances have commonly been identified with aspects of
international relations with the potential to lead to conflict, specifically in reference to
the balance of power. On one level, alliances could be viewed as a natural mechanism
of the international system; while on another level, the formation of alliances appears
to be an appropriate strategy through which national decision-makers sought a
pooling of resources, either to increase the weight on their side of the scale or to move
their own weight over to that side which would ultimately be heavier.10
It is often the case that a state can make its promises and threats more credible, and
the sum total of its possible rewards and penalties larger, by joining an alliance or by
organising one. In sum, an alliance is an essential instrument for exercising influence
and power, in international no less than in domestic politics. Most often no single
person, group, or nation is strong enough to prevail alone in a major decision; most
often each can prevail only with the help of a coalition, or not prevail at all.
*
This term refers to any non-Islamic party with which the Islamic State may be in alliance. It could be a group of people, like a
tribe, a single individual, such a foreign merchant, or a non-Islamic State.
9 Nicholson, Michael, Formal Theories in International Relations, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1989, p. 188.
to Beer, Francis A., Alliances, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1970, pp. 4-5.
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The basic interest of this chapter is in focusing on military alliances, and those in
which military components were involved, during the early time of the Islamic State
and particularly during the time of Prophet Muhammad and the four Orthodox
Caliphs. This chapter will review and analyse the Muslim Scholars' views regarding
military alliances in terms of a number of important elements, such as the aims,
methods, structures, parties and system. However, due to the lack of any systematic or
scientific Islamic theory of alliance in classical Figh, this chapter tries to discover and
systematise the most important elements required in an alliance between the Islamic
State and a non-Islamic political entity. It will be concerned in particular to support
the claim that treaties with non-Muslims are legitimate in Islam, provided certain
conditions are fulfilled, but that there can be no alliances in Islam, that is, within the
Muslim Ummah where brotherhood prevails.
7.2) Alliance in the Jahiliyyah and Islam
In classical Muslim thought, alliance (Hill k-i-L) was extensively debated.
Basically, there is no distinction between the juridical and linguistic meaning of the
term "alliance" in both the Arabic language and Figh. Ibn Mandhore in his book
Lisan al-Arab defined alliance as,
It is an agreement of collaboration and mutual aid. The Plural is
Ahlaf, which is derivative from Hilf `thi oath". It is, moreover, a
pledge between people to patronise, support, and agree on
specific matter."
Hilf is what is known as a particular idiomatic notion, which is the military pact.
Thus, from the searcher's point of view, military alliances could be defined
accordingly as,
The pacts, or agreements convened between two or more nations, by which each is
obliged to act upon the terms of such a pact by assisting the other by fighting side by
side in case of attack, or defending each other in case of aggression. Combat may
begin on the spot, if justifiable. Defence may imply consultations and contacts
between concerned parties so they may be able to settle the dispute. Otherwise, a
Ibn Mandhore, Muhammad Ibn Makram, Lisan al-Arab, Vol. IX, Dar Beirut, Beirut, 1956, pp. 53-54.
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battle and military engagement would be necessary according to the advantages of
each ally.
In the immediate period of Jaheliyah in Arabia before Islam, and in the early
phases of the Islamic State, there were no states in the academic sense. There were
only the so-called City-States which were tribes allied together to control a particular
geographic area and impose their own law on it. In the words of Asghar Ali,
• • there was no state machinery or any similar repressive
organ, neither in Mecca, nor in Medina. The people were used to
living a free lffe uncontrolled by any external authority except, of
course, the tribal traditions. The repressive organs of a state like
the police and army were also unknown. There was no law except
the tribal traditions.12
In addition, the Arabs, like other nations, knew alliances in the form of tribal
alliances for other particular purposes such as support, co-operation on the matters of
revenge, sacrifice and blood ransom or, alternatively, for permanent co-operation.
Consequently, military force was used as the main element to fulfil the objectives of
the tribe alliances, which could be identified as military alliances. Moreover, when
the people of that time were allies, they used to say "My blood is yours, you inherit
me and I inherit you, you defend me and I defend you"" or 'Your blood-seeking is
[my] blood-seeking and [your] blood-remitting is my blood-remitting"" then he
renders his ally the sixth of his inheritance. Therefore, Islam rescinded that sort of
alliance when the Holy Qur 'an insisted that,
12	
.
(V* : (.11-62 1 ) .c..);22-.1 L0.1_9i t24-Z22-.1 4.ji l ..91.91..9
. . . but kindred in by blood have prior rights against each other.
(8: 75) [but in-law relatives have priority —over blood relatives- in
reliance on each other].
Alliances, moreover, were of great concern to Arabs since it consolidated the
tribe's power and security, it was related to the concept of protection. The solidarity
of the kinship group meant that the group protected its individual members. W.
Montgomery Watt, for instance, mentions three devices which increased the size and
Engineer, Asghar Ali, The Islamic State, Advent Books, New York, 1980, p. 24.
13 M-Tabari, Mohamad Ibn &treat ., Jam? Al-Bayan An Ta'weal Al-Qur'an, VoL V, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1995, p. 34.
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strength of the group or extended the circle of those obliged to help it, these are:
attached to the group as clients (Mawla )ya), neighbourly protection (Jiwar and
the main interest of this chapter- alliance or federation (Hi? f). According to Watt,
This was ostensibly between equals, and might be between
several individuals or groups; but sometimes, especially when it
was between two of whom one was stronger than the other, an
element of superiority and inferiority crept in, and the
confederate (halifi was hardly distinguishable from the client.15
Alliances were also in great vogue in all parts of Arabia. Many ceremonies were
observed at the time of "signature". People used to celebrate by putting drops of blood
in wine before drinking it, smearing themselves with scents and making a fire, the so-
called Coalition Fire. 16 Moreover, there were alliances of the so-called system of
(Elaf k-i-NA) which organised the security and protection of the commercial caravans.*
This system was developed by the Quraishite who concluded or obtained charter
forms with the rulers of Syria, Abyssinia, Persia and Yemen to safeguard and protect
their caravans of trade to their territories in perfect immunity during their trade
journeys to the south in winter and to the north in the summer. 17 A. Y. Ali mentions
In those days of general insecurity, their prestige as custodians
of Makkah enabled them [Quraishite] to obtain Covenants of
security and safeguard from the rulers of neighbouring countries
on all sides.18
7.3) Legitimacy of alliance
There are different kinds of military alliances in the Islam. There is, on one hand,
the alliance among the Muslims themselves; and on the other hand those between the
Islamic State and non-Islamic political entities which can be divided into two
categories, (i) the civil alliance; (ii) the military alliance. There are two kinds of
14 Ibn Hisham, Abd Almalik,A1-Syrah al-Nabawyah, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1955, p. 297.
15 Watt, W. Montgomery, Islamic Political Thought, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1968, pp. 7 -8.
16 Al-Qalqashandi, Ahmed, Sobh al-A 'ash, Vol. I, Al-Matba'ah al-Atniriyah, Cairo. 1931, p. 409.
See page 263.
17
Al-Qassimi, Dhafir, Nidham al-Hulan fi al-Shari 'ah wa al-Tareakh al-Islami, Dar al-Nafstis, Beirut, 1990, pp. 13-14.
18 Ali, Abdulah Yusuf, The Holy Qur'an Text, Translation and Commentary, King Fand Holy Qur'an Printing Complex, Al-
Madinah Al- Monawarah, 1991, p. 2015.
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military alliance: (a) against the Muslim rebels, and (b) against the other non-Islamic
entities. The legitimacy of these alliances will be explored in what follows:
7.3.1) Alliance among the Muslims
It has been concluded in the previous chapter that Classic Muslim jurists permitted
the existence of different Islamic political entities (such as the Fatimid state in Egypt,
or the Emirate of Cordoba, nominally in the `Abbaside Islamic State) at any one time.
These Muslim jurists insisted that it is indisputable that the rulers of the Islamic
polities have to ally against their enemies. By examining their viewpoint, it could be
found that there are two different opinions in this regard. The followers of the first,
among them Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim, 19
 assume that an alliance among the
Muslim themselves is absolutely not permitted and it is null and void, based on the
Prophetic Hadith,
Islam supports and increases the power of the Jahiliyyah's
alliances; However no alliance in Islam.20
Jurist Ibn al-Qayyim said,
If an alliance necessitates something violating Islam, it is
forbidden. And if it necessitates what Islam necessitates, it has no
effect and no benefit.21
Accordingly, all other proofs are nullified with the previous Hadith. In the view of
the second group (who were supported by the majority of the Muslim jurists, such as
Imam Anas Ibn Malik, Imam Abu Hanifah, Imam al-Nawawi and others) there is only
one kind of alliance that is permitted between Muslims. It must be an alliance to
achieve inviolability, support the oppressed, deter the unjust, remove grievances,
establish rapport in place of antagonism or prevent bloodshed and spread security.
The Jahiliyyah alliance called al-Fodhoul and its principles are a clear example of
such a lawful alliance (see below). All other alliances contain unlawful or prohibited
terms and conditions and therefore are forbidden to Muslims. They fall into two broad
19Al-Tabari, Mohamad Ibn Jarear, Jami' Al-Bayan 'An Ta 'weal Al-Qur'an, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1968, pp. 35-36 &
Ibn Taymiyyah, Taq al-Dean Ahmed, Fatawa Ibn Taymiyyah, Riyadh, 1381 Ail, pp. 92-98.
20 
Ibn Hanbal, Ahmed Ibn Muhammad, Musnad al-Imam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal, VoL I, Dar al-Ma'aref, Cairo, 1980, p. 600.
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groups - those related to inheritance and those involving support for oppression.
a) Inheritance. Muslim jurists agreed that the Jahiliyyah practice of allies
inheriting from one another due to their alliance was abrogated by the Qur'an. The
relevant verse was (8: 75) which taught that in-law relatives had priority over blood
relatives in reliance upon each other. Imam Abu Hanifah, however, rejected this view,
or rather he allowed allies to inherit under a special condition,
An inheritance between the two allies is lawful if the deceased
has no heirs.22
b) Supporting oppression. Muslim jurists agreed to prevent an alliance which
would support oppression. They proscribed alliances with people of dubious or bad
character, such as supporters of oppression, in order to realise Islamic teachings in
general, and fraternity under God and similar acts, in particular. Imam Anas Ibn Malik
approved this view as well as some jurists such as al-Nawawi and Ibn Hajar Al-
' S galani.23
On the face of it there is a disagreement between the Hanbalite jurists Ibn
Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim, on the one hand, and the jurists of the other three
Sunni Schools of law, on the other hand, the former insisting there can be no alliance
in Islam, the latter allowing alliance in a limited case — al-Fodhoul. However, if the
al-Fodhoul agreement examined closely it terns out to be a kind of brotherhood
agreement since it is made within the tribe. Thus the al-Fodhoul alliance to which the
Prophet referred was an agreement made by some senior members of the Quraish
tribe and this kind of alliance was accepted and endorsed by the Prophet in these
words.
attended the Fodhoul alliance at the house of Abdullah lbn
Gad'an, I do not like this alliance to be nullified even in return for
the means of an easy life. However, if I were to call for similar
21 A1-Jawziyah, Muhammad Ibn Abu Bala- Ibn Al-Qayyim, Tahtheab Sunan Abu Da'aud, Vol IX, Dar al-Ma'arifah,
Beirut, 1980, p. 142.
22A1-Bahrawi, AbdulRalunan al-Hanati & Others, Al-Fatawa al-Ilmdlyah, Vol. VI, Al-Matba'ah al-Amerlyyah, Bulaq,
1310 AIL p. 447 & Al- Jasas, Abu Bakr Ahmed Ibn All Al-Razi, Ahkam al-Qur'an, Vol. II, Matba'at al-Awqaf al-
Islatnlyyah, Alasatanah, 1335 AH, p. 185.
23A1-Nawawi, Yahya Ibn Sharaf, Sharh al-Imam al-Nawawi 'Ala Saheah Muslim, Vol. XVI, 3" Edit., Dar al-Fikr, Beirut,
1978, pp. 81-82 & Al-'Sqalani, Shehab Al-Dean Abu Alfadhl, Fat% al Bari bi Sharh Saheah Al Bukhari, Vol X, Matba'at
al-Halabi, Cairo, 1378 AH, pp. 501-502.
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alliance in Islam I would accept it.24
Al-Fodhoul alliance in Islam will be examined more extensively in section 7.3.2
below. For the moment it is sufficient to note that it is an internal agreement between
members of the same group and though this group in the Jahiliyyah period was not
the Ummah the principle of brotherhood it contained was the one which Islam
adopted for the Ummah. It is in this sense that the Prophetic Hadith, previously cited,
is to be understood,
Islam supports and increases the power of the Jahiliyyah's
alliances; however no alliance in Islam.25
Within the Ummah the relationship between its members from the beginning of the
Islamic State has been that of brotherhood. * Imam al-Bukhari reported the following,
A'asem narrated: I said to Anas Ibn Malik: "Did you reach you that
the Prophet said: 'There is no alliance in Islam" Anas said: "The
Prophet made an alliance of brotherhood between the Quraishs,
Emigrants [Muhajirun], and the Helpers [Ansar] in my house".26
When the Prophet was reported to have made an alliance of brotherhood, it is clear
that the term 'alliance' is used here in a metaphorical sense as the Emigrants and the
Helpers were both Muslim groups and not two externally (and therefore formally)
related bodies. The relationship of brotherhood is far stronger than the contractual
relation of alliance. In alliances between non-Muslims or between Muslims and non-
Muslims, there were specific purposes in every case and the relationship created to
achieve them could always be terminated for specific reasons. In contrast, the
'alliance' of brotherhood could not be terminated for any cause or reason. A good
example of that occurred during the time of the second Caliph Abu-Bakr when he
requested from the Muslims of Yemen their support for the Islamic State in its fight
against the Romans of Syria. Scholar Hamidullah mentions Abu-Bakr's letter as
follows,
From the Caliph of the Messenger of God to whom who reach
24 Ibid.
25
Ibn Hanbal, Ahmed Ibn Muhammad, Musnad al-bnam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal, Vol.!, Dar al-Ma'aref, Cairo, 1980, p. 600.
See chapter 111, 3.4.
26 
Ibid., Vol. VIII, p. 35.
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him my letter from the believers and Muslims of the people of
Yemen. Peace be upon you, I thank to you my God, Who is the
only Lord Allah imposes Jihad upon believers and commands
them by saying "Go ye forth, (whether equipped) lightly or
heavily" and He says `and struggle, with your goods and your
persons in the Cause of Allah", Jihad is a religious duty and
Allah has put great reward for it. We have called upon the
Muslims who are living with us to perform Jihad against the
Romans, they were rushed to obey that, they camped and got
ready to fight . . . Therefore rush you servants of Allah to your
Lord's duty and to one of the two glorious either the death in the
Cause of Allah or the manifest Victory.27
Here in this letter, there is no reference to an implementation of the terms and
conditions of a formal treaty of alliance. Instead, Abu Bakr simply calls upon his
fellow Muslims to join the Jihad against the Romans. This is an example of the
brotherhood alliance within the Ummah in action.
7.3.2) Alliance with the non-Islamic entities
It is a matter of discretion among the Muslim jurists as to who approved and to
who prohibited it. A well-known difficult point among the Muslim jurists is the
question of alliance with non-Muslims in Jihad. This issue is entangled with many
others. Each issue should be defined apart from the others, including whether the
Islamic State is in a position to seek military aid or ally with a non-Muslim political
entity. The following work will attempt an answer to this problem.
(i) The civil alliance. Nearly, all Muslim jurists strongly permitted the use of non-
Muslim entities, individuals or groups, in the affairs of civil life. This is confirmed by
all Hadiths which deal with this point. Jurist Ibn Sa'ad, for instance, noted,
The Prophet and Abu Bakr hired a man from Banu Al- Dail
(tribe) who was a follower of the idolatrous of Quraish to guide
them in their immigration to Madinah.28
27
HamIdullah, Mohamad, Al-Wathaeg al-Skyasyah b al-Ahd al-Nabawy wa al-Khelafah al-Rashedah, 6th- Edit., Dar al-
Nafais, Beirut, 1987, pp. 397-399.
28
Ibn Sa'ad, Muhammad, Ketab al-Tabagat al-Kubrah, Vol. I, Dar Beirut, Beirut, 1980, p. 229.
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Similarly, Ibn Ishaq reported,
The Prophet was told that Safwan Ibn Umayyah had some shields
and weapons. The Prophet sent to him - he was still idolatrous -
asking for those shields and weapons. Safwan asked: In spite of
my teeth, Muhammad?" The Prophet answered no, on loan, and
insured until we give them back. So, (Safwan) gave him a
hundred shields with ample weapons.29
(ii) The military alliance. Using non-Muslims entities in the military fields,
particularly during war, caused a disagreement among the Muslim jurists. Imam
Malik reported, for instance, that the Prophet said in the battle of Badr, ,
I do not ask for the help of a polytheist.30
Ibn Hazm in his work Al-Muhali contradicts this and similar Hadiths when he
narrated the following evidences:3I
1) The Prophet used Jews in his conquests and allocated them arrows just
like the Muslims, Moreover, the Muslim commander Sa'ad Ibn Aby
Waqas used Jews in one of his conquests.
2) Imam al-Sha'abi was asked about Muslims who used the Dhimmis in
their wars. Imam al-Sha'abi answered: "I have witnessed Muslim rulers
who would use adherents of these two religions. They would share (the
booty) with them, and exempt them from their tributes.
Similarly, Imam al-Shafei'i had made a clear dividing line in this theme when he
said,
What is narrated is that the Prophet only used Muslims in the
battle of Badr. He refused the help of the non-Muslims because at
that time he was in the position to decide to use the non-Muslims
or not. However, this was abrogated when the Prophet, after two
years, used a number of Jews from Banu Qayniqa' and [later] in
the battle of Hunyin when he sought the help of the polytheist
Safwan An Umayyah.32
29 
Ibn Hisham, Abd Almalik, A1-Syrah al-Nabawyah, Vol. IV, Matba' at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1955, p. 67.
30 
Ibn Majah, Muhammad Ibn Yazead, Simon Ibn Majah, Vol. II, Dar Ehya'a al-Kutub al-Arabiyah, Cairo, 1987, p. 100.
31 
Ibn Hazm, All Ibn Ahmed, ,e11-Muha/t, Vol. VII, Dar al-Itehad al-Arabi U al-Teba'a, Cairo, 1969, pp. 542-543.
32 Al-Shaferi, Muhammad I bn Idris, Al-Umin, Vol. IV, Al-Matba'ah al-'Amereyah, Cairo, 1322 All, p. 261.
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It could be argued that the Prophet refused the help of the non-Muslims when he
was in strong and military effective. On the face of it, in the previous debate, there is
an obvious clash between the Had//h, which reported by Imam Malik and the opinion
of the jurist Ibn Hazm. This was consistent with the view Fatwa of Imam al-Shafei' i
who said,
If the Imam thinks that a non-Muslim is wise and honest with
Muslims, and there was a need for him to help the Muslims, then
it is permissible. If it is not, then it is prohibited to seek to ally
with them (i.e. the non-Muslims).33
This means that the Imam is the only one entitled to decide the benefit of an
alliance with the non-Muslims. Ibn Hazm argued for alliance with non-Muslims when
the Islamic State was strong and militarily effective. However, if the Islamic State in a
weak military position, two issues arose (i) seeking a military alliance with infidels
against the Muslim rebels; (ii) seeking a military alliance with a non-Muslim political
entity/s against another non-Muslim political entity/s.
(i) Alliance against the Muslims rebels. Muslim jurists disagreed on this theme. Ibn
Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim and some of the Shafei'ites, on one hand, refused the
military help of non-Muslims against the Muslim rebels. The Shafei'ite members
declared that: "Harbis, Dhimmis, and those who must be fought against by Muslims
must not be used in war against the Muslim rebels". This was because the status of the
Harbi is organised under the specific, temporary, Aman condition, which does not
allow the Musta 'mins to become involved in any of the affairs of the Islamic State.
Under the Dhimma treaty which is based on the Shari 'ah status of Jizyah, Dhimmis
were originally exempt from joining military activities of the Islamic State. If they
volunteered for war the Jizyah would be dropped automatically. * However, the
Hanafites, on the other hand, permitted the Islamic State to seek military help from
non-Muslim individuals or groups. 34 In the words of Abu Muhammad, of the
Hanafites,
33 
Al-Khateab, Muhanunad, Mughni al-Mu htaj ila Ma'arefat Ma'ani al-Fath al-Mwhaj, Vol. IV, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo,
1958, p.221.
For further details of the statuses of Harbis and Dhimmis, see chapter IV.
34 
Al-San'ani, Muhammad Ibn Ismael, Soubul Al Salam, Vol. IV, Matba'at al-Babi al-Halabi, Cairo, 1985, p. 1767.
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If Muslims are on the verge of death, and were obliged to,
without any other way out, it is permissible to resort to
mercenaries and be defended by Harbis and Dhimmis. Just as
long as Muslims are sure they adhere to (the teaching of) their
religions, and do not harm a Muslim, a Christian, or Jewish soul,
property or honour unjustly. This is evident in the Qur'an: 'He
details to you what has been prohibited for you except what you
have been forced to". This is general to everyone obliged to
unless a text or consensus forbids it. If a Muslim knows,
individually or in a group, that whom he called to his aid Harbis
or Dhimmis or mercenaries are harming the Muslims or
Dhimmis unjustly, he is forbidden to use their help even if he is to
die. Muslims should surrender to God's will and obey even if
they lose their lives and their properties. They are to fight to the
death in order to die as a dignified martyr.35
Hence, it could be argued that the Islamic State could recognise that Dhimmis,
Harbis, individuals or groups of mercenaries and others of whom they asked for aid,
are supporting and not harming Muslims,. In the history of Islam, there are countless
examples of non-Muslims who have supported the Islamic State with arms in time of
war.
Among the examples of Muslims receiving military support or in alliance with
non-Muslims are the following: the Banu Tay's participant in the battle of the bridge
Al-Jisr under the leadership of al-Muthana; in the battle Al-Buwaib the Christian tribe
of Banu Taghlib joined the war on the side of the Muslims. A member of the tribe
killed the commander of the Persian army. 3 6 It may be concluded that the Islamic
State is permitted to ally with non-Muslims against Muslims challenging or rebelling
against its authority.
(b) Alliance with a non-Muslim polity against another non-Muslim political entity.
Muslim jurists disagree on this point and have divided into two groups. The first
group, including Imam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal and jurist al-San'ani, refused to accept
such an alliance, citing the following Prophetic Hadiths and Qur 'anic verses in
support for their case. The Qur 'anic verses
C>4..9u:=04 FLA; ,g.J.:2,4 p l...1.1_91 0 jlAgall j J.J441. 1 I JI&I.I`i 1_91.41 al.111 Lerli 14
35 
Al-Ghadhban, Monear,A1-Tahalofal-Siyasifi al-Islam, 2nd Edit., Dar al-Salam, Cairo, 1988, pp. 167-168.
36 
Azam, AbdulRahman,A1-Risalah al-Khalidah, 1 't Edit., Jordanian Ministry of Education, Aman, 1975, p. 211.
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0 ye who believe! Take not the Jews and the Christians for your
friends and protectors; they are but friends and protectors to each
other; and he among you that turns to them (for friendship) is of
them; verily Allah guideth not a people unjust. (5: 51)
A-11"	 Isjkj V14i ta.C.144	 .C1..9.1 (:).4	 1_911:6)t 1_9.1..1(.5;1111,4
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0 ye who believe! Take not into your intimacy those outside your
ranks: they will not fail to corrupt you. They only desire for you to
suffer: rank hatred has already appeared from their mouths: what
their hearts conceal is far worse. We have made plain to you the
Signs, if ye have wisdom. (3: 118)
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0 ye who believe! Take not my enemies and yours as friends (or
protectors), offering them (your) love, even though they have
rejected the Truth that has come to you, and have (on the
contrary) driven out the Messenger and yourselves (from your
homes), (simply) because ye believe in Allah your Lord. (60: 1)
And the Prophetic Hadith
• no alliance in Islam.37
And
I do not ask for the help of a polytheist. 38
Against these Prophetic Hadiths, it is clear that other Hadiths provide strong
evidence between Muslims and non-Muslims, and these may have been ignored by
the first group. Imam al-Bukhari narrated that,
A'asem narrated: I said to Anas Ibn Malik: "Did you reach you that
the Prophet said: 'There is not alliance in Islam" Anas said: "The
Prophet made an alliance of brotherhood between the Quraishs
iMuhajerean] and the Ansar in my house".39
He also narrated that the Prophet said,
Allah may support this religion (i.e. Islam) even with an evil
37 Ibn Hanbal, Ahmed Ibn Muhammad, Musnad al-Imam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal, Vol. I, Dar al-Ma'aref, Cairo, 1980, p. 600.
38 Ai-San'anl, Muhammad Urn Ismael, Soubul Al Salam, Vol. IV, Matba'at al-Babi al-Halabi, Cairo, 1985, p. 1767.
39 Matraji, Mahmoud, Translation of Saheb Al-Bukhari,. Vol. VIII, Dar Al-Fikr, Beirut, 1993, p. 35.
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wicked man.'
And that he also said,
Allah may back up this religion by non-Muslims nations:11
Imam al-Termedhy confirmed this when he narrated that Prophet Muhammad said,
Fulfil the alliance of Jaheliyah, it adds to Islam power, and do not
conclude alliance in Islam.42
According to al-Termedhy, do not conclude alliance in Islam meant that the
Prophet stressed that the brotherhood of Muslims is stronger than military coalitions
or alliances.° However, Islam does not deny the objectives for which alliances are
concluded, as long as these objectives achieve dignity and protect the virtue of
mankind. The Prophet praised some alliances that were known in the Jaheliyah,
particularly, the al-Fodhoul alliance. The story of this alliance was narrated in Ibn
Hisham's work al-Syrah al-Nabawyah as follows,
It was called for it in Makkah at the time of Gerhem, and
concluded by persons all of them had the name of Fadhl: Al-
Fadhl Ibn al-Hareth, Al-Fadhl Ibn Weda'ah, and Al-Fadhl Ibn
Fodhalah. The Quraish tribe held a meeting of this group at the
house of Abdullah Ibn Gad'an, one of their notables, in Makkah
after the number of their leaders increased This caused enmity
to grow, so members of the meeting decided to form an alliance
and considered Makkah to be sacred and a place of safety for the
people. Raiding, fighting, plundering and unfairness are not
allowed in Makkah. They agreed on removing grievances and
giving back the rights to the oppressed."
Prophet Muhammad attended a meeting of the al-Fadhl alliance. Shortly after he
had been honoured with the ministry of the Prophethood he witnessed this league and
commented on it with very positive words. The Prophet said,
40 
Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 245.
41 Ibn Hanbal, Aluned Ibn Muhammad, Musnad al-Imam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal, Vol. Dar al-Ma'aref, Cairo, 1980, Musnad
al-Basriyyen.
42 Al-Termidhi, Muhammad Ibn Easa, Sunan al- Termidhi, Al-Maktabah al-Islannyyah, Beirut, 1983, Kitab al-Siyar.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibn Hisham, Abd Almalik, AI-Syrah al-Nabawyah, Vol.!, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1955, p. 92-93.
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I attended the Fodhoul alliance at the house of Abdullah Ibn
Gad'an, I do not like this alliance to be nullified even in return for
the means of an easy life. However, if I were to call for similar
alliance in Islam I would accept it.45
The al-Fodhoul alliance, moreover, existed in the Islamic history for a long time
after the death of Prophet Muhammad. Ibn Hisham in his book narrated the following
event,
There was a financial dispute between al-Hussein Ibn All Ibn
Abu Talib —the grand son of the Prophet- and al-Walid Ibn
`Utbah Ibn Abu Sofyan the governor of Madinah. The latter used
his authority to discriminate against the former. Al-Hussein then
requested from al-Walid to treat him fairly, or he will take his
sword and call for al-Fodhoul alliance in the Mosque of the
Prophet. Abdullah Ibn al-Zobear, al-Mosawar Ibn Noafal al-
Zohri and AbdulRahman al-Tayimi. As a result, al-Walid Ibn Abu
Sofyan did justice to al-Hussein.46
If this event, as described, is analysed, the following salient facts emerge (a) Those
who supported al-Hussein' s call were those who lead the tribes which founded al-
Fodhoul alliance. (b) Al-Hussein's call for al-Fodhoul alliance was not of al-
Jahiliyyah for two reasons: (i) if it had been for al-Jahiliyyah call, his Ummayyads
enemies, would use it against him and his allies, and there is no evidence that this ever
took place; (ii) if it had been for al-Jahiliyyah call, Muslim jurists would not hesitate
to condemn such a Jahiliyyah call and there is no jurists' condemnation recorded.
Various jurists mentioned that the cause for the Prophetic Hadith "I do not ask for
the help of a polytheist" was the aim to recruit the polytheists to convert to Islam. In
the word of jurist al-San'ani,
When the Prophet rejected the help of the polytheist person in
Badr battle, he [the Prophet] perceived that the polytheist
desired to embrace Islam and was seeking for a cause to do so.
The Prophet's refusal impelled him to embrace Islam.'"
45 Ibid.
46
Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 124-125.
47 
AI-San'ant, Muhammad Ibn Ismael, Soubu/A/Sa/am, Vol. IV, Matba'at al-Babi al-Halabi, Cairo, 1985, p. 1767.
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Seeking alliance with non-Muslims, or their participation in the Islamic army, is
based on Muslims' need and as estimated by the Imam, who is the only one entitled to
consider the Ummah's interest and wise policy according to the jurists."
On the other hand, in answer to the Qur 'anic verse (5: 51) it could be said that this
verse is not unconditional and to be applied to every non-Muslim. To interpret it as
such contradicts the injunctions of the Qur 'an which enjoin affection and kindness to
the good and peace-loving people of every religion, as well as the verses which permit
Muslim males to marry the women of the People of the Book. Allah says about
Christians that,
(A :Li) .
	
J.,S1.4 H.A..9
. . . and nearest among them in love to the Believers wilt you find
those who say, "we are Christians". Because among these are
men devoted to learning. And men who have renounced the
world, and they are not arrogant. (5: 81)
The Qur 'anic verses cited earlier (3:118 & 60: 1) were revealed in connection with
those people who were hostile to Islam and made war upon the Muslims. Al-Tabari,
for instance, explained in his book Jami' al-Bayan `an Ta'weal al-Qur'an, the
meaning of the verse (3:118)
This verse was revealed for a group of Muslims in Madinah
during the time of the Prophet. They were associated with some
Jews [of Madinah], their pre-Islamic hypocritical allies. Before
the advent of Islam the Muslims had considered them as their
intimates because of their friendly and very close relationship.
Allah forbade the Muslims to continue in that friendship or even
to consult the Jews in any of the Muslims' affairs.49
As for the verse (60: 1), al-Tabari said,
This verse was for the polytheists and pagans of the Quraish who
48 AI-Sarkhasi, Muhammad Ibn Ahmed, Al-Mabsut, VoL X, Matba'at al-Sa'adah, Cairo, 1931, p. 23 & Al-Ghazall,
Muhammad Ibn Muhanunad, Al-Waseat, VoL VII, Matba'at al-Halabl, Cairo, p. 143 & Al-Mawardi, All Muhammad, Al-
Hawi al-Kabir, Vol. XIX, Maktabat al-Azhar, Cairo, p. 37 81. Al-Shafer', Muhammad Ibn Idris, Al-Utnm, VoL IV, Al
Matba'ah al-'Amereyah, Cairo, 1322 All, p. 117.
49 Al-Tabari, Mohamad I bn Jarear, Jam/ 'Al-Bayan 'An Ta 'weal Al-Qur'an, Vol. IV, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1968, pp.
80-84.
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had driven out the Prophet and his followers from Makkah.5°
Accordingly, those al-Tabari mentioned are those whom the Muslims are forbidden
to support or assist — including being their ally — and also not to entrust them with
secrets at the expense of their own religion and community. The characters of such
people are that they conceal great enmity and hatred for the Muslims in their hearts
and their tongues express some of this hostility. These are the people with whom
Islam prohibited any sort of friendship and alliance. However, the Qur'an has not
dismissed the hope of possible reconciliation. The Qur'an, moreover, did not declare
complete and utter disappointment in them, but encouraged Muslims to entertain the
hope that better relations could be established with them; in effect, a statement of
assurance that hostility and deep hatred would be changed to be friendship. In the
Holy Qur 'an,
•
	 41 j iik3A 	 ej..14,3	 3,44	 41
(V :;i.i.‘14.4.11)
It may be that Allah will establish friendship between you (the
Muslims) and those whom ye (now) hold as enemies. For Allah
has power (over all things); and Allah is oft-Forgiven, Most
Merciful. (60: 7)
Islam, then, does not reject alliances between Muslims and non-Muslims, even of
the Jaheliyah kind. More evidence can be given for the permissibility of such
Jaheliyah alliances. An example is al-Mottaybean alliance which called for virtue and
the implementation of justice in the Jaheliyah time. The Prophet Muhammad is
reported to have said,
attended with my uncles al-Mottaybean alliance when I was a
youth [before he had been honoured with the Ministry of the
Prophethood] I would not like to terminate it even if it is for the
most valuable of the camels plomr al-Ne'am*151
Ibn Kathear explained the reason behind that confederacy when he mentioned that,
It was the conflict between Banu Abdumanaf and Banu Abduldar
to provide protection, service and support for the visitors of
50 
Ibid., Vol. XXVIII, pp. 73-74.
These are red camels. In the past these kinds of camels were the most expensive and only wealthy people owned them.
51
Ibn Hanbal, Aluned Ibn Muhammad, Musnad al-bnam Ahmed Ibn Hanbal, Vol. II, Dar al-Ma'aref, Cairo, 1980, p.404
& Ibn Kathear, Emad Al-Dean Ismael, AI-Bidaya wa al-Thhaya, VoL II, Maktabat al-Ma'arlf, Beirut, 1980, pp. 291-293.
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Makkah. Therefore, the Quraish broke up to two sides, and
pledged to assist and support one side against the other. The war
was about to erupt before their masters favoured reconciliation
and concluded a pledge to prevent bloodshed It was called this
[al-Mottaybean alliance] because while concluding, they brought
a bottle of perfume and put it in the K'abah; and everyone dipped
his hand in it declaring and pledging support.52
These Hadiths about Jahiliyyah alliances are evidence of Muslims in alliance with
non-Muslims. They prove that such alliances were permissible because they were
supported by the presence of the Prophet and his declaration he would never violate
such alliance when he said "if I were to call for similar alliance in Islam I would be
accepted'.
Moreover, the Shari 'ah permits Muslims to be under the protection of non-
Muslims if they are weak. In the early Islamic history, the Prophet himself sought
such protection. In his work "The Sealed Nectar" SafiulRahman al-Mubarakphori, for
instance, mentions the following event,
When he (the Prophet) was a short distance from Makkah, he
retired to Hira' Cave. Whence he despatched a man from
Khuza'ah tribe to Al-Akhnas Ibn Shuraiq seeking his protection.
The latter answered that he was Quraish's ally and in no position
to offer protection. He despatched the messenger to Suhail Ibn
`Amr, but to no avail: Al-Mut'im Ibn 'Adi, a notable polytheist in
Makkah, volunteered to respond to the Prophet's appeal for
protection. He asked his people to prepare themselves fully
armed and then asked the Prophet to enter Makkah. The Prophet
entered Makkah directly to the Holy Sanctuary . . . Abu Jahl
asked Mut'im if he is protector or conversion, the latter replied
"it was merely protection". The Prophet never forgot Mut'im's
favour. At the conclusion of the battle of Badr, he declared that
"if Mut 'im had been still alive and asked for the release of the
Quraishite captives, I would not deny him his request ".53
Other evidence of Muslims receiving assistance from non-Muslims when they
were in a weak situation was the situation immediately after the Emigration. The
Prophet's treaty with the Jews of Madinah, which was later called the Constitution of
52 
Al-Halaby, All Ibn Burhan al-Din, Al-Syrah al-Halalnyah, Vol. I, Dar al-Ma'arifah, Beirut, 1980, pp. 213-214.
53
Al-Mubarakphori, SafiulRahman, The Sealed Nectar, Biography of the Noble Prophet, Maktaba Dar us Salam, Riyadh,
1995, pp. 128-129 & Ibn Hisham, Abd Almalik,P11-Syrah al-Nabawyoh, Vol. I, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1955, pp. 419-
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Madinah * has several clauses in which the Jews agree to assist the Muslims, despite
the neighbourly protection given to the former by the latter.
• The Jews bear expenses along with the believers so long as
they continue at war.
• It is for the Jews to bear their expenses and for the Muslims
to bear their expenses. There is to be (mutual) 'help' between
them against whoever wars against the people of this document.
Between them there is to be (mutual) giving of advice,
consultation, and honourable dealing not treachery. A man is not
guilty of treachery through (the act of) his confederate. 'Help' is
(to be given) to him who is wrong.
• The Jews bear expenses along with the believers so long as
they continue at war.
• Between (the people of this document?) is (mutual) 'help'
against whoever attack Yathrib
	 suddenly (without
provocation?).54
The Constitution of Madinah is thus incontrovertible evidence of alliance between
the Muslims and their non-Muslims counterpart by which the latter undertake to assist
the former. If it is objected that the Constitution was a Dhimma contract, it should be
pointed out that Dhimma contracts did not exist at this time. The Jizyah tribute and
Dhimma contracts were legislated after the 6 th year of the Hijrah according to the
Muslim jurists, whereas the Prophet's treaty with the Jews at Madinah was in the first
year of Hijrah. Furthermore, the treaty contained terms that are absent from the
Dhimma contract, such as military support for the Muslims, while the Dhimma
contract obligates Muslims to protect the Dhimrnis and not the opposite.
Jurist al-Shawkani in his work, Nail al-Awtar, argued that after an initial
prohibition, alliances became permissible Islam under certain conditions,
Alliance with non-Muslims was prohibited, and later was
permitted if they are controlled by the Imam, who can measure
the needs of his Ummah, and the only one who has the decision
422 & Ibn Al-Qayylm, Shams Al-Dean Muhammad Ibn Balm, Zad al-M'aad, Vol. II, Al-Matba' ah al-Masriyah, Cairo,
1914, pp. 46-47.
See appendix I.
54 Watt, W. Montgomery, Islamic Political Thought, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1968, p. 131-133 &
IChadduri, Majid, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, 2" Edit., John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1979, p. 208.
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to ally with non-Muslims.55
There is documentary evidence that in the second year after the Hijrah the Prophet
contracted treaties of alliance and mutual assistance with two pagan tribes near Yanbu
on the coast of the Red Sea called Banu Ghifar and Banu Mudlig and their allies, the
Banu Dhumrah. The treaties are similar in their main parts,
Their lives and money are safe. Help is assured them if anybody
attacks them aggressively. If the Prophet requires their help, they
will help him, and it is incumbent upon them to support him
except in wars waged for religion. This is valid as long as a sea
wets the shells.56
In its normal, natural meaning, the last sentence quoted above indicates the treaty
was of permanent duration. The treaty had nothing to do with either the sea or with
shells, it was in essence a treaty of military alliance, and so it seems reasonable to
infer that this colourful provision was intended to show that the treaty was intended to
be permanent, not temporary. However, this is a wholly speculative interpretation,
and is not consistent with the argument advanced in chapter V that all treaties of the
Prophet were temporary, except the Dhimma treaty, which was permanent. Despite
the protection given to these tribes by the Islamic State and their exclusion from
Jihad, under the treaty terms, neither was a Dhimma treaty because there is no
mention of Jizyah payment in return for protection. The status of this treaty is
explored further below in conjunction with a similar treaty concluded between the
Islamic State and the Banu al-Ashja' tribe against the Quraish.
A leading contemporary jurist-scholar, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, in his pioneering book
The Lawful and Prohibited in Islam argues for military alliances with non-Muslims in
parallel to their treaties over technical matters. In the latter case, it is clear that the
Muslims need to seek help in these matters to remedy their weaknesses and aim for
self-sufficiency. In the case of military alliances the Muslims' need for assistance is
implicit. Al-Qaradawi writes,
There is no harm done if Muslims, at either the private or
55
Al-Shawkani, Muhamad Ali, Nall al-Awtar, Vol. IX, Matba'at al-Halabi, Cairo, 1952, p. 89.
56
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governmental level, seek help from non-Muslims in technical
matters which have no connection with the religion — for
example, in medical, industry, or agriculture. At the same time it
is of course extremely desirable that Muslims become self-
sufficient in all such fields . . . Going considerably beyond this,
scholars say that it is permissible for the leader of the Muslims to
seek help from non-Muslims, especially the People of the Book,
in military matters, and to give them an equal share of the spoils
with the Muslims.57
7.4) Aims of alliance
Historically, it can be found that the Islamic State has derived benefits from
alliances which would be denied to it if it acted independently. Usually, states can
obtain different advantages from being allied with different powers of different size.
Why then do Muslims choose to undertake or shun external commitments? And why
do they elect to join a particular alliance in preference to another? There is a wide
range of objectives that persuaded the Islamic State to join alliances. After reviewing
the Prophet's treaties, it can be found that there are two important elements:
1) Accretion of the Islamic power. Traditionally, the significant value of alliances
has been the degree to which a state increases anothers power through the alliance.
When the Prophet concluded his treaty with the Jews and the Christians of Madinah
(the Constitution of Madinah) he aimed to increase the power of the Muslims against
the Quraish, the main enemy of the first Islamic State. That was because the Muslims
alone lacked the means to confront the Quraish or its allies. This notion underlies the
historic operation of the balance of power, where a combination of Muslims and non-
Muslims joined together against other non-Muslim groups to prevent either one or the
other from gaining a hegemonic position. The Muslims position is not to defend or
restore the balance of power as such: it is to enhance its own position within it. John
Spanier has noted the connection between alliances and the politics of maintaining a
balance of power. Spanier remarks,
Alliance is a major technique in the balance of power politics
57
Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf, The Lawfiil and the Prohibited in Islam, International Islamic Federation of Student Organization,
Kuwait, 1989, p. 342.
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engaged in by states preserving common threat.58
An example of what Spanier means here was the alliance between the Prophet
Muhammad, as head of the Islamic State, with the leader of Banu al-Ashja', according
to Watt, against the Quraish. The text of the treaty was cited by W. M. Watt as
follows:
These are the (the terms) on which Nu 'aym Ibn Mas 'aud Ibn
Rukhaylah al-Ashja'i made confederacy (halafa); he made
confederacy with him on the basis of help and counsel (nasr,
nasihah), so long as [mount] Uhud is in its place as long as the
sea wets a piece of wool. All wrote 11.59
Taking the final sentence of the treaty in its normal meaning it conveys the idea
that the treaty was intended to be permanent, like the alliance and mutual assistance
treaties with the two pagan tribes of Yanbu mentioned earlier. As in that case, the
terms of the treaty show that it was not a Dhimma agreement, because there was no
mention in the text of the treaty of Jizyah payment. Other evidence seems to confirm
this judgement. The phrase, "as long as the sea wets apiece of wool", was also used
in an earlier alliance treaty in conjunction with other similar expressions like, 'as
long as the sun rises on [mount] Thabia"; "as long as people join the Umra [lesser]
pilgrimage to Makkah"; 'Cis long as [mount] al-Khshaban remains in place "; `crs
night follows day"; "as long as a camel takes a rest", to reinforce the words of the
alliance treaty that it was "an alliance for ever and ever". These expressions are taken
from the alliance treaty between AbdulMutalib, the Prophet's grandfather, with the
Khuza'ah tribe. "As long as the sea wets apiece of wool" in this treaty thus meant
'forever' and it is reasonable to assume it had a similar meaning in the alliance for
(military) help and counsel concluded by the Prophet with the Banu al-Ashja' tribe.60
2) The Protection of strategic interests of the Islamic State. The kind of strategic
interests which the Islamic State may seek to secure through an alliance can most
easily be seen in the Constitution of Madinah. Several provisions of the alliance
58 Spanier, John., Games Nations Play, Nelson, London, 1972, p. 191.
59 Watt, W. Montgomery, Muhammad at Medina, Oxford University Press, London, 1956, p. 357 & Hamidullah,
Mohamad, Al-Wathaeo al-Siyasyah Ii al-Ahd al-Nabawy wa al-Khelafah al-Rashedah, 6tk Edit., Dar al-Nafais, Beirut, 1987,
p. 286.
60 
See the text of the treaty in the work of Hamidullah, Mohamad, Al-Wathaeg al-Siyasyah h al-Ahd al-Nabawy wa al-
Khelafah al-Rashedah, 6`k Edit., Dar al-Nafais, Beirut, 1987, p. 274.
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promote the internal security of the Islamic State and its domination. Those treaty
articles which are most relevant to these strategic interests were:
• Any dispute or quarrel between the parties of this agreement
which may lead to an unfortunate result, shall be referred to
Allah and Muhammad;
• The interior of Yathrib will be sacred to the possessors of
this document;
• No protection is to be given (in the name of the family)
except by the permission of that family;
• Each party shall have his share from his own side;
• None of the Jews will leave the territorial jurisdiction of the
Islamic State without the permission of Muhammad*
A second group of strategic interest of the Islamic State which the alliance served
were in the political, military and financial spheres. The more important of these
treaty articles were:
• If the Jews were invited to conclude peace, they must adhere
to peace with the Muslims. If they were invited by the Muslims to
the same, they will have the same obligations.
• The Jews shall contribute to the cost of battle with the
believers as long as they fight;
• Never shall a polytheist grant Quraish goods or persons nor
shall he prevent a believer from an attack on Quraish.
Military aid to Muslims was not confined to the Constitution of Madinah treaty. It
was also the chief objective of the Prophet's treaty with the Christians of Najran in the
South of Arabia. According to the terms of that treaty,
The people of Najran are expected to lend the Muslims
shields, horses, animals and other objects. . . If there was
war in Yemen and Ma'arra, they must supply clothes for
thirty persons, thirty horses and thirty camels. If some of
what was lent was destroyed or perished, the people of
It has to be mention, in connection with this regard, that there are various interpretations to the Constitution ofMadinah, such
interpretations have mistakes in the English meaning, among these mistakes is the interpretation of Majeed Khaduri for this
article when he translated the Arabic text "a ...-N-4 (;J:1!-I	 m-14 c.)•4 431_, " as: "No Jew is allowed to join [the Muslims
in battle] without the authorization of Muhatnmad." Khadduri, Majid, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, John Hopkins
Press, Baltimore, 1979, p. 208.
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Najran shall be compensated,61
This Islamic conception of the strategy of alliance is parallel to the way in which
Western scholars have approached the subject of alliances. Hans Morgenthau, for
example, draws attention to the fact that, typically, an alliance is against a third party,
just as the Najran alliance was directed against the people of Yemen and Ma' arra.
A typical alliance is directed against a specific nation or group.
. . which threatens the community of interests.62
In his book International Politics, G. R. Berridge identified the essential feature of
a treaty of alliance which was clearly present in the Constitution of Madinah.
Alliance is a contractual commitment entered by two or more
states [or a state and a religion group or groups of people] to
engage in co-operative military action in the event of an external
or internal attack in specified circumstances. It is the one way in
which a state might maintain military commitment to other states,
and the entente is an alternative.63
George Liska in his work Alliance and the Third World draws attention to other
purposes in an alliance other than mutual military assistance.
The aim of great power of entering into an alliance is to disguise
control over the lesser ally's actions. The actual purposes of such
an alliance may be as varied as hegemonial dominance, restraint
to foster equilibrium and peace, and surveillance to guard
against disastrous ventures or surprises.64
The Constitution of Madinah established the Muslims in a hegemonic position in
relation to their Jewish allies, particularly in the neighbourly protection articles and in
the article which required the unbelievers to be bound by a treaty that the Muslims
had concluded.
• Whenever (the believers) are summoned to conclude and accept (or live
under) a treaty, they conclude and accept it; when in turn they summon
(unbelievers) to a similar (treaty), they are bound (to observe it) towards
61
1Chadduri, Majid, War and Peace In the Law of Islam, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1979, p. 179.
62 Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics among Nations, 4th Edit., Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1967, p. 176.
63 Berridge, G. R., International Politics, Wheatsheaf Books, Sussex, 1987, pp. 155-157.
64 Liska, George., Alliances and the Third World, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1968, p. 32.
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(the unbelievers) except in the case of those who fight about religion.
(incumbent) on every man is their share from their side which is towards
them."
Despite securing Muslim superiority in the Islamic State, the main purpose of this
alliance and of others concluded by the Prophet was to achieve objectives that could
only be obtained by securing the military assistance of non-Muslims.
It can be concluded that in the early period of the Islamic State when Muslims
realised that they cannot by themselves achieve their objectives, they sought to
construct either permanent or temporary military alliances. Thus, they relied upon,
and made commitments to others who faced similar problems or who shared similar
objectives. These alliances would normally be implemented in two ways: (i) by
providing troops and military assistance such as weapons; (ii) by offering other
support, such as spying. The second form of implementation of an alliance shows that
the Islamic State does not conclude alliances only when its military weakness consists
in lack of troops or military equipment: shortage of military information may also be a
form of military weakness.
There are numerous examples of such military alliances with non-Muslims
concluded during the period of the Islamic wars of conquest in the time of the four
Orthodox Caliphs. It has been narrated, for instance, that during the time of the Caliph
Umar I, the Muslim commander Nu'aim Ibn Muqrin concluded a treaty with the
people of Raiy in Central Asia. Under the terms of the treaty the people of Raiy under
took to act in good faith, serve and guide the Muslims in that territory, never to act
faithlessly, and never to help secretly the enemies of the Muslims. 66 Another example,
also in the period of the Caliphate of Umar I, was the treaty between the Muslim
commander Habib Ibn Maslam al-Fihri and the people of Al-Gargomah, in Syria. The
people of that territory asked the Muslims to exclude them from paying Jizyah in
return for providing help and logistical support to the Muslim army. * They pledged
their help and support to the Muslims in their wars, by spying on all military activities
of the Romans in that territory and giving that information to the Muslims. They also
65 
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pledged to share with the Muslims their captured booty if they participated in the
Muslim wars of conquest.° Still, another example is the treaty which was concluded
during the time of the Caliph `Uthman between Mu'awiyyah Ibn Abu Sofyan, an
army commander, and the people of Cyprus. The treaty stipulated that the Cypriots
would have to inform the Muslims if they recognised any anti-Muslim military
activities by the Romans.68
Finally, it has to be noticed that when Muslim jurists examined and discussed the
purposes of the Islamic State entering into an alliance with non-Muslims they never
considered the aims and objectives of the other party/s. Although these factors may
have been irrelevant in classical Fiqh, the purposes for which non-Muslims allied
themselves to the Islamic State seem to have been for protection or to gain military
and financially benefits. Non-Muslims reasons for concluding an alliance with the
Islamic State could be seen when Khuza'ah tribe sought protection from the Prophet
under an earlier Jahiliyyah alliance with his grandfather. The Prophet expressed his
ignorance of this alliance, but honoured it by affirming it remained in force with the
Islamic State. In his work Ibn Hajar remarked,
The origin in the Prophet's loyalty to Banu Khuza'ah was that
Banu Hashim [the tribe of the Prophet] and Banu Khuza'ah were
allies in the Jahiliyyah and continued their alliance after Islam. .
. Despite that there were Muslims in Khuza 'ah when the
Quraishs attacked, but the origin of alliance had been before that
time.69*
7.5) Methods of Alliance
The alliances of the first Islamic State were organised and co-ordinated in a variety
of different ways. This section will examine the methods which were commonly
Modern term for such helping is "logistic supplies" which contain housing, catering and other sort of services which provide to
armies, and excluding any sort of military weapons or reservoir.
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adopted in those alliances, which might serve as useful examples for the Islamic
theory of alliance. However, it has to be noticed that some of the Prophet's and the
Caliphs' truce treaties were characterised with a kind of alliance. These methods
could be summarised as follows:
1) Commitment of allies. This is through an agreement, written or not, by which
when one ally is attacked, the other ally will automatically or after consultations move
against the attackers, thereby implementing the alliance. The treaties between the
Prophet and the Khuza'ah and the Banu Dhumrah tribes are examples of such an
alliance. In fact, his treaty with the latter was a truce treaty, but it contained an
alliance commitment;
Help is assured them if anybody attacks them aggressively. If the
Prophet requires their help, they will help him, and it is
incumbent upon them to help him except in wars waged in the
name of religion. 7°
The Prophet was compelled to fight the Quraish because of their responsibility for
their ally the Banu Bakr which attacked the ally of the Islamic State, the Banu
Khuza'ah tribe, on the terms of his treaty with this tribe. 71 The Treaty of Joint
Defence and Economic Co-operation, promulgated in 1950 within the Arab League
adopted the same method. Article 2 of the treaty, for instance, reads as follows:
- The Contracting States consider any act of armed aggression
made against any one or more of them or against their forces to
be directed against them all, and therefore in accordance with
the right of legal defence, individually and collectively, they
undertake to hasten to the aid of the state or states against which
such an aggression is made, and to take immediately,
individually and collectively, all means available, including the
use of armed force, to repel the aggression and restore security
and peace. 72
2) Augmentation of the armed forces. This method applies when the Islamic State
or its ally/allies, are involved in some military operations, with troops, weapons and
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other material from other members, in order to help the troubled ally initiate or
conduct military action with or without direct involvement of its allies. The treaty
between the Prophet and the Christians of Najran is a clear example. Ibn Hisham, for
instance, mentioned,
The people of Najran are expected to lend the Muslims shields,
horses, animals and other objects. . . If there were war in Yemen
and Ma'arra, they must supply clothes for thirty persons, thirty
horses and thirty camels. If some of what was lent had destroyed
or perished, the people of Najran shall be compensated 73
3) Giving access to territory. An ally can help its partner by giving a right of
passage for troops or by allowing its territory to be used by its ally for military
purposes, such as, in the present day, for military bases. An example of such a
territory alliance is the treaty between the Muslim commander Suraqa Ibn Amr and
Shahrbraz, the king of Armenia, by which the king allowed Armenian territory to be
used to provide bases for the Muslim army.74
4) Logistical supply. An ally may supply its military partner with strategic military
or civil supplies, when their ally is unable to supply it themselves. An example of
such an alliance was the treaty concluded during the time of Caliph `Uthman between
the Muslim commander Mu'awiyyah Ibn Abu Sofyan and the people of Armenian in
653 AD. The Armenians were exempted from paying Jizyah for three years in return
for supplying and catering for 15000 Muslim soldiers. For their part, the Muslims are
obliged to support the Armenians and fight for them if they are attacked by the
Romans.75
Further, there are indirect methods of supporting the military objectives of the ally.
These could include the supply of certain non-military resources, such as financial
grants and loans, in addition to providing strategic (i.e. economic) information. In
modern academic literature, Western scholars have argued extensively on this theme.
Bulloch and Morris have pointed out that in many cases, such agreements do not
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necessarily imply a sort of alliance. They claim that there are many countries, which
engage in sales of weapons and military equipment or even the supply of technical
officers who are not attached with any political or military conditions. 76 However,
George Liska insists that assisting and providing military support to non-aligned
states signify a type of alliance. Liska argues,
Assistance to a non-aligned state may be part of alliance policy.
It may be intended to reconcile "neutral? with the assisting
power alliance with another state in the region; or assistance to
the non-aligned country may aim at developing it into a power
which could help promote security and stability in changed
conditions of the future.77
7.6) Elements and requirement of alliance
In has been found out in the definitions of the Western scholars that the alliance
parties have to be on the same level, if one party is a state the other should be a state,
and the same is true for the political parties or the groups. However, the Shari 'ah is
different from international law in that the parties can be on the same or different
levels because there is no distinction between public and privet spheres in Islam.
Therefore, the Islamic State can conclude an alliance with a group of people, or
several individuals, or a nation. The Prophet, for example, allied with the Jewish
tribes in the first year of the Hi/rah to support his new state. * He (i.e. the Prophet)
allied with Safwan Ibn Umayyah, an individual, in the battle of Hunyin to support and
fight with the Muslims, 78
 which could show that the Islamic State has the option to
select with whom to ally.
An alliance requires from its creation a basic community of interests between the
allies, which does not cover commercial and economic interests alone, but which
covers all general interests - as military, political and economic. The Islamic State,
therefore, usually constructed military alliances to act as deterrents against those who
were making demands against its interests or posing an immediate military threat.
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Alliances always add precision, especially in the form of limitation, to an existing
community of interests, to general politics and to concrete measures serving them. At
the same time, alliances are capable of adding precision and limitation with regard to
the prospective common enemy. Moreover, the interests which nations have in
common are not typically so precise and limited as to geographic region, objective
and appropriate politics. Hence, even if mutual military needs exist, the creation or
maintenance of an alliance often requires a convergence of interest that goes beyond
common interests in security. 79
 Hans Morgenthau asserts,
An alliance attempts to transform a small fraction of the total
interest of the contracting parties into common policies and
measures. Some of these interests are irrelevant to the purpose
of the alliance, some support them, and others diverge from
them. 8°
7.7) Disintegration of alliance
Alliance, as with any other treaty, comes under the Islamic Shari'ah which
organises all aspects of Muslims affairs. Therefore the same causes which terminate
any treaty can terminate the alliance treaty. However, in Islamic history, there was
one main cause which led to disintegration all military alliances between the first
Islamic State and other nations, that was the violation of the main conditions of the
alliance. 81
Based on the assumption that Shari 'ah insisted that Muslims have to be honest,
and fulfil their engagements, alliances on the Muslims side was obviously durable and
during the time of the Prophet none no alliance contracted by him was terminated by
the Islamic State. Treaties only terminated by non-Muslims by violating their
obligations. A clear example is the alliance of the Prophet Muhammad with the
Jewish tribe of Banu Quraidhah, when they betrayed their alliance with the Muslims
79 Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations, 4th Edit., Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1967, p. 176.
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and intrigued with the enemy during the siege of Madinah.82
In conclusion, during the search for disintegration of the alliance amongst the
Islamic State and non-Muslims, the author has found that none of the classical
Muslim jurists had discussed, on the one hand, the causes which lead to disintegration
of alliances between the two parties. On the other hand, they did not formalise any
kind of theory which could arrange the military alliance between the Islamic State and
the non-Muslims. From these consideration, a theory of Islamic alliance between the
Islamic State and non-Muslim entities can be illustrated. The basic element of the
alliance is the permission of the Shari 'ah for alliance between the two parties (i.e.
Muslims and non-Muslims), while such an alliance has to fulfil and to meet with the
following conditions and objectives:
- It must support and increase the Islamic power, and it must not enable
the non-Muslims to control and threaten the high interests of the Islamic
State or its power and resources;
- There must be a necessity forcing the Islamic State to seek help or ally
with non-Muslims. Under the necessity and in some circumstances, such
as weakness of military resources where the Muslims find out that they
have to conclude an alliance with unfair and unjust conditions.
Consequently, it is permissible to accept these conditions until they
achieve their objectives;
- Under the acceptance of an alliance with unfair and unjust, conditions
must not include any terms which are prohibited by the Shari 'ah such as
supporting evils and sins;
- The Imam is the only one who has the right to decide such necessity;
- In the military field, non-Muslims have to fight separately or under the
Muslim commanders, but Muslim troops must always fight under a
Muslim commander;
- Alliance should not lead Muslims to accept non-Islamic ideologies in
part or as a whole and consider as a denunciation Islam or leads to
82 
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harmful effects on Islamic culture;
- Seeking military support or alliance should be first with the People of
the Book. However, if it is inapplicable then with any other nations or
religious groups under certain conditions;
- Allies parties, Muslims and non-Muslims, have to share spoils
equally;
- Non-Muslims have to be trusted by Muslims in order to fulfil the
main condition for seeking help from, or allies, with the non-Muslims;
- All terms and conditions of alliances have to be made by the Muslims,
but if non-Muslims put their conditions they must conform to the
Shari 'ah;
- Alliance has not to bind the Islamic State with its conditions. The Islamic State
has to be free to end its commitment to ally with the non-Muslims at any time if
it finds that such an alliance is no longer for its benefit and does not serve its
strategic interests. In other words alliance has to be temporary (which is a
logical consequence of the necessity condition).
7.8) Summary and conclusion
The conclusions reached in this chapter confirm and developed the key finding of
chapter III, namely, that the Islamic theory of international relations is based on a
distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims. This fundamental dichotomy is
reflected in the Islamic theory of alliances. Briefly, there are no legitimate alliances
within the Ummah, but alliances can be legitimately concluded not merely between
non-Muslim states but also between the Islamic State and non-Islamic states or tribes.
In chapter III, it was found that the core meaning of Ummah was a nation or
community of believers who rejected polytheism in favour of an uncompromising
monotheism and among the members of which peace was the ideal norm. The basis of
that peace was the idea that all intra-Ummatic relations should be fraternal. The
principle involved — brotherly relations — appeared to be derived from the al-Fodhoul
intra-tribal alliance of the Jahiliyyah period. It was found that the Prophetic Hadith
320
Chapter VII
about the relationship between the Emigrants and the Helpers as "an alliance of
brotherhood" and another Hadith which explicitly excluded alliances within the
Ummah, "no alliances in Islam" were the Islamic foundations of this ideal of fraternal
and peaceful relations among Muslims. Thus, if some Muslims require military aid
and assistance from other fellow Muslims, that help will be directly requested and not
be sought through a (prohibited) alliance. The example of Abu Bakr's request as
Caliph to the Yemeni Muslims for military support in the Jihad against the Romans
was cited in support of the Islamic rule against alliances within the Ummah.
In contrast, it was found that there was a consensus among the jurists that the
Islamic State is permitted to inter into a military alliance with non-Muslim states or
tribes, normally when it is militarily weak through lack of weapons, expertise,
military personal, strategic information and access to territories. Where such military
weakness is found the Muslim jurists interpreted the situation of the Islamic State as
one of necessity, even if of dire necessity. The Hanafite jurists further argued that
such a military alliance must never endanger the Muslims but always be to their
advantage on the basis of confirmed Hadiths. All Muslim jurists agreed, however, that
necessity permitted sinners, the immoral and the dissolute could all be enrolled under
the banner of Islam to fight rebels and aggressors against the Ummah. Similarly,
Harbis, Dhimmis and immoral Muslims could be enrolled in the war against rebels
and aggressors.
One of the hypotheses to be tested in this thesis has been the conventional
academic belief that all treaties, including alliances, in Islam are temporary, except for
the Dhimma treaty which is permanent. In this chapter, an examination of the
alliances between the Islamic State and the Banu Ghifar, the Banu Mudlig and their
allies the Banu Dhumrah, in addition to the alliance with Banu al-Ashja' tribe showed
clearly that these treaties of alliance were intended to be permanent. This intention
was conveyed by such phrases as, `cis long as the sea wets a piece of wool" or "as
the sea wets the shells". In short, there can be permanent military treaties of alliance
(as well as temporary alliances) in addition to the permanent Dhimma treaty.
Despite their extensive discussion of the legitimacy of alliances with non-Muslims,
the jurists in fact failed to provide any overall theory of the nature of military
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alliances between the Islamic State and non-Muslim political entities. They were
concerned to some extent with the purposes of alliances. It was found that the
classical Muslim jurists were apparently uninterested in the reasons for non-Muslims
becoming allies of the Islamic State since they never examined their motives for
concluding an alliance. (They were, however, greatly exercised by non-Muslims
terminating alliances by violating or betraying their alliance obligations or intriguing
with the enemy of the Islamic State, whereas Muslims were under an Islamic
obligation to fulfil them, like all treaties.) However, they gave extensive attention to
the examination of the aims, objectives and purposes of the Islamic State in making
an alliance with non-Muslims. Altogether, six objectives were identified and
analysed: (i) the accretion of Islamic power; (ii) protection of strategic interests; (iii)
augmentation of the armed forces; (iv) logistical supplies; (v) indirect support such as
financial aid; (vi) access to territory.
In the next chapter (VIII) some of these findings will be applied in a case study of
the military alliance of 1990-91 between the Muslim states and non-Muslim states
against Iraq, focusing on the legislative side of that alliance according to the Islamic
Law. The key difference between this alliance and those considered legitimate by the
classical jurists was that in 1990 the enemy state was Muslim, whereas in the classical
period it was always a non-Muslim state or tribe.
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8.1) Introduction
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 shook up the Islamic world as it has
rarely been disturbed before. Old alliances crumbled, new ones were forged and close
friends fell out. Fear, anger and bitterness spilled over the Arab and Islamic world
after Iraq invaded Kuwait, an invasion, which deeply split the Arab world.
This event came after several rapid shifts in the balance of regional power. During
the early 1970s, the region the so-called "the twin pillar" composed of, on the one
hand, Iran and Saudi Arabia with their military powers and huge economic resources,
two countries which relied heavily upon the United States and Western Europe to give
them full military support. On the other hand, there was Iraq, who was considered as a
pro-Soviet and linked with Moscow by a military co-operation treaty to arm its
military forces with the most intensive Soviet weapons.' Therefore, it could be said
that the military situation in the region, during that time, was relatively stable where
power was distributed equally between the two camps, led by Iraq and Iran who had
signed an agreement in 1975 to organise the navigation in Shat al-Arab. This
procedure of balance was confirmed by the words of Arnold Wolfers,
Under normal circumstances, with several nations seeking to
maximize their power position through the various methods and
techniques of balance of political powers, no one nation gains
hegemony, and a precarious equilibrium is maintained.2
However, by the end of the 1970s crucial changes occurred with effect to long-
term consequences in the regional balance of power, these are: (i) In 1979 Egypt
signed a single peace treaty with Israel, which led to the ostracism of Cairo from the
Arab political domain and a freeze in its political relations with, nearly, all Arab
states; therefore, the only power which was accessible to supplement the power
vacuum was Iraq with its massive military, political and economical power. (ii) The
occurrence of the Iranian revolution in 1979, which contributed by sweeping away the
Iranian monarchy and replacing it with a revolutionary regime which adopted an
extremist and fundamentalist view and was hostile to the West as well as to its Arab
I Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, War and Peace in the Gulf, Ithaca Press, Reading, 1991, p. 97.
2 Wolfers, Arnold, Discord And Collaboration, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1962, p. 120.
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Gulf States neighbours. That caused a sort of isolation to the new Iranian government,
because neither the Arab Gulf States nor the West were willing to co-operate or
support it. (iii) The invasion of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan compelled the West
to stand impotent, and transformed the region's political landscape yet again.
All these crucial changes prepared an opportunity for Iraq to regain Shat al-Arab
waterway, which was believed to have been sign away to Iran in 1975 because Iran's
support for the Iraqi Kurds forced Iraq to sign the Algiers Agreement in 1975. In
exchange for Iran cutting off aid to the Kurds, the Iraqis conceded to Iranian demands
for a revision for their mutual border, especially where it ran down to the Shat al-Arab
waterway. 3 Therefore, Iraq in 1980 after a year of the Iranian revolution moved its
massive military power to attack the Iranian territories to fulfil a quick victory.
However that victory changed to be a war of eight years which effected badly on the
Iraqi economic position. Consequently, the conflict bred complex alliances in the
region, where the Arab Gulf states supported Iraq; Syria, Libya and Israel, and on
some occasions they backed Iran. Therefore, the conflict did not divide neatly along
Arab vs. Iranian lines, but an Arab alliance against Arab/non Arab states.4
In 1980 six of the Arab Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain
and Sultanate of Oman formalised the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), which is a
political and military establishment to counter the threat of the Iraq-Iran war. In this
council, the states created a joint defence military power called the Gulf Rapid
Deployment Forces located in the north of Saudi Arabia which contained a small
contingent of highly trained troops under Saudi command. 5 However, by the end of
the Iraq-Iran war in 1988 a change in the balance of power had taken place. Iraq, with
its military might virtually intact, emerged as the pre-eminent power in the region.
Confident of its power, Iraq flexed its military muscle in Lebanon, and engaged in
ominous political rhetoric against the USA, such as the demand in February 1990 that
the US withdraw its navy from the Persian Gulf, and Israel, when the Iraqi President
threatened in 2 April 1990 to" make fire eat half Israel" if it tries to do anything, like
3
McKnight, Sean, Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Army, in Patrick A. J. Cordingley, The Gulf War Assessed, Arms and
Armous Press, London, pp. 24-25.
4
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, War and Peace in the Gulf, Ithaca Press, Reading, 1991, p. 111.
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attack Iraq. Finally, Iraq adopted an aggressive stance against its small neighbour,
Kuwait, and when all attempts at political extortion ended in an impasse, it resorted to
military invasion.6
This exposed the weakness of the GCC, despite its Rapid Deployment Force. That
resulted in the GCC states seeking military help from the West, and formalising an
alliance to counter the Iraqis and liberate Kuwait. This confirmed what has been
found out in the balance of power theory, which was mentioned by Gordon
Schloming,
The balance of power refers to a policy of promoting a power
equilibrium, in the recognition that unbalanced power is
dangerous. Prudent states that are at a disadvantage in the
balance of power will (or at least should) form alliances against
a potential hegemonic state or take other measures to enhance
their ability to restrain a possible aggressor]
However, the creation of a regional security structure was the most pertinent
security issue for the GCC members. Arab brotherhood had not provided enough
protection and as King Fand had observed at the GCC summit in Doha on 24
December 1990,
We cannot but admit that the Arab order has failed facing up to
the disaster that has befallen us, and has contributed only slightly
in dealing with it. This order must be revised and reviewed, and
perhaps the lesson that we drew from what happened is that co-
operation between brothers must be through Arab institutions
that work in a sound and scientific way. . . at the forefront of our
preoccupation is the establishment of economic co-operation
between Arab states.8
It is thus plausible to argue that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a consequence of
a disequilibrium in the regional balance of power resulting from various causes,
including the Iraq-Iran war with its massive impact upon the Iraqi economy.
5 Sandwick, John A., The Gulf Cooperation Council, Westview Press, Washington, 1987, pp. 169-173, 193-203.
6 Pimlott, John, The Gulf Crisis and World Politics, in Patrick A. J. Cordingley, The Gulf War Assessed, Arms and Armous
Press, London, p, 37.
7 Schloming, Gordon C., Power And Principle In International Affairs, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers,
1991, p.83.
8 Saudi Press Agency (SPA), 24/12/1990.
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To this invasion there were three major, but conflicting, responses. The first
response was of a group, which included Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria at the head of
a narrow majority opposed to the Iraqi take-over and committed to reversing it. The
second response included such countries as Algeria and Tunisia who chose to adopted
a neutral stance; and the third response was that of the PLO, Yemen, Sudan,
Mauritania and Jordan which was broadly sympathetic to Iraq. Unfortunately, the
failure of the Arab countries to find an Arab solution to the crisis intensified the
dispute. In the words of Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh,
The gap between Saddam and the other Arab leader was simply
too wide to bridge, and the two parties realized this fact. An
immediate Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait was an impossibility.
An eventual evacuation depended on the readiness of other
leaders to sacrifice the family of al-Sabah and to acquiesce in
Iraqi hegemony over Kuwait.9
What made clear that the divisions had been deep and enduring was a decision
taken by a majority of just 12 of the 20 members of the Arab League who attended an
emergency Arab summit on 10 August 1990 in Cairo. The conference was to solve the
crisis under the umbrella of the Arab League, but the concrete position of the Iraqi
delegation was not to discuss the Kuwaiti issue or withdraw its troops from Kuwait
which compelled the summit to vote on a resolution to commit forces to Saudi Arabia
in order to defend the country against possible Iraqi invasion and stand alongside the
United States presence there.m
The Arab resolution backed Saudi Arabia's invitation to American troops and
fighter planes to defend it (i.e. Saudi Arabia) and its oilfields against a possible Iraqi
attack. It was, moreover, crucial for the Saudi government which had resolved within
about twenty-four hours of the Iraqi invasion to call for American military support. In
connection with this, King Fand, of Saudi Arabia, explained the reason behind his
invitation to the Western troops. On 8 th August during his meeting with the US
secretary of Defence the King said,
We have to do this . . . The Kuwaitis waited, they waited too long
9
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10 International Herald Tribune newspaper, 11-12/8/1990 & the Independent Newspaper, London, 11/8/1990.
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and now there is no longer a Kuwait, and all the Kuwaitis are
living in our hotel rooms . . . We did not have the luxury of time;
we faced immediate danger."
The resolution of the Cairo summit said, "the Arab Countries voted to send a force
to protect Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States, and to demand an Iraqi withdrawal
from Kuwait; the token force would join other forces in the region. They, the Arab
Countries, also endorsed United Nations sanctions against Iraq".12
On the 13 th of August 1990, another effort was made by the Arab League to solve
the conflict. The foreign ministers of twelve Arab states: Egypt, Morocco, Syria,
Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Oman, Kuwait, Djibouti and Somalia
met in a special session of the Arab League in Cairo to persuade Iraq to withdraw
from Kuwait, and to co-ordinate their own response to the crisis in the Gulf The final
statement of the meeting requested that Iraq respond to the Arab efforts to solve its
dispute with Kuwait according to the Arab League Charter which forbids the resort to
force or to threaten the use of it to settle differences and disputes between Arab states,
which is the road to destruction and annihilation. 13 However, the absence of eight
countries: Iraq, Algeria, the PLO, Tunisia, Yemen, Sudan, Mauritania and Jordan, all
in the pro-Iraqi camp provided a vivid demonstration of the rift in the Arab world
since the invasion of Kuwait. Libyan officials arrived in Cairo for the talks, and taking
part in efforts to draft a resolution reiterating the position that Iraq must withdraw
from Kuwait.14
In fact, no Arab State had wholeheartedly supported the invasion. According to the
Arab League Charter "it is not allowed for any Arab state to interfere in the affairs of
another, or take it over by force". Even Yemen, which had supported Iraq, urged
Baghdad to withdraw its invasion troops. A carefully worded Yemeni statement
11 Woodward, Bob, The Commanders, Simon & Schuster, London, 1991, p. 271.
12 Time magazine, New York, 20/8/1990. p. 33.
13 The Economist magazine, 25 August 1990, pp. 11 & 48.
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published on the 7th August 1990 said, "Iraq and Kuwait should seek a peaceful
settlement" 15
During the Gulf crisis and after the war, many accounts of the Gulf crisis were
published though none of them either explained the real facts which led to building
the alliance of 1990 or, in particular, accounted adequately for the Saudi perspective
on that crisis. The books of Khaled Bin Sultan Desert Warrior; The Commanders by
Bob Woodward and Secret Dossier by Pierre Salinger may be considered as vital
sources which present information which are unavailable in any similar works. The
first book offers details of the "official" and public Saudi views during the crisis, and
clears up the answers in various debates about the cause/s which compelled the Saudi
government to rely on Western (Christian) forces instead of the Arab and Islamic
troops to counter the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the threat to Saudi Arabia. The
other two books reveal more information about the American role in the Gulf crisis.
However, another startling book in Arabic called Harb Talid Okhra (War and the One
After) by Sa'ad al-Bazzaz, *
 presents candid revelations about what happened inside
Iraq just before the Gulf crisis and includes the real motive behind the war. The
important issue in this book is that it articulates the Iraqi perspective. Therefore the
reader will notice that the author relies on these four books because each of them
explains the view of the main three parties which were involved in the Gulf crisis.
8. 2) The military alliance
Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt, were betrayed by the Iraqi
President after he gave, their leaders, his word that he would not invade Kuwait, and
they saw no particular reason to trust him anymore, even after his promises not to
invade Saudi Arabia and later to withdraw from Kuwait. 16 However, initially Saudi
Arabia favoured an Arab solution to the crisis and end it without resorting to the
military force (as of course did many Arab states). A former Soviet envoy to the
Middle East Yevgeni Primakov, for instance, in his meeting with the press stated,
15 The Times newspaper 8/8/1990
*
Sa'ad al-Bazzaz is familiar with the Iraqi President and many top Ba'thist officials, he was the head of the Iraqi TV and Radio
committee during the 1990 crisis.
16 The Financial Times newspaper, 16/2/1991.
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In fact I can certify that King Fand was hoping very sincerely for
the possibility of getting Iraq out of Kuwait without resorting to
military forces."
It was not until it became clear that this objective was unlikely to be achieved
when the Iraqis annexed Kuwait on the 8th August 1990. Saudi Arabia, as well as
Egypt and Syria, recognised that an external solution to the problem would be
necessary. Accordingly, the Saudi government accepted the enormous risks involved
in calling the military assistance of the USA. The Saudi government's fear was
clarified by what Khaled Bin Sultanssaid,
Saddam already had far more troops than he needed in Kuwait,
but all the reports we received indicated that he was steadily
reinforcing his vast army there. . . Inevitably, it suggested he had
some further objectives. In the meantime, we seem to be
witnessing an operational pause, which was not unexpected — a
pause which Saddam could secure his first-stage objective,
resupply his forces, move in combat support elements. . . give his
field commanders a chance to complete their operational plans
and then assign them combat missions for the next stage.18
Another point of view similar to the one above, is Norman Schwarzkopf, * who
mentioned,
The worst-case scenario had materialized. The conquest of all
Kuwait had taken less than three days and it looked as if the
Iraqis weren't planning to stop there . . . three divisions of the
Republican Guard that had led the initial attack into Kuwait
began massing tanks and artillery along the border of Saudi
Arabia and bringing supplies forward We had to assume they
were getting ready to cross [into Saudi Arabia].19
When any country feels that its independence and stability may be threatened, it
quickly adopts one or more military measures to ensure its security and protect its
most vital interests. Hassan al-Badri has found out four measurements that have to be
17 Rashid, Nasser Dr. & Shaheen, Esbar Dr., Saudi Arabia and the Gulf War, International institute of Technology, Joplin,
1992, p. 277.
*
Prince Khaled Bin Sultan al-Saud is a member of the Saudi Royal family, he was the Commander-in-Chief of the Coalition
forces.
18 Sultan, Khaled Bin, Desert Warrior, Harper Collins Publisher, London, 1995, pp. 11-12.
.
The commander general of the Western military forces of the 1990 military alliance.
19 Schwarzkoph, H. Norman, It Doesn't Take A Hero, Bantam Press, London, 1992, p. 299.
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taken by any country subjected to a foreign threat. The country has to:
1) Increases its own military capability (i.e. buying weapons, increase
manpower, improve the tactical and operational combatants) which cannot
be available immediately or when it is needed because of the different
political, economical and security restrictions.
2) Or, adding to its military capability another allied military power/s through
co-operation or merger in a military bloc or coalition. This requires a high
degree of common interests and objectives of major importance to the allies.
3) Or, weakening its enemies power by deprivation of its friends through
neutralising them or winning them over. This method requires a very strong
financial and political-moral capability.
4) Finally, announcing its neutrality which is conditional upon the countries
credibility, usefulness and respect for such neutrality.20
Therefore, assuming that Iraq was to invade Saudi Arabia after Kuwait, the Saudi
military forces, with all its modern equipment, was simply not able to counter the
Iraqis forces, because of the lack of both manpower and battle experience. Neither
was an Arab nor an Islamic military power able to counter the Iraqi military forces.
Egypt, for instance, one of the Arab predominant military powers, had fallen well
behind Iraq in numbers of men under arms, and it was in no position to assert itself
against a battle-hardened Iraq. Likewise, Syria was tied down in a confrontation with
Israel, which would not allow it to send massive military power to counter Iraq.*
Khaled Bin Sultan has explained this point when he said,
After an appraisal of the political and military situation was that
the ratio of Saudi land forces to Iraqi land forces was one to
fifteen; while the ratio of all GCC land forces to Iraqi land forces
was one to seven. If the whole Egyptian army could have come to
the aid of the GCC, the ratio would still have been one to two. If
we had been able to bring in both the Egyptian and the Syrian
armies, the ratio would have been about one to one. But of
course, it was wholly unrealistic to imagine that either Egypt or
Syria, or indeed our GCC partners, could have lent us all their
land forces . . . An Islamic State like Pakistan was deeply
20 Al-Badri, General Hasan, Al-Ta'awan al-Askari al- Arabi al-Mushlarak, Dar al-Mareakh, Riyadh, 1982, pp. 15-16.
.
See appendices IV & V.
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preoccupied by its confrontation with India, while Bangladesh
and Malaysia were not very strong and. . . a long way away . . .
As only the Americans could stop him [Saddam] and reverse his
aggression, they were welcome to come [to Saudi Arabia].21
Based on al-Badri's assumption, it can be said that Saudi Arabia, due to the fast
changes in events during that time was unable either to increase its own military
capability or to announce its neutral stance. The only option was to build up co-
operation with another military power, one which could and would give support to the
military power of Saudi Arabia, in order to counter the Iraqi threat. This was the
United States. Saudi Arabia later used all its political and financial power to weaken
Iraq's power by depriving it of its friends through either neutralising or winning them
over to the alliance side. Such a procedure was used, for example, with China and the
former Soviet Union by established a working political relation with the former, and a
full political relation including a grant of 1,500 million US Dollars loan to the latter.22
Most notably, the measurements which were taken by the Saudi government met
with article two of the Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty of the Arab
League, which states that
- The contracting States consider any armed aggression made against any
one or more of them or their armed forces, to be directed against them all.
Therefore, in accordance with the right of self-defence, individually and
collectively, they undertake to go without delay to the aid of the State
against which such an act of aggression is made, and immediately to take,
individually or collectively, all steps available, including the use of armed
force, to repel the aggression [aggressor] and restore security and peace.23
Since the beginning of the conflict, the Saudi government attempted to give its
request for Western military aid a religious-legal basis (Fatwa). In his meeting with
the American Secretary of Defence, King Fand of Saudi Arabia requested that the
21 Sultan, Ithaled Bin, Desert Warrior, Harper Collins Publisher, London, 1995, pp. 21-26.
22 Harrison, Martin, Saudi Arabian's foreign policy: relations with the superpowers, CMEIS, University of Durham, No. 46,
Feb. 1995, p.30 & Okaz newspaper, Jeddah, 2/8/1995.
23 Macdonald, Robert W., The League of Arab States, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1965, 328.
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decision to deploy the American military forces in Saudi Arabia would be
accompanied and facilitated by an authoritative Islamic ruling. The purpose of this
ruling was to broaden public support for the Saudi request for military aid from the
United States and other non-Muslim countries among the world-wide Islamic
Ummah.24
The Saudi Supreme Council of Senior Ulama, the fifteen Islamic scholars whose
authority in religious and social matters is universally accepted throughout the
kingdom and who rule on religious matters of the country, declared its support for the
government's decision to allow Western and Arab troops to enter the kingdom. Their
statement Fatwa* declared that
The Council of the organisation of Senior Ulama approves the
measures by the ruler [King Fand] in inviting forces equipped
with arms which frighten and deter anyone wishing to invade this
land [Saudi Arabia]. This is a duty, which the present
circumstances impose on him and decision which the painful
reality makes necessary.25
The jurists of the Council lacked trust in the Iraqi government and for this reason
they issued their Fatwa to the Saudi government legitimating its invitation to the
United States troops as the only ones able to help to counter the Iraqi enemy.
8.3) The Ummah's reaction
The Saudi decision to seek military help from the West caused a great split within
the Ummah. The main fear of the Ummah was not based on a religious view: it was
the fear of a new crusade or of Western bullying to control the Islamic resources,
and/or a new Christian force in occupation of a part of the Islamic world. This will be
discussed in greater detail in what follows.
It is worth mentioning that the first response among the Islamic Ummah was taken
by the OIC, the foreign ministers whose members were meeting in Cairo between 1-5
24 Bulloch, John & Morris, Harvey, Saddam's War, Faber and Faber, London, 1991, p. 173.
*
See appendix VIII.
25 Saudi Press Agency (SPA), 14/8/1990.
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August 1990 when the invasion occurred. The final statement of the OIC condemned
Iraq and called for an immediate withdrawal of the Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The OIC
resolution also declared support for the ousted Kuwaiti government as the legitimate
government of the country. 26 However, Iraq, Jordan, Sudan, Mauritania, and the PLO
abstained, while Libya and Djibouti did not attend the vote and later they refrained
from approving the resolution. The conferences resolution touched on the theme of
the Saudi request for military help from the Western countries, but the conference
ended before this took place.27
However, within the Muslim world, there were three main official stances in
relation to the dilemma of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait: The first was against Iraq.
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Morocco, the Gulf states, Pakistan, Bangladesh and
Turkey represented this stance by their participation in the anti-Iraq alliance. The
second position was that of an official claim of neutrality, coupled with the demand
for withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the United States and Western forces
from the region. At the heart of this trend lay Iran, but Tunisia and Algeria can also be
included. Iran's position for ending the war, enjoyed a positive international response,
which showed the extent of influence that Iran could potentially have in the whole
setting and reconstructing of the Middle Eastern security structure. The third position
belonged to the Islamic countries that supported Iraq against the alliance. Jordan,
Sudan, Yemen, PLO, Mauritania exemplify this stance. It led to a deterioration of
their relationship with the United States and the West, as well as the Islamic countries
of the alliance.
However, there was overwhelming support for Iraq against the alliance coalition by
the public in the countries of the first (anti-Iraqi) camp. In Pakistan, for example, the
widespread attitude amongst the military was reflected in the remarks of the Army
Chief-of-Staff at the end of January 1991, describing the war as part of a Zionist
strategy. 28 Another criticism came from Abd1Sattar Niazi, the Minister of Local
Government, who accused the United States of wanting to grab the oilfields of the
region. Niazi, moreover, condemned the Saudi's decision to request Western help
26 Middle East News Agency (MENA) Cairo, 4/8/1990 & Riyadh TV, 2/8/1990.
27 The Washington Post newspaper, 4/8/1990 & Okaz newspaper 5/8/1990.
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against Saddam. 29 However, such views did not prevent Pakistan, the close ally of
Saudi Arabia, dispatching 11,000 men to join the allied forces.
In Turkey, which participated indirectly in the military operations against Iraq,
there were large anti-war demonstrations in the capital Ankara when the war began.
Similar demonstrations of varying sizes took place in Bangladesh, Pakistan and
Morocco. However, these demonstrators failed to make any impact upon their
governments to adopt a pro-Iraqi stance. According to Nadhear Rashead the Jordanian
Interior Minister, rights could not be obtained by demonstrations or by condemnations
because this was irresponsible behaviour.30
In Tehran, when the war began, the Iranian Parliament issued a statement
condemning the crimes of "world arrogance" led by the Americans, in slaughtering
Muslims, the innocent and defenceless people of Iraq and the violation of God's
sacred sanctuary and also the actions of the multinational forces in the land of divine
inspiration Saudi Arabia. 31 Hazhir Temourian, for instance, illustrated the Iranian
stance when he said,
Iran, which has condemned the presence of Western troops in
Saudi Arabia in more vehement terms than it has used to describe
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, is reliably learnt [sic] to have told the
United States and Britain to overthrow President Saddam
Hussein without delay, as well as to leave the area promptly.
However, Tehran issued a warning to the Western allies not to
bomb any of Iraq's Shiite holy sites.32
Even in Saudi Arabia itself, the day the Saudi government announced publicly the
arrival of the United States troops on Saudi soil it published prominently the opinion
of several lesser-known members of the Ulama counteracting the decision by the
government. They based their condemnation on the pretence that Muslims are
28 
Malik, J. Mohan, India's Response to the Gulf Crisis, Asian Survey, No. 9, September 1991, p. 849.
29
The News International newspaper, Karachi, Pakistan, 25/11/1990.
30 
In a meeting with the Middle East Broadcasting Centre TV (MBC), London, 6.00 p.m., 13 February 1998.
31
Iran News Agency, 1 d February 1991.
32
The Times newspaper, 10/1/1991.
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forbidden to seek support from non-Muslims to fight the Muslims, which, according
to the Shari 'ah 's teaching, their view was completely incorrect.*
In Egypt a statement was signed by forty-three of the best known Egyptian jurists
and scholars. Their statement condemned the Iraqi government for its invasion of
Kuwait, characterising it as a crime, and called for an Arabic or Islamic solution for
the crisis. They warned that reliance on foreign countries [non-Muslim/Arab] to solve
an Arab problem is a sort of resort to an abominable act. They insisted that "if any
military action should take place it should be under the umbrella of the United
Nations and with its name."33
In summary, the Ummah 's fear was of a new kind of crusade and Western
interfering in Muslim affairs. Therefore the Iraqis, in their efforts against the alliance,
concentrated on such issues and gave the crisis a shape of new Islamic Christian
confrontation, it described the Western forces as the new invaders and called for a
Jihad against these forces. This propaganda effort was aided by the historic relations
between the Middle East and the West, as the Financial Times newspaper noted,
The history of relations between the Christian West and the
Muslim Middle East is not a happy one. The crusades by which
medieval Europe strove to liberate the Holy Lands from Islamic
control were marked by barbarity.34
Another view similar to this was expressed by John Bulloch and Harvey Morris in
their work Saddam 's War,
Growing Arab fears that the America build-up was part of neo-
colonialist enterprise were fed by propaganda from Baghdad,
with the Iraqi regime casting itself in the heroic role of defender
of the poor against greedy Western powers and tight-fisted and
reactionary Arabs. 35
However, prior to analyses the Iraqi's called to wage a Jihad against the UN
coalition forces, it is important to understand three important facts. Firstly, the
For more details regarding the legitimacy of alliance between the Muslims and non-Muslims entities see chapter VII.
33 
Al-Ahram newspaper, Cairo, 21/8/1990.
34
Financial Times, No Holy War, London, 17/1/1991.
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meaning of Jihad, in the work of Charis Waddy "The Muslim Mind" a clear
explanation of Jihad. Waddy says,
Jihad . . . is divided into two. The Greater Jihad is fighting ones
animal tendencies. The Lesser Jihad— is fighting on behalf of the
community, in its defence — is a duty incumbent on a Muslim
provided that he is attacked. A man has the right to defend his
life, his property, and he has to organize himself along these
lines. Why you 'Muslims] fight is important. It is quite clear that
they did not go out to acquire wealth, land, riches, though these
were a by-product. Their purpose was to fight in the path of
God.36
Secondly, the real cause of the 1990 crisis. Hafiz al-Asad, the Syrian President,
gave his answer to this when he said,
The issue is not that of foreign troops, because the problem
started before the foreign troops came into the area and it was
the 'problem" that brought us the foreign troops . . . The
problem is the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.37
While the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was the main cause of the crisis and led directly
to the intervention of the Western (Christian) forces in Muslim affairs, the aims of the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait requires some explanation. Musallam Ali has given an
academic explanation to the invasion when he said,
The tremendous economic and human losses brought about by
the war with Iran 1980-88 made it extremely difficult for the
Iraqi government to retain the always precarious allegiance of its
various ethnic minorities. No sooner had the war with Iran ended
and a cease-fire agreement had been signed then the political
strength and social unity of Iraq as a nation began to falter . . .
Aware of the discontent of the people, the government mounted a
two-pronged campaign: first, it sought to revive Iraqi
nationalism . . . second, it proffered various measures to alleviate
the economic plight of the Iraqi people . . . When this two-
pronged approach failed, the government finally resorted to the
invasion of Kuwait in an attempt to resolve all the problems.
Kuwait represented an economic prize sufficient to solve all the
financial ills which had befallen Iraq . . . The humiliation of
Kuwait would, it was believed, do much to reinvigorate Iraqi
35 
Bulloch, John & Morris, Harvey, Saddam 's War, Faber and Faber, London, 1991, p. 173.
36 
Waddy, Charis, The Aluslim Mind, Longman Group Ltd., London, 1976, pp. 94-95.
37 
Heikal, Mohammed, Illusion of Triumph, Harper Collins Publisher, London, 1992, pp. 200-201.
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nationalist sentiments and restore Iraqi national pride. It was
against this complex interplay of factors that the invasion of
Kuwait occurred.38
An Iraqi scholar called Sa'ad al-Bazzaz presented candid revelations, and, perhaps,
the real motives behind the invasion. According to Al-Bazzaz,
Economic considerations were primary. The war with Kuwait
was inevitable. After eight years of attrition Iraq could not build
on its previous economy and create a high standard of living. It
became necessary therefore, to find a permanent solution to the
economic predicament, with its problem of debt, a solution which
can only be geo-political would provide new sources for the Iraqi
economy. 39
Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Foreign Minister during the crisis, explained the Iraqi
philosophy behind the invasion of Kuwait. Aziz said,
The intention was to bring about a military coup, through which
a new indigenous regime would replace the ruling family. As a
result, in the ashes of the ruins we will build a political
understanding rather than a politics of confrontation, to unite, to
become one after the long separation, and finally, Iraq will be
able to solve its economic problems with a lung open to the sea.40
Kiren Chaudhry added further explanations to the economical difficulty of the Iraqi
regime when he said,
There was another dimension to Iraq's economic difficulties. It
was not only the effects of the war with Iran itself that were
responsible for the economic crisis but the economic strategy
employed to solve that crisis.'"
Hence, while saying that the Iraqi call for a Jihad not for wealth, land and riches
but only for the path of God; it could only be waged against non-believers, therefore
Jihad is forbidden against fellow Muslims. Therefore, since the UN coalition
contained substantial numbers of Muslims, both Arab and non-Arab, consequently it
38 
Musallam, Musallam Ali, The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, British Academic Press, London, 1996, p. 64.
39 
Al-Bazzaz, Sa'ad, Harb Talid Okhra, Al-Altliyyah libiashr wa al-Tawziy'a, Amman, 1992, p.34.
40 
Ibid., p. 37.
41 
Chaudhry, Kiren Aziz, On the Way to the Market: Economic Liberalisation and Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, Middle East
Report, May-June 1991, pp. 14-23.
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could be stated that the Iraqi statement was not accurate. In connection with this, it
may be of interest to quote a statement by Majeed Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb
who clarified the Iraqi call to wage a Jihad against the UN forces,
In the case of the Gulf crisis . . . since Iraq, an Islamic country,
attacked another Islamic country, the declaration of jihad against
unbelievers was irrelevant. Moreover, as Iraq was governed by
the Ba'th Party, considered by opponents a secular political
Party, its declaration of the Jihad was questioned, although the
Ba'th Party has never officially declared the separation of
religion from the state.42
It is no exaggeration to say that the previous statements give evidence that the Iraqi
calls for Jihad was for its own benefit. Religion was used as an expedient to achieve
its goal. These goals were summarised by the Iraqis themselves as: solving all the
Iraqi's economic and financial difficulties; giving Iraq an extra outlet to the Gulf; and
creating a puppet regime in Kuwait to serve Iraqi interests.
Nevertheless, Iraqi used propaganda, in its efforts to exploit Islamic and anti-
Western sentiment, adopted the issue that the Western Christian forces come to
occupy the two holiest cites, Makkah and Madinah, in Saudi Arabia. One
commentator noted that,
It was a major strategy of the Iraqis to attempt to separate the
Arab people from their government by appealing to them directly
as brother Arabs with an obligation to mount a Jihad in order to
defend Islam's holy places in Mecca from foreign forces.43
Moreover, the Iraqi government organised an Islamic conference in Baghdad to
sustain the Iraqi leader (Saddam Hussein) and his policy. Of the one thousand people
(approximately) who attended that conference, the majority were members of Islamic
militant groups such as HAMAS, Islamic Jihad, Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria
and other groups." Unusually, the participants at the conference called for the Iraqi
President, Saddam Hussein, leader of the hitherto determinedly secular Ba'ath party,
to be declared the Caliph of the Muslim world. Moreover, among the participants of
42 
Kliadduri, Majid & Ghareeb, Edmund, War in the Gulf 1990-91, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, p. 257.
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Matthews, Ken, The Gulf Conflict and International Relations, Routledge, London, 1993, p. 66.
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the conference there were some who had previously been very hostile to Saddam.
Sheikh Assad Tamimi, * was one. He said,
I had been a long time foe of President Saddam Hussein, but I am
supporting the Iraqi President because Saddam has announced a
holy war, and he wants to protect Makkah from the unbelievers.
Mr. Saddam 's return to Islam has marked a high point in the
Islamic wakening.45
In addition, other religious groups throughout the Arab world have rallied to the
Iraqi President's call to keep Westerners out of Saudi Arabia where the two holiest
cities, Makkah and Madinah, are situated. All across North Africa religious groups,
such as the Islamic Salvation Front (ISF) announced support for the man they have
always despised as an atheist. 46
 In addition, Mass demonstrations in the Middle East
were commonplace and popular recruiting centres were established in Jordan and
North Africa which received thousands of would-be volunteers for Iraq. Arab
parliamentary resolutions supported Iraq, and Arab and Islamic delegations and
conferences proliferated. A plethora of radical and paramilitary groups backed Iraq,
and although the stance of many Arab groups was not always simple Iraq essentially
received the support of the PLO and the more radical Palestinian groups; George
Habash's PFLP, Ahmed Jibril's PFLP-GC, Abu al-Abbas's PLF, and Abu Nidal's
Fatah Revolutionary Council. Many of the Palestinian groups threatened to attack the
United States interests in the event of fighting breaking out. The armed groups
sympathetic to Iraq also represented a threat to the major Arab Coalition states Egypt,
Syria and Saudi Arabia.47
In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, an influential and much less radical religious
group than HAMAS, the Islamic Jihad and the ISF, made a statement announcing
their condemnation and opposition to the American military intervention in the Gulf
crisis, and for an immediate withdrawal of the United States troops from the region.
Finally, the statement asserted that the Muslim Brothers movement does not ratify any
The leader of the emergent Islamic Jihad in Jordan and a participant in Baghdad's conference.
45 
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resort to force in order to resolve disputes between either the Arab or the Muslim
countries, and refused any military intervention from an Arab or a Muslim state
against another state."
Khaled Bin Sultan responded to those who incriminated Arabs for allying with
Western Christian countries instead of with the Arab and Muslim states during the
1990 Gulf crisis. Khaled says,
During and after the Gulf crisis, some Arab intellectuals argued
that it was a crime for Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt
and Syria, to ally themselves with the United States against
another Arab state, and that by doing so we had subverted the
principles of Arab nationalism and destroyed the Arab
consensus. The real threat to the Arabs, they said, came not from
Saddam Hussein but from the West. Others even went so far as to
portray Saddam as a hero of Arab nationalism brought down by
a Western or a Zionist conspiracy. Such attitudes reflect the pain
some Arabs feel at the West's colonial carve-up of the Arab
world early this century, at its role in creating Israel after World
War Two, and at the blind support the United States has given
Israel ever since, even when this ran counter to American's own
national interests. 49
Khaled added that,
Many Arabs also feel an understandable nostalgia for the distant
past when their civilization and power were unrivaled. But views
such as these offend against contemporary reality. Regardless as
it may be from an Arab perspective, "Arab nationalism," the
credo of most Arabs, has so far resulted in coherent political
action, while an "Arab consensus" has been more often absent
than present in most of the great events affecting our area . . .
Certainly, the invasion of Kuwait has resulted in immense
damage to the Arabs: quite apart from the tragic loss of life, it
has caused material losses of hundreds of billions of dollars,
forced hundreds of thousands of people from their homes, and
created deep-seated divisions in the Arab world, marked at the
popular level by mutual hate and suspicion. This is perhaps its
[the crisis's] most dangerous legacy. We, in the Kingdom . . . in
our hour of need the nationality of the troops that come to our
48 
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aid was our last concern. If your house is on fire, you are not too
concerned about who helps you extinguish the flames.5°
The Saudi government attempted to dampen feelings against the anti-Iraqi alliance,
among the world Ummah and opposed the Iraqi allegations. In September 1990 Dar
al-Ifta', the Saudi-based authority of Islamic guidance, summoned a group of Muslim
jurists who had criticised the build up of Western forces on Saudi soil to a conference
in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, organised by Imam Muhammad Bin Saud University.
The conference's final statement condemned the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and
supported Saudi Arabia in its reliance on Western troops to face the Iraqi direct
invasion threat.51
Moreover, as a counter to the Iraqi issue, the League of Muslim World (MWL)
made a statement on the 8 1" August 1990 calling for an immediate withdrawal of the
Iraqi forces from Kuwait under supervision of Islamic forces. 52 Later, the League
organised two conferences in Makkah. The first was in September 1990, where more
than 300 Muslim jurists, scholars and thinkers from 80 countries were invited. That
conference aimed to: (i) organise a visit for those participants to the two holy cities of
Makkah and Madinah to ensure that they were not being defiled by the presence of the
United States forces in Saudi Arabia; (ii) discuss the result of the Iraqi occupation of
Kuwait, the direct threat to Saudi Arabia and other Arabian Gulf countries and the
subsequent Arab, Islamic and foreign military build-up to defend the Arabian Gulf
states; (iii) give legal judgements regarding the previous issues. 53 Accordingly, Dr.
Abdullah Omar Naseef, the Secretary General of the Muslim World League
announced,
The Muslim World League's adoption of a declaration and fifteen
resolutions regarding the American forces. The declaration
condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as un-Islamic and accepted
the US build-up as an emergency measure, which should be a
50 
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temporary solution and it should be removed as soon as
possible.54
In January 1990, the MWL organised the second conference, which nearly all
famous Muslim jurists and Scholars participated in that conference. Among them, for
instance, the famous Jurist Sheikh Muhammad al-Ghazali, the Mufti of Egypt, the
Mufti of Saudi Arabia, the Secretary General of the Islamic Conference Organisation
OIC, the Secretary General of the MWL and others. 55 The conference was aimed at
discussing the Gulf crisis particularly the legitimacy of the Western back up for Saudi
Arabia, and the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. The final statement of the conference
contained various resolutions, the most important were: (i) a condemnation of the
Iraqi government for its invasion of Kuwait and its consequent looting and destroying
of the Kuwaiti properties. (ii) The legality of seeking military help of the non-
Muslims to help counter the Iraqi military threat to Saudi Arabia. (iii) The conference
requested the restoring of the sanctioned legitimate Kuwaiti authorities to rule the
country; (iv) establish a permanent Military Muslim power under the supervision of
the OIC and that the Islamic countries resort to it when any future dispute occurs.56
8.4) Shari'ah and legality of the Iraqi invasion
Regardless of Iraq's main reason, and any other causes, for the invasion, all laws,
secular or divine, forbid military invasion. In the League of Arab States * , for instance,
article 5 of the League's Charter insists that,
- Any resort to force in order to solve disputes arising between two or
more member states of the League is prohibited"
Similarly, in the Charter of the UN, article 2 insists on the same principles, which
reads as follows,
54
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- All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means
in such a manner that international peace and securities, and justice, are
not endangered.
- All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations.58
Even the Iraqi President himself, on many occasions, forbade invasion and called
for action to be taken if an Arab country invades another Arab country. In a speech to
Arab lawyers delivered on 28 th November 1988, for instance, Saddam said,
An Arab country does not have the right to occupy another Arab
country . . . God forbid, if Iraq should deviate from the right
path, we would want the Arabs to send their armies and move to
overwhelm another Arab state, the Arabs would have the right to
deploy their armies to keep it in check How will it be possible for
us to live together and trust each other, if the minimum mutual
trust is lacking? . . . Walking with your brother and your gun at
the ready is like keeping the company of Chicago gangsters.59
The legitimacy of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait from the Shari 'ah perspective, must
begin with the observation that the invasion occurred in August, the month of
Muharram in the Islamic calendar. In the Shari 'ah Muharram is one of four forbidden
months in Islam, * which were described by the Holy Qur 'an,
(jet,j.11 	 ji 41111 4.15I	 „Az'	 411	 J.34.414	 c;j1
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The number of months in the sight of Allah is twelve (in a year) so-
ordained by Him the day He created the heavens and the earth; of
them four are sacred; that is the right religion so wrong not
yourselves therein. (9: 36)
In the Sunnah, Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said that,
Time has completed a cycle and come to the state of the day when
Allah created the heavens and the earth. The year is constituted of
58 Leland M. Goodrich, Charter of the United Nations, 3rd Edit., Columbia University Press, New York, 1969, pp. 36-37.
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The others are: Dhu al-Qa'adah, Dhu al-Hijjah and Rajah.
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twelve months, of which four are sacred; three of them
consecutive, viz. Dhu al-Qa'adah, Dhu al-Hijjah and Muharram,
and the fourth is Rajab.6°
During these months all military actions have to be frozen unless it is self-defence.
Even in the Jahiliyyah time, Arabs tribes were to restrain themselves from fighting
and delay all their military activities until the passing of these months. Therefore, it
could be concluded that Iraq committed a forbidden sin by invading Kuwait in that
month.
Shari 'ah, moreover, forbids betrayal. In the Holy Our 'an,
:F.L—Q.:41) L-44 L--11,.,i, cjtS cjA ;....t..%..1. `I ill 'a *Jail (10:11.4 C.8:111 Cyc,
 clil-li 1j
(1 . v
Contend not on behalf of such as betray their own souls; for Allah
loveth not one given to perfidy and sin. (4: 107)
And in the Sunnah, the Prophet said,
On the Day of Judgment there will be a flag for every person guilty
of breach of faith, and it will be raised in proportion to the extent
of his guilt; and there is no guilt of treachery more serious than
the one committed by the ruler of people.61
The Iraqi leadership in their effort to invade Kuwait betrayed everyone. Fred
Halliday, for instance, noted that,
The international community, including Egypt, were assured by
Saddam that he would not invade Kuwait, but on August 2 he did
SO.
62
In his meeting with the Egyptian President in Baghdad in July 1990, the Iraq
President gave his word, and assured Mubarak that he would not use force against
Kuwait. The Iraqi President's assurance was mentioned in Saddam' s meeting with the
United States ambassador to Baghdad during the same month in the Iraqi capital
Baghdad. The Iraqi President said,
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Mubarak [the Egyptian President] told me that they [the Kuwaiti
government] were scared. They said troops were only 12 miles
north of the Arab League (border) line. I said to him that
regardless of what is there, whether they are police, border
guards or army — regardless of how many they are, and what
they are doing — assure the Kuwaitis and give them our word that
we are going to do nothing until we meet with them.63
Similarly, Many Iraqi officials declared that Iraq would not use force to resolve its
dispute with Kuwait. In his meeting with the United States officials, the Iraqi
ambassador to Washington announced that Iraq is not going to move against anyone
(i.e. Kuwait).64
The Iraqi invasion caused various kinds of great damage to the Islamic Ummah.
The most important of these will be summarised, with the understanding that there are
many more that have not been mentioned. Islamic Shari 'ah forbids discord (Fitna)
and commands Muslims to avoid evoking it. In the Holy texts of Qur'an,
:0_02 1) . yuti l .1.4,1 41 cii 1j.41c1 j LAI 41.41 ..9.416 caiill c.)4..21' V Lli 1,061j
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And fear the trial (Fitna) which affecteth not in particular those of
you who do wrong: and know that Allah is strict in punishment. (8:
25)
In another verse, the Qur 'an insists that,
(1 91 Cifil.bil) . 43:111 Cida J.,l'i ;*VIIII.,9
. .. for Persecution [Fitna] is worse than slaughter. (2: 191)
Islam, moreover, forbids killing innocent people. During the first few days of the
invasion, between 100 and 200 Kuwaiti citizens were killed including the Amir's half-
brother Sheikh Fand al-Ahmad al-Sabah. 65
 The Kuwaiti Government estimated that
63 Rashid, Nasser & Shaheen, Esbar, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf War, International institute of Technology, Joplin, 1992, p.
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some 1000 civilians were murdered during the Iraqi occupation, with many more
forcibly deported to Iraq.66
The Islamic teaching is very clear regarding this theme. The Holy Qur'an contains
various verses which forbid killing innocents, and threaten those who commit such an
act with great punishments in this life and in the life to come. Among the Qur 'anic
verses,
(:).....„9 LA .4.44. uaL-111 Sa Lali 0:231 (0.:9 ALA jti uaii .j iii Li; 3:ii clA d . • •
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That if any one slew a person it would be as if he slew the whole
people and if any one saved a life it would be as if he saved the
life of the whole people. (5: 32)
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Nor take life except for just cause. (17: 33)
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Those who invoke not, with Allah, any other god, nor slay such
life as Allah has made sacred except for just, nor committed
fornication and any that does this meets punishment. The
Chastisement on the Day of Judgement will be doubled to him and
he will dwell therein in ignominy. (25: 68-69)
In the Sunnah, Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said that,
Abusing a Muslim is an evil doing (Fusuq) and killing him is
disbelief (Kufr).67
And
Your bloods, your properties and your honours are sacred to you
like the sacredness of this day [the Day of sacrifice in the month
of Hall] of yours, in this city [Makkah] of yours . . . So do not
return after me infidels some of you striking the necks of others
[killing each other/.68
And
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Avoid the seven noxious things . . . Associating anything with
Allah, magic, killing of one whom Allah has declared inviolate
without a just cause, devouring the property of an orphan, dealing
in usury, fleeing on the day of fighting, and calumniating the
chaste, innocent, believing women.69
Under the law of war crimes * of the United Nations, any of the acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group
as such as: (i) Killing members of the group; (ii) Causing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group; (iii) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (iv) Imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group.7° Richard Stevens has
summarised Iraqi war crimes during the occupation in these words,
Iraqi violations of the law of war were widespread and
premeditated. They included taking hostages, torture and murder
of civilians, looting civilian property, looting cultural property,
indiscriminate attacks on noncombatants by the launching of
SCUD missiles against cities rather than specific military
objectives, illegal employment of sea mines, mistreatment of
prisoners of war, and unnecessary destruction of property, as
evidenced by release [of] oil into [the] Arabian Gulf and the
destruction of hundreds of Kuwaiti oil wells.71
Iraqi environmental crimes began on 19th
 January 1991, when the valves were
opened on the Sea Island terminal near Kuwait City and marine oil tankers load was
dumped into the Gulf. At the time an estimated 11 million barrels of oil were released
and the oil slick was marked as one of the worst-ever oil-related ecological disasters,
covering an area of about 240 square miles. On 21' t January the Wafrah Kuwaiti
oilfields and storage facilities were set on fire, producing a large amount of smoke.72
Hence, it must be observed that while Islam forbids arbitrariness, transgression,
and oppression, it permits those who were effected by any sort of previous
humiliation to defend themselves. This confirmed by the Holy Qur'anic verses
69	
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And those who, when an oppressive wrong is inflicted on them,
(are not cowed but) help and defend themselves. The recompense
for an injury equal thereto (in degree): but if a person forgives and
makes reconciliation, his reward is due from Allah: for Allah
loveth not those who do wrong. But indeed if any defend himself
after a wrong (done) to him, against such there is no cause of
blame. The blame is only against those who oppress people with
wrongdoing and insolently transgress beyond bounds through
the land, defying right and justice: for such there will be a
Chastisement grievous. (42: 39-42)
Islam, moreover, forbids looting, violation and vandalism. The Prophet in his
conquests prevented Muslims from looting. He is reported to have said,
He who has ever committed pillage or plunder is not from us [the
Muslims]."
During the Iraqi invasion, when the Iraqis found a house that was empty they
would paint a red cross on the door and come back with a truck or a van and take
everything out of it. Nearly all the equipment in the country was moved to Iraq by the
Iraqi troops. Among the long list of the vital equipment which was looted from
Kuwait was all hospital equipment, such as ambulances and laboratories; the sports
equipment of the three main sports centres; the Universities' equipment, such as
libraries. All the records from the Institute of Science Research was looted. This had
been done intelligently, overseen by men who were scientists. At the civil airport, all
emergency fire equipment and all navigational, flight and maintenance simulators,
and all machine-shop tools. From the National Bank everything was taken including
safes and computers. All equipment of the Kuwait National Oil Company KNOC, and
the oil terminals' equipment was moved to Iraq. At Filaka Island, two ferries were
taken and latter seen in use in Basra. From the Kuwaiti Army, all the military
equipment was moved including Hawk anti-aircraft missiles. 74 N. J. Rengger
mentioned that,
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Iraq had transferred between US$ 3,000 million and US$ 5,000
million in gold, foreign currency and goods from Kuwait and that
this had significantly increased Iraq's financial reserves which
had stood at an estimates US$ 6,500 million before the
invasion. 75
Moreover, the Iraqi troops prior to their withdrawal from Kuwait proceeded to
destroy the country. Among its destruction were hundreds of Kuwaiti oil wells and the
base structure of the country. The Shari 'ah makes it incumbent upon those who
commit vandalism to accept responsibility for what have done. Jurist Ibn AbdulSalam
in his work Qawa 'ed al-Ahkam insists that,
Whoever intends to destroy properties belonging to others, he
has to refund what he destroys.76
Therefore, looting is another sin which can be added to the evils of invading a
Muslim country in a forbidden month and killing innocent people, which is regarded
as war crimes committed by the Iraqi government during its invasion of Kuwait.
Islam requests from Muslims to solve their disputes according to the Islamic
Shari 'ah teaching, which is based on the Qur 'anic verse,
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If two parties among the Believers fall into a fight, make ye peace
between them; but if one of them transgresses beyond bounds
against the other, then fight ye (all) against the one that
transgresses until it complies with the command of Allah; but if it
complies, then make peace between them with justice, and be fair:
for Allah loves those who are fair (and just). (49: 9)
In chapter VI, it was concluded that this Holy Qur 'anic verse implied neutrality.
However, it could also be used as a method to solve disputes among the Muslims
themselves. Muslims are obliged to solve all their disputes peacefully and unite
against the aggressor. During the crisis nearly all Arab and Islamic states involved, as
well as the International community, presented peace proposals or projects to solve
the dispute. All these proposals concentrated on two main issues: on the one hand, the
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failure of Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait; on the other hand, the restoration of the
legitimate authorities in Kuwait. Dr. Sayed al-Taweal, * in his effort to explain the
Islamic teaching in solving a dispute between the Muslims said,
This (Qur 'anic) verse [49: 9] gave the method that the Ummah
has to follow against oppression and tyrants. The Islamic
Ummah has to confront, strongly, this group in order to frighten
it and return it to the right path and solve the cause of dispute,
and to create peace founded on justice and equality.77
In preference for a peaceful settlement of the crisis, the MVVL, the Organisation of
the Islamic Conference (OIC), as well as the other Islamic organisations such as the
Arab League (LAS) and the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), decided that before
resorting to force, an appeal to Iraq to withdraw was necessary. The Secretary General
of the OIC, for instance, offered his good office to Iraq on the 14th January 1991, a
day before the UN Security Council Resolution 678 was to take effect by the use of
force against Iraq. He appealing to the Iraqi President to give orders to the Iraqi forces
in Kuwait to withdraw quickly and unconditionally to avoid unforeseen
consequences. 78
After the failure of all peace efforts, there was the need to use force to compel Iraq
to withdraw from Kuwait and establish order among the Muslim countries. In order to
fulfil that the only Muslim countries that could counter Iraq were Saudi Arabia, Egypt
and Syria. However, because of the shortage of manpower other non-Muslim
countries participated with them in expelling the Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
In International Law, there are measures similar to the Islamic one. In the Charter
of the United Nations, under chapters VI and WI, articles 38-48 reads as follows:79
- The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek
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a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other
peaceful means of their own choice.
- The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.
-
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council
may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures
provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with
such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such
provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or
position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take
account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.
- The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may
call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
-
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may
take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may
include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land
forces of Members of the United Nations.*
- All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the
maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make
available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a
special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities,
* Article 42.
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including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security.
- Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of
forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the
facilities and assistance to be provided.
- The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on
the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the
Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and
groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory
states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
- The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for
the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all
the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security
Council may determine.
- Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United
Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international
agencies of which they are members.
Out of the previous debate, it can be found that Shari 'ah and secular (international)
laws condemn the use of force to solve disputes. The Shari 'ah, as seen in the previous
Qur 'anic verses, orders Muslims to build their brotherhood and avoid using force to
solve their disputes. However, if a member of the Ummah transgress on another
member, state or individual, the Ummah has to unite against the aggressor and use all
available methods to end the conflict. The Shari 'ah permits victims of oppression to
defend themselves, but in a rational way.
No doubt, secular (international) laws, such as the UN charter and the charter of
the Arab League, or any similar charters, forbids aggression, and calls for a peace
settlement for any conflict. The UN Charter, for example, meets with the Shari 'ah law
in permitting self-defence if exposed to aggression or threat under article 51.
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8.5) 1990 alliance under the Islamic conditions
It has been indicated in the previous chapter that the hypothesis of alliance in Islam
assumes that alliance with non-Muslim entities (e.g. tribes and states) is lawful under
conditions of necessity * to fight against either non-Muslims or Muslim rebels who
threaten the Islamic State's security and stability. Moreover, according to our
hypothesis, such an alliance has to be covered by a treaty organising the participation
of these forces. However, among the Muslims themselves the need for such a treaty to
secure their participation in war is unnecessary because relations among the Muslims
are based upon brotherhood and assumes that all Muslims are united in the Umma.
AbdulKhalek Hassouna, stated that,
Each Muslim feels himself a member of one Islamic nation, and
this contributes to the promotion of co-operation and joint
efforts. This feeling is manifest in one of the Prophet's tradition
[Hadith] sayings, "The faithful are like the members of the body:
if one of them complains all the others feel restless and
feverish". 80
Consequently, for the Muslim forces - particularly the Egyptians, the Syrians, the
Pakistanis and the Bangladeshis - no bilateral treaties were signed. Their presence as
part of the coalition forces could be explained either in terms of membership of the
Arab League, or in terms of membership of the UN, or both. Taking the Arab League
first, its Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty provides a legal basis for
their participation in the anti-Iraq coalition. This treaty cculd be described as a
brotherhood defence treaty. It is different from any other international alliance treaty
such as NATO or the former Warsaw Pact, because Arabs have a common language,
religion and history. Moreover, according to the Islamic teaching Muslim brotherhood
is stronger than any other relations such as Arab brotherhood. Jurist Sayed Sabiq, for
instance, mentions
These relations are characterised by their moral nature. Unlike
other materialist relations, they do not come to an end when the
For further details of the term, see chapter IV, 4.4.2.
80 
Waddy, Charis, The Muslim Mind, Longman Group Ltd., London, 1976, p. 182.
353
Chapter VIII
need no longer exists. These links are stronger than the relations
of blood, colour, language, homeland and financial interests.81
In addition, or alternatively, their participation in the 1990 coalition had a legal
basis in the article 51 of the UN Charter which affirms the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence against armed attack, and UN Security Council resolution
number 678 (November 1990). Under paragraph 2 of this resolution and in
accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the Security Council authorised
member states co-operating with the Kuwaiti government "to use all necessary means
to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) [calling for Iraq's immediate and
unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait] and all subsequent resolutions [661, 662, 664,
666, 667, 669, 670, 674 and 677. August-November 1990] and to restore international
peace and security in the area. Paragraph 3 requested member states to provide
appropriate support for actions taken under paragraph 2. 82 However, it appears to be
the case that the Muslim states joined the anti-Iraq coalition not through the
provisions of treaties (although as member states they were bound by the UN Charter
and UN Security Council Resolutions made in accordance with it in relation to the use
of armed force against Iraq), but in the Islamic/Ummatic way, namely, by
volunteering their help to fellow Muslims or after a request from the Saudi
government. Unlike the non-Muslims' participation in the 1990 coalition, Muslim
states only needed a request from the Saudi government to take part, and sometimes
they offered their help without any such request or invitation. The Afghan Mujahedin,
is a clear example of such a case. They offered their help to the Saudis without any
official request from the Saudi Government, but because of the Islamic call of the
Muslim World League and the OIC. 83
 Significantly, as a non-Government
Organisation (NGO), the Afghani Mujahedin were not bound by the UN Charter.
In the 1990 anti-Iraq coalition forces two main parties had formalised an alliance,
on one hand Saudi Arabia, and on the other hand the United States. The rest of the
alliance consisted of thirty-eight countries worldwide. Some were involved directly in
military activities with their troops, such as UK, France, Egypt and Syria, while the
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others-like Singapore, Senegal, Japan, Turkey, and the Philippines- participated
indirectly, by providing medical supplies or financing the alliance for example. It is
worth mentioning that except for the military forces of the two main parties, all other
forces were symbolic and made no change in the balance of power. The Islamic
military forces, for instance, were in total 90.000 soldiers only. * This is confirmed by
Nigel Pearce,
Of the 40 nations, 18 took part in military operations against
Iraqi forces (by land or air), although Pakistan and Senegal (and
an infantry battalion of Afghan Mujahedin) took up purely
defensive positions in Saudi Arabia. The Americans [for
example] provided two-thirds of the allied forces, which
eventually numbered nearly three-quarters of a million."
Non-Muslim forces, especially the United States and the European forces, came to
support Saudi Arabia in 1990 under treaties which provided for military assistance. In
the case of the Americans, as mentioned earlier, their presence in Saudi Arabia was
regulated by a secret treaty between the Saudi and the US governments. No detailed
information about this treaty has been released. In the case of the British, French, and
other non-Muslim military forces no such bilateral treaties appear to have existed.
Indeed, it was publicly announced that military assistance by these countries and the
United States was provided under the treaty terms of the UN Charter, in order to
implement and enforce UN resolutions upon Iraq (see page 354 above). These
resolutions were imposed by an alliance of the military forces under the leadership of
the United States and Saudi Arabia. It can therefore be concluded that non-Muslim
forces were engaged against Iraq on the basis of treaty alliances unlike Muslim forces
which participated in the conflict against Iraq, on the basis of giving assistance to
fellow Muslims in need and/or in response to a request for such assistance by the
Saudi government. Thus, the essential feature of the Islamic rule about military co-
operation between an Islamic State and Muslims, on the one hand, and non-Muslims,
on the other hand, was implemented in the coalition of 1990-91.
Other specific conditions have also to be fulfilled if an alliance between the Islamic
State and non-Muslims is to be legitimate. Some conditions could not be implemented
s
For full details see appendix VI.
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because of the change of time and political and military situations, such as sharing
spoils of the war, which in the past included slaves. Nevertheless, if there were
genuine spoils during the 1990-91 crisis they were, on the Arab side, the liberation of
Kuwait and ending the threat of an Iraqi invasion of Saudi soil; and, on the Western
side, the destruction of the Iraqi military capabilities. Most of the other Islamic
conditions were, however, implemented in the 1990-91 alliance.
1) The alliance has to support and increase the Islamic power and must not enable
the non-Muslims to control and threaten the vital interests of the Islamic State, such as
its power and resources. The 1990 military alliance supported and increased the Saudi
military power to counter a possible Iraqi invasion of Saudi soil, and moreover
changed the balance of power in favour of this country. In August 1990, the military
forces of Saudi Arabia were 95,000 men to confront 200,000 Iraqi troops in Kuwait
alone. In January 1991, however, the military forces available to counter the Iraqi
forces were 700,000 troops. Under the conditions of the 1990 alliance the non-Muslim
powers were not able to control or threaten the high interests of the Islamic State, such
as its power and resources.
2) There must be a necessity forcing the Islamic State to seek help, co-operation
and/or alliance with non-Muslim powers. Because of the shortage of military
manpower, the Saudi ability to cope with the Iraqi military power was impracticable.
Another important necessity was: the condition to meet the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
and to counter the threat to Saudi Arabia, which was in danger from Iraqi invasion.
Dr. Sayed al-Taweal, for instance, mentions,
In Islamic history, there are various evidences which permit
seeking help from non-Muslims to defend the lives, homeland,
and sacred places . .. What Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states
have done is categorised under necessity which permits any
forbidden approach as necessary to save and protect lives.85
From another point of view, Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, noticed that,
The Saudi military was generally well equipped. . However, it
was extremely small compared with the Iraqi forces and lacked
battle experience. Besides, all that faced Iraq at this point was
85
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the National Guard, which had been mobilized on 4 August.
There was no way that it could cope without the American forces.
The CIA estimated the capital, Riyadh, 275 miles away from
Kuwait, could be reached within three days.86
3) Under the acceptance of an alliance with non-Muslims the conditions must not
include any terms which are prohibited by the Shari 'ah such as supporting evils and
sin. It can be argued that the alliance of 1990 did not harm either Islam or the
Muslims beliefs, an evidence of such is that the non-Muslim troops were not allowed
to enter Makkah or Madinah. Peter de la Billiere confirmed that when he stated that,
. • . when the war was over it would be apparent that the
Christian forces had not defiled the cradle of Islam."
The alliance of 1990-91 instead of harming Islam or the Muslims, gave the
opportunity for non-Muslims to make contact with the Muslims to discover the
genuine teachings of Islam, which consequently led many American and Western
soldiers to embrace Islam. In connection with that the Saudis organised a programme
of lectures for non-Muslim forces with the aim of explaining the beliefs, rituals and
practices of Islam. Khaled Bin Sultan has written that,
While the [1990-911 crisis lasted. • • a large number of American
servicemen and women converted to Islam, no doubt influenced
by the contacts they had made with our civilian population. They
would visit the religious authorities and declare themselves
publicly as Muslims. . . Eventually there were more than 2000 of
them.88
This claim is supported by the later, post-war crisis between Iraq and the UN,
which occurred over Iraq's refusal to allow unrestricted access to the UN weapons
inspectors in the November of 1997 and called "The UN weapons inspectors crisis."
During that crisis the United States and Britain mobilised their forces to strike Iraq in
order to apply the Security Council resolution regarding the inspection and right to
destroy the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. As the Washington Post stated,
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Saudi Arabia has not given the United States permission to
conduct operations . . . which would be serious and sustained
enough to damaged the Iraqi civilians. 89
What can be concluded is that the United States and the Western states could not
unilaterally impose their decision on Saudi Arabia. In 1997-98 as in 1990-91 Saudi
Arabia refused to allow its Western partners to use its territories for military action
against Iraq unless it was satisfied about legitimacy of such proposed action.9°
4) The head of the Islamic State, the Imam, is the only one who has the right to
decide such necessity. When the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has occurred, none of the
Saudi government were entitled to make a decision to seek help from the Arabs and
Western nations except the Monarch of Saudi Arabia. Dick Cheney's mission of
August 1990 presupposed this invitation under conditions of necessity,
Dick Cheney, the American Secretary of Defence, travelled to the
Middle East on 6 August primarily on a coalition-building
mission. The invitation had to come from the Saudis but the
Americans themselves were instrumental in ensuring that the
invitation was sent.91
Bob Woodward added,
During the meeting with King Fand, Dick Cheney, the US
Defence Secretary, insisted that the [US] President asked me to
assure you that we will stay as long as you want us. We will leave
when you no longer need us. We are not seeking bases but you
are a long way away. . . After the danger is over, our forces will
go home.92
5) In the military field, non-Muslims have to fight separately or under Muslim
command. Muslim troops however must always fight under a Muslim commander.
The command structure in Desert Storm was explained by the US General Colin
Powell as follows,
89 Jon, Harris, US Contracting Allies in Bid Pressure Iraq, The Washington Post, 25/1/1998.
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On the delicate subject of who would take the decision to initiate
military action only the Saudi government commands their forces
and we command our forces. We are co-located in the Ministry of
Defence building and so we make sure that our plans are
synchronised. 93
Khaled Bin Sultan , the Saudi commander confirmed this,
From the very start, the King, the Crown Prince. . . agreed that
Saudi forces were not to serve under any command but their own.
They could not serve under American command.94
6) The Islamic State in a situation of necessity is required to seek military support
or alliance first from the People of the Book. However, if this is unavailable then it
may seek such support from any other nations or religious groups (under certain
conditions). In the 1990 crisis, the Saudi government sought military support first
from the United States under a bilateral treaty of alliance and from the United
Kingdom and France firstly as allies of the United States and subsequently, formally,
under the UN Charter. It did not seek military support from the Soviet Union or any
other communist states. Long after the alliance with the major Western powers had
been formed, other Christian states offered various forms of supports to the coalition
and Japan as a non-Christian country contributed financial support to the coalition."
7) Alliances should not lead Muslims to accept non-Islamic ideologies, either in
part or as a whole, nor should they result in such things as denunciation of Islam or
any other ideas which badly affect Islamic culture,
As the center of the Muslim world, we could not afford to be as
flexible as some other countries in matters of public behaviour . .
. From the very start, I made crystal clear to Schwarzkopf that
the King [of Saudi Arabia] had laid down firm guidelines
regarding the entertainment of the troops: there was to be no
singing or dancing by entertainers. President Bush [of the United
States] himself could not make us bend on this issue. Some time
later, however, Schwarzkopf came to me with the news that Bob
Hope was planing to come to Saudi Arabia, accompanied by
Brook Shields and a troupe of cheerleaders from Texas. 'Bob
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Hope is very welcome "I told him, "but the others, no way. That
is the clear answer I can give you. But please feel free to try
another channel, if you like — either through James Baker [the
US Secretary of State] in Washington or direct to Prince Sultan
[the Saudi Minister of Defence]. But I can assure you the answer
will be no ". 96
Guy Garcia confirmed this in the Time magazine,
The Bob Hope Christmas Show was subjected to prior
censorship. In deference to Saudi Muslim sensibilities, the
Pentagon banned the Pointer Sisters and Marie Osmond from
performing for the troops in Saudi Arabia.97
Janice Simpson added more details when she illustrated the control of the Saudis
on the American entertainment media during the Gulf conflict of 1990-91. Simpson
said,
Even so, all tapes and transmissions coming into the country
[Saudi Arabia] are monitored to avoid offending the sensibilities
of the Saudi hosts. That rules out programs containing make-out
scenes, women wearing tight or revealing clothing and displays
of religious icons. Programmers for the VH-1 cable network,
which sponsored the show, did exclude some videos from the
program, including all by Madonna, but Cher passed muster by
wearing jeans and a jacket. When Bob Hope staged his
Christmas show for the troops, the Saudis passed the word that
they weren't happy about his female troupers and that only
women accompanied by their husbands were welcome in the
kingdom. Thus the only woman on the tour was Hope 's wife
Dolores. 98
8) Non-Muslims have to be trusted by Muslims to fulfil the main condition for
seeking help from, or alliance, with the non-Muslims. In his visit to Saudi Arabia
during the first days of 1990-91 crisis, Dick Cheney, the US secretary of defence, in
his meeting with King Fand insisted that his country (the United States) had come to
the assistance of Saudi Arabia in 1962 against Yemen and Egypt. Another example of
the United States backing its allies in the region was the protection of the oil tanker
shipments in the Gulf in 1987-88, he said. Cheney went on to say that the assistance
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of Saudi Arabia in the crisis was a commitment that the United States would not take
lightly. He assured the king that the United States would commit a force to defend
Saudi Arabia which could do the job and deter Iraqi forces. The US secretary of
defence confirmed the US President's assurance he would not be seeking bases in
Saudi Arabia for US forces. They would stay only as long as the Saudi government
wished.99
9) All terms and conditions of alliances have to be made by the Muslims. In the
treaty of the 1990's alliance, the Saudi government, as the main party who called for
that alliance put regulations which organised behaviours and attitudes of the foreign
troops inside Saudi Arabia. In the words of Khaled Bin Sultan,
As the hosts, the Saudis had to lay down the terms of reference,
and the other members of the Coalition had to refer to them. If
they did not like the terms, they could negotiate and try to change
them. But at the end of the day, that is how it was.10°
10) Muslims are free to end their alliance with the non-Muslims if at time they find
that such alliance has become disadvantageous. In connection with this, it maybe of
interest to quote a statement of General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the US Joint
Chiefs-of-Staff, who said,
We are here at the invitation of the government of Saudi Arabia
and we will leave when they wish us to leave and we believe that
our purpose in being here has been served. I don't know how
long that will be. We have no desire to be a permanent presence
in the kingdom.1°'
In summary, the military alliance of 1990, which was formed between an Islamic
country and non-Islamic countries did meet with the basic elements of the Islamic
theory of alliance.
8.7) Summary and conclusion
In this chapter, various facts have been found in connection to the relation between
361
Chapter VIII
Muslims and non-Muslims particularly in the Islamic and international law of military
relations. The crisis, it was concluded, was a result of the disequilibrium in the
regional balance of power after the Iraq-Iran war. Its impact on the Iraqi economy was
what finally compelled Iraq to invade Kuwait to resolve all its post war problems. The
most important feature regarding the 1990 crisis however was the fact that Muslim
countries formed an alliance with non-Muslim countries against a Muslim country,
Iraq.
Fiqh of the classical period dealt with alliances between the Islamic State and non-
Muslim countries or groups against a non-Muslim country or group, therefore the
situation in 1990 of an alliance against Iraq by both Muslim and non-Muslim states
was a novel situation not covered by classical Fiqh. The 1990 alliance has been
examined according to the theory of the Islamic military alliances in chapter VII. The
case for Iraq in this conflict has also evaluated according to Islamic criteria.
Iraq was opposed in 1990-91 by a coalition of a Muslim and non-Muslim armed
forces under the flag of the United Nations and with the authority of UN Security
Council resolutions. However, within the coalition the presence of the Western
powers was secured by military alliance between Saudi Arabia and the United States
and the provisions for self defence under the UN Charter which secured the military
presence of France and the United Kingdom and other Western support. By contrast,
the presence of the Muslim powers in the coalition forces was secured through a
brotherhood call for aid and assistance by the head of an Islamic country (Saudi
Arabia) in conjunction with the Muslim World League and the Organisation of the
Islamic Conference to the entire Muslim Ummah and specifically by the Saudi King
to Muslim heads of state for troops and military weapons and equipment. In short, the
anti-Iraq coalition reflected the fundamental claim which had been argued in this
thesis, namely, that Islamic international relations are between Muslims and non-
Muslims (here in the form of treaties) and that relations between Muslims are never
international, but always internal or Ummatic.
It has been found that the military alliance of 1990, which was formed by Saudi
Arabia and the West met all the ten crucial elements of the theory of Islamic alliance.
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It supported and increased the power of Saudi Arabia without the non-Muslim states
gaining control over this state, its resources and its other interests. The alliance was
sought by Saudi Arabia in a situation of necessity resulting from the invasion and
occupation of Kuwait by Iraq and its subsequent military threat to invade the Saudi
soil. The existence of this situation of necessity was decided by the proper Islamic
authority which in this case was the Saudi head of state, King Fand. The King, in
accordance with the Islamic requirement, first sought military support in this situation
from the People of the Book, namely, the USA, France and the UK. Subsequently,
these allies were completely trusted by the Saudis to fulfil the terms of the alliance.
These terms of the treaty of alliance were not in conflict with the Shari 'ah nor were
unjust. Again, in conformity with the requirement of Islam all terms and conditions of
the alliance were made by the Saudi government and agreed to by it Christian allies,
for example, over the behaviour of Christian ground forces on Saudi soil. Moreover,
in general the alliance was found to have caused no harm to Islam or to the Muslims
allies and not conflict with their strategic interests. Neither the formation of the
alliance nor the presence of Christian troops in Saudi Arabia for military operations
against Iraq and Iraqi occupied Kuwait resulted in the adoption of new non-Islamic
ideologies or beliefs. In fact the opposite occurred. There were many recorded cases
of US troops embracing Islam during their stay in Saudi Arabia. During military
operations, it was found that American and other Western armed forces were under
Western command, while Muslim troops and some Western forces fought under the
Muslim command of Khaled Bin Sultan. Shortly after the end of the hostilities the
armed forces of the Western states began to withdraw from Saudi Arabia and their
withdrawal was completed by the end of 1991. All this was in accordance with the
Islamic requirement that alliances are temporary and that the Islamic State may
terminate them when it decides it no longer needs the military support of its allies
Moreover, it has been found that the support, which the Muslims, worldwide, gave
to Iraq was not support for the aggression and occupation of Kuwait, but it was a
support for an Arab Muslim country against the Christian powers and a rejection of
the military role that the Christian West had played in the Islamic World. The support
began from the day the foreign troops landed in Saudi Arabia, and it was enhanced
later when Iraq was bombarded by the alliance. This opposition of the Muslim world
to the Gulf War, both manifests and raises issues about the nature of the (Christian)
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West's presence in the (Muslim) Middle East over a long historical period and its
impact on the Third World's perception of their relationship with the US and the
West.
Despite this (largely) popular Muslim support for Iraq, it was concluded that the
Iraqi invasion had no Islamic backing, because it was not for any religious purpose.
As Iraq summarised its case, it had sought to solve the Iraqi economic and financial
difficulties, to give Iraq an extra outlet on the Gulf, and finally to create a puppet
regime in Kuwait to serve Iraqi interests. The Iraqis, however, did use religion as an
means to achieve their goals notably when they called upon all Muslims to wage
Jihad against the UN forces in the Gulf, which according to the genuine nature of
Jihad, Muslims have to wage against non Muslims. Saddam' s call to Jihad was in part
a war against the armed forces of other Muslim states.
Another crucial fact that has been found is that the Muslim countries have no
dynamism to resolve their differences and disputes. If, prior to the Gulf crisis, such
dynamism was obtainable, then the Iraqi invasion could not took place. Therefore, it
is important to say that the Muslim world has to have such a mechanism via the
Muslim World League or the Organisation of the Islamic Conference to resolve
differences and disputes among the Muslim Ummah in order that relations could not
reach such a crisis as in 1990s.
The next chapter is the conclusion. It will draw together conclusions from the
previous chapters and it summarises the most important findings of this thesis.
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Chapter IX
9.1) Introduction
The purpose of this thesis was to examine a major segment of Islamic international
relations theory, namely, that portion which is concerned with peaceful relations as
distinct from that other major segment which is about Jihad or Islamic warfare.
Nevertheless, some discussion of Jihad is required by this thesis in four different
treaties — Dhimma, Must'amin, truce and alliance — are to be fully understood. In
addition, the key concepts of Dar-al-Islam, Dar al-Harb in chapter HI are
unintelligible without an extensive understanding of the nature and purposes of Jihad.
For this reason and in order to determine the possibility of neutrality in Islamic
international relations theory, the purposes of Jihad were analysed on pages 94-98.
Most of the thesis is, however, concerned with peaceful relations in this theory and
attention is focused on the key organising concepts, treaties, including alliance and
neutral status. Part of the purpose of this study has been to clarify the fundamental
differences between Islamic international relations theory and Western international
relations theory and show the relevance of Islamic international relations theory in the
present day, including exploring the kind of difficulties which can occur in applying it
to contemporary circumstances. The thesis has sought to achieve these objectives by
testing a number of hypotheses concerning either Islamic international relations
theory or treaties and neutrality. These hypotheses were:
1. That the Muslim juridical division of the world into two domains, Dar
al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, or three domains with the addition of Dar
al-Ahd (Sulh), was not based on legal-religious grounds. At least one
other domain existed during the lifetime of the Prophet Dar al-Da'wa.
This Dar may have some relevance to contemporary conditions.
2. The real basis of Islamic international relations consists of relations
between Muslims and non-Muslims. All relations between Muslims
(within the Ummah) are internal or non-international, even though they
could be relations between independent Islamic heads of government.
3. That the basis of the Islamic theory of international relations is Islamic
Law. This law, it will be argued, is treated in Islamic international
relations theory as binding upon both Muslims and non-Muslims alike;
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international relations should be conducted in practice in accordance
with the Share 'ah. It is further hypothesised that this law is dynamic,
progressive, and flexible enough to meet the changing circumstances
of time and place
4. Islamic international relations theory is normative, but not like
normative Western international relations theories. They are moral
theories: it is a theory framed on Divine Law (Share 'ah).
5. The Islamic theory unlike most Western theories, recognises no
distinction between public and private affairs at the international level.
6. Relations between the Islamic State (not states) and non-Muslim states
are fundamentally pacific, not hostile. Peace not war is the normal state
of affairs. War, hostility and Jihad exist or are employed for certain
specific purposes, such as self-defence. This hostility ends when that
purpose has been achieved.
7. That all peaceful international relations (i.e. except Jihad ) are
contractual in form.
8. There is a separate Islamic theory of international relations which
differs fundamentally from Western theory of international relations.
9. Legal persons involved in contracts or treaties can be either
individuals, various groups like tribes or religious communities, non-
Muslim states and the Islamic State (not-states).
10. Military alliance between the Islamic State and non-Muslim countries
is legitimate in Islamic international relations theory under certain
conditions.
11. In addition to treaties of truce, friendship, commercial, alliance, and
safe-guard Aman there is a further kind of treaty hitherto unrecognised
in juristic or other scholarly commentaries; conciliation treaties.
12. That neutrality as well as neutralisation is permissible in Islam to meet
the necessity of the Islamic State.
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9.2) The Findings
The findings in relation to these hypotheses will now be considered in turn.
1) It has been found that in classical Fiqh the interrelated concepts of the domain
of peace or Islam Dar al-Islam and the domain of hostility or war Dar al-Harb
formed the basis of classical Islamic international relations theory. (pp. 84-100)
Neither concept was mentioned in the Holy Qur'an or the Sunnah and therefore it was
concluded that they had no legal-religious Share 'ah basis. (p. 100) It was found the
dual concepts were formulated by jurists early in the classical period of Fiqh (the
exact date is unknown) and reflected the preponderant character of relations between
Muslims and non-Muslims, namely, the hostility and prevalence of Jihad between
them. (p. 92) In classical Fiqh, Dar al-Islam meant the people and territories within
the Islamic State, or which had once been part of it wherein the Share 'ah was applied.
(p. 102) Dar al-Harb was that part of the earth and its population outside Dar al-
Islam, that is, those peoples and territories outside the Islamic State where the
Share'ah was not applied. A further and crucial characteristic of Dar al-Harb was its
hostility to Islam and the Islamic State and it was this that was the fundamental cause
of war between the two domains. (p.108) Later, in the second century AH a third
intermediate domain between Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb was added, the domain
of pledge Dar al-Ahd or Dar al-Sulh. These antithetical domains were brought into
line with changed circumstances, namely, the growth of temporary truce treaties and
peaceful relations with formerly hostile states or groups by the addition of this third
domain Dar which reflected the increasingly normal peaceful relations between the
Islamic State and the non-Islamic external world. (p. 87)
Yet, the outside world was imperfectly mirrored in the triple domains of classical
Fiqh. Neither Dar al-Islam, Dar al-Harb or Dar al-Ahd was applicable to the
situation of the first Muslim in Makkah before the Hijrah. There was no Islamic State
and despite the hostility they encountered from the Quraish this was not Dar al-Harb
at this time. The best way of describing the Makkah situation before the Hijrah is in
terms of a forth Dar, namely, the domain of calling to Islam Dar al-Da 'wa.(p. 88)
Like the three domains of classical Fiqh, it too has no Share 'ah basis, unlike Dar al-
Muhajiroun the domain of Emigrants (or Madinah after Hijrah) which is mentioned in
the Prophetic Hadith narrated by Imam Muslim. (pp. 85-87)
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In contemporary circumstances the original two domains Dar al-Islam and Dar al-
Harb of classical Fiqh were found to be largely inapplicable to the modern world.
Accordingly the two domains were tentatively redefined in a way which made them
relevant to present day circumstances. Dar al-Islam is any place where Muslims can
practice their religion in complete freedom, wherever located, or whenever practised.
Dar al-Harb is where the Islamic religion cannot be practised in complete freedom,
where Muslims experience aggression, and are denied their most basic religious
rights. Even with this redefinition of the two domains there are certain countries
which are difficult to fit into one or the other, because although they are not Islamic
countries, yet they are not hostile to Islam and Muslims nor do they deny them
religious freedom. They cannot be classified as part of Dar al-Ahd either because
they have no truce treaties with the Islamic State/s. It was proposed to group all such
countries in a fourth domain, the domain to calling to Islam Dar al-Da'wa. (pp. 107-
108)
2) The thesis raised a more fundamental question through the discussion of the
three domains of classical Fiqh and their possible applicability in the contemporary
world. The two original domains were derived from a historically transitory, hostile,
relation between Muslims and non-Muslims which was converted into juristic or
theoretical concepts. This had become inadequate to describe the contemporary world
after the second century AH, hence the addition of Dar al- 'A/id to redefine the
Muslim/non-Muslim relationship. Instead of framing Islamic international relations
theory in terms of two, three or even four domains, it was argued that the more
fundamental relationships of Muslims to non-Muslims was the foundation of Islamic
international relations theory. This was argued in two ways. First, that all relations
between all Muslims are internal or Ummatic and consisted of Islamic brotherhood.
Second, that all relations between Muslims and non-Muslims are external or between
foreigners, including relations between citizens of the Islamic State and even Muslim
husband and non-Muslim wife. These arguments may be summarised as follows.
The revelation that all Muslims form a single brotherhood (Holy Qur'an 49: 16) is
the basis of the argument that inter-Muslim relations are never external. The Prophet
likened their relationship to a wall where one part supports the rest or like a body
which suffers when one of its organs is ill, thereby indicating the high degree of
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solidarity, interdependence and mutual support within the Ummah. The case of Ansar
and Muhajiroun at Madinah exemplified the brotherhood relationship because
although the two groups came from the very different tribes, environments and
polities of Makkah and Madinah, and would be counted as foreigners in Western
international relations theory, their solidarity and interdependence based on Islam
meant their interests were closer than those of blood kinsmen. (pp. 140-142) The call
to Jihad to the Muslims of Yemen against the Romans of Syria by Caliph Abu Bakr
was cited as an example of internal Ummatic relationships among Muslims. Instead of
seeking an alliance with the heads of various polities in Yemen, which would have
occurred if they were non-Muslims, the head of the Islamic State summoned his
Muslim brothers of Yemen to perform their religious duty of Jihad alongside other
Muslims from Madinah and elsewhere. If all relations between members of the
Muslim Ummah are internal, it follows that all other relations will be external, that is,
relations with all non-Muslims. This view is confirmed by the nature of Share 'ah. It
has two parts, one organising man's relations with Allah, the other his relations with
his fellow human beings. The latter is subdivided into that part which applies to
members of the Muslim Ummah and the other part which regulates relations between
the Muslim Ummah organised as the Islamic State, on the one hand, and non-Muslim
individuals, groups and states, on the other hand. This subdivision of the Share 'ah is
termed al-Siyar and it is the law governing the external relations of the Islamic State
with non-Muslims. (pp. 83-84) The Qur 'anic basis of Islamic international relations
theory is summarised in the findings for the next hypothesis.
3) In the Holy Qur'an (3: 110) the fundamental difference between Muslims and
non-Muslims is revealed and this single verse contains the basis of Islamic
international law and Islamic international relations theory, namely, the religious
distinction between the Islamic Ummah, based on belief in Allah (4 cui.:0* j) and
implementation of His law by doing good and forbidding evil ( LI). .)_,4.11_, L:._9_,....11 ,...w..1:1
..) < I A), on the one hand, and unbelievers who do not adhere to Islamic law, on the
other hand. Since every part of the Qur 'an is a source of Share 'ah, it follows that
Siyar and the fundamental conception of Islamic international relation theory is this
element of the Share 'ah. (p. 71) In chapter II, the fundamental unities of Allah and his
laws and also the unity of mankind were examined. Allah's laws were revealed
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through the a series of Prophets culminating in the Prophet Muhammad for the whole
of mankind, though at each stage only part of the human race believed in God and
followed his law. Thus in the final Divine revelation to mankind through the Prophet
Muhammad only Muslims responded to his message and became bound by Allah's
law in its final form. But because this law was revealed for all mankind it must
provide the rules and norms of international relations between Muslims and non-
Muslims. In this sense, that part of the Share 'ah which regulates these relations, al-
Siyar, is binding upon both parties. In other words, Islamic international relations
theory excludes the possibility of relations between states being conducted on the
basis of secular international law or on secular moral or other principles, except in so
far as these may be found in Islamic law or, at least, do not contradict the Share 'ah or
its principles. Finally, it was hypothesised that the Share 'ah is dynamic, progressive
and flexible enough to meet changes of time and pace. This does not mean that
existing Islamic law is under constant modification for once a rule had been
established to cover a particular case in Figh that rule never changes thereafter. The
flexibility of the Share 'ah, it was found, lies in its ability to be expanded to cover new
cases or situations for which either there is no rule or the existing rule relates to
circumstances which have changed significantly from those for which the rule was
formulated (chapter II). Through the use of analogy Qiyas, in particular, a juristic
consensus ljma ' was able to arise over how the Share 'ah applied to such new
situations (for example the Imam al-Shafei'i himself changed some of his Fatwas and
personal judgement when he moved from Iraq to Egypt) or new phenomena, such as
organ transplants. A recent development has been the Islamic Jurisprudence Council,
1983 in Jeddah, consisting of expert Muslim jurists of the highest level of knowledge
in both the sciences of Share 'ah and detailed source evidence, in place of the
judgements of a single jurist. These new juristic rulings are evidence of the dynamic
and progressive character of Figh, for Figh changes by way of enlargement in
applying the Share 'ah to what is new. As a result, it can be argued that the gate of
Ijtihad (legal judgement/opinion) has been reopened.
4) In chapter VIII certain international relations theories were applied to the Gulf
region up to 1990-91. However, there was no Islamic equivalent to the theories of
balance of power and decision-making because those theories were empirical and
explanatory in character. It may be argued that the key concepts of Dar al-Islam Dar
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al-Harb and Dar al-Ahd were empirically based since they were drawn from the
actual historical experience of relations between the Islamic State and non-Muslims.
Moreover, these concepts in Islamic international relations theory do not function in a
normative way: they purport to describe and (up to a point) explain hostile and non-
hostile relations between Muslims and non-Muslims.(pp. 101-113, 256) To this
extent, a case could be made for part of Islamic international relations theory not
being normative. Western international relations theory has also a non-empirical,
normative branch, but this branch is based on moral and political philosophy. Islamic
international relations theory is also normative. It details the ways Muslims should
behave toward non-Muslims (their religious-legal duties and obligations toward
unbelievers) and the duties of non-Muslims to the Islamic State and, through it, to all
Muslims. The important point about the normative nature of the Islamic international
theory is that it is entirely legal and consists of a branch of Divine Law, the Share 'ah,
called al-Siyar.
5) It was found that under the Share'ah treaties between the Islamic State and non-
Muslim states or political/religious groups were no different from contracts made
between individuals. The public character of treaties in Western international law and
international relations theory and the private nature of contracts is absent from
classical Figh in which the public/private distinction is not made. (Modern Muslim
scholars have, however, attempted to introduce the public/private distinction into
Islamic law). Hamed Sultan was cited for his comment that every part of the Share 'ah
treats individuals and groups (including states) at the same level because every part
comes from the same source. (p. 204)
6) It was hypothesised that relations between the Islamic State and non-Muslim
states or other polities were fundamentally pacific, not hostile. The thesis that peace,
not war, was the normal state of affairs was justified by criticising Khadduri's
argument for permanent war and questioning the assumptions made by some classical
jurists which underpin their conception of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, by
clarifying the purposes for which Jihad may legitimately be fought. The argument of
AbuSulayman was confirmed that the prevalence of warfare in the early centuries of
the Islamic State gave rise to the fundamental pair of concepts Dar al-Islam and Dar
al-Harb and the hostility between them, or that peace was temporary and abnormal.
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However, this situation resulted from the constant aggression against the Islamic State
by non-Muslims states and polities. So, unless that non-Muslim hostility was assumed
to be permanent, there could be no reason for supposing that warfare was the normal
relationship between the Islamic State and the non-Muslims. The alternative
explanation for the prevalence of warfare in the first few centuries of Islam, put
forward by Khadduri, Armanazi and others, was that Islam is based upon force, the
Prophet Muhammad was an apostle of war and that the Islamic State would wage
Jihad until Islam embraced the entire world. This explanation was rejected for several
reasons.
It is a tenet of Islamic Faith that mankind is a unity, consequently division and
conflict are, in principle, alien to it. That division and conflict is not the responsibility
of the Islamic State for jurists overwhelmingly rejected the argument of jurists, such
as al-Ramli, that the rejection of Islam by non-Muslims was a legitimate cause for
fighting and killing them. Instead, the basic Islamic attitude towards non-hostile
unbelievers is, in general, peaceful even before the Hijrah when the Muslim Ummah
was being attacked Jihad was not permitted to them and Allah required that they
behave towards non-believers with wisdom, discretion and beautiful preaching. Allah
commands that the call to Islam must be made by meeting people on their own ground
and convincing them with illustration from their own knowledge and experience.
Moreover, preaching must be, not dogmatic, not self-regarding, not offensive, but
gentle, considerate, and such as would attract the attention of non-Muslims. Manner
and arguments should not be acrimonious. Qur 'anic verses after the Hijrah were cited
to show that peace was presupposed as normal between Muslims and non-Muslims. In
addition, further Hadiths were cited to put in context the Hadith narrated by Imam al-
Bukhari in which the Prophet says he has been ordered by Allah to fight until all
people confess their Faith, pray to Allah and pay the Zakah. In context, the Hadiths
show that the Prophet teaching is for a peaceful approach and that this is required by
the Share 'ah also. Finally, it was argued that Jihad was only legitimate for self-
defence, against injustice and for the protection and guarantee of freedom of the Faith.
These three causes in conjunction with the Qur 'anic verse prohibiting the
transgression of limits (2: 190) meant that Jihad could not be waged legitimately for
any other reason. Furthermore, the three legitimate causes for Jihad all indicate that it
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is temporary and not a permanent state of war; hostilities end when the purpose or
cause has been achieved. (Section 3.3.1)
7) The hypothesis about peaceful international relations between Muslims and non-
Muslims was that they were organised by voluntary contractual treaties between the
Islamic State and non-Muslims individuals, groups and states. This was found to be
true of almost all such peaceful relations, given that Arnetn is counted as a treaty in
Islamic law. However, there was one exception to the rule that Muslim relations with
non-Muslims are organised in terms of treaties: neutrality. On the argument that the
neutrality (not neutralisation) of Abyssinia was recognised by the Prophet Muhammad
as head of the Islamic State and that he commanded his subordinates accordingly, it
was found that no treaty or even an informal agreement was involved.
8) It was found that there is a separate Islamic theory of international relations
which differs fundamentally from Western theory of international relations in several
respects. First and foremost, it is a normative theory derived from Islamic Divine
Law, though it has an explanatory element in the empirically derived concepts of Dar
al-Islam, Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Ahd. Second, it treats international relations not as
interstate relations or even as relations between states and groups like NGO's, but as
relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. Relations between Muslims rulers or
between different Muslim polities are not counted as foreign relations, but as internal
Ummatic brotherhood relations. Relations between non-Islamic states and non-Islamic
groups or individuals do not feature in the Islamic theory of international relations,
they are never discussed. Logically, however, they are relations internal to that sphere
of the world that Muslim jurists termed Dar al-Harb and therefore not foreign
relations. Nevertheless, the status of all such relations must be a matter of pure
speculation because the Islamic theory is silent about them.
9) In relation to hypothesis no. 7, it has been found that all peaceful international
relations are organised contractually in terms of treaties with the sole exception of
neutrality. It was found that the parties to theses treaties were, on the one hand, the
Islamic State and, on the other hand, non-Muslim individuals, groups and states.
(Contractual relations between individual Muslims and non-Muslims were excluded
from this thesis in the Introduction with the exception of the early Aman treaty
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discussed in chapter IV.) The Aman treaty, it was found in chapter IV, was between
the Islamic State and individuals from non-Muslim societies that were labelled as
Harbi, or hostile, by the classical jurists. It was noted, however, that originally Aman
could be given by an individual Muslim to an individual or up to group of ten non-
Muslims. Jurists argued over whether individual Muslim slaves could give Aman, but
the majority rejected the Hanafites denial of their competence to give Aman. (p.168)
Later, the Islamic State came to monopolise giving Aman. When it provided general
Aman it could be not only for an individual, but also for a very large group of Harbis
not just ten. (p. 169) During the period of classical Fiqh and contrary to the
contemporary position, the Hanafite and Malikite jurists, it was found, held that Aman
allowed non-Muslims to visit Makkah and Madinah, though not the Holy Mosque.
This was disputed by Shafei'ite and Hanbalite jurists. (p. 171) The Islamic State also
concluded treaties with tribal groups, such as the alliance with the Jewish tribes in the
Constitution of Madinah, or with religious communities, such as the treaty concluded
between the Caliph Umar I and the Christian Patriarch of Jerusalem. (pp. 210-211)
Under that treaty, the people of Jerusalem became Dhimmis. However, Dhimma
treaties could be concluded with states as well as groups, such as the one with Persia
after its military defeat by the Islamic State and before its people embraced Islam.
Cyprus was another example of a treaty concluded with a state, though in this case its
relationship was much more complex than that between Persia and the Islamic State.
(p. 221)
10) Some contemporary Muslim jurists, particularly during the Gulf crisis 1990-
91, publicly doubted the Islamic validity of an alliance between Muslim states and
Western Christian states. (pp. 341-345) In chapter VII, however, it was found that
classical Fiqh allows for the possibility of a legitimate military alliance between the
Islamic State and non-Muslim polities or groups, such as the alliance between the
Jewish tribes of Madinah and the infant Islamic State in the first year AH. It was
further found that the classical jurists did not discussed treaties of alliance in any
systematic way. Consequently, it proved necessary to collect together all the
conditions which must be present in order to legitimate an alliance and which are
mentioned in various locations in classical Fiqh. Altogether there were eleven such
conditions:
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The Islamic State must be in a situation of necessity such as military weakness or
lack of resources. Only the Imam or head of state is entitled to decide whether such a
situation of necessity exists. An alliance must support and increase the power of the
Islamic State and not enable the non-Muslims to threaten or control it. The terms of
alliance must be fair and just, but above all, they must be consistent with the
Share'ah. Muslims should normally set the terms and conditions of the alliance, but
when they do not, the terms must conform to the Share'ah. Muslims must not be led
into accepting non-Islamic ideologies, or those which denounce Islam and harm its
culture, through forming the alliance. An alliance should first be sought with the
People of the Book, and only after this with other religious communities. All allies
have to be trusted. A legitimate alliance ensures the order of battle will be one in
where Muslim troops will always fight under a Muslim commander, whereas non-
Muslim troops may either fight under him or under a non-Muslim commander. Where
there are spoils of war, these have to be shared equally between the Muslims and their
non-Muslim allies unless different terms have been agreed. No valid alliance can be
permanently binding upon the Islamic State. (This final condition in classical Fiqh
was found to be incorrect. In several treaties of the Prophet, the terms were worded in
a way which indicated the alliance was intended to be permanent (pp. 310-312) "as
long as a sea wets the shells.") Subject to these conditions, an alliance between the
Islamic State and non-Muslim polities was Islamically valid in classical Fiqh and,
similarly, such an alliance between a Muslim state/s and non-Muslim state is valid in
Islam today. For reasons discussed in relation to hypotheses no. 2, there can of course
be no alliance between Muslim states.
In the final chapter, it was found that the alliance between Islamic and non-Islamic
States during the Gulf crisis of 1990-91 fulfilled the conditions listed in the previous
paragraph, and consequently was an Islamically valid alliance despite the objections
to it voiced by some modern scholars and jurists.
11) Several varieties of treaty were distinguished in the thesis, of which treaties of
Dhimma, Aman, truce, friendship, commerce, extradition and alliance were the most
important. However, it was found that another treaty did not fit into any of these types
of treaty and it was argued that it was a separate type of treaty hitherto unrecognised
in classical Fiqh or in scholarly commentaries. This newly recognised kind of treaty is
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a conciliation treaty. It differed from a truce-and-reconciliation treaty, the type of
treaty to which it was closest, in that it was not concluded after a war. The situations
in which the Prophet concluded conciliation treaties was after a call to Islam to the
people of Maqnah and the Makokus of the Egyptian Copts. (pp. 243-245)
12) Majeed Khadduri had argued that neutralisation is permissible in classical
Fiqh, and he interpreted neutralisation to mean the status of non-Muslim groups or
states which had concluded a temporary truce treaty with the Islamic State and so had
peaceful relations with it for the time being. The situation of these non-Muslim states
of Dar al-Ahd, or what Khadduri calls Dar al-Hiyad, was not one of neutrality
according to Khadduri. The argument which excludes the possibility of neutrality in
the relations between the Islamic State and non-Muslims was rejected however. The
neutrality of non-Muslim state in a conflict between the Islamic State and some
other/s non-Muslim polities is impossible on the thesis that the Islamic State is
permanently at war with the non-Islamic world until all of it embraces Islam, or
concludes a treaty or accepts Dhimmi status within the Islamic State. This
interpretation of Jihad was rejected (see above hypothesis no. 6) and consequently
neutrality was, in principle, possible. (pp. 279-282) Such a status was found to be the
situation of Abyssinia during the life time of the Prophet, for although the Abyssinian
were neither Muslims nor Dhimmis, the Prophet exempted them from Jihad. (p. 281)
Although the Islamic State was, as a matter of fact, neutral in many wars between
non-Muslim polities, no discussion of this de facto situation could be found in
classical Fiqh. The jurists were simply interested in the possibility of neutrality of a
non-Muslim polity in a war between the Islamic State and another such polity.
However, they were concerned about what action should be taken by Muslims when
fighting broke out between Muslims. In this situation they maintained that neutrality
was not permissible and that other Muslims must take the side of the victim and end
the aggression. (pp. 264-266)
9.3) Recommendations
This thesis has argued that a viable and relevant Islamic theory of international
relations exists today if the three domains are removed from classical Fiqh to leave a
theory of Muslim relations with non-Muslims. Some modern scholars, such as
AbuSulayman, have seen the need for an Islamic theory of international relations
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which is fully applicable in the modern world in which the Caliphate has been
abolished and where non-Muslim states are in the ascendant. However, several major
omissions exist in our treatment of this theme. First, it has been an analysis of Sunni
Fiqh: the Shi 'i perspective and School of Fig/7 has been intentionally excluded for
reasons of space. A comparison between Shi 'i Fiqh and that of the four Sunni law
Schools could prove to be very fruitful. For the same reasons of space, Muslim/non-
Muslim social relations, like marriage between Muslim men and non-Muslim women,
have been left out of the thesis, though an important modern work of Figh on this
subject was noted in the introduction to the thesis. Additional work could also carried
out into non-Dhimmi treaties in the time of the `Abbaside Empire. This thesis
concentrated on such treaties in the time of the Prophet and the four Orthodox Caliphs
given the legal importance of this Tradition in Islam, but the later application of these
treaties under the `Abbaside Caliphs would be beneficial. In the thesis, for example, it
was noted that truce treaties had exceeded the temporary period of ten years during
the Empire, and had in fact become permanent in the time of Saladin. In short, the re-
examination of the Islamic theory of international relations though treaties, alliances
and neutrality is a major task to which this thesis has made a modest contribution.
Finally, Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi has published and broadcast on an entirely new
feature of Muslim/non-Muslim relations in the twentieth century, the position of
Muslims who are permanent residents in Western countries. This new dimension also
requires to be integrated into a contemporary re-assessment of Islamic international
relations theory.
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Appendix I: The Constitution of Madinah*
1. They are a single community distinct from (other)
people.
2. The Emigrants of Quraysh, according to their former
approved practice, pay jointly the blood-money (incur-
red by one) among them, and ransom the captive of
them, (doing this) with upright dealing and justice
between the believers.
3. Band Awf, according to their former approved practice,
pay jointly the previous blood-wits and each sub-group
ransoms its captive, (doing this) with upright dealing
and justice between the believers.
4. Bana 1-1-Iarith, according to their former approved prac-
tice, pay jointly the previous blood-wits, and each sub-
clan ransoms its captive(s), (doing so) with uprightness
and justice between the believers.
5. Band Sa c ida .. (as 3).
6. Band jusham ... (as 3).
7. Band n-Najjar . (as 3).
3. Band `Amr b. (Awf . (as 3).
9. Band n-Nabit ... (as 3).
1o. Band 1-Aws ... (as 3).
The believers do not forsake a debtor among them, but
give him (help), according to what is fair, for ransom
or blood-wit.
* Watt, W. Montgomery, Islamic Political Thought, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1968, pp. 130-134.
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12. A believer does not ally himself with the client of
(another) believer without (the latter's) consent.
13. The God-fearing believers are against whoever of them
acts wrongfully or seeks (? plans) an act that is unjust or
treacherous or hostile or corrupt among the believers;
their hands are all against him, even if he is the son of
one of them.
14. A believer does not kill (another) believer (in ven-
geance) for an unbeliever, and does not 'help' an un-
believer against a believer.
15. The security (or protection) of God is one; the granting
of 'neighbourly protection' by the least of (the believers)
is binding on them (all); the believers are patrons (and
clients) of one another to the exclusion of (other)
people.
16. A Jew who follows us has (a right to) the same 'help'
and support (as the believers), so long as they are not
wronged (by him) and he does not 'help' (others)
against them.
17. The peace of the believers is one; no believer makes
peace (separately) apart from (other) believer(s), but
(in any peace maintains) equality and fairness between
them.
18. In every party that makes a razzia with us, one takes
turns with another (at riding? at all military duties?).
19. The believers exact vengeance for one another where a
man gives his blood in the way of God. The God-fearing
believers are under the best and most correct guidance.
20. No idolater (among the clans of Medina?) gives 'neigh-
bourly protection' for goods or person to (any of)
Quraysh, nor intervenes on his behalf against a believer.
21. When anyone wrongfully kills a believer, the evidence
being clear, then he is liable to be killed in retaliation for
him, unless the representative of the victim is satisfied
(with a payment). The believers are solidly against (the
murderer), and may do nothing except oppose him.
22. A believer who has agreed to what is in this document
and has believed in God and the Last Day may not 'help'
or shelter a 'disturber'. Upon whoever 'helps' and shel-
ters him is the curse and wrath of God on the day of
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resurrection. Nothing will be accepted from him as com-
pensation or restitution.
23. Wherever there is anything about which you differ, it is
to be referred to God and to Muhammad for a decision.
24. The Jews bear expenses along with the believers so long
as they continue at war.
25. The Jews of Band `Awf are a community along with the
believers. To the Jews their religion and to the Muslims
their religion. (This applies) both to their clients and to
themselves, with the exception of anyone who has done
wrong or acted treacherously; he brings evil only on
himself and on his household.
26. For the Jews of Band n-Najjar the like of what is for the
Jews of Band `Awf.
27. For the Jews of Band 1-1-.Iarith the like .. .
28. For the Jews of Barna S5`ida the like .
29. For the Jews of Band jusham the like
30. For the Jews of Bandl-A-ws the like .. .
31. For the Jews of Band Thalaba the like of what is for the
Jews of Band `Awf, with the exception of anyone who
has done wrong or acted treacherously; he brings evil on
himself and his household.
32. jafna, a subdivision of Tha`laba, are like them.
33. For Band sh-Shutayba the like of what is for the Jews of
Band `Awf; honourable dealing (comes) before treach-
ery.
34. The clients of Thalaba are like them.
35. The 'intimates' of (particular) Jews are as themselves.
36. None of (the believers) goes out (on a razzia) without
the permission of Muhammad, but a man is not preven-
ted from avenging wounds. If a man kills (another un-
awares, or, more generally, acts rashly), (he involves
only) himself and his household, except where he has
been wronged. God is the truest (fulfiller) of this (docu-
ment?).
37. It is for the Jews to bear their expenses and for the Mus-
lims to bear their expenses. There is to be (mutual)
'help' between them against whoever wars against the
people of this document. Between . them there is to be
(mutual) giving of advice, consultation, and honourable
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dealing, not treachery. A man is not guilty of treachery
through (the act of) his confederate. 'Help' is (to be
given) to him who is wronged.
38. The Jews bear expenses along with the believers so long
as they continue at war.
39. The valley (or oasis) of Yathrib is sacred for the people
of this document.
40. The 'protected neighbour' (of a believer) is (in respect
of the right to protection) as the man himself, so long as
he does no harm and does not act treacherously.
41. No woman is given 'neighbourly protection' without the
consent oilier people.
42. Whenever among the people of this document there
occurs any 'disturbance' or quarrel from which disaster
for (the people) is to be feared, it is to be referred to God
and to Muhammad, the Messenger of God. God is the
most scrupulous and truest (fulfiller) of what is in this
document.
43. No 'neighbourly protection' is given to Quraysh and
those who help them.
44. Between (the people of this document?) is (mutual)
'help' against whoever attacks Yathrib suddenly (with-
out provocation?).
45. Whenever (the believers) are summoned to conclude
and accept (or live under) a treaty, they conclude and
accept it; when in turn they summon (unbelievers) to a
similar (treaty), they are bound (to observe it) towards
(the unbelievers) except in the case of those who fight
about religion. (Incumbent) on every man is their share
from their side which is towards them.
46. The Jews of al-Aws, both their clients and themselves,
are in the same position as belongs to the people of this
document while they are thoroughly honourable in their
dealings with the people of this document. Honourable
dealing (comes) before treachery.
47. A person acquiring (? guilt) acquires it only against
himself. God is the most upright and truest (fulfiller) of
what is in this document. This writing does not intervene
to protect a wrong-doer or traitor. He who goes out is
safe, and he who sits still is safe in Medina, except who-
ever does wrong and acts treacherously. God is 'protect-
ing neighbour' of him who acts honourably and fears
God, and Muhammad is the Messenger of God.
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Appendix II: The Prophet's Treaty with the people of Magnah:
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- in Arabia During the First Century AH, 622-718 AD.*
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Appendix IV: Armed Forced of Iraq and Saudi Arabia in 2 August 1990.*
SAUDI
COUNTRY	 IRAQ	 ARABIA
Total Regular Aimed Forces
(A) Active	 1,000,000
	 67,800
(B) Reserves
GROUND FORCES
(A) Regular Army
Active	 955,000	 40,000
Reserves	 —
(B) Para-military
Active	 250,000
	 7,000
Reserves	 600,000
In Service Equipment
Battle Tanks	 5,500	 550
Armoured Combat Vehicles 	 7,500	 1,600
Major Artillery	 3,500	 475
Combat Helicopters	 159
Aircraft
AIR FORCES
Regular Air Force	 40,000	 22,000
In Service Equipment
Combat Aircraft	 689	 189
Combat Helicopters
NAVAL FORCES
Regular Navy	 5,000	 9,500
In Service Equipment
Surface Combatants
(Aircraft Carriers,
Cruisers, Destroyers,	 5	 8
and Frigates)	 (frigates)	 (frigates)
Patrol and Coastal Combatants	 38	 12
Mine Warfare Vessels	 8	 5
MARINE FORCES
Regular Marine Corps 	 1,500
In Service Equipment
Battle Tanks
Armoured Combat Vehicles 	 140
Major Artillery
* International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1990-1991, London Autumn 1990.
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Appendix V: Military Forces of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the GCC, Egypt and Syria
1990.*
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Appendix VI: Islamic Military Forces in the Gulf Crisis 1990.*
Afghanistan	 300 mujahedin (i.e. thc an
guerrilla movement)
Bahrain	 3,500 troops
Bangladesh	 2,000 troops
Egypt	 40,000 troops; 400 tanks; 300 artillery pieces
Kuwait	 7,000 troops
Morocco	 2,000 troops
Niger	 400 troops
Oman	 2,500 troops
Pakistan	 10,000 troops
Qatar	 4,000 troops; 24 tanks
Saudi Arabia	 95,000 troops; 550 tanks
Senegal	 500 troops
Syria	 20,000 troops
UAE	 4,000 troops
* Matthews, Ken, The Gulf Conflict and International Relations, Routledge, London, 1993, p. 313.
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Appendix VII:  The Muslim World League Statement about the Gulf Crisis
1990.*
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Appendix VIII: Fatwa of the Saudi Supreme Council of Senior Ulama.*
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